/.  y.  ^ 


0t  tut  Sheotogifltf 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


& 


lk 


Purchased  by  the  Hamill  Missionary  Fund. 


DS  763  . L6  B6 
Bland,  J.  0. 
Li  Hung-chang 


1917 
P.  1863-1945. 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/lihungchangOOblan 


VV.  & D.  Downey  Ltd.  Photo. 


LI  HUNG  CHANG 


MAKERS  OF  THE  NINETEENTH 
Edited  by  Basil  Williams 


CENTURY 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


by 

J.  O.  P.  BLAND 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
1917 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 


GENERAL  EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


The  Lobby  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  the  scene 
of  many  picturesque  ceremonies,  the  daily  procession 
of  Mr.  Speaker  preceded  by  the  mace  and  accom- 
panied by  his  chaplain  and  secretary,  or  the  periodical 
visits  of  Black  Rod,  who  has  the  door  of  the  House 
solemnly  slammed  in  his  face  that  he  may  knock 
thrice  before  summoning  the  Commons  to  the  House 
of  Lords.  But  the  most  impressive  spectacle  I ever 
witnessed  there  was  on  a summer  afternoon  some  score 
of  years  ago.  As  I was  making  my  way  out  of  the 
House  I was  suddenly  brought  face  to  face  with 
Li  Hung-chang,  who  was  being  ushered  in  to  hear 
a debate.  A wondrously  tall,  beneficent-looking 
stranger  from  another  world  he  seemed — glorious  in 
his  blue  robes,  dignified  in  his  gait  and  bearing,  and 
beaming  with  courtly  smiles  of  appreciation  at  all  he 
saw.  For  distinction  of  appearance  it  would  be  hard 
to  think  of  any  man  of  this  or  the  last  generation  to 
approach  Li  Hung-chang.  It  was  not  that  he  gave  you 
the  impression  of  great  achievement  or  personal  power, 
but  his  mien  conveyed  a sense  of  personal  dignity  as 
of  some  demi-god  self-sufficient  and  detached,  yet 
suave  and  condescending  to  struggling  mortals. 

In  this  respect  he  seemed  to  typify  much  that  is 
peculiar  to  his  still  mysterious  country.  When  we 
were  barbarians  stained  with  woad,  the  Chinese  had 
long  enjoyed  a civilisation  in  some  aspects  higher 
than  ours  even  at  the  present  day,  and  with  all  their 
political  vicissitudes  they  have  always  cherished  a 
high  standard  of  culture,  a sense  of  superiority  to  the 
rest  of  the  world,  and  a personal  dignity  unruffled  by 
political  cares  of  their  own  or  other  countries.  These 
characteristics  were,  no  doubt,  largely  due  to  their 
isolation.  As  reported  by  Mr.  John  Bell,  who 


VI 


GENERAL  EDITOR’S  PREFACE 


accompanied  a mission  from  Peter  the  Great  to  the 
Emperor  of  China  in  1715  : 


“ The  empire  of  China  is,  in  a manner,  separated  from  all 
the  rest  of  the  world  ; situated  in  a fine  and  healthy  climate, 
surrounded  by  the  ocean  to  the  east  and  south  ; by  a chain 
of  high  rocks  and  barren  mountains  on  the  north  and  west, 
along  which  runs  the  famous  wall  as  an  additional  defence. 
But  what,  in  my  opinion,  is  a greater  security  to  the  empire 
against  invaders  than  anything  yet  mentioned,  is  the  barren 

desert,  stretching  for  several  hundred  miles  westwards 

The  seas  to  the  south  and  east  are  indeed  open,  and  China 
might  be  attacked  on  that  side ; but  I am  persuaded,  no  prince 
will  think  it  proper  to  disturb  his  own  repose,  and  that  of  such 
a powerful  people,  inclined  to  peace  with  all  their  neighbours, 
and  satisfied,  as  they  seem,  with  their  own  dominions.” 


John  Bell’s  prophecy  held  good  for  over  a hundred 
years,  and  then  the  attacks  came,  as  he  suggested, 
from  the  open  seas  to  the  south  and  east.  The 
interest  of  Li  Hung-chang  in  nineteenth  century 
history  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  was  the  first  Chinese 
statesman,  worthy  of  the  name,  who  was  called  upon  to 
deal  with  this  new  danger  to  his  country’s  ancient  insti- 
tution. By  birth,  education  and  disposition  wedded  to 
the  traditions  of  his  race  and  naturally  contemptuous 
of  strangers,  yet  he  was  the  first  of  the  Chinese  to  recog- 
nise that  the  “ foreign  devil  ” could  not  be  simply 
ignored,  that  he  had  come  to  stay,  and  that  he  had  for 
the  future  to  be  reckoned  with  in  Chinese  politics. 
Li  Hung-chang,  as  appears  clearly  in  Mr.  Bland’s  pages, 
had  many  of  the  grave  faults  natural  to  a race  not 
primarily  interested  in  political  questions.  Neverthe- 
less no  man  could  have  led  his  countrymen  more  deftly 
than  he  into  that  arena  of  international  politics,  which 
henceforth  they  could  not  avoid  ; and,  indeed,  with  all 
those  faults  he  gained  for  China  and  for  himself  a posi- 
tion in  the  world  far  exceeding  their  intrinsic  impor- 
tance. In  a word,  Li  Hung-chang  laid  the  foundations 
of  a foreign  policy,  which  had  never  hitherto  existed 

for  China.  BASIL  WILLIAMS. 


Chelsea,  March , 1917. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

General  Editor’s  Preface  .....  v 

CBAP. 

I.  Introductory i 

A Review  of  the  Conditions  existing  in  China 
at  the  Outset  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  Career  . i 

II.  Early  Life  and  Family  Circle  ...  37 

III.  As  Chinese  Official  .....  76 

IV.  Li  as  Diplomat:  Relations  with  France; 

Japan .126 

Relations  with  France  . . . .144 

Relations  with  Japan  . . . . 157 

V.  Li  as  Diplomat  ( continued ')  . . . .186 

Relations  with  Russia ; Tour  Abroad ; The 

Peace  Negotiations  of  1900  . . .186 

VI.  Li  as  Naval  and  Military  Administrator  . 217 

— VII.  As  Statesman  and  Politician  . - . . 251 

VIII.  The  Human  Equation 276 

Bibliographical  Note 313 

Chronological  Table  . ....  315 

Index ....  319 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

A Review  of  the  Conditions  existing  in  China  at 
the  Outset  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  Career. 

In  the  sense  that  he  was  the  proximate  initiator 
of  many  of  the  changes  which  have  tended  to  modify 
the  structure  and  actions  of  the  Chinese  people  since 
1850,  Li  Hung-chang  must  undoubtedly  be  recog- 
nised as  a maker  of  the  nineteenth  century.  But, 
as  Herbert  Spencer  observes,  in  his  critical  analysis 
of  the  “ Great-Man  ” theory  of  history,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  remember  that  “ the  Great  Man  must  be 
classed  with  all  other  phenomena  in  the  society  that 
gave  him  birth,  as  a product  of  its  antecedents. 
Along  with  the  whole  generation  of  which  he  forms  a 
united  part,  he  is  a resultant  of  an  enormous  aggregate 
of  forces  that  have  been  co-operating  for  ages.” 

To  obtain  a just  appreciation  of  the  career  of  the 
greatest  of  modern  China’s  great  men,  it  is  expedient 
that  we  should  study  his  genesis  from  this  point  of 
view,  and  carefully  consider  what  were  the  social  and 
political  influences  predominant  in  his  environment. 

Before  proceeding  to  describe  the  life  work  of 
Li  Hung-chang  and  its  effect  upon  the  history  of 
modern  China,  it  will  be  well,  therefore,  to  review 
generally  the  conditions  existing  in  the  country  at 

L.H.  B 


2 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


the  beginning  of  his  official  career  and  to  consider 
in  particular  the  results  produced  thereupon  by  the 
forcible  impact  of  Europe’s  material  civilisation. 
At  the  time  when  Li  Hung-chang  laid  the  foundations 
of  his  remarkable  career  as  a military  leader  against 
the  Taiping  rebels,  the  invasion  of  China’s  splendid 
isolation  by  the  armies  and  traders  of  the  West  had 
already  become  a permanent  factor,  evidently  des- 
tined to  modify  very  seriously  the  sentiments  and 
habits  of  the  Chinese  people.  The  suddenness  and 
strength  of  the  new  forces  thus  brought  to  bear 
upon  a people  atavistically  opposed  to  change 
rendered  it  inevitable  that  the  process  of  adaptation 
would  be  difficult  and  fraught  with  much  danger  to 
the  nation’s  political  institutions.  The  outstanding 
feature  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  genius  as  a statesman 
consists  in  that,  almost  alone  amongst  his  contem- 
poraries, he  realised  at  once  the  strength  of  these  new 
forces  and  the  necessity  of  meeting  them  (as  Japan 
was  successfully  doing)  by  radical  modifications  of 
the  ancient  systems  of  education  and  government. 
The  principles  and  traditions  of  statecraft  with  which 
the  government  of  China  had  heretofore  been  iden- 
tified were  those  which,  during  long  centuries  of  self- 
sufficient  isolation,  had  proved  effective  in  main- 
taining an  autocratic  system  based  on  moral  force, 
together  with  a type  of  civilisation  remarkable  for 
its  homogeneous  continuity.  Li’s  chief  claim  to 
greatness  and  the  keynote  to  his  long  career  of  multi- 
farious activity,  lie  in  the  fact  that,  from  the  outset, 
he  perceived  that  steam-travel  and  the  military 
science  of  the  West  must  speedily  relegate  most  of 
his  country’s  ancient  traditions  to  the  limbo  of  things 
useless  and  outworn.  His  efforts  to  lead  his  fellow- 


INTRODUCTORY 


3 


countrymen  to  perception  of  this  truth  and  to 
minimise  the  perils  of  their  rapidly  changing  environ- 
ment were  foredoomed  to  failure,  not  only  because 
the  Chinese  people  were  by  their  nature  incapable 
of  accomplishing  the  swift  transformation  required 
of  them,  but  because  Li  himself  remained,  in  certain 
important  respects,  a mandarin  true  to  type.  It  is 
undeniable  that  much  of  his  work  was  tainted,  and 
its  utility  impaired,  by  personal  ambition  and  by  the 
love  of  money,  and  that  even  his  most  progressive 
aspirations  were  occasionally  vitiated  by  the  pre- 
judices born  and  bred  in  the  Confucian  literati . 
According  to  his  lights — which  shine  with  all  the 
greater  brilliance  because  of  the  deep  darkness  around 
him — he  was  courageous  and  patriotic  ; his  physical 
and  mental  energies  were  extraordinary,  his  resource 
infinite,  and  he  displayed,  both  in  adversity  and 
prosperity,  many  admirable  qualities.  But  when  all 
is  said  and  done,  he  remains  essentially  the  natural 
product  of  his  antecedents,  imbued  with  the  qualities 
and  defects  of  the  social  state  which  produced  him. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  what  were  the  conditions  of 
that  social  state  at  the  time  of  his  first  appearance 
on  the  political  scene.  The  Taiping  rebellion,  in  the 
suppression  of  which  he  first  earned  the  gratitude  of 
the  Empress  Dowager  Tzu  Hsi  and  a high  place  in 
the  opinion  of  his  contemporaries,  had  assumed 
serious  dimensions  in  1851.  Li  was  then  about 

twenty-eight  years  of  age ; he  had  just  passed 
with  distinction  the  final  Palace  examination  of  the 
classical  curriculum,  which  secured  his  admission  into 
the  ranks  of  the  Hanlin,  or  College  of  pre-eminent 
scholars.  This  great  rebellion,  which  ravaged  the 
Empire  for  over  thirteen  years,  devastating  nine 


4 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


provinces  and  reducing  the  population  by  more  than 
a hundred  millions,  was  one  of  those  convulsions 
which  all  Chinese  history  shows  to  be  of  regular 
recurrence,  an  inevitable  result  of  the  economic 
conditions  produced  by  the  Chinese  social  system. 
As  the  present  writer  has  pointed  out  elsewhere, 

“ If  we  look  back  through  the  Chinese  annals  since 
the  end  of  the  Tang  dynasty  (or  roughly  speaking, 
since  the  Norman  conquest  of  England),  we  find 
history  persistently  repeating  itself  in  violent  rebel- 
lions ; in  the  ejection,  with  great  slaughter,  of 
dynasties  that  had  ‘ exhausted  the  mandate  of 
Heaven  ’ ; in  regularly  alternating  periods  of  upheaval 
and  recuperation  ; all  traceable,  in  almost  rhyth- 
mical series,  to  a social  system  which  has  inculcated 
principles  of  passive  resistance,  together  with  pro- 
creative  recklessness  as  a religious  duty.  Intervals 
of  relief  from  economic  pressure,  of  a kind  more 
severe  than  anything  Europe  has  experienced,  have 
been  bought  at  the  price  of  cataclysms  which  have 
depopulated  vast  regions.  Within  the  memory  of 
living  men,  the  whole  process  has  been  witnessed — 
provinces  that  were  laid  waste  by  the  Taiping  and 
Mahomedan  rebellions  have  been  re-peopled  in  one 
generation  from  the  surplus  of  their  neighbours, 
and,  in  the  next,  have  once  more  been  faced  by  the 
grim  spectre  of  famine.” 1 

So  long  as  China  remained  geographically  isolated 
and  politically  self-sufficient,  these  regularly  recurring 
calamities  of  disorder  and  bloodshed,  this  thriftless 
breeding  and  wholesale  destruction  of  superabundant 
lives,  were  accepted  by  rulers  and  ruled  as  part  of 
the  inevitable  destiny  of  man.  The  recuperative 
powers  of  the  race,  intensified  by  the  very  fierceness 
of  its  struggle  for  life,  and  the  solid  cohesion  of  its 

1 “ Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China  ” (Heinemann,  1912). 


INTRODUCTORY 


5 


national  institutions,  had  always  emerged  successfully 
from  these  periodical  paroxysms.  The  world’s  most 
ancient  and  venerable  civilisation  had  been  built 
up,  despite  these  calamities,  and  preserved  in  un- 
paralleled longevity,  by  observance  of  the  funda- 
mental doctrine  that  the  nation  must  be  governed 
by  moral  rather  than  by  physical  force.  But  the 
Taiping  rebellion  differed  from  all  earlier  upheavals 
in  that  it  was  not  allowed  to  run  its  natural  course 
and  to  overthrow  a dynasty  which,  under  three 
successive  Emperors,  had  proved  itself  degenerate 
and  incapable  of  directing  that  moral  force  to  the 
proper  purposes  of  government.  Foreigners  had 
intervened,  by  force  of  arms,  to  support  the  degene- 
rate and  inefficient  Manchus.  They  had  succeeded 
in  keeping  the  dynasty  in  its  place  ; nevertheless,  its 
prestige  of  authority  had  been  shaken  beyond  all 
hope  of  permanent  recovery.  For  those  who  could 
read  the  writing  on  the  wall,  the  future  loomed 
darkly  with  imminent  perils  of  change.  Li  Hung- 
chang,  as  a military  commander  under  Tseng  Kuo-fan, 
rapidly  perceived,  from  personal  experience  in  the 
field  and  from  his  relations  with  Gordon,  Ward, 
Burgevine,  and  other  foreigners,  that  the  Western 
barbarians  were  possessed  of  forces  which  China 
could  not  hope  to  resist  by  any  of  her  time-honoured 
expedients  of  military  science  or  statecraft.  With 
clear  and  rapid  vision,  he  foresaw  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  the  situation  thus  created  ; he 
realised  that  China  could  never  hope  to  re-establish 
the  old  order,  or  even  to  maintain  her  sovereign 
rights  and  independence,  by  persistence  in  the 
unbroken  continuity  of  ancient  traditions.  There- 
after the  whole  history  of  his  life  is  the  record  of  his 


6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


endeavours  to  bring  home  to  his  countrymen  some 
perception  of  this  truth.  In  the  measure  of  his  success 
in  these  endeavours,  in  the  influence  of  his  progres- 
sive ideas  and  administration  on  the  present  genera- 
tion in  China,  lies  his  chief  claim  to  be  considered  a 
maker  of  the  nineteenth  century.  To  show  what 
that  influence  has  been,  and  how  achieved,  is  the 
purpose  of  this  book. 

That  Li  Hung-chang  had  grasped  the  vital  signifi- 
cance of  the  impact  of  the  West,  and  the  necessity 
for  reorganising  China’s  system  of  government  and 
national  defences  to  meet  it,  was  clearly  shown  in 
a memorial  which  he  addressed  to  the  Throne  in 
1867.  To  this  important  document,  which  affords 
a key  to  all  his  subsequent  career  as  diplomat  and 
administrator,  full  reference  will  be  made  in  due 
course.  Suffice  it  here  to  say  that  it  was  chiefly 
remarkable  for  the  fact  that  its  writer,  then  Governor- 
General  of  the  Hu  Kuang  provinces,  boldly  advocated 
reform  on  the  ground  that  the  political  and  military 
superiority  of  foreign  nations  was  incontestable. 
To  estimate  the  courage  required  to  submit  such  a 
memorial  to  the  Throne  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
the  political  conditions  of  the  country  at  that  date 
and  the  mental  equipment  of  his  colleagues,  the 
provincial  viceroys  and  the  dignitaries  of  the 
Metropolitan  Boards.  Broadly  speaking,  the  Court 
of  China  at  that  period,  the  Censorate,  the 
higher  officials  and  the  literati , remained  in  the 
condition  of  magnificent  detachment  from  the 
outside  world,  which  has  characterised  the  rulers 
of  the  Middle  Kingdom  for  the  past  two  thousand 
years. 

For  the  information  of  readers  who  may  be 


INTRODUCTORY 


7 


unfamiliar  with  China’s  system  of  government,  a 
brief  explanation  of  its  principal  features,  as  they 
existed  under  the  last  of  the  Manchu  rulers,  may 
serve  to  facilitate  this  study  of  the  great  Viceroy’s 
career.  In  theory,  the  government  of  the  Chinese 
Empire,  from  remote  ages  until  the  beginning  of  the 
present  century,  was  an  absolute  autocracy,  a primi- 
tive form  of  Imperialism,  based  on  ancestor  worship 
and  on  the  patriarchal  institutions  which  have  become 
part  of  the  very  life  of  the  people  by  reason  of  the 
unbroken  continuity  of  the  Confucian  system.  But, 
in  practice,  the  Emperor  on  his  throne  (except  in 
the  case  of  strong-minded  sovereigns  like  Ch’ien 
Lung)  was  little  more  than  the  ornamental  coping- 
stone  of  the  Celestial  fabric  of  government.  The 
routine  of  bis  daily  life,  defined  and  confined  at 
every  point  by  the  ordinances  and  regulations  of  the 
dynastic  house-laws,  made  the  Son  of  Heaven  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  a prisoner  within  the  walls  of 
the  Forbidden  City.  His  role , as  the  Heaven-appointed 
centre  of  the  family  system,  was  to  be  the  High 
Priest  charged  with  the  performance  of  the  solemn 
ceremonies  laid  down  in  the  Canons  of  the  Sages. 
In  the  matter  of  personal  initiative  he  enjoyed, 
indeed,  less  scope  than  the  least  of  all  the  myriad 
functionaries  of  the  official  hierarchy.  Even  in  the 
all-important  matter  of  his  civil  list  and  privy 
purse,  the  absolute  monarch  of  China  was  dependent 
on  the  goodwill  and  loyalty  first  of  the  official  class, 
and,  in  the  last  resort,  of  the  people.  Such  auto- 
cratic power  as  was  exercised  by  the  Government 
was  actually  vested  in  the  mandarinate,  but  even 
this,  as  history  shows,  was  always  limited  by  the 
people’s  readily-asserted  right  of  rebellion,  and  by  the 


8 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


fundamental  fact  that  the  whole  fabric  of  authority 
under  the  Chinese  system  of  government  is  a matter 
of  moral,  and  not  of  physical,  force.  For  this  reason 
the  theoretical  autocracy  of  its  officialdom  has  always 
been  tempered  in  practice  by  the  democratic  instincts 
of  the  masses. 

The  late  Mr.  W.  F.  Mayers,  in  his  standard  work  on 
the  government  of  China,  observed  in  1877  : 

“ The  foundations  of  the  Chinese  State  repose  upon 
an  all-pervading  officialism,  a bureaucracy  trained 
through  the  national  system  of  education  to  apply  the 
maxims  of  government  enunciated  centuries  before  the 
dawn  of  the  Christian  era,  and  impelled  by  motives 
of  self-interest  to  reject  the  introduction  of  all  prin- 
ciples at  variance  with  these  venerable  dogmas.” 

And  to  this  accurate  description  was  added  a timely 
word  of  warning  addressed  to  the  sanguine  idealists 
who,  even  at  that  date,  were  predicting  a sudden  and 
radical  change  in  the  national  character  of  the  Chinese 
people  and  of  all  their  political  institutions  : 

“ An  appreciation  of  this  condition  of  affairs  ” (he 
wrote)  “ may  possibly  tend  to  correct  the  too  san- 
guine views  which  have  been  entertained  of  a speedy 
entrance  of  the  Chinese,  as  a Government  and  people, 
upon  the  path  of  European  progress.  In  order  that 
such  a result  should  be  accomplished,  to  any  tangible 
extent,  it  would  be  necessary  that  the  most  cherished 
principles  of  the  national  religion  should  be  aban- 
doned, the  idols  of  literary  worship  dethroned,  and 
the  recognised  fountain  of  all  honour  deserted  in 
favour  of  pursuits  and  doctrines  which  are  now  con- 
temptuously ignored.  A change  such  as  this  may, 
and  perhaps  will,  be  produced  under  the  pressure  of 
imperious  necessity  if  not  as  the  consequence  of 
revolution  ; but  it  would  be  a delusion  to  anticipate 
it  as  brought  about  by  voluntary  development.” 


INTRODUCTORY 


9 


The  long  chaos  and  destruction  of  the  Taiping 
rebellion  shook  the  prestige  of  the  Manchus  beyond 
hope  of  permanent  recovery,  but  it  left  the  privileges 
and  power  of  the  mandarin  undiminished  and  his 
complacent  conceit  undisturbed.  Only  one  new 
feature  distinguished  the  government  of  the  Empire 
after  i860  from  that  which  had  hitherto  existed, 
namely,  the  creation  of  a special  department  of  State 
for  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  This  was  the 
famous  Tsung-li  Yamen,  an  invertebrate,  gelatinous 
body,  which,  as  time  went  on,  became  gradually  more 
and  more  closely  identified  as  regards  its  personnel 
with  the  fossilised  Grand  Council,  and  which  faith- 
fully reflected  the  latter’s  stolid  conservatism,  tem- 
pered by  slim  elusiveness.  For  thirty  years — that 
is  to  say,  during  the  greater  part  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
career  as  Viceroy — the  Tsung-li  Yamen’s  chief 
function  was  to  serve  as  a buffer  between  the  Chinese 
Executive  and  the  foreign  representatives  at  Peking  ; 
such  activities  as  it  displayed  were  directed  towards 
curtailing  rather  than  extending  the  country’s  foreign 
relations.  Its  superfluous  character  was  emphasised, 
until  1890,  by  the  omission  of  all  reference  to  its 
existence  in  the  Government’s  official  list  of  State 
departments.  As  will  be  observed  in  the  ensuing 
chapters,  the  conduct  of  China’s  foreign  affairs  from 
1870  to  1895  was  practically  vested  in  Li  Hung-chang, 
in  his  dual  capacity  of  Viceroy  and  Superintendent 
of  Northern  Trade.  Li  himself  became  a member  of 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen  upon  his  removal  from  the 
Chihli  Viceroyalty  after  the  Japanese  war,  in  1896. 
He  lived  long  enough  to  see  the  establishment  of  the 
Waiwupu  in  its  place  in  1901,  with  powers  and  prece- 
dence which  emphasised  the  helplessness  of  the  old 


IO 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


order,  and  the  Empress  Dowager’s  belated  conversion 
to  new  methods  of  government.  Had  he  lived  to 
witness  the  collapse  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  and  the 
so-called  revolution  of  1911,  he  would  have  seen  the 
mandarin  tradition  emerge  once  more  unbroken 
from  the  welter  of  that  chaos  and  maintaining  its 
pride  of  place  amidst  all  the  crowding  perils  of 
economic  and  political  upheaval.  He  would  have 
seen  the  bureaucracy  calmly  triumphant  above  the 
conflict  of  Young  China  and  Old. 

Throughout  Li’s  career  the  autocratic  powers 
ostensibly  vested  in  the  Throne  were  actually  wielded 
by  the  high  functionaries,  metropolitan  and  pro- 
vincial, who  held  their  offices  by  appointment  of  the 
Court.  And  because  of  the  physical  and  moral 
degeneration  of  the  Imperial  clans,  which  set  in  after 
the  reign  of  Ch’ien  Lung  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  Manchus’  waning  prestige  and  inability  to 
rule  the  country  firmly  were  increasingly  reflected 
in  the  proportion  of  Chinese  to  Manchus  in  the  highest 
offices.  At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century 
the  latter  were  hopelessly  outnumbered  and  out- 
classed. For  this  reason  the  Court  officials  and 
Metropolitan  Boards  gradually  lost  their  power  of 
direct  initiative  from  i860  to  1901,  and  their  functions 
tended  more  and  more  towards  supervision  and 
exhortation.  Only  the  Throne’s  immemorial  right 
to  remove  any  and  every  official,  without  reason 
assigned,  by  Imperial  Edict,  and  the  unquestioning 
reverence  for  those  decrees  prescribed  by  the  Con- 
fucian  tradition,  enabled  the  statecraft  of  the 
Empress  Dowager  to  hold  the  Empire  together,  in 
a condition  of  unstable  equilibrium,  during  her  life- 
time. 


INTRODUCTORY 


1 1 


In  addition  to  the  Grand  Council — an  advisory 
body  which  solemnly  transacted  State  business  daily 
in  the  presence  of  the  Emperor  — and  the  Grand 
Secretariat — whose  functions  had  become  largely 
honorific  under  the  Manchus — the  Throne  was  assisted 
in  the  governance  of  the  Empire  by  the  Six  Boards 
and  Nine  Ministries  at  Peking,  by  the  Memorials 
of  the  provincial  viceroys  and  governors,  and  by  the 
advice  of  the  Censorate.  It  was  the  special  duty  of 
the  body  of  Censors  (fifty-six  in  all)  to  inform  and 
advise  the  Emperor  upon  all  matters  affecting  the 
conduct  of  the  government  and  the  welfare  of  the 
people.  Their  privileged  position  and  functions 
had  remained  unaffected  from  one  dynasty  to 
another  for  over  two  thousand  years.  Even  to-day, 
under  the  so-called  Republic,  they  remain  part  of 
the  unchanged  and  unchanging  machinery  of  China’s 
bureaucratic  administration.  Under  the  last  of  the 
Manchu  sovereigns  the  Censorate  had  come  to 
reflect  the  general  demoralisation  of  the  public 
service  ; the  “ eyes  and  ears  of  the  Throne  ” were  all 
too  frequently  at  the  disposal  of  the  highest  bidder, 
and  their  activities  made  to  serve  the  base  purposes 
of  the  warring  political  factions.  Amongst  them 
were  always  to  be  found  a certain  number  of  upright 
and  brave  men  who  steadily  pursued  the  legitimate 
ends  for  which  the  Censorate  had  been  created  in 
the  Golden  Age,  by  denouncing  public  corruption 
and  acting  as  a court  of  appeal  against  injustice  in 
high  places.  Some  there  were  who,  relying  on  the 
tradition  of  inviolability  which  attached  to  their 
position,  boldly  exercised  their  right  of  criticising 
the  abuses  of  the  Court  and  of  the  Empress  Dowager 
herself.  But  for  the  greater  part  the  functions  of  the 


12 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Censors  were  exercised  in  base  intrigues  and  venal 
espionage,  or  in  conspiracies  directed  against  high 
officials  (such  as  Li  Hung-chang),  whose  wealth  and 
reputation  invited  the  “ Outs  ” to  combine  against 
them  in  the  hope  of  plunder. 

Finally,  behind  the  visible  and  authoritative 
machinery  of  government,  working  “ in  the  profound 
seclusion  of  the  Palace,”  and  in  close  and  constant 
attendance  on  the  fountain  of  all  honour,  were  the 
eunuchs  of  the  Court,  a body  of  individuals  whose 
influence  in  the  business  of  the  State  had  steadily 
increased  since  the  reign  of  Chia  Ch’ing.  Linder  the 
dissolute  Emperor  Hsien  Feng  these  Palace  myrmi- 
dons waxed  fat  and  kicked,  even  as  their  predeces- 
sors had  done  towards  the  lamentable  end  of  the  Ming 
dynasty.  After  his  death  and  during  the  regencies 
of  his  consort,  the  Empress  Dowager  Tzu  Hsi,  the 
baneful  influence  of  the  chief  eunuchs,  her  body- 
servants,  became  paramount,  not  only  within  the 
Palace  precincts,  but  wheresoever  within  the  Empire 
rank,  titles,  and  preferment  were  to  be  bestowed  by 
Imperial  favour.  Li  Hung-chang,  being  withal  a 
prudent  man,  and  plus  royaliste  que  le  roi  where  Tzu 
Hsi  was  concerned,  never  hesitated  to  make  for  him- 
self friends  of  the  mammon  of  unrighteousness  in  the 
person  of  her  favourite  chamberlains,  especially  with 
the  Chief  Eunuch,  Li  Lien-ying,  whose  influence 
dominated  all  Palace  politics  from  1870  till  the 
death  of  his  Imperial  mistress  in  1908.  According  to 
the  house-laws  of  the  Manchu  dynasty,  no  eunuch 
was  allowed  to  hold  any  official  position  or  to  leave 
the  capital  upon  any  pretext  whatsoever,  and  until 
the  reign  of  Hsien  Feng  these  rules  had  been  enforced. 
But  under  the  regencies  of  Tzu  Hsi  all  the  corruption 


INTRODUCTORY 


i3 


and  intrigues,  which  had  characterised  the  Court 
of  the  Mings  in  the  decline  of  that  dynasty,  were 
reintroduced  as  the  result  of  the  power  which  she 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  eunuchs.  The  countless 
abuses  which  they  practised  under  her  protection 
gradually  increased  during  her  reign,  until,  after  the 
coup  d’etat  of  1898,  her  favourite  Li  Lien-ying, 
keeper  of  her  privy  purse,  was  wont  to  boast  openly 
that  he  could  make  or  mar  the  highest  officials  in 
the  Empire  and  to  defy  the  authority  of  the  Emperor 
on  his  throne.1  At  many  points  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
career  his  hands  were  tied  and  his  policies  undone  by 
the  far-reaching  intrigues  of  Li  Lien-ying  and  his 
satellites,  and  this  most  notably  in  the  matter  of 
the  financing  of  the  navy  during  the  period  preceding 
the  war  with  Japan  and  in  regard  to  the  secret  agree- 
ments made  with  Russia  thereafter.  Even  during 
the  years  1889-98  of  Kuang  Hsii’s  majority,  while 
the  Empress  Dowager  was  living  ostensibly  in 
retirement  at  the  Summer  Palace,  the  unseen  hand 
of  Li  Lien-ying  continued  to  direct,  through  her, 
the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  high  functionaries 
and  to  reap  the  rich  harvest  of  official  squeezes  there- 
from resultant. 

The  influence  of  these  “ sleek  rogues  ” of  the  Palace, 
like  that  of  the  fossilised  mandarins  of  the  Metro- 
politan Boards  and  of  the  Censorate,  was  opposed 
from  the  outset  to  the  introduction  of  those  liberal 
ideas  and  measures  of  reform  which  Li  Hung-chang’s 
wider  vision  recognised  as  necessary  for  the  salvation 
of  the  country. 

In  1901,  amidst  the  tumultuous  chaos  produced  by 
the  Boxer  rising,  Sir  Robert  Hart  (always  an  optimist 

1 Vide  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,”  Chapter  VI. 


H 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


where  China  was  concerned)  ascribed  the  unchanged 
and  unchanging  attitude  of  the  ruling  class  in  China 
to  pride — “ inherited  pride,  in  its  massive  and  magni- 
ficent setting  of  blissful  ignorance.”1  This  attitude 
of  haughty  aloofness  has  since  then  been  somewhat 
modified  by  the  inexorable  logic  of  events  ; but  at 
the  time  when  Li  Hung-chang  first  endeavoured  to 
modify  it  by  his  outspoken  appeals  to  reason,  it  was 
immovable  in  its  “ pride  of  race,  pride  of  intellect, 
pride  of  civilisation,  pride  of  supremacy.”  We  may 
deplore  the  obstinate  refusal  of  this  innate  pride  to 
face  obvious  facts,  but  we  can  hardly  withhold 
admiration  for  the  indomitable  spirit  of  the  race, 
which  held  fast  to  its  belief  in  the  eventual  triumph 
of  moral  over  physical  force,  of  right  over  might, 
which  asserted  its  right  to  persist  in  its  policy  of 
splendid  isolation,  and  continued  to  regard  every- 
thing that  was  not  Chinese  as  outer  darkness. 

Morally  and  intellectually,  China  in  Li  Hung-chang’s 
early  days  was  essentially  the  China  of  antiquity — 
a cohesive  social  structure  which,  through  good  and 
evil  fortune,  despite  innumerable  shocks  of  rebellion 
and  invasion,  had  preserved  intact  its  splendid 
civilisation  and  all  the  fixed  traditions  of  an  agricul- 
tural people  born  and  bred  in  ancestral  worship  and 
patriarchal  Theism.  Pride  ourselves  as  we  may 
upon  the  sciences  and  arts  of  European  civilisation, 
upon  our  many  inventions  and  mechanical  achieve- 
ments, there  is  surely  something  which  commands 
instinctive  respect,  and  sometimes  even  envious  ad- 
miration, in  China’s  deliberate  attitude  of  superiority 
to  practical  and  utilitarian  considerations,  in  the 
spectacle  of  her  contemplative  philosophy,  trium- 

1 “ These  from  the  Land  of  Sinim  ” (London,  1901). 


INTRODUCTORY 


*5 


phant  even  amidst  the  ruins  of  its  material  habi- 
tation. This  patriarchal  system,  and  the  moral 
philosophy  upon  which  it  is  founded,  had  effectively 
welded  a third  of  the  human  race  into  deep-rooted 
homogeneous  nationality,  long  before  Europe  had 
emerged  from  savagery  to  the  civilisation  of  Greece 
and  Rome.  And  partly  because  of  her  geographical 
situation,  partly  because  of  a national  self-sufficiency 
which  experience  had  justified,  China  continued 
through  the  long  centuries  to  ask  nothing  and  to 
learn  nothing  of  the  “ lesser  breeds  without  the  law  ” ; 
to  dream  her  own  dreams  and  pursue  her  own  medi- 
tations, concerned  more  with  ultimate  causes  than 
immediate  results,  and  undisturbed,  even  in  these 
latter  days,  by  all  the  earth-shaking  progress  of  the 
Western  barbarian.  Ever  stronger  than  the  claims 
of  new  creeds  or  the  inventions  of  science,  have  been 
her  ancient  beliefs  enshrined  in  the  Canons  of  her 
Sages.  At  times,  during  the  long  twilight  of  her 
unbroken  isolation,  disturbing  voices  had  reached 
her  from  the  West.  Indian  invasions  of  her  remote 
frontiers  and  Indo-Scythian  conquests  in  Central 
Asia — faint  echoes  of  the  “ glory  that  was  Greece  ” — 
had  been  heard  and  recorded  in  watch-towers  and 
Buddhist  shrines  along  the  farthest  borders  of  the 
Western  trade  routes.  Throughout  the  Middle  Ages 
of  Europe,  Persians  and  Arabs  and  Hindus,  the 
merchant  adventurers  who  brought  to  her  southern 
shores  spices,  frankincense,  ivory,  and  precious  stones, 
had  carried  with  these  cargoes  many  strange  tales 
concerning  the  manners  and  customs  of  the  outer 
barbarians  and  the  great  uncharted  world  of  waters 
that  lay  beyond  the  outposts  of  the  Middle  Kingdom. 
From  the  Franciscan  priests  and  Levantine  traders, 


i6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


who  made  their  perilous  journeys  to  Southern  Cathay 
by  way  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  her  rulers  had  acquired 
some  fragmentary  secondhand  knowledge  of  Catholic 
Europe  in  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  ; 
but  the  literati  had  remained  nevertheless  indifferent 
and  complacently  devoid  of  curiosity  with  regard  to 
the  outside  world  and  its  affairs.  The  prestige  and 
influence  enjoyed  by  Marco  Polo  and  his  relatives 
at  the  Court  of  Kublai  Khan  left  little  or  no  trace 
in  the  dynastic  records  and  was  soon  completely 
forgotten  in  China,  just  as  his  description  of  Far 
Cathay  in  the  thirteenth  century  had  passed  com- 
pletely from  the  memory  of  the  Western  world  until 
revived  two  hundred  years  later  by  the  Portuguese 
navigators.  These,  in  their  turn,  were  disdainfully 
regarded  by  Peking  as  suppliant  traders  from  bar- 
barian lands,  permitted  on  sufferance  to  trade  at 
Canton,  and  that  only  under  the  most  humiliating 
conditions. 

With  the  arrival  upon  the  scene  of  the  first  free- 
trading  British  merchants,  after  the  abolition  of  the 
East  India  Company’s  monopoly  in  1834,  a few  of 
the  more  intelligent  mandarins  began  to  conceive 
a presentiment  of  impending  danger  and  some  idea 
of  the  forces  that  lay  behind  these  traders  from  over- 
seas. For  more  than  three  hundred  years  before  Lord 
Napier  became  representative  of  the  Crown  (instead 
of  the  Company)  at  Canton,  China’s  intercourse 
with  Europeans  had  produced  nothing  to  disabuse  her 
rulers’  minds  of  their  ancient  and  venerable  beliefs 
concerning  their  country  as  the  fixed  centre  of  the 
universe.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  first  war  waged 
against  them  by  Great  Britain  (1839-42)  the  Chinese 
Government,  no  less  than  the  Chinese  people,  were 


INTRODUCTORY 


i7 


firmly  convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  the  policy  which 
the  Dragon  Throne  had  always  followed  in  dealing 
with  outer  barbarians,  namely,  “ that  the  true  and 
only  right  way  of  ruling  them  was  by  arbitrary  mis- 
rule.” The  Rev.  Charles  Gutzlaff,  writing  in  1838, 
correctly  described  the  Celestial  Empire  of  that  date 
as  “ absolutely  separated  from  the  whole  world  and 
viewing  with  indescribable  contempt  every  other 
country.”1  All  other  nations  were  regarded  as  bar- 
barians “ doomed  to  live  at  the  extremities  of  the 
square-cornered  earth,  or  upon  some  small  islands  of 
the  Four  Seas  which  surround  the  Middle  Kingdom.” 
“ Conscious  of  its  majesty,”  says  the  same  writer,  “ it 
“ assumes  the  universal  Empire  of  the  World,  sways 
“ the  Four  Seas  and  always  rules  by  compassion. 
“ With  equal  tenderness  it  embraces  all  countries,  but 
“ at  the  same  time  leaves  distant  barbarians  to  their 
“ lot,  if  they  are  so  stupid  as  not  to  acknowledge  the 
“ supremacy  of  the  only  civilised  nation  in  the  world.” 
This  was  the  spirit  which  animated  the  rulers  of  China 
in  their  relations  with  the  first  envoys  of  Great  Britain, 
Earl  Macartney  (1793)  and  Lord  Amherst  (1816) — 
a spirit  which  remained  undisturbed  by  the  reports 
which  had  then  reached  them,  through  Tibet  and 
Nepal,  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Great  Mogul’s  Empire 
and  the  military  superiority  of  the  white  race  in 
India.  The  Imperial  Mandate  issued  by  the  Emperor 
Ch’ien  Lung  to  His  Majesty  King  George  III.  a few 
days  after  his  reception  of  Earl  Macartney  at  Jehol, 
and  that  addressed  by  Chia  Ch’ing  to  George  IV.  in 
1816,  display  this  spirit  in  all  its  massive  ignorance.2 

1 “ China  Opened,”  by  the  Rev.  Charles  Gutzlaff  (Smith,  Elder  & Co.), 
London,  1838). 

2 Vide  “ Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  Peking  ” (Heinemann,  1913). 

L h,  c 


i8 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


After  the  first  war  with  England,  concluded  by  the 
Treaty  of  Nanking  (1842),  and  until  the  appearance  of 
Li  Hung-chang  upon  the  scene  as  an  organiser  of 
European  mercenary  forces  against  the  Taiping 
rebels,  the  impact  of  the  West  may  have  opened  the 
eyes  of  a few  Chinese  to  the  perils  of  a policy  of 
contemptuous  supremacy  unsupported  by  force,  but 
it  certainly  did  nothing  to  diminish  the  arrogance  of 
the  Government  at  Peking  or  that  of  its  representa- 
tives at  the  provincial  capitals.  Even  the  taking  of 
Peking  and  the  burning  of  the  Summer  Palace  by  the 
Anglo-French  armies  in  i860  could  not  shake  it  ; 
for  this  national  spirit  of  arrogance  was  due  to  a 
deep-rooted  traditional  sentiment,  underlying  all 
the  people’s  moral  conceptions,  rather  than  to  any 
obvious  facts  or  political  convictions.  This  firmly- 
planted  conviction  of  moral  superiority,  bred  in  the 
bone  of  the  Chinese  ruling  class  and  undisturbed  for 
ages,  was  not  to  be  lightly  overthrown  by  any  material 
successes  of  the  foreigner.  That  the  mandarins  have 
always  believed  these  successes  to  be  accidental  and 
hoped  that  they  would  prove  to  be  temporary,  is 
shown  by  the  persistence  of  their  attempts  at  various 
periods,  down  to  their  final  effort  in  1900,  to  “ drive 
the  barbarians  into  the  sea.”  At  no  period  in  the 
history  of  its  spasmodic  relations  with  foreign  Powers 
has  the  Government  of  China  been  sincerely  converted 
to  any  of  the  political  innovations  imposed  upon  it 
by  treaties  ; never  did  any  of  the  measures  which 
it  adopted  aim  at  creating  anything  more  than  the 
machinery  to  render  these  treaties  inoperative.  This 
observation  applies  with  particular  force  to  the 
period  which  followed  the  return  of  the  Court  to 
Peking  from  Jehol  in  i860  and  the  short-sighted 


INTRODUCTORY 


l9 


intervention  of  the  Allies  to  support  the  Manchu 
dynasty  against  the  Taiping  rebellion.  The  moral 
effect  of  these  first  wars  and  of  the  early  treaties 
was  speedily  dissipated,  and  the  mandarins  took 
heart  of  grace  when  they  realised  that  the  foreign 
Powers  were  definitely  committed,  in  their  own 
avowed  interests,  to  the  policy  of  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  China  and  to  the  international 
jealousies  which  that  policy  could  not  fail  to  create. 
Chinese  diplomacy  from  i860  onwards  repeatedly 
waxed  bold  by  perception  of  the  paradoxical  truth 
that  its  political  strength  lay  in  the  Empire’s  moral 
weakness  ; and  the  success  which  for  nearly  half  a 
century  it  achieved  in  the  matter  of  playing  off  one 
barbarian  against  another  tended  to  increase  rather 
than  to  diminish  the  mandarin’s  contempt  for  the 
intelligence  of  the  foreigner.  Li  Hung-chang  differed 
from  the  most  distinguished  of  his  contemporaries, 
both  as  diplomat  and  as  administrator,  in  that,  while 
he  fully  shared  their  dislike  and  distrust  of  the 
European,  he  did  not  share  their  contempt.  How 
greatly  his  discrimination  in  this  respect  exceeded 
that  of  the  other  high  officials  and  advisers  of  the 
Throne  becomes  evident  when  we  compare  his 
memorials  and  despatches  with  those  of  the  Viceroys 
and  governors,  his  colleagues.  The  State  papers  of 
the  most  famous  of  the  famous  Yangtsze  Viceroys, 
Chang  Chih-tung  and  Liu  K’un-yi,  continued  to  the 
end  to  represent  faithfully  and  without  shadow  of 
change  the  orthodox  mandarin’s  conception  of  China 
as  the  centre  of  the  universe,  and  the  Confucian 
scholar  as  the  fragrant  flower  of  that  centre.  Their 
advice  to  the  Throne  on  matters  of  foreign  policy 
never  bore  any  relation  whatsoever  to  the  world 


20 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


of  actual  facts  and  events.  Compared  to  the  lucid 
and  practical  utterances  of  Li  Hung-chang,  their 
writings  convey  an  impression  of  fantastic  unreality 
and  puerility,  as  if  these  super-scholars  had  varied 
their  studies  of  the  Confucian  Analects  and  Odes 
with  political  excursions  conducted  after  the  manner 
of  the  Hunting  of  the  Snark.  We  shall  have  occa- 
sion hereafter  to  make  certain  critical  comparisons 
between  the  intelligence  and  foresight  displayed  by 
Li  Hung-chang  and  the  undiscerning  incapacity  of 
his  chief  colleagues  and  rivals.  For  the  moment  it  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  the  mental  and  moral  condition 
of  the  literati  and  the  patriarchal  traditions  of  the 
mandarin  class,  unswerving  in  their  contempt  for 
the  foreigner,  constituted  forces  which  no  one  man 
could  ever  destroy  or  even  greatly  disturb.  Their 
causes  lay  too  deep,  the  vested  interests  involved  in 
their  maintenance  were  too  powerful,  to  be  affected 
by  the  precept  or  example  of  any  individual  leader 
or  preacher.  Despite  his  pre-eminently  successful 
career  and  the  power  which  he  wielded,  the  voice  of 
Li  Hung-chang  preaching  political  reform  was  even 
as  a voice  crying  in  the  wilderness  ; and  he  knew  it. 
It  was  not  possible  that  he  should  remake  the  society 
of  which  he  himself  was  in  many  respects  a normal 
and  natural  product.  The  memorials  which  he 
addressed  to  the  Dowager  Empress  after  her  flight 
from  Peking  in  1900  reflect,  just  as  clearly  as  those 
which  he  indited  forty  years  before,  his  knowledge 
of  the  truth  that  the  dangers  which  threatened  China 
arose  from  the  mental  inertia  of  his  countrymen  as 
much  as  from  the  aggressive  tendencies  of  foreigners. 
In  judging  of  the  successes  and  failures  of  his  career 
it  is  important  to  bear  this  fact  in  mind,  to  remember 


INTRODUCTORY 


21 


that  his  life-work  lay  not  only  in  preventing  European 
and  Japanese  encroachments  upon  China’s  sove- 
reignty, but  in  endeavouring  to  educate  his  country- 
men to  a clear  understanding  of  the  new  forces, 
which  must  inevitably  uproot  their  tradition  of 
arrogant  exclusiveness. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  study  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
career  it  is  also  necessary  to  observe  that  his  remark- 
able clearness  of  vision  and  courage  in  dealing  with 
foreign  affairs  were  frequently  neutralised  by  his  own 
venality  and  nepotism  in  domestic  politics.  In  these 
matters  he  remained  a typical  product  of  his  ante- 
cedents. Throughout  his  long  record  of  constructive 
statesmanship  the  trail  of  China’s  old  serpent  of 
corruption  is  clearly  marked  ; for  forty  years  he 
laboured  with  untiring  energy  to  provide  a modus 
vivendi  between  China  and  the  outside  world,  boldly 
declaring  to  unwilling  hearers  the  causes  and  results 
of  China’s  defenceless  state  ; but  never  during  all 
those  years  did  he  attempt,  either  by  precept  or 
example,  to  stem  the  chief  source  of  her  weakness, 
the  deep-rooted  dishonesty  of  the  mandarin  class. 
On  the  contrary,  all  his  progressive  measures  of  educa- 
tional and  administrative  reform,  his  vast  schemes  for 
the  improvement  of  the  country’s  defences,  and  his 
many  commercial  and  industrial  undertakings,  were 
notoriously  tainted  with  peculation  and  the  greed  of 
unearned  increment.  In  these  matters  his  country- 
men never  judged  him  severely,  the  tradition  of 
venality  in  the  public  service  being  part  of  the 
recognised  established  order  of  things  ; on  the  con- 
trary, the  admiration  which  his  career  evoked  and  the 
power  which  he  wielded  were  largely  due  to  the 
adroitness  of  his  methods  of  amassing  and  increasing 


22 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


wealth.  Two  of  his  chief  rivals  in  public  life,  the 
hard-bitten  soldier  Tso  Tsung-tang  and  the  Nanking 
Viceroy  Liu  K’un-yi,  were  both  men  of  a rare  type 
of  personal  integrity,  living  and  dying  poor  in  their 
high  offices  ; but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  Li  Hung-chang’s 
career  of  successful  “ squeezing  ” raised  him  to  a 
much  higher  eminence  in  the  eyes  of  the  great 
majority  of  his  countrymen.  Of  these  matters,  and 
of  Li’s  own  frankly-expressed  opinions  concerning 
the  virtue  of  the  well-filled  purse  in  Chinese  politics, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  speak  plainly.  While  recog- 
nising Li  Hung-chang  as  a maker  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  considering  his  career  as  such,  it  will  be 
well  for  the  reader  at  the  outset  to  accept  the  fact 
that  his  undeniably  great  influence  on  his  contem- 
poraries and  upon  his  successors,  the  present-day 
officials  of  China,  was  by  no  means  wholly  beneficial 
or  morally  elevating.  In  so  far  as,  by  his  example, 
he  confirmed  the  mandarin  class  in  its  traditions  of 
selfish  individualism  and  dishonesty,  in  so  far  as  he 
failed  to  inculcate  a higher  standard  in  public  life, 
he  must  be  held  to  blame  and  his  influence  pernicious. 
All  the  record  of  his  official  career  from  i860  to  1896 
justified  his  countrymen  in  believing  that  his  relations 
with  Russia,  from  the  time  of  the  Japanese  war  till 
the  date  of  his  death  (1901),  were  made  to  serve  not 
only  his  political  purposes  of  far-seeing  statecraft, 
but  his  less  legitimate  private  ends.  His  close 
relations  with  the  Empress  Dowager  during  his  long 
tenure  of  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty,  and  the  firm  support 
which  she  extended  to  him  “ when  in  disgrace  with 
fortune  and  men’s  eyes,”  were  primarily  the  result 
of  his  conspicuous  ability  and  staunch  loyalty  to 
the  Throne ; but  they  were  also  undoubtedly 


INTRODUCTORY 


23 


strengthened  and  maintained  by  the  corrupt  in- 
fluence of  the  notorious  Chief  Eunuch  Li  Lien- 
ying,  with  whom  he  preserved  to  the  end  an  intimate 
connection  in  matters  financial  of  a kind  that  will  not 
bear  close  inspection.  Much  of  the  humiliation 
and  spoliation  that  China  has  suffered  during  the 
past  thirty  years  may  justly  be  ascribed  to  the 
wholesale  organised  corruption  of  which  this  eunuch 
was  the  chief  instigator  and  beneficiary.  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  secret  traffic  with  him  and  creatures  of  his 
kidney,  and  the  fortune  which  he  amassed  by  illicit 
connivance  in  practices  which  (like  the  Empress 
Dowager)  he  publicly  professed  to  denounce  as  a 
source  of  weakness  in  the  State,  were  evils  inherent 
in  the  state  of  society  which  produced  him  and  there- 
fore generally  condoned  by  that  society.  But  from 
the  European  observer’s  point  of  view,  it  is  lamentable 
that  a man  whose  strength  of  purpose  and  intelligence 
placed  him  so  far  ahead  of  his  contemporaries  in  other 
respects  should  have  failed  so  conspicuously  in  this. 

From  the  outset  of  the  anti-Manchu  movement, 
which  derived  its  final  impetus  from  the  humiliation 
of  China  by  Japan  in  1894,  and  until  the  collapse  of 
the  helpless  dynasty  in  1911,  Europe  was  persistently 
told  by  Young  China,  and  believed,  that  the  corrup- 
tion of  the  State  was  an  evil  which  would  speedily 
be  purged  by  the  expulsion  of  these  alien  Manchu 
rulers.  Fervent  idealists  like  Sun  Yat-sen  and  oppor- 
tunists of  the  Wu  Ting-fang  type  had  no  hesitation 
in  proclaiming  to  the  world  in  their  Republican 
manifestoes  that  “ the  Manchu  dynasty,  by  its  be- 
nighted conceptions  and  barbaric  leanings,  had 
brought  China  to  a position  of  degradation.”  Never- 
theless, Young  China  knew  well  in  its  heart — for  the 


24 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


evidence  was  all  around  and  about  it — that  the 
mandarin  tradition  of  venality  was  a Chinese,  not  a 
Manchu,  tradition  ; that  it  had  flourished  long  before 
the  Manchus  had  emerged  from  tribal  obscurity, 
and  that,  if  the  Manchu  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu  failed 
in  his  high-spirited  but  impracticable  projects  of 
national  reform,  the  insurmountable  obstacles  in  his 
path  were  the  vested  class  interests  of  officials  of 
Li  Hung-chang’s  type  and  tendencies,  rather  than 
the  weight  of  Manchu  conservatism  or  Manchu 
privileges.  It  is  important  to  bear  this  fact  in  mind, 
for  it  helps  us  to  understand  the  actual  position  of 
affairs  in  China  to-day,  to  appreciate  the  unchecked 
activity  of  the  mandarin  tradition,  both  under  the 
short-lived  Parliament  of  the  Republic  and  under 
the  ill-fated  rulership  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai.  The 
Manchus  have  gone  their  ways,  but  the  mandarin 
remains  ; the  principles  of  statecraft  practised  by 
Yuan  and  those  who  desired  to  make  him  Emperor 
are  precisely  the  same  as  those  which  were  followed 
by  Li  Hung-chang.  Indeed,  remembering  that  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai  and  many  of  the  highest  officials  of  the 
“ Republic  ” looked  up  to  Li  as  their  patron,  pro- 
tector and  pattern,  and  studied  under  him  many  of 
the  ingenious  modifications  of  mandarin  finance 
which  generally  took  form  as  the  result  of  China’s 
later-day  necessities  and  foreign  debts,  it  may  fairly 
be  said  that  in  many  respects  the  existing  parlous 
condition  of  affairs  at  Peking  is  a direct  legacy  from 
Li  Hung-chang. 

This  becomes  particularly  evident  when  we  con- 
sider the  nature  and  results  of  the  policy  of  centralisa- 
tion upon  which  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  concentrated  all 
his  efforts  after  the  collapse  of  the  Kuo  Min-tang 


INTRODUCTORY 


25 


(“popular  party”)  and  Young  China  in  1913,  and  by 
means  of  which  he  succeeded  in  re-establishing  and 
strengthening  the  fiscal  machinery  dislocated  by  the 
disturbances  of  the  revolution.  One  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  chief  claims  to  statesmanship — probably 
greater  than  his  handling  of  foreign  affairs — lies  in 
that,  alone  in  his  time,  he  perceived  clearly  the  need 
for  fiscal  reorganisation,  based  on  effective  central 
authority,  as  a preliminary  to  the  provision  of 
adequate  military  and  naval  defences.  To  say  that 
at  certain  stages  of  his  career  he  failed  to  act  according 
to  his  lights,  and  on  occasion  even  supported  the 
principle  of  provincial  autonomy  (as  in  the  case  of 
the  Sherard-Osborn  flotilla),  is  merely  to  admit 
that  the  vested  interests  of  the  class  to  which  he 
belonged,  and  the  dead  weight  of  official  conser- 
vatism against  him,  were  more  than  any  one  man, 
however  great,  could  hope  to  overcome  by  sudden 
frontal  attack.  In  this  question,  as  in  many  others, 
Li  Hung-chang’s  genius  lay  in  adopting  “ the  happy 
mean  ” between  striving  for  those  things  which  he 
knew  to  be  necessary  and  accepting  those  which  he 
was  compelled  to  accept  as  expedient.  For  his  pur- 
poses of  diplomacy,  for  evading  the  demands  and 
confusing  the  minds  of  foreign  Ministers,  he  certainly 
upheld  and  used  adroitly  the  traditions  of  devolution 
and  provincial  responsibility  ; but  at  the  same  time 
he  fully  realised  that  China  must  reorganise  and 
strengthen  herself  from  within  by  administrative 
reforms,  and  that  these  could  only  be  seriously 
undertaken  after  increase  and  centralisation  of  the 
Government’s  authority  in  matters  fiscal.  Whenso- 
ever it  suited  his  purposes,  he,  like  his  Imperial 
mistress,  Tzu  Hsi,  proclaimed  in  solemn  treaties, 


2 6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


for  the  beguilement  of  Europeans,  the  Central 
Government’s  intention  and  ability  to  redress  all 
grievances  and  initiate  all  reforms  ; but  more  than 
once,  in  moments  of  frankness  and  apparent  sincerity, 
he  confessed  to  foreigners  with  whom  he  was  on 
familiar  terms  that,  so  long  as  every  province  remained 
a law  unto  itself,  no  substantial  progress  could  be 
achieved  either  in  administration,  finance,  or  national 
defences.  As  far  as  China’s  internal  government  was 
concerned,  he  became  convinced  in  later  life  that 
nothing  but  centralised  autocracy,  tempered  by  some 
sort  of  constitutional  procedure,  could  keep  the 
country  together  in  the  face  of  the  disintegrating 
influences  threatening  it  from  without  ; the  educa- 
tional and  other  reforms  which  he  advocated  all 
point  to  this  conclusion.  Centralisation,  in  fact,  had 
become  necessary,  to  enable  the  Chinese  people  to 
adapt  themselves  to  their  changed  and  changing 
environment.  After  his  return  from  concluding  the 
humiliating  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  in  1895,  these 
truths  came  home  to  Li  in  his  old  age  with  a new  force 
of  bitterness  ; they  were  further  emphasised  by  the 
rapid  growth  of  the  Cantonese  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  1898  and  by  the  Boxer  rising  in  1900.  The 
lesson  which  he  learned,  all  too  late,  was  not  lost 
upon  his  protege  and  successor,  the  Viceroy  and 
Emperor-aspirant,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  whose  efforts  at 
fiscal  centralisation  were  unremitting  and,  on  the  whole, 
not  unsuccessful.  But  neither  of  these  highly-gifted 
men,  wiser  in  so  many  ways  than  their  generation, 
could  hope  by  exhortation  or  example  suddenly  to 
change  the  ingrained  character  and  custom  of  the 
race.  And  in  many  respects  they  themselves  fre- 
quently testified,  by  their  own  careers  and  conduct, 


INTRODUCTORY 


27 


to  a force  of  atavism  stronger  than  their  political 
genius.  Their  intelligence  perceived  the  dangers 
of  provincial  autonomy,  but  their  social  instincts, 
their  inherited  bias  of  class,  all  made  for  conformity. 
We  who  survey  the  political  economy  of  the  Chinese 
from  a vantage  ground  outside  it,  should  make  all 
possible  allowance  for  these  deep-rooted  tendencies, 
so  different  and  remote  from  our  own  standards  of 
thought  and  action  ; and,  in  estimating  the  successes 
and  failures  of  Li  Hung-chang,  we  should  judge  him, 
so  far  as  we  are  able  to  do  so,  as  the  product  of  a 
peculiarly  rigid  social  system.  If,  for  instance,  we 
should  be  inclined  to  condemn  in  him  the  persistence 
of  those  instincts,  of  that  bias  of  class,  which  occa- 
sionally led  him  to  act  against  his  own  perception  of 
the  necessity  for  centralisation  as  a fundamental 
national  reform,  let  us  not  forget  that  provincial 
autonomy  had  through  long  ages  proved  itself  a 
successful  policy,  suitable  to  the  needs  and  genius 
of  this  self-sufficient  and  peace-loving  people,  and 
that  it  might  well  have  continued  to  serve  their  pur- 
poses had  not  the  impact  of  the  West  drastically 
altered  their  economic  conditions  and  political 
balance.  In  the  sudden  invasion  of  China’s  venerable 
seclusion  by  the  commercial  and  military  forces  of 
the  West  lies  the  chief  cause  of  the  parlous  condition 
to  which  the  world’s  oldest  civilisation  has  been 
brought.  Li  Hung-chang’s  life,  regarded  from  this 
point  of  view,  stands  out  as  a gallant  but  futile 
struggle  against  hopeless  odds  ; and  the  futility  of 
the  struggle  was  rendered  all  the  more  pathetic 
because  of  his  own  unshaken  belief  in  the  moral 
superiority  of  a social  and  political  system  which 
he  knew  to  be  defenceless  and  doomed. 


28 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


The  late  Mr.  Alexander  Michie,  probably  the  ablest 
observer  and  the  most  accurate  recorder  of  modern 
Chinese  history,  in  discussing  the  life-work  of  Li 
Hung-chang  from  this  point  of  view,  suggests  the 
inquiry  why  a practical-minded  man,  as  Li  certainly 
was,  should  have  devoted  a lifetime  to  the  pursuit 
of  impossible  achievements,  and  why,  in  a nation  of 
great  intellects,  the  task  should  have  been  virtually 
relegated  to  one  man.  The  Chinese,  he  observed,1 

“ are  by  no  means  fools,  and  if  we  find  them  exhibit- 
ing in  great  national  affairs  no  more  intelligence  than 
that  shown  by  children  in  building  castles  of  sand,  it 
is  natural  to  conclude  that,  either  on  their  part  or 
ours,  there  is  some  fundamental  misconception  of  the 
problem  before  them.  But  if  we  consider  the  Chinese 
as  belonging  to  the  world  of  moral  force,  then  their 
misconception  of  all  that  belongs  to  the  world  of 
physical  force  is  not  only  explicable,  but  it  is  inevitable, 
for  between  the  two  there  is  no  common  ground  on 
which  even  a compromise  might  be  effected,  and  the 
one  must  eternally  misunderstand  the  other.” 

Li  Hung-chang  spent  his  days  in  seeking  the 
formula  of  that  impossible  compromise.  Were  he 
alive  to-day,  his  keen  intelligence  would  surely  find, 
in  the  present  appalling  results  of  Europe’s  material 
civilisation,  new  assurances  of  justification  for  China’s 
persistence  in  clinging  to  her  ancient  beliefs  and 
patriarchal  system  of  government.  Often,  during 
his  long  and  troubled  years  of  intercourse  with 
Europeans,  we  find  him  asking  himself,  and  them, 
What  shall  it  profit  a nation  if  it  gain  the  whole  world 
of  man-killing  machinery  and  lose  its  own  soul  ? 
Even  amidst  the  surprises  and  splendours  of  his 
progress  through  Europe  and  America  in  1896,  his 

1 “The  Englishman  in  China,”  Vol.  II.,  p.  384. 


INTRODUCTORY 


29 


mature  judgment  led  him  to  a sincere  and  final 
opinion  that,  for  all  its  humiliation  of  physical 
weakness,  the  civilisation  of  China  constitutes  a more 
rational  and  humane  science  of  life  than  anything 
that  has  been  evolved  by  “ the  outer  barbarians.” 
And  this,  his  judgment,  formed  on  comparative 
observation,  coincides  with  the  instinctive  and 
unswerving  conviction  of  the  Chinese  people — one- 
fourth  of  the  human  race.  Any  record  of  the  life 
of  Li  Hung-chang  must  be  misleading  if  it  fails  to 
take  into  account  the  fact  that,  behind  all  his  professed 
enthusiasm  for  the  mechanical  sciences  of  the  West, 
and  far  stronger  than  any  impulse  which  led  him  to 
adopt  them,  was  his  invincible  faith  in  that  Celestial 
system  of  moral  philosophy  upon  which  has  stood 
the  test  of  ages,  unconquered  and  unconquerable, 
a non-militant  civilisation  more  stable  than  that  of 
Greece  or  Rome.  In  his  sedulous  search  for  the 
impossible  compromise  he  bought  ships  and  guns  ; 
but  to  the  end  of  his  days,  as  his  more  intimate 
writings  prove,  his  ultimate  belief  remained  firmly 
rooted  in  the  Canons  of  the  Sages. 

In  attempting  a critical  study  of  the  life-work  of 
China’s  most  celebrated  statesman  the  European 
biographer’s  task  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  in 
China  no  accurate  account  of  his  career  has  been 
produced.  Such  information  as  may  be  sparsely 
gleaned  from  his  own  memorials  to  the  Throne,  from 
Imperial  edicts  and  State  papers,  is  all  more  or  less 
vitiated  by  the  tendency  of  China’s  official  recorders 
to  “ make  history  ” with  an  eye  rather  to  the  approval 
of  rulers  and  posterity  than  to  the  truthful  recording 
of  actual  events.  They  make  their  dynastic  annals  to 
conform  to  the  official  conception  of  the  world-of- 


30 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


things-as-they-should-be,  with  little  or  no  relation 
to  the  world-of-things-as-they-are,  and  the  native 
Press,  served  chiefly  by  writers  imbued  with  the  same 
predilection  for  solemn  make-believe  in  the  discussion 
of  public  affairs,  affords  but  little  material  for  checking 
or  amplifying  the  official  annals.  When  the  Empress 
Dowager  expunged  the  Boxer  edicts  from  the  dynastic 
records  “ for  purposes  of  historical  accuracy,”  she 
acted  in  accordance  with  precedents  long  established 
in  the  compilation  of  the  Celestial  “ Hansard,”  and 
it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  official  biography  of  Li 
Hung-chang,  which  has  been  in  process  of  laborious 
and  leisurely  compilation  by  scholars  and  annalists 
since  1904,  will  conform  to  the  same  classical  tradition 
of  discreet  faking.  A certain  amount  of  interesting 
and  fairly  accurate  material  is  to  be  obtained  from  the 
diaries  and  narratives  of  scholars  privately  circulated, 
but  these  are  generally  lacking  in  what  American 
editors  call  the  “ human  interest.”  A biography  of 
Li,  published  by  a Shanghai  newspaper  in  1901, 
makes  no  attempt  to  analyse  the  underlying  motives 
of  his  statecraft  or  to  discover  the  secret  of  his 
successful  career  ; it  throws  little  or  no  light  on  the 
domestic  and  social  aspects  of  his  life.  Thus  it  is  that 
most  of  the  information  available  for  critical  exami- 
nation of  his  career  as  a whole  is  to  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  European  observers.  Some  of  these  have 
been  misled  as  to  their  facts  and  the  conclusions  drawn 
from  them,  by  superficial  knowledge  of  the  language 
and  customs  of  the  country,  and  by  attaching  undue 
importance  to  official  documents.  Those  Europeans 
who  knew  him  best,  and  who  might  have  written 
the  secret  history  of  many  important  events  in  his 
career  from  close  personal  observation,  have  died 


INTRODUCTORY 


31 


and  left  no  word.  The  diary  which  was  kept  for 
many  years  by  his  American  secretary,  Mr.  Pethick, 
was  reported  to  have  been  stolen  from  his  deathbed 
and  has  never  been  produced  ; the  voluminous 
correspondence  and  records  preserved  by  Sir  Robert 
Hart  at  Peking  and  by  Li’s  most  trusted  adviser, 
Herr  Detring,  at  Tientsin  were  completely  destroyed 
during  the  Boxer  disturbances  ; so  that  much  of 
Li’s  secret  diplomacy  in  foreign  affairs  from  1870 
to  1900  must  remain  matter  for  speculation  because 
of  the  conflicting  nature  of  the  surviving  evidence. 
That  which  remains  the  most  valuable  of  all  contem- 
porary records,  the  work  of  the  late  Mr.  Alexander 
Michie,  covers  only  a comparatively  brief  period  ; 
also  it  suffers  somewhat  from  the  fact  that  its  author’s 
personal  relations  with  Li  and  his  enthusiastic 
admiration  for  the  great  Viceroy  have  conduced 
to  a certain  lack  of  balance  and  perspective  in  the 
otherwise  admirable  picture  which  he  presents  of 
him  in  “ The  Englishman  in  China.” 

One  other  source  remains  from  which  light  may 
eventually  be  thrown  upon  the  character  and  life- 
work  of  this  maker  of  the  nineteenth  century 
in  China,  namely,  his  own  voluminous  writings. 
Throughout  his  career  Li  was  undoubtedly  an  inde- 
fatigable compiler  of  memorials  and  commentator 
on  current  events,  but  the  results,  so  far  as  existing 
knowledge  of  them  goes,  are  not  of  a nature  to  add 
much  to  our  stock  of  accurate  information,  either- 
regarding  their  author  or  the  part  which  he  played 
as  the  chief  instigator  and  exponent  of  China’s 
foreign  policy.  The  work  published  in  1913,  entitled 
“ Memoirs  of  the  Viceroy  Li  Hung-chang,”  with  an 
introduction  by  the  Hon.  John  W.  Foster  (ex-Secre- 


32 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tary  of  State  at  Washington),  purports  to  be  compiled 
from  a translated  selection  from  Li’s  voluminous 
manuscripts,  recovered  from  the  various  Yamens  in 
which  he  had  held  ofhce.  According  to  the  statement 
of  its  carefully  anonymous  editor,  this  selection  from 
his  memoirs  was  given  to  the  world  by  the  deceased 
statesman’s  family  and  friends,  with  the  approval  of 
the  Imperial  Government.  Even  before  it  became 
known  with  certainty  that  this  work  was  a literary 
fraud,  its  remarkable  reticence  on  matters  of  inter- 
national importance,  together  with  its  persistent 
emphasis  of  trivialities,  justified  the  conclusion  that 
the  Viceroy’s  State  papers  must  have  been  used 
either  to  serve  deplorable  purposes  of  yellow  jour- 
nalism or  for  political  ends  by  those  who  had  charge 
of  them.  The  only  escape  from  this  conclusion  lay 
in  assuming  that  Li  Hung-chang  had  deliberately 
compiled  semi-political  diaries  with  a cynical  eye  on 
posterity  and  his  tongue  in  his  cheek.  The  book, 
introduced  to  public  notice  by  the  American  diplo- 
mat and  statesman  who  had  held  a distinguished 
post  under  the  Chinese  Government,  attracted  no 
little  attention  ; nevertheless  its  authenticity  was 
questioned  from  the  outset  by  competent  critics.  It 
contained  some  entertaining  gossip  and  a curious 
assortment  of  philosophical  reflections,  but  threw 
practically  no  light  on  any  of  the  important  State 
affairs  in  which  the  great  Viceroy  played  so  prominent 
a part  for  thirty  years.  Moreover,  as  was  pointed  out 
by  more  than  one  reviewer  at  the  time  of  its  publica- 
tion, the  book  contained  unmistakable  evidence 
of  constructive  memory  and  selective  editing,  but, 
strangely  enough,  no  definite  statement  as  to  the 
authenticity  of  the  documents,  on  which  justifiable 


INTRODUCTORY 


33 


doubts  had  been  freely  expressed  at  the  time  of  their 
first  publication  in  the  English  and  American  Press. 
The  fraud  was  suspected,  in  fact,  long  before  it  was 
definitely  proved  ; but  those  who  suspected  it  were 
naturally  unable  to  decide  whether  Mr.  Mannix, 
the  enterprising  American  journalist  who  originally 
published  the  Memoirs  in  the  New  York  Sun  and  the 
London  Observer , did  his  work  with  or  without  the 
knowledge  and  consent  of  the  Viceroy’s  relatives 
and  friends.  The  internal  evidence  of  fraud  was 
overwhelming  ; but  on  the  other  hand  there  was  the 
remarkable  fact  that  no  public  disclaimer  of  the  book 
was  ever  issued  by  the  Chinese  Government  (which 
was  declared  to  have  authorised  the  publication) 
or  by  any  member  of  Li’s  own  family.  It  has  now 
been  formally  declared  by  a member  of  that  family 
that  the  Viceroy  never  kept  a diary,  either  during 
his  tour  of  the  world  or  at  Tientsin.  At  the  same  time, 
the  fact  has  been  established  that  Mr.  Mannix 
actually  was  in  North  China  and  in  Peking,  as  a 
private  in  the  United  States  9th  Infantry,  in  1900,  and 
it  is  therefore  remotely  possible  that  he  may  then 
have  come  into  contact,  in  his  journalistic  capacity, 
with  some  member  of  the  Li  family,  or  with  other 
Chinese  ready  and  able  to  provide  him  with  materials 
for  these  “ Memoirs,”  for  the  furtherance  of  their 
own  political  ends.  The  book  contains  numerous 
suggestive  traces  of  “ Young  China’s  ” ways  of 
thinking,  which  seem  to  point  to  inspiration,  if  not  to 
actual  co-operation,  afforded  to  the  author  of  this 
ingenious  fabrication.  Needless  to  say,  it  was 
accepted  by  the  public  in  all  good  faith  and  welcomed 
as  a valuable  addition  to  our  knowledge  of  men  and 
affairs  in  the  Far  East. 


L.H. 


34 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Setting  aside  the  question  as  to  whether  intellectual 
Young  China  did  actually  co-operate  in  the  com- 
pilation of  these  Memoirs,  it  is  fair  to  say  that,  in 
any  case,  they  convey  in  more  than  one  instance  a 
very  plausible  presentment  of  what  his  literary  heirs 
and  assigns  might  have  thought  fit  to  confer  upon  the 
Viceroy  as  posthumous  reflections  ; they  possess  also  a 
certain  picturesque  value  in  the  indications  which  they 
afford  of  the  Chinese  official  race-mind,  at  which  the 
author  could  scarcely  have  arrived  without  some  first- 
hand local  knowledge  and  expert  assistance.  For 
example,  the  Memoirs  reflect  in  many  curious  ways 
the  Chinese  official’s  contempt  for  everything  that  is 
not  of  the  Middle  Kingdom,  together  with  his  magnifi- 
cent valour  of  ignorance.  For  this  reason  occasional 
quotations  have  been  made  from  this  curious  volume 
chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  affording  a comparison 
between  the  workings  of  the  native  official  mind,  thus 
indirectly  but  skilfully  displayed,  and  the  opinions 
of  European  observers  concerning  important  events 
in  the  Viceroy’s  career  ; but  the  reader  should  bear 
in  mind  the  fact  that  few  if  any  of  the  sentiments 
therein  ascribed  to  Li  Hung-chang  were  ever  actually 
recorded  by  him,  and  that  he  certainly  never  wrote 
a diary. 

A collection  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  official  despatches, 
edited  by  his  most  obedient  humble  servant,  the 
pluralist  placeman  Sheng  Hsiian-huai,  was  pub- 
lished at  Shanghai  not  long  after  his  death.  These 
documents  are  of  no  more  practical  utility  for  his- 
torical purposes  than  the  Imperial  edicts  and  annals 
of  the  Manchu  dynasty.  As  a whole,  they  display 
in  a remarkable  manner  the  classical  mandarin’s 
talent  for  phrase-weaving  and  their  author’s  con- 


INTRODUCTORY 


35 


spicuous  ability  in  making  or  saving  his  official  face, 
quite  regardless  of  accuracy  or  the  actual  course  of 
events.  In  the  light  of  all  that  is  authoritatively 
known  of  recent  Chinese  history,  and  the  part  which 
Li  played  in  it,  from  the  days  of  the  Taiping  rebellion 
down  to  the  Boxer  rising,  these  despatches  of  Li 
Hung-chang  afford  noteworthy  evidence  of  the  all- 
pervading  atmosphere  of  “ make-believe  ” in  which 
the  Chinese  bureaucracy  lives,  moves,  and  has  its 
being  ; evidence  also  of  their  author’s  instinctive 
conformity  to  his  environment  in  politics  and  morals. 
Indeed,  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  their  chief  value 
lies  in  the  unconscious  testimony  which  they  bear  to 
the  Confucian  scholar’s  placid  aloofness  from  the 
world  of  realities,  and  to  the  fact  that  this  attitude 
is  generally  due  to  a perfectly  sincere  belief  in  the 
superior  wisdom  of  the  Chinese  conception  of  state- 
craft. 

Our  present  study  of  the  life  and  times  of  Li  Hung- 
chang  must,  therefore,  be  based  more  upon  the 
recorded  opinions  of  independent  and  competent 
European  observers  than  upon  the  evidence  of  Chinese 
official  records  or  Li’s  own  posthumous  papers.  That 
evidence  must  necessarily  be  regarded  as  contributory 
rather  than  conclusive.  But  whatever  the  authorities 
by  whom  we  are  guided,  or  the  judgment  which  we 
may  be  disposed  to  form  upon  their  opinions,  in 
estimating  the  final  verdict  of  history  upon  Li  Hung- 
chang  and  his  place  as  a maker  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  let  us,  in  justice  to  the  man  and  to  his  work, 
remember  the  social  and  political  conditions  into 
which  he  was  born.  And  when  we  have  fairly  weighed 
the  sum  of  his  achievements  against  that  of  his  errors 
and  failures,  let  us  not  forget  the  peculiar  and  ever- 


D 2 


36 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


increasing  difficulties  with  which  he  was  called  upon 
to  cope,  almost  single-handed,  as  the  result  of  the 
decline  of  the  Manchu  power  within,  and  the  alarms 
and  excursions  of  Europe  without,  the  “ sacred 
heritage  ” of  the  Middle  Kingdom. 


CHAPTER  II 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE 

Having  thus  examined  the  general  characteristics 
of  the  state  of  society  into  which  Li  Hung-chang  was 
born  and  some  of  its  prevailing  and  permanent  causes, 
let  us  now  consider  what  was  the  nature  of  the  educa- 
tion and  domestic  environment  which  produced  this 
Oriental  super-man,  and  what  were  the  events  or 
circumstances  of  his  early  life  which  served  to  give  a 
particular  direction  to  his  thoughts  and  actions. 
Imprimis , there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  inherited 
much  of  his  extraordinary  physical  and  mental 
vigour  from  his  mother,  and  that  from  her  also  he 
acquired  that  genial  temperament  and  tolerant  philo- 
sophy which  distinguished  him  in  private  life,  and 
made  for  him  many  friends  amongst  those  with  whom 
he  came  into  contact  in  diplomacy  and  business. 
Again,  it  is  certain  that  the  intelligent  appreciation 
of  foreigners  which  he  displayed  at  the  outset  of  his 
viceregal  career,  and  during  the  whole  subsequent 
course  of  his  foreign  policy,  was  sensibly  influenced 
by  his  close  association  with  General  Gordon  during 
the  Taiping  campaign.  These  were  assuredly  factors 
in  the  determination  of  his  character  during  its  most 
formative  period  ; both  influences  tended  to  modify 
in  him,  though  they  could  never  eradicate,  the 
inevitable  results  of  his  environment,  of  his  stereo- 
typed education  and  the  rigid  class-interests  of  the 
mandarin. 


38 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Of  Li’s  father  very  little  is  known  beyond  the  fact 
that  he  spent  a large  portion  of  his  days  as  one  of 
the  “ great  unpaid  ” — the  discontented,  disappointed 
army  of  “ expectant  ” officials.  Li  himself,  who,  as 
a staunch  Confucianist,  always  professed  to  regard 
filial  piety  as  the  chief  of  virtues,  seldom  mentioned 
his  father  in  private  conversation,  and,  so  far  as  we 
are  aware,  indited  to  his  memory  none  of  the  lauda- 
tory verses  in  which  he  was  wont  to  exercise  his 
literary  talents.  We  know  that  Li  pere  belonged  to 
the  literati  class  ; that  is  to  say,  he  had  succeeded 
in  passing  the  provincial  Bachelors’  examination, 
but,  like  so  many  of  that  struggling  army  of  scholars, 
he  had  lacked  either  the  ability  or  the  means  to  secure 
further  advancement.  He  married  young,  and  had 
five  sons  (of  whom  Li  Hung-chang  was  the  second), 
and  was  able  to  provide  them  all  with  the  rudiments 
of  the  usual  orthodox  education  : all  of  them  acquired, 
under  the  direction  of  the  village  pundit,  the  parrot- 
like proficiency  in  reciting  the  Classics  which  in  China 
is  the  beginning  of  wisdom.  In  the  alleged  “ Memoirs  ” 
to  which  I referred  in  the  previous  chapter  there 
are  some  references  to  Li  Hung-chang’s  relations  with 
his  father  in  the  year  1846.  One  of  these,  purporting 
to  have  been  written  when  Li  Hung-chang  was 
twenty-five  years  of  age  at  the  ancestral  home  in  Hofei, 
places  his  parent’s  age  at  forty-two ; this  would 
imply  that  the  father  had  married  a:t  the  early  age 
of  fifteen.  Another  entry,  under  a date  in  January 
1846,  records  the  ambitious  young  scholar’s  reluc- 
tance to  comply  with  his  “ noble  and  severe  parent’s  ” 
expressed  desire  that  he  should  get  married.  Li’s 
first  marriage  must  have  taken  place  at  or  about 
this  time,  for  we  know  that  his  young  wife  and 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  39 


children  disappeared,  and  doubtless  perished  at  the 
hands  of  theTaiping  raiders,  shortly  after  his  exchange 
of  civil  for  military  duties  in  1853.  It  is  recorded 
that  a post  in  the  Prefecture  was  then  secured  for  Li 
through  the  influence  of  his  uncle  (himself  employed 
in  the  local  Lekin  tax  collectorate),  and  that  the 
District  Magistrate,  hearing  of  the  prudent  youth’s 
literary  prowess,  made  him  recite  the  Spring  and 
Autumn  Annals  backwards,  with  results  highly 
gratifying  to  Li’s  self-esteem.  There  is  ample 
evidence  that  during  these  years  all  his  energies  were 
concentrated  on  achieving,  by  diligent  hard  work, 
the  literary  distinction  and  skill  in  penmanship 
through  which  lay  the  high-road  to  an  official  career. 
It  was  in  1847  that  he  passed  out  third  from  amongst 
four  thousand  competitors  at  the  Palace  examination 
for  Metropolitan  graduates  ( chin-shih ),  and  secured 
his  place  in  the  Hanlin  Academy,  or  “ Forest  of 
Pencils.”  In  1851,  when  he  became  a second-class 
Recorder  of  the  Hanlin,  he  had  already  achieved 
no  small  measure  of  distinction ; his  beautiful  and 
scholarly  caligraphy  was  becoming  celebrated  amongst 
the  literati  of  the  capital,  and  its  fame  had  extended 
to  the  provinces.  But,  beyond  revealing  an  infinite 
capacity  for  taking  pains  and  a keen  appreciation  of 
his  own  abilities,  he  had  so  far  displayed  no  mental 
qualities  other  than  those  of  the  orthodox  Con- 
fucianist.  The  rigidly-stereotyped  system  of  learning 
which  absorbed  him  was  precisely  the  same  in  every 
detail  as  that  which  had  served  to  petrify  the  imagi- 
nation and  destroy  the  mental  activity  of  his  fore- 
fathers and  contemporaries.  He  could  recite  whole 
volumes  of  the  Classics,  backwards  or  forwards, 
and  indite  endless  essays,  in  prose  and  verse,  on  any 


4o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


and  every  subject  ; at  the  same  time  his  acute 
intelligence  had  taught  him  that  the  path  to  success, 
such  as  his  high  ambition  craved,  lay  chiefly  through 
a well-filled  purse  and  the  favour  of  the  great.  But 
the  Taiping  rebellion,  which  broke  out  in  the  south  of 
China  in  the  same  year  that  he  entered  the  ranks  of 
the  Hanlin,  served  to  widen  his  experience  and  to 
enlarge  his  outlook,  completing,  on  very  different 
lines,  the  education  which  the  Classics  had  begun. 

In  that  year,  Li,  then  aged  twenty-eight,  was  living 
at  the  home  of  his  fathers,  at  Hofei,  in  the  province  of 
Anhui  ; very  little  is  known  of  his  occupation  at  this 
period.  The  Hon.  John  Foster,  in  his  curiously 
eulogistic  preface  to  the  imaginary  Memoirs,  describes 
how,  at  the  time  of  his  return  from  Peking  to  the 
ancestral  home,  the  rebellion  had  gained  alarming 
headway,  and  narrates  that  “ as  he  reached  his 
“ father’s  house,  he  saw  the  rebels  pass  by  on  their 
“ triumphant  march  towards  Peking.  His  patriotism 
“ was  stirred  within  him  as  he  saw  the  dynasty  which 
“had  conferred  on  him  such  high  honours,  and  the 
“ ancient  Government,  in  imminent  peril.  He  at  once 
“ set  to  work  to  raise  a volunteer  regiment  to  fall 
“ upon  and  harass  the  rear  of  the  enemy.”  Professor 
Douglas  gives  a similar  account  of  the  origin  of  Li’s 
military  career,  but  he  puts  its  date  at  the  beginning 
of  1853.  What  we  know  of  Li’s  extreme  carefulness 
in  money  matters,  however,  makes  it  difficult  to 
accept  this  story,  quite  apart  from  the  improbability 
of  his  being  able,  even  if  willing,  to  raise,  by  his  own 
unaided  efforts,  any  military  force  worthy  of  the 
name.  There  is  far  more  presumptive  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  explanation  that  he  abandoned  his 
literary  career,  and  adopted  the  despised  profession 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  41 


of  arms,  because,  after  the  Taiping  rebellion  had 
assumed  formidable  proportions,  Tseng  Kuo-fan  (com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  Imperialist  forces)  applied 
to  Peking  to  be  supplied  with  a number  of  secretaries, 
and  that  young  Li  was  recommended  for  one  of  these 
promising  posts  by  an  Anhui  member  of  the  Hanlin 
College.  If,  as  report  has  it,  he  and  his  father  (who 
died  in  1856)  were  instrumental  in  raising  local  levies 
for  the  Imperialist  army,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  they 
both  did  so  under  the  direction  of  Tseng  Kuo-fan,  and 
that  the  funds  were  provided  for  the  purpose  by  the 
provincial  authorities.  This  view  of  the  matter  is 
partially  borne  out  by  contemporary  evidence,  which 
describes  Li  Hung-chang  as  employed  in  the  office 
of  the  treasurer  at  Hofei  in  1855,1  and  incidentally 
making  money.  In  that  capacity  his  intelligent 
activities  attracted  the  attention  of  the  District 
Magistrate,  who  reported  on  him  as  an  official  of 
unusual  promise.  His  father,  according  to  the  same 
reports,  would  appear  to  have  had  several  interviews 
with  Tseng  Kuo-fan,  as  the  result  of  which,  and  of 
the  great  scholar-soldier’s  admiration  for  Li’s  literary 
style  and  penmanship,  the  young  Hanlin  gave  up  the 
pen  and  took  to  the  sword.  Whatever  his  reasons 
for  accepting  this  appointment,  it  certainly  laid  the 
first  solid  foundations  of  his  career. 

English  readers  will  note  that,  in  China,  the  civil 
official  with  no  qualifications  other  than  those  of  his 
classical  education  performs  high  military  functions 
as  readily,  and  with  the  same  valour  of  ignorance, 
as  he  undertakes  the  negotiation  of  a foreign  treaty, 
the  management  of  a bank,  or  the  conservancy  of  a 
great  river.  The  whole  mandarin  class,  in  fact, 

1 The  southern  capital,  Nanking,  had  fallen  to  the  rebels  in  March,  1853. 


42 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


assumes  the  direction  of  highly-technical  affairs  upon 
an  assumption  of  omniscient  versatility  not  unlike 
that  with  which  politicians  and  public  opinion  invest 
Cabinet  Ministers  in  England.  There  is,  therefore, 
nothing  remarkable  in  the  fact  that  Li  Hung-chang 
rose  speedily  from  the  position  of  a Military  Secretary 
to  be  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Imperialist  forces  in 
the  province  of  Kiangsu  ; there  is  ample  and  reliable 
evidence  that  he  succeeded,  by  sheer  force  of  industry 
and  merit,  in  winning  the  good  opinion  of  Tseng 
Kuo-fan,  upon  which  his  promotion  depended.  And 
simultaneously  with  his  promotion  to  high  military 
command,  he  rose  in  the  ranks  of  the  civil  service, 
for,  as  a Hanlin,  his  belligerent  activities  were  recog- 
nised as  a temporary  digression.  In  1857  he  was 
made  acting  provincial  judge  of  Chekiang,  and  in 
1859  (for  reasons  that  are  not  apparent,  since  he  never 
took  up  the  post)  he  was  appointed  to  a Taotaiship 
(Intendancy)  in  Fukhien.  Finally,  in  1862,  he  became 
Governor  of  Kiangsu,  and  in  this  capacity  began  to 
acquire  at  Shanghai  his  first  insight  into  the  arts  and 
crafts  of  diplomacy  and  the  wide  field  of  foreign 
politics.  In  i860,  his  experience  of  European  methods 
of  warfare  began,  by  reason  of  his  relations  with  Ward, 
the  American  adventurer-captain  of  the  “ Ever- 
victorious  Army.”  At  this  time  also  the  foreigner’s 
military  superiority  was  brought  home  to  his  acute 
intelligence  by  the  ease  with  which  the  Anglo-French 
forces  had  overthrown  all  the  northern  defences  of 
the  Empire  and  invested  Peking. 

Two  interesting  but  unconfirmed  stories  have 
always  been  current  in  China  with  regard  to  this 
period  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  career.  Mr.  Alexander 
Michie,  a competent  and  usually  reliable  authority, 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  43 


gave  publicity  and  credence  to  the  first1  in  an  article 
published,  shortly  after  the  Viceroy’s  death,  in  1901. 
He  declared  that  much  of  Li’s  success  in  dealing  with 
the  rebellion  was  due  to  the  fact  that  he  had  been  for 
some  time  a captive  in  the  insurgent  armies,  during 
which  period  he  saved  his  life  by  placing  his  pen 
at  the  disposal  of  the  illiterate  rebel  chiefs,  and  by 
this  means  obtained  a close  acquaintance  with  their 
organisation  and  methods.  This  may  be  true,  or  it 
may  be  only  one  of  the  many  “ ben  trovato  ” inven- 
tions which  in  Eastern  countries  attain  solidity  by  force 
of  repetition  and  which,  in  the  case  of  Li,  tend  greatly 
to  obscure  the  record  of  his  life.  The  fact  that  all 
official  records  are  silent  on  the  subject  affords  no 
conclusive  disproof  of  the  story  ; but  his  captivity,  if 
it  ever  occurred,  must  have  been  extremely  brief. 

The  other  legend  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  much  more 
likely  to  be  founded  on  fact.  It  is  to  the  effect  that 
the  Imperialist  General  Chen2  (who,  under  Li,  fought 
valiantly  with  Gordon  against  the  Taipings  and  had 
particularly  distinguished  himself  in  the  recapture 
of  Soochow  in  1863)  had  originally  been  a rebel 
leader  and  had  been  artfully  persuaded  by  Li  Hung- 
chang  to  transfer  his  allegiance  to  the  Imperial  side. 
In  a memorial  to  the  Throne  describing  how  this 
brave  man  met  his  death  at  the  taking  of  Kiashing-fu 
in  April,  1864,  Li  confirms  the  fact  of  Chen  having 
been  a rebel  chief  : 

“On  the  15th  of  April”  (he  wrote)  “he  died.  I 
was  excessively  grieved ; all  the  military  officers 

1 Vide  Blackwood  for  December,  1901. 

2 Professor  Douglas  calls  him  General  Ch’eng.  Hake,  in  his  “ Story  of 
Chinese  Gordon,”  adopts  the  local  romanisation  of  “ Ching.”  Mrs.  Little’s 
“ Li  Hung-chang  ” refers  to  him  as  General  Chang.  The  North  China 
Herald  of  that  period  usually  called  him  General  Ching.  His  name,  accu- 
rately romanised,  was  Chen  Hsiao-chi. 


44 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


wept  bitterly.  Everyone,  whether  belonging  to 
Kiangsu  or  Chekiang,  whether  mandarins  or  scholars 
or  common  people,  lamented  his  death.  I then 
examined  into  Chen’s  previous  history  and  discovered 
that  he  came  from  a place  in  Anhui,  whence  he  was 
taken  as  a prisoner  during  the  rebel  troubles.  The 
‘ four-eyed  dog  ’ Ying  placed  great  confidence  in 
him.  Chen  at  length  made  an  attempt  to  get  away 
from  the  rebels  because  he  saw  that  they  oppressed 
the  people.  . . . Chen  came  over  to  the  Imperialist 
camp  and  surrendered  himself.  He  was  instantly 
recognised  as  being  of  a superior  class,  far  above  the 
general  run  of  rebel  officers  who  had  come  over  to  our 
ranks.  He  was  therefore  appointed  to  a command  in 
our  forces  and  took  part  in  the  expedition  which 
recovered  Ngankin,  where  he  displayed  great  valour. 
The  Governor-General  Tseng  Kuo-fan  reported  the 
affair  to  your  Majesty  at  the  time  and  pledged  himself 
for  Chen’s  loyalty.  I myself  constantly  heard  of  his 
exploits,  of  his  wisdom,  courage  and  resource.” 

The  memorial  goes  on  to  describe  the  deceased 
General’s  military  virtues  and  achievements,  inciden- 
tally giving  him  the  entire  credit  for  the  victories  won 
by  General  Gordon.  But,  if  the  legend  commonly 
current  is  true,  Li  knew  a great  deal  more  about 
Chen  than  what  he  learned  from  these  official 
inquiries,  for  it  is  commonly  asserted  and  believed 
that  the  rebel  leader  purchased  his  position  and  pro- 
motion in  the  Imperialist  army  from  Li  with  a con- 
siderable sum  of  money,  and  that  Li  used  this  money 
to  purchase  his  own  official  advancement.  There  is 
nothing  inherently  improbable  in  the  story,  for  such 
transactions  have  always  been  recognised  as  part  of 
the  higher  science  of  warfare  in  China  ; Chen’s 
marriage  with  Li’s  sister  is  alleged  to  have  been  part 
of  the  compact,  and  a mutual  guarantee  of  good  faith. 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  45 


It  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
work,  to  give  any  detailed  account  of  the  important 
part  played  by  Li  Hung-chang  in  the  suppression  of 
the  Taiping  rebellion.  The  principal  events  of  that 
campaign  (1853-64)  have  been  succinctly  recorded 
by  Professor  Douglas.1  Readers  who  seek  more 
precise  information  will  find  it  in  the  despatches 
of  Sir  Frederick  Bruce,  General  Staveley,  and 
“ Chinese  ” Gordon,  recorded  in  the  Blue-Books  of 
that  period,2  and  may  profitably  compare  them,  as  an 
object-lesson  in  the  making  of  history,  with  the  con- 
temporary memorials  of  Tseng  Kuo-fan  and  Imperial 
decrees,  a collection  of  official  documents  selected 
and  translated  by  R.  A.  Jamieson,  Interpreter  in 
the  British  Consular  Service  in  China.3  The  story 
of  his  famous  quarrel  with  Gordon  in  the  matter  of 
his  treacherous  killing  of  the  rebel  chiefs  at  Soochow 
exemplifies  the  truth  that,  with  all  his  superior  intel- 
ligence and  three  years’  experience  of  Europeans  at 
close  quarters,  Li  Hung-chang  was  no  more  able  to 
look  at  the  moral  side  of  things  from  Gordon’s  point 
of  view  than  Gordon  was  able  to  recite  the  Chinese 
Classics  backwards.  In  expecting  Li  to  assimilate 
and  act  upon  his  own  humane  and  chivalrous  ideas 
of  warfare,  Gordon  showed  a lack  of  judgment  and 
insight  fully  equal  to  that  which  Li  displayed  when  he 
refused  to  believe  that  the  Englishman  attached 
serious  importance  to  his  pledged  word.  But  the 
whole  episode,  though  rendered  memorable  and 
dramatic  by  Gordon’s  characteristic  outburst  of 
righteous  wrath  and  vengeful  pursuit  of  the  offending 


1 “ Li  Hung-chang,”  by  Professor  Robert  K.  Douglas  (London,  1895). 

2 Also  vide  “ General  Gordon’s  Diary  in  China,”  by  S.  Mossman  (1885 

3 Published  as  pamphlets  (Shanghai,  1864-65). 


46 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Governor,  was  only  one  of  many  similar  encounters 
between  these  two  men  in  the  field  of  hopelessly 
conflicting  ideals.  If  Gordon  found  it  hard  to  put 
up  with  Li’s  grasping  avarice  and  insincerity,  the 
mandarin,  panoplied  in  the  suave  certainty  of  his  own 
ineffable  superiority,  found  it  equally  hard  to  endure 
Gordon’s  blunt  directness  and  uncompromising  insis- 
tence on  honesty.  Politically  speaking,  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  unmistakable  object,  from  the  outset  of  his 
relations  with  Ward,  Burgevine  and  Gordon,  was  to 
use  the  foreigners’  superior  military  skill  while  at  the 
same  time  preventing  them  at  all  costs  from  exercising 
any  executive  authority  which  might  encroach  upon 
the  prerogatives  of  the  mandarinate.  He  feared  the 
encroachments  of  the  European  more  than  any 
native  rebellion  because,  more  clearly  than  any  of 
the  high  officials  at  Peking,  he  had  gauged  the  real 
political  significance  of  the  military  expeditions  from 
the  West,  which  had  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Canton 
by  a small  British  force  in  1857  and  in  t^ie  signature 
at  Peking  of  Lord  Elgin’s  Treaty  of  Peace  in  October, 
i860.  In  1862,  when  he  politely  declined  Russia’s 
offer  of  troops  to  suppress  the  Taipings,  he  was  already 
fully  determined  to  oppose  the  brute  force  of  the 
Western  world  by  subtlety  of  superior  statecraft 
and  by  political  arts  of  jujitsu.  A Russian  force 
under  Russian  officers  would  never  have  suited  his 
policy,  since  it  would  have  been  independent  of 
his  orders.  He  saw  nothing  undignified,  however, 
in  using  against  Chinese  rebels  the  services  of  English 
and  French  troops  fresh  from  the  capture  of  Peking  ; 
on  the  contrary,  he  derived  unconcealed  satisfaction 
from  the  willingness  of  General  Staveley  and  Admiral 
Protet  to  co-operate  with  his  own  forces  in  the 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  47 


Imperialist  cause  and  at  the  same  time  to  recognise 
in  him  the  representative  of  China’s  undiminished 
sovereign  rights.  He  was  only  too  willing  that  Gordon 
and  his  soldiers  of  fortune  should  do  the  hard  fighting} 
provided  always  that  the  recording  of  events  for 
the  information  of  the  Throne  and  the  dispensing  of 
rewards  remained  entirely  in  his  own  hands.  In  his 
Memorials  reporting  the  final  collapse  of  the  rebellion, 
as  in  the  despatch  which  recorded  the  death  of  General 
Chen  Hsiao-chi,  the  part  played  by  Gordon  in  recover- 
ing the  sacred  heritage  of  the  Throne  was  reduced 
to  insignificant  proportions.  Gordon  received  a 
yellow  jacket  and  a peacock’s  feather,  it  is  true, 
and  an  offer  (which  he  declined)  of  pecuniary 
reward  for  his  services  ; but  Li,  with  his  ready  pen, 
saw  to  it  that  the  achievements  of  the  “ Ever-vic- 
torious  Army  ” and  its  leader  were  discreetly  merged, 
“ for  purposes  of  historical  accuracy,”  in  the  blaze  of 
glory  which  fittingly  rewarded  his  own  exploits  of 
foresight  and  of  valour. 

His  attitude  towards  Gordon  varied,  according  to 
the  extent  of  his  dependence  upon  that  gallant  but 
impulsive  officer’s  efforts,  from  almost  affectionate 
gratitude  to  cavalier  rudeness  ; more  than  once  their 
relations  became  severely  strained,  by  reason  of 
Li’s  incorrigible  bad  faith  in  regard  to  the  regular 
payment  of  the  troops.  The  American  adventurer 
Burgevine,  Gordon’s  predecessor  in  command  of  the 
“ Ever-victorious  Army,”  had  quarrelled  with  Li, 
and  eventually  had  gone  over  to  the  rebels,  because 
of  these  same  money  difficulties  ; the  fact  of  the  matter 
being  that  Li  regarded  this  campaign,  as  he  did  all 
China’s  later  wars,  from  the  standpoint  of  its  effect 
upon  his  own  purse.  His  fundamental  idea  in  military 


48 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


finance  at  this  period  was  payment  by  results,  with 
the  proviso,  frequently  implied,  that  what  the  troops 
lost  by  official  short  payments  they  might  make  good 
by  the  looting  of  captured  cities — Chinese  cities.  The 
“ Memoirs  ” credit  him  with  some  remarkably  frank 
admissions  under  this  heading. 

The  first  is  dated  February  25th,  1863  (Gordon  took 
up  the  command  in  March)  : 

“ Colonel  Gordon  writes  that  it  must  be  understood 
that  he  is  in  supreme  command  or  not  at  all.  That  is 
just  the  manner  of  all  these  foreigners  who  come  into 
our  service,  even  when  they  themselves  are  seeking 
the  position  and  are  held  waiting  many  days  or 
weeks  for  their  answer.  Of  course,  I cannot  say  this 
of  this  English  officer,  for  he  did  not  apply  for  the 
generalship,  nor  does  he  want  pay.  He  does  not  say 
this  last  himself,  but  his  superiors  do,  and  that  is 
enough  for  me.  However,  if  he  is  an  able  man  and 
can  make  of  the  army  the  kind  of  weapon  that  is 
needed  now  to  break  the  necks  of  all  these  Taipings, 
I will  see  to  it  that  he  is  well  rewarded  in  honours 
and  money.” 

A month  later  : 

“ Gordon  is  superior  in  manner  and  bearing  to  all 
the  foreigners  I have  come  into  contact  with,  and 
does  not  show  outwardly  that  conceit  which  makes 
most  of  them  repugnant  in  my  sight.  Besides,  while 
he  is  possessed  of  a splendid  military  bearing,  he  is 
direct  and  business-like.  Within  two  hours  after  his 
arrival,  he  was  inspecting  the  troops  and  giving 
orders,  and  I could  not  but  rejoice  at  the  manner  in 
which  his  commands  were  obeyed.” 

Under  date  April  7th  occurs  an  entry  which  cer- 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  49 


tainly  conveys  an  accurate  description  of  his  methods 
of  military  finance  : 

“ General  Gordon,  with  3,000  members  of  the  Ever- 
victorious  Army  and  15,000  or  16,000  of  regular 
Imperial  troops  and  irregular  provincials,  is  pressing 
a hard  attack  upon  the  rebels  at  Fushan.  I gave 
them  some  pay  the  day  before  yesterday,  and  let  it 
be  known  that,  as  soon  as  Fushan  is  completely  in 
our  hands,  another  good  payment  will  be  made. 
Then,  when  Soochow  is  again  in  our  control,  I told 
them  full  payment  and  a bounty  will  be  given  each 
member  of  the  force  under  Gordon.” 

In  May  he  became  so  enthusiastic  over  Gordon’s 
splendid  qualities  as  a fighting  man  “ that  he  called 
him  his  brother,”  and  memorialised  the  Throne 
with  a request  that  Gordon  should  be  given  “ rank 
and  office  as  a Chinese  tsung-ping  ” (brigadier- 
general),  which  was  done.  The  Imperial  edict  con- 
ferring this  rank  was  in  the  best  Chinese  style  of 
solemn  make-believe. 

“ Let  Gordon  be  enjoined  to  use  stringent  efforts 
to  maintain  discipline  in  the  Ever-victorious  Army, 
which  has  fallen  into  a state  of  disorganisation,  and 
thus  guard  against  the  recurrence  of  former  evils.” 
Li  forwarded  to  Gordon  a copy  of  the  Decree,  “ to 
which  the  officer  in  question  will  yield  respectful 
obedience.” 

But  in  July  a sordid  rift  appeared  in  the  lute  : 

“ Gordon  thinks  of  nothing  but  money  these  days 
and  demands  coin  of  me  as  if  I were  the  god  of  gold 
and  silver.  He  says  the  men  will  not  fight  any  more 
unless  they  are  paid.  I tell  him  that  as  soon  as 
Soochow  is  in  our  hands,  there  will  be  funds  sufficient 
to  pay  all  arrears  and  some  good  bounty.” 

L.H.  E 


5° 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Burgevine,  when  confronted  by  the  same  difficulty 
of  extracting  his  troops’  pay  from  the  civil  authori- 
ties, had  helped  himself  by  force  from  the  coffers  of 
the  merchant-mandarin  paymaster  at  Shanghai,  and 
had  been  dismissed  by  Li  for  so  doing.  In  the  sub- 
sequent diplomatic  discussion  of  the  dispute,  he  had 
received  sympathy  and  support  from  the  British 
and  American  Ministers  at  Peking,  but  Li  positively 
refused  to  have  any  further  dealings  with  a man  who 
could  take  not  only  the  law  but  the  money  into  his 
own  hands.  Five  months  after  Gordon’s  appoint- 
ment Burgevine  went  over  in  wrath  to  the  enemy, 
taking  with  him  a hundred  other  European  malcon- 
tent deserters  from  the  Imperialist  cause.  Gordon, 
already  sick  at  heart  and  despairing  of  ever  being 
able  to  organise  a disciplined  force  under  such  con- 
ditions, had  resigned  his  command,  but  with  charac- 
teristic chivalry  he  resumed  it  upon  learning  of  Burge- 
vine’s  treachery.  This  was  in  August,  1863.  Li 
Hung-chang’s  nerves  had  been  severely  shaken  by 
the  Burgevine  episode,  as  was  shown  by  his  issue  of 
a proclamation  offering  a reward  of  3,000  taels  for 
his  capture,  alive  or  dead  ; nevertheless,  his  subse- 
quent controversy  with  the  British  and  American 
consular  authorities  displayed  all  the  qualities  of 
subtle  intelligence,  complacent  ignorance,  and  un- 
bounded audacity,  which  distinguished  his  subsequent 
career  in  diplomacy. 

Gordon’s  magnanimity  in  returning  to  his  uncon- 
genial duties  after  Burgevine’s  act  of  perfidy  evoked 
no  feelings  of  gratitude  in  Li,  who  persisted  in  his 
parsimonious  treatment  of  the  “ Ever-victorious 
Army.”  Gordon,  on  his  side,  continued  to  insist  on 
regular  salaries  and  supplies,  and  strongly  protested 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  51 


against  continuance  of  the  system  of  payment  by 
looting  which  had  flourished  under  his  predecessors. 
After  the  capture  of  Quinsan,  he  had  written  very 
forcibly  to  Li  announcing  his  intention  of  resigning 
his  command  “ in  consequence  of  the  monthly  diffi- 
culties I experience  in  obtaining  the  payment  of  the 
force/’  and  declaring  that  retention  of  office  under 
these  circumstances  was  derogatory  to  his  position 
as  a British  officer.  But  where  money  was  concerned 
Li  was  adamant,  and  in  parting  with  it  he  yielded, 
not  to  reason,  but  only  to  fear. 

His  treachery  in  ordering  the  murder  of  the  rebel 
chiefs  after  Gordon’s  capture  of  the  city  of  Soochow 
(December,  1863)  was  thoroughly  in  keeping  with 
his  own  conception  of  statecraft  and  morality.  The 
incident  throws  instructive  light  on  a feature  of  his 
character  which  was  but  rarely  revealed  to  Europeans, 
namely,  his  utter  callousness  and  contempt  for  human 
life  in  any  emergency  where  either  his  political  pur- 
poses or  personal  ambitions  were  at  stake.  Towards 
those  who  stood  in  the  way  of  what  he  considered 
his  duty  to  the  State  or  his  private  interests  he  dis- 
played a thoroughly  Oriental  frightfulness,  following 
in  this  the  example  of  his  illustrious  sovereign,  Her 
Majesty  Tzu  Hsi. 

For  some  time  before  the  final  successful  assault 
of  the  “ Ever-victorious  Army  ” on  Soochow,  it  had 
been  evident  to  Li  Hung-chang  that  the  rebel  leaders 
were  losing  heart  and  that  the  great  rebellion  was 
drawing  to  its  close.  For  a little  while,  in  the  autumn 
of  1863,  after  Burgevine’s  desertion  to  the  rebel  ranks, 
it  seemed  as  if  Li’s  parsimonious  treatment  of  Gordon’s 
force  might  lead  a considerable  portion  of  that  force 
to  follow  Burgevine’s  lead.  But  the  reinforcements 


52 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


which  that  embittered  soldier  of  fortune  brought 
to  the  Taipings  were  too  small  and  arrived  too  late 
to  stem  the  tide  of  disaffection  and  disillusion  which 
had  set  in  amongst  them.  In  transferring  his  services 
to  the  enemy,  Burgevine  had  hoped  to  revenge  him- 
self for  the  cavalier  treatment  meted  out  to  him  by 
Li  Hung-chang,  by  leading  a victorious  Taiping  host 
against  Peking,  and  he  had  even  hoped  to  persuade 
Gordon  to  join  him  in  this  magnificent  adventure. 
But  he  was  rapidly  disillusioned.  Within  the  walls 
of  Soochow  he  found  no  scope  for  his  indisputable 
talent  of  leadership,  but  only  the  chaos  of  divided 
counsels  and  an  impending  sauve  qui  peut.  Of  the 
eight  rebel  “ princes  ” there  was  only  one,  the  Mu 
Wang,  who  remained  firm  of  purpose  and  determined 
to  continue  the  struggle  to  the  bitter  end.  The  rest, 
supported  by  some  30,000  of  their  followers,  had 
already  begun  to  make  secret  overtures  to  the  Im- 
perialist General  Chen,  with  a view  to  capitulation 
in  return  for  a general  amnesty.  Burgevine  and 
those  who  had  changed  sides  with  him  were  not  long 
in  perceiving  that  the  Taiping  cause  was  hopeless  ; 
they  therefore  made  proposals  on  their  own  account 
to  Gordon,  which  he  readily  accepted,  that  they 
should  return  once  more  to  the  Imperialist  army, 
on  the  understanding  that  no  steps  would  be  taken 
against  them  for  having  deserted  it.  The  conclusion 
of  this  arrangement  was  speedily  followed  by  the 
assassination  of  the  Mu  Wang  at  a council  of  the  rebel 
chiefs,  who  hoped,  by  putting  an  end  to  the  last 
determined  leader  of  the  insurrection,  to  gain  favour 
and  easy  terms  of  surrender  for  themselves.  Previous 
to  the  perpetration  of  this  foul  deed,  Gordon,  accom- 
panied by  General  Chen,  had  had  an  interview  with 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  53 


the  capitulating  Wangs,  and  these,  in  return  for  his 
promise  that  their  lives  would  be  spared,  had  under- 
taken to  hand  over  the  city  by  secretly  withdrawing 
the  guards  from  one  of  its  gates.  General  Chen  was 
a party  to  this  agreement,  which  included  an  under- 
standing that  the  city  was  not  to  be  looted.  Having 
thus  come  to  terms  with  the  rebel  chiefs,  Gordon  left 
General  Chen  to  carry  out  the  details  of  the  capitu- 
lation as  arranged.  He  himself  went  off  to  report 
matters  to  Li  and  to  endeavour  to  obtain  from  him 
such  bonus  pay  for  his  troops  as  would  reconcile  them 
to  the  loss  of  plunder  from  the  city.  To  remove  them 
from  the  temptation  of  their  lust  for  loot,  he  proceeded 
to  withdraw  his  men  a day’s  march  from  Soochow. 
Bur  Li  Hung-chang,  confident  now  that  the  end  was 
in  sight,  forgot  all  his  promises  of  liberal  largesse 
and  refused  Gordon’s  request  for  two  months’  pay 
for  the  “ Ever-victorious  Army.”  This  was  bad 
enough,  since  it  lowered  Gordon’s  prestige  with  the 
force  and  nearly  provoked  a mutiny ; but  worse  was 
to  follow.  Gordon  had  solemnly  promised,  in  Chen’s 
presence,  that  the  lives  of  the  rebel  chiefs  would  be 
spared  on  their  making  due  submission.  Even  with- 
out a specific  assurance  from  Li,  he  had  a right  to 
give  this  undertaking  and  to  expect  that  the  van- 
quished would  receive  humane  treatment.  Some 
months  before,  after  the  taking  of  the  walled  city 
of  T’ai-tsang,  seven  rebel  chiefs  had  been  cruelly 
tortured  and  slain  by  the  Imperialist  General  after 
Gordon  had  entrusted  them  to  his  care  ; the  prisoners 
had  been  crucified  and  subjected  to  the  slicing  process. 
These  barbarous  proceedings  had  created  such  a 
strong  feeling  amongst  Europeans  that  General 
Brown,  commanding  the  British  forces  at  Shanghai, 


54 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


had  plainly  intimated  to  Li  Hung-chang  that  if  such 
a thing  occurred  again  all  British  officers  would  be 
withdrawn  from  the  Imperialist  army,  and  Li,  seri- 
ously alarmed,  had  promised  that  humane  methods 
would  in  future  be  observed.  But  all  this  was  before 
the  rebellion  had  given  unmistakable  signs  of  collapse. 
Now,  foreseeing  the  end  close  at  hand,  he  could  afford 
to  anticipate  with  equanimity  the  departure  of  Gordon 
and  his  British  colleagues  ; indeed,  it  soon  became 
evident  that  he  desired  to  speed  their  parting.  Cir- 
cumstances had  therefore  relieved  him  of  the  necessity 
of  keeping  a promise  made  under  pressure,  and  he 
had  no  hesitation  in  ordering  that  the  capitulating 
rebels  be  foully  done  to  death,  at  a moment  when 
Gordon  was  not  on  the  spot  to  prevent  the  cold- 
blooded butchery. 

Various  accounts  of  this  massacre  have  been  given 
and  various  reasons  assigned  for  it.  The  first,  written 
by  Gordon  in  the  white  heat  of  his  indignant  wrath, 
states  categorically  that  Li  not  only  gave  the  orders 
for  the  killing  of  the  Wangs,  but  also  for  delivering 
over  the  city  to  be  plundered  by  his  troops.  Both 
facts  were  vouched  for  by  Li’s  immediate  represen- 
tative, General  Chen.  As  regards  the  looting,  there 
is  no  doubt  that  it  was  Li’s  deliberate  practice  to 
combine  deterrent  frightfulness  with  this  simple  and 
vicarious  method  of  paying  his  army : he  made 
no  secret  of  the  fact.  As  to  the  killing  of  the 
Wangs,  he  was  certainly  under  no  misapprehension 
as  to  the  effect  of  this  treachery  on  Gordon’s  mind, 
for,  the  deed  having  been  done,  he  fled  and  hid 
himself  for  several  days  from  the  Englishman’s 
avenging  wrath.  He  remained  perdu,  in  fact,  until 
Gordon  had  withdrawn  himself  and  his  force,  in 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  55 


high  dudgeon,  to  Quinsan.  But  he  willingly  took 
the  risks  of  that  wrath  and  of  the  possibly  imme- 
diate withdrawal  of  the  British  contingent  from  the 
Imperialist  army,  because  he  knew  well  that  Peking 
would  not  only  exonerate  but  splendidly  reward 
him  for  taking  the  surest  course  to  safeguard  the 
Empire  against  further  conspiracies  on  the  part 
of  these  rebel  leaders.  He  knew  that  the  fact 
of  their  having  been  slaughtered  by  treachery  would 
in  no  wise  detract  from  his  achievement.  In 
this  he  was  completely  justified  ; the  rewards 
bestowed  upon  him  by  the  grateful  Throne  for  the 
victories  which  Gordon  had  achieved  were  more 
than  ample  compensation  for  the  risks  he  ran  in 
provoking  that  gallant  officer  to  wrath.  They 
were,  indeed,  the  foundation  of  all  his  subsequent 
career. 

According  to  reliable  evidence  collected  on  the  spot 
by  the  British  authorities,  the  massacre  of  the  rebel 
chiefs  took  place  after  they  had  been  received  by 
Li  Hung-chang  at  his  camp  with  much  friendliness. 
He  had  congratulated  them  in  person  on  having 
forsaken  the  rebel  cause  and  promised  to  recommend 
them  for  high  rank  in  the  Imperial  service.  Then, 
with  every  expression  of  goodwill,  he  had  left  them 
in  the  keeping  of  General  Chen,  to  whom  they  were 
quietly  talking  when  Li’s  executioners  suddenly  fell 
upon  them  and  hacked  them  to  pieces.  This,  beyond 
all  doubt,  is  what  actually  occurred.  Two  months 
later,  however,  when,  through  the  skilful  mediation 
of  Mr.  (later  Sir)  Robert  Hart,  Gordon’s  wrath  had 
been  partially  appeased,  and  when  he  had  consented 
to  take  the  field  again,  Li  put  forth  his  own  cleverly- 
varnished  account.  This  he  did  in  a characteristic 


56 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


proclamation,1  in  which  his  mandarin  methods  were 
shown  to  be  fully  justified,  not  only  on  grounds 
of  expediency,  but  of  humanity.  The  issue  of  this 
document  had  been  demanded  by  Gordon  as  a public 
intimation  that  he  had  had  no  part  or  lot  in  the  foul 
treachery  committed  by  Li’s  orders.  The  proclama- 
tion certainly  made  this  quite  clear  ; but  at  the  same 
time  it  completely  exculpated  Li  and  made  it  appear 
that  (to  use  his  own  words)  “ the  Governor’s  inten- 
tions, though  seemingly  at  variance,  were  in  reality 
identical  with  those  of  Major  Gordon.”  Furthermore, 
Li  asserted,  in  justification  of  the  massacre,  that  when 
the  rebel  chiefs  arrived  at  his  camp  they  had  not 
shaved  their  heads  and  their  contumacious  attitude 
was  plain  for  all  to  see.  They  had  refused,  he  declared, 
to  disband  their  followers,  etc.,  etc.  “ The  Na  Wang’s 
speech  was  ambiguous  and  his  bearing  extremely 
bold  and  fierce.” 

“ Therefore  the  Governor,  for  his  own  safety,  was 
bound  to  guard  against  any  modification  of  the  terms 
which  had  been  settled.  At  the  outset,  when  the 
Governor  agreed  with  General  Gordon  to  accept 
the  submission  of  these  men,  he  had  no  idea  that  they 
would  attempt  to  alter  the  terms  at  the  last  moment. 
With  respect  to  what  subsequently  occurred,  the 
signs  of  danger  revealed  themselves  so  suddenly 
that  if  no  action  could  have  been  taken  without  con- 
sulting with  General  Gordon,  it  would  have  been  too 
late  and  all  the  advantages  of  victory  would  have  been 
sacrificed.  Had  the  Governor  adhered  strictly  to  the 
agreement,  allowing  this  handful  of  bandits  to  save 
their  lives  and  return  to  the  path  of  rebellion,  many 
tens  of  thousands  would  have  suffered  in  consequence, 
and  the  final  result  would  have  been  very  different 

1 Vide  Blue-Book,  “ China  No.  7 ” (1864). 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  57 


from  what  was  intended  when  they  were  first  per- 
mitted to  surrender.  Fortunately,  however,  by  a 
swift  decision  at  the  critical  moment,  by  which  these 
few  outlaws  were  put  to  death  and  their  followers 
scattered  to  the  winds,  the  safety  of  the  whole 
population  was  secured,  which  was  the  main  object 
in  view.” 

Li  was  a pastmaster  in  the  art  of  making  black 
appear  white,  or  at  least  grey,  and  Gordon  was  no 
match  for  him  in  logomachy.  His  prejudices  as  a 
British  officer  and  his  ignorance  of  mandarin  methods 
and  traditions  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  condone 
the  massacre  at  the  time  of  its  perpetration,  but 
eventually  he  was  led  by  Hart  and  other  intermediaries 
to  realise  that  the  negotiations  for  the  surrender  of 
the  city,  the  promised  amnesty,  the  banquet  of  recon- 
ciliation, and  the  prearranged  slaughter  were  all  in 
accordance  with  the  classical  tradition  of  Chinese 
statecraft,  as  practised  from  time  immemorial.  The 
figure  of  Gordon,  chivalrous  and  honest  soldier, 
was  an  anachronism  in  such  a picture.  From  Li’s 
point  of  view  (which,  be  it  noted,  was  that  of  every 
mandarin  in  China)  Gordon’s  solicitude  for  the  lives 
of  these  rebels  and  his  wrath  at  the  violation  of  his 
own  pledged  word  were  either  insincere  or  absurd. 
Herein  we  are  confronted  by  the  great  gulf  which 
divided  East  from  West  and  which  neither  Gordon 
nor  Li  could  bridge. 

For  two  months  after  the  taking  of  Soochow 
Gordon  remained  angrily  brooding  and  inactive  at 
Quinsan,  the  “ Ever-victorious  Army  ” which  he  had 
withdrawn  growing  steadily  more  discontented  and 
disaffected  ; and  Li,  perceiving  the  delicacy  of  a 
situation  in  which  his  own  life  had  more  than  once 


58 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


been  threatened,  was  constrained  to  display  more 
liberality  in  the  matter  of  disbursements.  In  the  end, 
Gordon,  anxious  above  all  things  to  see  the  wretched 
Chinese  people  relieved  of  the  horrors  of  civil  war, 
allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  to  a reconciliation 
with  the  Governor.  In  February,  1864,  the  “ Ever- 
victorious  Army  ” resumed  its  successful  campaign, 
not  because  Gordon  liked  or  trusted  Li,  but  because 
calm  reflection  had  convinced  him  that  the  best 
service  he  could  render  to  China  and  to  England  was  to 
put  an  end,  even  by  methods  which  he  despised,  to 
this  long-drawn  chaos  of  destruction.  By  May  the 
end  of  the  rebellion  was  in  sight,  whereupon  it  became 
Li’s  immediate  object  to  secure  the  disbandment  and 
dispersal  of  Gordon’s  force.  With  the  classical 
scholar’s  instinctive  (and  not  unreasonable)  dread  of 
the  idle  fighting  man’s  tendency  to  treasons,  strata- 
gems and  spoils,  no  sooner  was  the  task  of  the  “ Ever- 
victorious  Army  ” accomplished,  than  Li,  opening 
generous  purse-strings  of  largesse , expedited  the 
passage  of  its  European  contingent  from  China  to 
their  native  lands.  From  Gordon  he  parted  more  in 
anger  than  in  sorrow,  for  the  blunt  soldier,  with  his 
usual  frank  contempt  for  money  and  make-believe, 
had  spurned  the  gifts  and  gewgaws  proffered  by  the 
Throne.  Also  he  had  frankly  shown  his  lack  of  respect 
for  Li  himself,  now  an  illustrious  defender  of  the 
dynasty  on  the  high  road  to  wealth  and  power. 

But  for  all  that,  there  is  no  doubt  that  his  inter- 
course with  Gordon  created  a very  deep  and  permanent 
impression  on  the  mind  of  Li  Hung-chang,  and  con- 
tributed more  than  any  other  influence  of  his  career 
to  inspire  his  subsequent  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 
with  the  appreciative  breadth  of  view  which  raised 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  59 


him  above  the  level  of  all  his  contemporaries.  Li 
resembled  Gordon  in  his  fiery  impatience  of  opposition 
in  the  heat  of  a dispute  or  in  the  pursuit  of  an  imme- 
diate end  ; he  was  quick-tempered,  unreasonable 
and  sometimes  petulant.  But  he  was  not  small- 
minded,  and  the  noble  qualities  of  this  gallant 
English  gentleman  were  never  lost  on  him  ; later, 
as  the  wounds  which  Gordon  had  inflicted  on  his  pride 
closed  under  the  healing  hand  of  Time,  he  forgot 
the  bad  hours  and  remembered  only  the  good.  After 
his  appointment  to  the  Tientsin  viceroyalty,  the 
sordid  atmosphere  of  that  hunting  ground  of  place- 
men and  concessionaires  must  have  served  to  throw 
into  strong  relief  the  heroic  character  of  the  soldier, 
sans  peur  et  sans  reproche.  And  Gordon,  on  his  side, 
was  too  great  a soul  to  nurse  a long  grudge  or  bear 
retrospective  malice.  With  the  continent  of  Asia 
between  them,  both  men  could  afford  to  let  bygones 
be  bygones  ; and  they  did.  Thus,  three  years  after 
Gordon’s  departure  from  China  we  find  Li  citing  him 
to  the  Throne  in  proof  of  the  straightforwardness 
and  trustworthiness  of  foreigners.  The  famous 
memorial  in  which  this  occurs  will  be  quoted  in  due 
course. 

Again,  sixteen  years  later,  when  China  was  on  the 
verge  of  war  with  Russia,  Li  Hung-chang  did  not 
hesitate  to  accede  to  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  advice  in 
seeking  the  help  of  General  Gordon.  The  counsel 
which  Gordon  gave  to  the  Chinese  Government  on 
this  occasion,  and  which  was  instrumental  in  prevent- 
ing them  from  proceeding  to  hostilities,  was  unpalat- 
ably  frank  in  its  exposure  of  China’s  weakness.  It 
did  not  convince  Li,  nor  cure  him  of  the  personally 
profitable  folly  of  wasting  money  on  warships  and 


6o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


armaments  ; but  it  happened  to  coincide  with  the 
policy  of  conciliation,  which  he  was  then  urging  upon 
the  Throne  in  opposition  to  Prince  Ch’un  and  Tso 
Tsung-tang’s  war  party  ; also,  it  served  his  purposes 
by  enabling  him  to  convert  the  Empress  Dowager 
to  his  own  views  and  to  secure  the  remission  of  the 
death  sentence  which  had  been  passed  on  Ch’ung 
Hou  for  the  negotiations  at  St.  Petersburg,  in  which 
he  had  conceded  part  of  the  province  of  Kuldja  to 
Russia.1  The  financial  origin  of  China’s  military 
difficulties  was  so  bluntly  emphasised  in  the  memo- 
randum which  Gordon  left  with  Li  on  this  occasion, 
and  his  views  were  so  evidently  inspired  by  recol- 
lection of  his  own  unpleasant  experiences,  that  a 
smaller  man  than  Li  might  have  suspected  its  author 
of  a desire  to  pay  off  old  scores.  But  Li  was  never 
petty,  and  he  knew  Gordon  too  well  to  doubt  the 
disinterested  sincerity  of  his  counsel. 

The  effect  of  Gordon’s  remarkable  personality  on 
Li  Hung-chang  was  not  only  to  convince  him  of  the 
military  strength  of  Europeans,  but  it  undoubtedly 
led  him  also  into  uncomfortable  but  salutary  reflec- 
tions on  the  subject  of  comparative  morality.  In 
this  sense,  and  apart  from  the  fact  that  his  victories 
laid  the  foundations  of  Li’s  successful  career,  the 
influence  of  “ Chinese  Gordon  ” was  a determinant 
factor  in  forming  many  of  the  opinions  which 
inspired  Li  in  his  subsequent  conduct  of  China’s 
foreign  policy.  True,  the  effect  of  that  influence 
and  his  high  opinion  of  European  morality  waned 
in  later  years,  as  the  result  of  his  relations  with  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  diplomats  and  financiers,  so 
that  towards  the  end  of  his  life  (and  especially  after 

1 Vide  infra,  Chapter  V. 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  61 


the  excesses  committed  by  the  Allied  troops  in  1900) 
he  often  spoke  of  Europeans  and  Christianity  with  the 
bitterness  of  disillusion.  But  Gordon  had  revealed 
to  him  the  existence  of  spiritual  forces,  unsuspected 
by  the  Confucianist,  in  the  civilisation  of  the  West, 
and  the  revelation  left  its  mark  upon  the  rest  of 
his  life. 

With  the  end  of  the  Taiping  rebellion  (1864)  Li, 
as  Governor  of  Kiangsu,  may  be  said  to  have  entered 
upon  his  career  as  diplomat,  politician,  and  adminis- 
trator. Between  that  date  and  1870,  when  he  became 
Viceroy  of  the  Metropolitan  Province,  he  was  still 
responsible  for  the  direction  of  desultory  military 
campaigns  against  the  Nienfei  and  the  Mahomedan 
rebels  ; but  he  had  now  become  a great  mandarin, 
and  his  pen  was  henceforth  mightier  and  more 
profitable  than  his  sword  had  ever  been.  In  1867 
he  became  Viceroy  of  the  Hukuang  Provinces,  and 
in  the  following  year  Superintendent  of  Southern 
Trade,  a post  in  which  the  range  and  importance  of 
his  relations  with  European  officials  and  traders 
rapidly  increased.  From  time  to  time,  in  the  brief 
intervals  between  campaigning  and  the  transaction 
of  new  official  duties,  he  had  visited  his  mother  at 
the  ancestral  home  in  Anhui,  and  had  found  some 
leisure  for  the  cultivation  of  those  domestic  habits 
and  virtues  to  which  he  was  naturally  disposed. 
Thus,  before  taking  over  the  viceroyalty  at  Wuchang 
in  1868,  he  spent  three  months  at  his  estates  in  Hofei. 
After  the  death  of  his  first  wife,  at  the  hands  of  the 
rebels,  he  married  again.  On  this  occasion  Providence, 
or  his  parents’  wisdom,  selected  for  him  a lady  of 
remarkable  force  of  character — intelligent,  broad- 
minded, and  gracious  in  all  her  ways.  It  is  clear 


62 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


from  every  record  of  Li’s  life  that  to  his  mother  and 
to  his  second  wife  he  owed  much  of  his  genial  and 
temperate  philosophy,  his  fortitude  in  adversity,  and 
his  liberal  views.  To  both  these  women  he  was 
sincerely  devoted ; his  filial  piety,  indeed,  shone 
out  so  brightly  before  men,  especially  on  the  occasion 
of  his  mother’s  funeral,  that  his  enemies  in  the 
Censorate  referred  to  it  more  than  once  as  proof  of  his 
vainglorious  ostentation  and  illgotten  wealth. 

After  his  departure  with  his  troops  to  put  down  the 
rebellion  in  Shensi  in  1870  (from  which  duty  he  pro- 
ceeded direct  to  the  Viceroyalty  at  Tientsin),  he 
never  saw  his  mother  alive.  She  died  in  the  spring 
of  1882,  at  the  official  residence  of  his  brother,  the 
Viceroy  Li  Han-chang,  at  Wuchang.  Li  gave 
classically  eloquent  expression  to  his  grief  and  to  his 
desire  to  fulfil  at  all  costs  the  Confucian  ritual  of 
mourning,  which  prescribes  twenty-seven  months’ 
retirement  from  public  life  on  such  occasions.  His 
numerous  memorials  to  the  Throne  begging  to  be 
released  from  office  are  still  regarded  by  the  literati 
as  models  of  their  kind.  Several  of  them  have  been 
published  in  English  works  ; but  one  is  worthy  of 
reproduction,  not  only  because  it  is  a fine  example 
of  the  Viceroy’s  literary  style,  but  because  it  records 
certain  facts  pertinent  to  the  study  of  his  career.  It 
was  published  in  the  Peking  Gazette  on  May  16th, 
1882  : 

“ Li  Hung-chang,  having  received  word  from  home 
that  his  mother  is  no  better,  sends  in  a Memorial  pray- 
ing that  he  may  be  granted  leave  of  absence  to  go  and 
see  her  at  once.  He  states  that  his  mother  (whose 
maiden  name  was  also  Li)  has  been  residing  for  the  past 
ten  years  or  so  at  the  Yamen  of  his  brother  Li  Han- 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  63 


chang,  the  Viceroy  of  the  Hukuang  Provinces.  She  is 
83  years  of  age,  and  up  till  lately  her  health  was  good. 
But  last  winter  she  had  an  attack  of  dysentery,  and 
although  the  physicians  succeeded  in  partially  curing 
it,  she  still  suffered  from  slight  fever  at  night.  In 
the  spring  a slight  improvement  took  place.  Before 
that,  the  Memorialist  had  sent  his  son,  Li  Ching-fang, 
to  minister  to  his  mother,  but  by  a letter  just  received 
he  is  informed  that  she  now  suffers  from  a continual 
cough  and  cannot  take  sufficient  nourishment.  She  is 
old  and  her  constitution  is  failing  ; and  her  illness  is 
made  the  more  serious  because  she  is  for  ever  thinking 
of  her  absent  son.  When  this  news  reached  the 
Memorialist  his  heart  was  consumed  with  anxiety, 
so  that  he  could  neither  eat  nor  sleep.  Since  the 
spring  of  1870,  when  he  left  with  his  troops  for  Shensi, 
he  has  never  seen  his  mother’s  face.  It  is  a common 
saying  that  a man  spends  many  years  in  the  service 
of  his  country  and  very  few  in  ministering  to  his 
parents.  Now  that  his  mother’s  long  illness  continues 
to  grow  upon  her,  the  Memorialist  is  sore  troubled, 
tossing  on  his  bed  all  night  and  getting  no  peace  of 
mind.  Therefore,  as  in  duty  bound,  he  earnestly 
begs  their  Majesties  of  their  grace  to  grant  him  a 
month’s  leave  of  absence.  He  hopes  that  in  this 
time  he  should  be  able,  travelling  rapidly  by  steamer 
to  Wuchang,  to  visit  his  mother  and  to  see  her  recover 
her  health  and  thus  satisfy,  in  some  slight  degree,  the 
deep  affection  which  (as  the  jay  for  its  parents) 
he  feels  for  her.  For  such  bounteous  kindness  on  the 
part  of  their  Majesties,  his  gratitude  would  be  truly 
unbounded.  If  this  favour  be  now  granted  him,  and 
if,  in  consequence,  his  mother  should  see  restored  to 
her  the  son  who  has  been  so  long  a wanderer  from 
home,  she  might  recover  her  health.  He  would 
then  return  with  all  speed  to  resume  his  duties  in 
Chihli.  These  duties  are  of  the  very  highest  impor- 
tance, including,  as  they  do,  the  Superintendence  of 


64 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Northern  Trade,  the  Directorship  of  Coast  Defences, 
the  conduct  of  international  affairs  and  the  govern- 
ment of  the  province  : the  Memorialist  therefore 

prays  that  an  official  of  suitable  rank  be  sent  to  act 
as  locum  tenens , so  that  business  may  be  carried 
on  without  delay  or  confusion.  He  presents  this 
Memorial,  forwarded  by  swift  courier  despatch  to  the 
Throne,  with  unspeakable  anguish  of  mind  and 
apprehension.” 

Li  was  not  exaggerating  the  importance  of  the 
duties  which  confronted  him  at  Tientsin.  The 
problem  of  Korea  and  of  Japan’s  claims  in  that 
direction  was  beginning  seriously  to  disturb  the 
Chinese  Government,  and  a cloud  of  new  trouble  with 
France  was  rising  on  the  horizon  in  Tongking.  There- 
fore, when  the  old  lady  died  at  Wuchang,  before  Li 
had  even  started  on  his  filial  mission  of  consolation, 
the  Throne  was  justified  in  refusing  to  grant  him 
more  than  one  hundred  days  of  mourning.  He  was 
directed  to  suppress  his  private  sorrow  in  the  interests 
of  the  State,  “ thereby  inspiring  his  mother’s  spirit 
with  the  comforting  conviction  that  her  son,  following 
her  early  precepts,  is  devoting  himself  to  the  service 
of  his  country.”  In  the  autumn  of  1882,  he  was 
granted  two  months’  leave  of  absence,  so  that  he 
might  return  home  to  bury  his  mother. 

The  ceremony,  imposing  in  its  magnificence  of 
ritual  and  funereal  pomp,  impressed  the  Chinese 
people,  not  only  as  evidence  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
orthodoxy  and  filial  piety,  but  even  more  so  of  the 
wealth  and  power  to  which  his  family  had  attained 
during  the  past  twenty  years.  By  the  graveside  of 
his  mother  there  gathered  together  a goodly  company 
of  ancestor  worshippers — his  brother,  the  Viceroy 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  65 


Li  Han-chang,  two  other  brothers,  with  twenty 
grandsons  and  eight  great-grandsons.  Subsequently 
the  memorial  tablet  of  the  deceased  lady  was  en- 
shrined in  the  ancestral  hall  of  the  Li  family,  with 
much  reverential  ceremony,  in  the  presence  of  a large 
concourse  of  mandarins,  all  very  sincere  in  their 
respect  for  a woman  so  truly  meritorious  as  the 
mother  of  two  Viceroys.1 

The  ingenious  author  of  the  Memoirs  asserts  that 
Li  Hung-chang  wrote  the  following  on  the  seventh 
day  of  his  visit  to  Germany  : — 

“ This  day  I will  seclude  myself  from  all  callers  in 
order  that  I may  devote  myself  to  thoughts  of  my 
celestial  mother,  who  died  fourteen  years  ago  this  day, 
and  who  for  that  long  time  has  been  thinking  of  my 
coming  to  the  Peaceful  Sunlight  of  the  Nine  Springs. 
With  all  the  incidents  of  my  life,  its  trials  and  lamen- 
tations, its  moments  of  joy  and  pride,  with  all  and 
every  affair  of  life,  I cannot  forget  my  celestial  mother 
and  all  she  was  and  is  to  me. 

“ My  father  died  many  years  before  my  mother, 
and  his  grave  is  great  and  hallowed.  Many  hundreds 
of  times  did  my  mother  bless  it  and  ask  my  father’s 
spirit  to  hasten  the  time  when  her  own  might  join 
his  in  the  Happy  Vale  of  Ancestral  Longevity.  My 
mother  could  never  think  of  taking  her  own  life.  It  is 
thought  great  and  glorious  to  do  such  a thing  by  many 
of  the  ignorant — and  many  of  the  intellectual  too. 
But  my  father’s  beloved  helpmeet  could  never  think 
it  was  right,  nor  that  it  pleased  the  spirits  of  the 
gone-befores.  . . . 

“ My  life’s  greatest  grief  was  the  death  of  my 
mother,  and  I desired  a year  of  mourning,  but  the 

1 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  she  was  by  birth  a member  of  the  Li  clan, 
which  would  have  prevented  her  marrying  Li  Hung-chang’s  father  but  for 
the  fact  that  his  father  was  an  adopted  son,  by  birth  a Hsu. 

l.H.  f 


66 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Throne  had  negotiated  with  Russia  as  to  the  status 
of  Korea,  and  I was  compelled  to  be  in  constant 
communication  with  the  Tsung-li  Yamen. 

“ A letter  from  von  Moltke  has  just  been  handed  me 
by  Song.  I shall  read  it  to-morrow.  To-night  I 
must  read,  long  into  the  hours,  from  the  philosophers 
in  memory  of  my  mother.” 

This  effort  of  constructive  memory  is  interesting, 
because  it  conveys  a very  fair  idea  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  orthodox  Confucianist  gives  expression  to 
the  fundamental  doctrine  of  filial  piety.  It  is  difficult 
to  say  how  far  in  his  case  this  orthodoxy  was  a matter 
of  sincere  feeling,  and  how  far  a pose,  for  the  edifica- 
tion of  posterity.  That  he  was  genuinely  attached  to 
his  mother  (and  to  the  rest  of  his  family)  those  who 
knew  him  intimately  never  doubted  ; but  his  was  a 
temperament  which  could  hardly  refrain  from  making 
political  and  literary  capital  even  out  of  his  domestic 
and  intimate  affections.  The  picture  of  Li  piously 
giving  up  five  hours  of  his  hardly-earned  night’s 
rest  at  Potsdam  in  order  to  read  Mencius  in  memory 
of  his  mother  is  strictly  in  accordance  with  classical 
tradition.  But  it  is  not  necessarily  convincing  for 
all  that. 

In  the  “ moments  perdus  ” of  his  laborious  days  Li 
was  essentially  a family  man.  His  domestic  life, 
even  after  he  had  attained  to  wealth  and  greatness, 
was  not  without  its  anxieties,  for  his  second  wife 
bore  him  no  children  for  several  years  after  their 
marriage.  In  1879  ^er  health,  which  had  been  bad 
for  some  time,  broke  down,  and  Li  was  persuaded  to 
call  in  an  English  lady  doctor,  assisted  by  Dr. 
Mackenzie,  of  the  London  Mission  at  Tientsin.  A cure 
was  effected  and  Li’s  confidence  in  European  medical 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  67 


skill  thereby  firmly  established.  He  boldly  testified 
to  his  faith  in  it  by  appointing  Drs.  Mackenzie  and 
Irwin  to  regular  attendance  on  himself  and  the  male 
members  of  his  family  ; Dr.  Irwin  even  accompanied 
him  on  his  tour  abroad  in  1896. 

Not  long  after  her  recovery  Lady  Li  became  a 
mother,  to  the  Viceroy’s  great  satisfaction.  He  had 
previously  made  provision  for  the  continuance  of 
his  line  and  the  performance  of  its  ancestral  worship 
by  the  adoption  of  a nephew,  son  of  his  deceased 
elder  brother,  Li  Chao-ching.  This  adopted  son, 
Li  Ching-fang,  commonly  known  in  later  life  as 
Lord  Li,  has  served  his  country  as  Chinese  Minister 
in  London,  Tokyo,  and  other  posts.  In  politics, 
under  the  Manchus,  he  was  distinguished  by  his 
sympathies  for  the  Japanese,  as  opposed  to  the 
Russian,  diplomatic  programme.  After  the  passing 
of  the  dynasty,  and  during  the  dangerous  days  of  the 
Revolution  of  1911-12,  he  sought  refuge  in  retirement 
at  Dairen.  Throughout  his  career  he  has  never  been 
remarkable  for  energy  or  originality  in  politics. 
His  conduct  of  affairs  has  been  characterised  by 
his  adopted  father’s  shrewdness,  but  lacking  in  his 
courage  and  initiative.  If  common  report  speaks 
truly,  he  possesses  all  Li  Hung-chang’s  acquisitive 
propensities,  and  a very  prudent  caution  in  avoiding 
any  line  of  action  which  might  prove  unprofitable 
to  the  Li  family  in  general  and  Li  Ching-fang  in  par- 
ticular. He  certainly  foresaw  the  collapse  of  Sun 
Yat-sen’s  fantastic  programme  of  representative 
and  republican  government  for  China,  and  accu- 
rately gauged  its  inevitable  consequences  of  military 
despotism  and  widespread  disorder. 

In  studying  the  career  of  Li  Hung-chang  and  its 


68 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


influence  on  the  history  of  his  country,  the  pro- 
clivities and  proceedings  of  his  immediate  descendants 
are  evidently  deserving  of  attention  and  quite  as 
important  as  those  of  his  progenitors — nay,  even  more 
so,  since  they  directly  affect  the  present  generation 
in  many  ways.  There  are,  however,  obvious  objec- 
tions to  critical  analysis,  in  a work  like  the  present, 
of  the  official  records  and  private  lives  of  such  officials 
as  Li  Ching-fang,  Li  Ching-mai,  and  Li  Ching-hsi. 
All  that  can  and  need  be  said  is  that,  while  none  of  the 
great  Viceroy’s  sons  or  grandsons  have  approached 
him  in  the  matter  of  literary  fame  or  political  achieve- 
ment, the  family’s  reputation  for  intelligence,  as 
proved  by  its  ability  to  acquire  and  retain  great 
wealth,  has  become  almost  proverbial  in  China. 
To-day,  when  the  fate  of  the  ancient  Empire  trembles 
in  the  balance,  when  everything  seems  to  point  to 
the  certainty  that  it  must  pay  in  vassalage  the 
penalty  of  its  unreadiness  to  conform  to  a changed 
and  changing  environment,  the  political  opinions  of 
Li’s  descendants,  and  high  Chinese  officials  generally, 
sound  like  the  twittering  of  birds  before  an  impending 
storm.  While  the  country  is  threatened  with  new  and 
grievous  humiliations,  from  which  nothing  less  than 
a united  body  of  intelligent  patriotism  could  protect 
it,  its  leading  men  (the  “ intellectuals  ” of  Young 
China  quite  as  conspicuously  as  the  mandarins  of  the 
old  political  clans)  continue  the  old,  sordid  struggle 
for  place  and  pelf  and  power.  In  this  respect  the 
Li  family  has  not  inherited  the  flair  and  foresight 
of  its  most  distinguished  member.  He,  assuredly, 
would  have  foreseen,  and  endeavoured  to  fore- 
stall, the  dangers  to  which  the  country  has  become 
exposed  by  reason  of  the  self-seeking  intrigues  of  its 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  69 


professional  politicians  and  the  barren  fiasco  of  the 
attempted  monarchical  restoration.  It  may  be  that 
such  a situation  as  the  present  European  war  has  pro- 
duced, revealing  all  the  weakness  of  China,  unprotected 
by  any  balance  of  power  on  her  borders,  might  have 
surpassed  the  resources  of  Li’s  diplomacy  and  his 
powers  of  passive  resistance.  The  fact  remains  that 
neither  amongst  those  who  supported  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s 
claims  to  the  throne,  nor  amongst  those  who  conspired 
to  overthrow  him,  has  there  been  any  sign  of  construc- 
tive statesmanship  or  any  attempt  to  suppress 
party  warfare  with  a view  to  common  action  for  the 
defence  of  the  country  against  aggression  from 
without.  On  the  contrary,  the  forces  of  aggression 
have  been  encouraged  by  the  politicians  of  Young 
China  and  Old  to  take  advantage  of  this  period  of 
dissension  and  disorder  and  to  destroy  the  country’s 
last  hopes  of  national  independence.  And  the 
motives  which  have  underlain  the  politicians’  activi- 
ties have  been  all  too  obviously  inspired  by  self- 
seeking  ambition  and  venality. 

With  one  or  two  exceptions  the  Li  family  has  been 
concerned  since  the  revolution  rather  with  its  own 
prospects  of  continuity  in  high  office  than  with  the 
devising  of  ways  and  means  for  the  preservation  of 
the  State.  Its  leading  members  appear  to  have  been 
divided  between  their  orthodox  conservative  hostility 
to  Young  China’s  Republican  programme  and  their 
tribal  objections  to  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  as  aspirant  to  the 
throne.  Li  Ching-mai,  for  example,  Li  Hung-chang’s 
second  son,  was  a well-known  figure  under  the 
Manchus  wherever  financiers  and  arms-dealers  were 
gathered  together,  and  especially  in  Vienna.  In  1911 
he  was  opposed  to  the  anti-Manchu  movement  ; 


7o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


nevertheless,  both  he  and  his  younger  brother,  Li 
Ching-ch’u,  were  hostile  to  Yuan  Shih-k’ai.  Like 
Li  Ching-fang,  they  may  be  assumed  to  be  legitimists, 
in  the  sense  that  they  are  opposed  to  the  establish- 
ment of  any  native  dynasty  that  has  not  achieved 
the  “ mandate  of  Heaven  ” by  incontestable  force 
of  arms.  But  this  is  an  achievement  which,  as  Sir 
Robert  Hart  declared  in  1900,  is  quite  impossible  under 
existing  conditions.  And  the  obvious  alternative  is 
internal  dissension,  followed  by  alien  rule. 

Li  Ching-shu,  the  eldest  son  of  Li  Hung-chang, 
died  three  months  after  his  father,  at  the  time  of  the 
return  of  the  Empress  Dowager  from  her  sojourn  in 
the  wilderness,  in  January,  1902.  His  death,  com- 
monly described  by  the  official  commentators  as  a 
touching  example  of  filial  piety,  was  actually  caused 
by  habits  of  dissipation.  His  eldest  son,  Li  Kuo- 
chieh,  successor  to  the  hereditary  title,  was  recently 
Minister  in  Belgium.  He  was  opposed  to  the  Republic 
in  1912,  but  he  also  viewed  with  disfavour  the 
restoration  of  the  monarchy  planned  by  the  friends 
and  supporters  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai.  His  brother 
Li  Kuo-yun  was  until  quite  recently  in  Peking.  He 
was  Civil  Governor  of  Kuangtung  after  the  abdica- 
tion of  the  Manchus,  but  could  not  bring  himself  to 
work  with  the  filibustering  upstart  military  governor 
Lung  Chi-kuang,  and  resigned  his  lucrative  but  dan- 
gerous post. 

The  best  known  and  most  respected  of  all  Li’s 
descendants  is  his  nephew  Li  Ching-hsi,  ex-Viceroy 
of  Yunnan  and  Kueichou.  A staunch  royalist,  he 
took  refuge  after  the  revolution  of  1911  at  Tsingtao, 
where  many  Manchus  and  high  Chinese  officials  found 
safety  under  German  protection  ; but  after  Yuan 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  71 


Shih-k’ai’s  drastic  dissolution  of  the  Kuo  Min-tang 
(or  revolutionary  party)  he  was  persuaded  to  return 
to  Peking.  There  he  took  office  as  chairman  of  the 
short-lived  Political  Council,  evidently  believing  in  an 
early  restoration  of  the  Manchus  to  the  throne.  But 
when  the  Political  Council  was  superseded  by  the  State 
Council,  consisting  almost  entirely  of  Yuan’s  personal 
adherents,  and  when  the  movement  for  putting  Yuan 
upon  the  throne  began  to  assume  definite  direction, 
he  left  the  capital  again  and  retired  into  private  life. 
An  honest  reactionary  of  the  old  regime  and  a sincere 
patriot  according  to  his  lights,  Li  Ching-hsi  resembles 
his  famous  uncle  in  the  courage,  initiative,  and 
independence  of  his  opinions.  Many  of  his  State 
papers  have  displayed  these  qualities,  most  notably 
a Memorial  in  which  he  advised  the  Throne  to  declare 
war  against  Great  Britain  over  the  Pien-Ma  frontier 
question,  and  another  in  which  he  urged  the  Regent 
in  1909  to  open  Parliament  at  a date  earlier  than  that 
promised  by  Tzu  Hsi  in  1907.  He  was  cashiered  in 
1902  by  the  Old  Buddha  for  “ petulant  and  querulous 
importunity,”  but  was  subsequently  restored  to 
office. 

Though  bon  enfant  by  nature  and  genial  in  his 
domestic  life,  Li  Hung-chang  was  a stern  parent  to 
his  sons,  and  especially  strict  in  enforcing  discipline 
in  the  matter  of  study.  His  ideas  on  the  subject  of 
education  were  liberal,  not  to  say  unorthodox,  but 
he  expected  from  his  sons,  grandsons,  and  nephews 
the  same  reverential  attitude  of  filial  piety  which  he 
himself  was  always  at  pains  to  display,  together  with 
profound  respect  for  the  Classics.  His  domesticity, 
like  that  of  most  wealthy  Chinese  tajen , was  of  the 
patriarchal  order,  becoming  gradually  more  pro- 


7 2 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


miscuous  and  miscellaneous,  after  the  manner  of  a 
caravanserai,  as  the  number  of  his  descendants  and 
dependants  increased.  And  he  ruled  over  it  in  the 
patriarchal  manner,  his  philosophy  of  the  happy 
mean  finding  expression  in  a mixture  of  salutary 
discipline  and  cheerful  bonhomie.  He  expected  his 
sons  to  follow  the  example  which  he  set  them  of 
untiring  energy  and  attention  to  duty,  but  at  the 
same  time  he  realised,  and  was  wont  to  admit,  that 
they  lacked  the  incentive  of  poverty  which  had  been 
the  spur  to  his  own  youthful  ambitions  and  efforts. 
In  other  respects  they  were  also  handicapped  by  their 
father’s  material  prosperity.  Nowhere  on  earth  is  it 
so  true  as  in  China  that  it  is  easier  for  the  camel  to 
pass  through  the  “ needle’s  eye  ” than  for  a rich 
man  to  “ make  good.”  Li,  who  was  always  frank 
with  himself  and  something  of  a speculative  philo- 
sopher, was  well  aware  before  he  died  that  the  reputa- 
tion of  his  family  and  entourage  in  the  matter  of 
peculation  and  official  malpractices  had  become 
sufficiently  notorious  to  make  them  a subject  for 
criticism  all  over  China.  He  had  given  his  sons  every 
advantage  of  education  at  home  and  abroad,  but  with 
his  own  example  and  that  of  his  insatiable  brother, 
Li  Han-chang,  ever  before  their  eyes,  he  could  hardly 
expect  them  to  cultivate  or  display  austere  probity 
after  the  manner  of  the  best  classical  models.  He 
knew — none  better — that  the  love  of  money  is  the  root 
of  all  evil  in  the  Chinese  State  ; like  Tzu  Hsi,  he  was 
wont  to  denounce  it  at  regular  intervals  in  mellifluous 
platitudes,  but  in  practice  he  failed  to  achieve  any- 
thing like  the  happy  mean  in  controlling  it,  and  his 
sons  followed  in  his  footsteps.  The  Viceregal  Yamen 
at  Tientsin  became  in  the  ’nineties  a gathering-place 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  73 


for  greedy  place-seekers  and  sordid  schemers,  and  its 
demoralising  influence  gradually  permeated  and 
vitiated  the  atmosphere  of  his  home  life  as  his  sons 
grew  up  and,  by  means  of  his  leverage,  attained  to 
official  positions.  The  beneficent  influence  of  Lady  Li, 
undoubtedly  in  itself  a very  saving  grace,  passed  with 
her  death  in  1892  ; the  last  eight  years  of  the  aged 
Viceroy’s  life  were  lonely  and  full  of  the  bitterness  of 
defeat  and  humiliation.  Their  effect  on  his  mind  was 
clearly  marked  by  an  increasing  cynicism  and  by  the 
waning  of  that  genial  philosophy  which  had  hitherto 
distinguished  him  through  good  and  evil  report.  It  is 
certain  that  his  wife  exercised  a very  great  and  salu- 
tary influence  over  him,  and  that  while  she  lived  he 
drew  from  her  ready  sympathy  and  yvise  counsel 
strength  and  cheerfulness  to  bear  his  heavy  burden 
of  duty.  And  Li,  on  his  side,  was  ever  an  affectionate 
and  considerate  husband. 

In  his  temperate  way  Li  was  a bon  vivant  and  con- 
vivially  inclined.  Like  the  Empress  Dowager,  he  had 
very  definite  ideas  on  the  subject  of  eating  and 
drinking,  and,  like  her,  he  observed  the  happy  mean  of 
moderation,  in  spite  of  occasional  bouts  of  wine- 
drinking. His  health,  on  the  whole,  was  unusually 
robust  ; indeed,  one  of  the  secrets  of  his  success  in  life 
lay  in  his  remarkable  physical  vigour  and  capacity 
for  enduring  strenuous  work.  In  1889  he  was  smitten 
with  facial  paralysis,  but  speedily  recovered  from  its 
effects.  His  extraordinary  vitality  was  again  dis- 
played in  1895,  when,  during  the  course  of  his  negotia- 
tions with  the  Japanese  plenipotentiaries  at  Shimono- 
seki,  he  was  shot  in  the  face  by  a Japanese  soshii. 
He  was  then  seventy-two  years  of  age  ; the  calm 
fortitude  with  which  he  bore,  and  recovered  from,  a 


74 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


very  painful  wound,  evoked  the  sincere  admiration 
of  friends  and  foes  alike.  To  Li  it  was  all  part  of  the 
day’s  work,  and,  from  his  diplomatic  point  of  view, 
a very  fortunate  occurrence. 

Knowing  himself  to  be  a great  figure  on  the  world’s 
stage,  Li  savoured  to  the  full  his  own  success.  He  was 
proud,  with  all  the  class  haughtiness  of  the  mandarin, 
and  revelled  in  his  power,  but  his  pride  was  tempered 
with  a certain  personal  naivete  and  childish  satis- 
faction at  his  own  achievements.  Especially  did  he 
rejoice  without  concealment  in  his  great  wealth, 
striving  ever  to  increase  it  by  avaricious  devices 
which  detracted  somewhat  from  his  viceregal  dignity. 
Had  he  been  born  fifty  years  sooner,  or  had  his  course 
been  run  under  conditions  such  as  existed,  say, 
under  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Ch’ien  Lung,  Li  would 
probably  have  achieved  normal  fame  by  virtue  of  his 
literary  achievements  and  would  have  died  a Grand 
Secretary,  in  the  odour  of  political  sanctity,  with 
several  millions  of  taels  to  his  credit.  But  the  impact 
of  the  West  and  the  special  knowledge  which  he 
acquired  of  foreigners  and  their  affairs  during  the 
Taiping  rebellion  thrust  upon  him  greatness  of  a 
kind  heretofore  beyond  the  scope  of  any  mandarin’s 
achievement,  and  at  the  same  time  placed  within  his 
reach  ways  and  means  of  amassing  riches  independent 
of  the  usual  Yamen  machinery  of  “ squeezing.” 
Thus,  within  a comparatively  short  space  of  time,  his 
name  stood  out  conspicuous  against  the  dark  back- 
ground of  China’s  inarticulate  millions  and  associated 
in  the  minds  of  foreigners  with  almost  superhuman 
qualities  of  diplomatic  subtlety  and  far  - seeing 
intelligence.  As  a matter  of  fact,  there  was  nothing 
superhuman  about  Li  ; the  secret  of  his  phenomenal 


EARLY  LIFE  AND  FAMILY  CIRCLE  75 


fame  lay  in  the  unprecedented  conditions  which  con- 
tinually created,  even  in  the  hour  of  defeat,  new 
opportunities  for  his  expert  knowledge  and  untiring 
energy. 

In  the  following  chapters  will  be  described  the 
principal  events  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  career,  consider- 
ing that  career  from  the  separate  standpoints  of  his 
work  as  official,  diplomat,  politician,  and  organiser 
of  naval  and  military  defences. 


CHAPTER  III 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 

The  chronological  record  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
official  career,  as  concisely  summarised  in  the  British 
Legation’s  List  of  Higher  Metropolitan  and  Pro- 
vincial Officials  (1902),  is  as  follows  : 

“ Fought  against  Taipings  1853.  Taotai,  Fukien 
1859.  Governor  Kiangsu  ’62.  Superintendent  of 
Southern  Trade  Feb.  ’68.  Governor  - General  Hu- 
Kuang  ’67.  Viceroy  Chihli  ’70.  Senior  Grand  Secre- 
tary ’75.  In  mourning  ’82  (acting  Viceroy  Chihli). 
Reappointed  Viceroy  and  Grand  Secretary  Sept.  ’84. 
Asst.  Director  Board  of  Admiralty  Oct.  ’85.  Three- 
eyed peacock’s  feather  Feb.  ’94.  Deprived  of  same 
and  yellow  jacket  Sept.  ’94.  Deprived  of  rank 
but  retained  at  post  Dec.  ’94.  Peace  Envoy  to  Japan 
Feb.  ’95.  Transferred  to  Peking  Aug.  ’95.  On  mission 
to  Coronation  of  Tzar  Nicholas  II.  ’96.  Appointed 
to  Tsung-li  Yamen  Oct.  ’96.  Relieved  from  duty 
at  Yamen  Sept.  ’98.  Yellow  River  Nov.  ’98.  Im- 
perial Commissioner  for  Trade  Nov.  ’99.  Acting 
Viceroy  Canton  Dec.  ’99.  Post  made  substantive 
May  1900.  Viceroy  Chihli  June  1900.  Peace  Pleni- 
potentiary August.  Council  of  Govt.  Reform  April 
’01.  Died  Nov.  ’01.  Posthumous  rank  of  Marquis 
with  title  of  ‘ Wen  Ching  ’ (learned  and  loyal).” 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  digest  of  his  career 
contains  no  record  of  any  important  event,  or  change 
in  his  position,  between  the  years  1885  and  1894. 
These  were  the  fat  and  fortunate  years,  in  which, 
having  passed  his  sixtieth  birthday  with  all  favourable 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


77 


auspices,  he  reaped  at  his  ease  a goodly  harvest  of 
wealth  and  dignity  and  power.  The  three-eyed 
peacock’s  feather,  conferred  upon  him  in  February, 
1894,  a symbol  of  almost  Imperial  dignity,  marked 
the  crowning  point  and  zenith  of  his  fortunes.  Pane- 
gyrists, commenting  on  this  unprecedented  honour, 
compared  the  great  Viceroy  with  the  most  famous 
dignitaries  of  Chinese  history,  and  all  to  his  advan- 
tage. His  wealth  was  commonly  described  by  writers 
in  the  vernacular  Press  as  rivalling  that  of  the  famous 
satrap  Ho  Shen,  the  Grand  Secretary  who  brought 
the  subtle  art  of  squeezing  to  unequalled  perfection 
under  the  Emperor  Ch’ien  Lung.1 

In  1885,  he  had  held  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty  for 
fifteen  years.  Firmly  established  then  in  the  good 
graces  of  the  “ Old  Buddha,”  protected  against  the 
intrigues  of  his  enemies  by  a mutual-benefit  under- 
standing with  the  Chief  Eunuch  and  other  myrmidons 
of  the  Forbidden  City,  he  had  made  himself  indis- 
pensable to  the  Throne.  His  ability  in  handling 
foreign  affairs  was  universally  recognised,  and  it  was 
equalled  by  his  energetic  initiative  in  adapting  Western 
methods  to  the  organisation  of  the  Peiyang  naval 
and  military  forces.  Up  to  this  time  the  practical 
value  of  his  impressive  preparations  had  never  been 
seriously  tested ; their  efficiency  was  taken  for 
granted  by  his  admiring  countrymen  and  by  the 
great  majority  of  foreigners.  In  the  field  of  diplomacy, 
so  far  as  the  European  Governments’  representatives 
were  concerned,  Li  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
the  Chinese  Government  personified  : affairs  were 
discussed  at  Peking,  but  settled  at  Tientsin.  The 
creation  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty  in  1885,  with  the 

1 Vide  “ Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  Peking  ” (Heinemann,  1913). 


78 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Emperor’s  father  (Prince  Ch’un)  as  its  figure-head 
President  and  Li  as  its  executive  chief,  put  the  seal 
of  Imperial  approval  upon  his  Viceregal  labours  of 
the  past  decade.  Thereafter  for  the  next  ten  years, 
and  until  Dai  Nippon  fell  upon  his  gaudy  Paper 
Dragon  and  stripped  it  of  its  tinsel  and  martial  trap- 
pings, Li  reaped  the  rich  harvest  of  his  bread  upon 
the  waters. 

just  before  the  end  of  these  fat  years  of  peace  and 
plenty,  before  the  Empress  thought  fit  to  tickle  his 
vanity  with  the  three-eyed  peacock’s  feather,  Li, 
convinced  of  the  impossibility  of  maintaining  China’s 
suzerainty  in  Korea  without  running  the  risk  of  war 
with  Japan,  submitted  to  the  Throne  a “ Nunc 
Dimittis  ” Memorial,  pleading  old  age  and  increasing 
infirmity.  He  was  then  in  his  seventy-first  year  ; 
his  failures  and  misfortunes  up  till  then  had  been  as 
nothing  in  comparison  with  the  triumph  of  his 
achievements.  There  was  every  reason  why  he  should 
wish  to  retire,  crowned  with  dignities,  and  to  let 
others  face  the  storm  which  he  foresaw  must  soon 
break  about  his  much-vaunted  defences.  But  Tzu 
Hsi  had  no  more  idea  of  letting  her  most  trusted 
adviser  doff  his  harness,  than  she  had  of  retiring  into 
private  life  herself.  In  1894  the  storm  broke  : six 
months  later  the  three-eyed  peacock’s  feather  was 
Li’s  no  longer,  and  with  it  had  gone  into  the  limbo 
of  disgrace  the  Yellow  Jacket  (conferred  upon  him  at 
the  close  of  the  Taiping  rebellion),  the  purple  bridle, 
and  other  symbols  of  Imperial  favour.  The  flowing 
tide  of  his  fortunes  had  turned,  and  now  the  ebb  was 
swift  ; the  last  seven  years  of  his  life  were  full  of 
ungrateful  labour  and  of  sorrow. 

Had  Tzu  Hsi  allowed  him  to  retire  in  1893,  or  had 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


79 


death  overtaken  him  after  he  had  seen  the  crowning 
glory  of  his  seventieth  birthday  celebrations  (1892), 
Li  Hung-chang’s  career  would  probably  have  gone 
down  to  history  as  that  of  the  greatest  of  Chinese 
statesmen.  Posterity  would  naturally  have  attri- 
buted China’s  subsequent  humiliation  to  the  with- 
drawal of  his  guiding  hand  ; his  forty  years  of  almost 
uninterrupted  success  would  have  justified  belief  in 
his  single-handed  ability  to  avert  disaster.  As  events 
fell  out,  Li  in  his  old  age  became  dangerously  exposed 
to  the  rancour  of  his  enemies,  to  the  blame  of  his 
wrathful  countrymen,  and  the  contemptuous  criticism 
of  foreigners.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  loyal  friendship 
and  protection  of  the  Empress  Dowager,  he  would 
assuredly  have  paid  the  death  penalty  in  1895.  We, 
who  study  his  life’s  work  to-day,  know  that  neither 
the  height  of  his  fame  nor  the  depth  of  his  misfortunes 
was  fully  deserved,  because  Li  at  his  best  and  at  his 
worst  was  essentially  the  result  of  an  environment, 
which  no  one-man  power  could  ever  hope  to  dominate 
or  to  change.  As  a Chinese  official,  he  was  funda- 
mentally true  to  type  ; the  circumstances,  which  for 
a time  led  observers  to  forget  this  fact,  were  transient 
and  exotic.  The  force  of  circumstances  which  brought 
him  into  world-wide  and  exceptional  prominence 
was  a force  not  only  beyond  his  control  but  also,  in 
many  respects,  beyond  his  apprehension. 

It  is  well  to  remember,  when  we  are  inclined  to 
think  of  Li  Hung-chang  as  a statesman  of  Machiavel- 
lian subtlety  and  deep  wisdom,  that,  outside  the 
range  of  Confucian  learning,  his  knowledge  of  men 
and  things  was  just  as  superficial  and  liable  to  error 
as  that  of  the  average  mandarin.  It  must  also  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  real  foundation  of  his  successful 


8o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


career  as  a Chinese  official  lay  in  his  ability  to  handle 
the  Chinese  brush-pen  with  the  skill  of  an  artist,  and 
that  artistry  in  Chinese  caligraphy  is  born,  not  made. 
In  China,  where  reverence  for  the  written  word  is 
a cult,  the  pen  has  ever  been  far  mightier  than  the 
sword  in  the  making  of  great  reputations.  Every 
Chinese  schoolboy  carries  a mandarin’s  button  in 
his  pen-case.  Specimens  of  super-excellent  scholarly 
writing,  in  the  form  of  scrolls,  are  collected  and 
cherished  with  religious  enthusiasm  from  one  genera- 
tion to  another.  Li’s  penmanship  became  celebrated 
in  the  early  days  of  his  work  as  a Hanlin,  and  he  took 
no  small  pride  in  it  himself.  There  is  a passage  in 
the  fictitious  “Memoirs,”  dated  January,  1846, 
which  would  appear  to  be  founded  on  fact.  Con- 
cerning a fellow-student  who  had  shown  him  some 
scrolls  of  original  manuscript,  Li  is  made  to  observe  : 

“ I could  not  hurt  him  so  much  as  to  tell  him 
that,  while  his  romances  seemed  most  interesting, 
his  language  was  too  plain  and  like  the  speech  of  the 
street  people.  I did,  however,  criticise  his  manu- 
script, for  he  writes  a tsao  tzu  style,  and  even  that 
is  homely  and  without  grace.  He  was  slightly  put 
out,  I fancy,  when  I exhibited  to  him  some  of  my 
compositions  in  the  best  bsing-sbu,  with  elaborate 
ornament  work  and  dainty  colours  in  the  high  and 
left  corner.” 

This  is  certainly  typical  of  the  naive  complacency 
with  which,  up  to  the  end  of  his  life,  Li  was  ever  wont 
to  contemplate  his  own  achievements.  But  he  had 
good  grounds  for  that  complacency,  for  he  always 
worked  hard,  on  the  foundation  of  his  natural  skill 
with  the  pen,  to  scale  the  loftiest  heights  of  classical 
scholarship.  He  cultivated  the  stereotyped  mecha- 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


81 


nical  art  of  Chinese  poetry  with  great  devotion,  while 
an  extremely  retentive  memory  enabled  him  to 
quote  in  limitless  profusion  from  the  Classics  and 
commentators.  His  first  appointment  to  the  staff 
of  Tseng  Kuo-fan  1 was  undoubtedly  the  result  and 
fitting  reward  of  his  industry  and  intelligence.  Up 
to  this  point  he  had  made  his  mark  by  sheer  force 
of  ability  and  the  will-power  to  succeed  ; at  the  same 
time,  the  very  fervour  of  his  classical  education  made 
him  and  left  him  in  all  respects  an  orthodox  sang-'pur 
mandarin,  ignorant  of  all  things  that  lay  beyond 
the  range  of  the  stereotyped  curriculum  of  Chinese 
scholarship.  He  possessed  some  knowledge  of  mathe- 
matics and  rudimentary  ideas  about  astronomy, 
but  the  bulk  of  his  learning  was  derived  from  the 
unfruitful  field  of  Confucian  literature,  and  consisted 
of  prehistoric  platitudes  concerning  the  art  of  govern- 
ment, of  wise  quips  and  saws  of  the  ancients  applied 
to  social  economy  and  ceremonial  precedents.  As 
a writer,  he  was  never  a trenchant  essayist  like  his 
famous  colleague  and  rival  Chang  Chih-tung  ; his 
memorials  and  despatches  were  chiefly  distinguished 
by  their  lucidity  and  by  a certain  quality  of  directness 
unusual  in  Chinese  State-papers.  But  for  all  his 
intelligence  and  energy  he  entered  official  life,  like 
every  other  mandarin  of  his  generation,  in  complete 
ignorance  of  the  vital  facts  and  forces  which  were 
then  steadily  converging  upon  China  to  overthrow 
her  hoary  traditions  of  complacent  superiority.  It 
was  given  to  him  to  learn  more  quickly  than  any  of 
his  colleagues  that  neither  artistic  penmanship  nor 

1 Tseng  Kuo-fan,  the  greatest  Chinese  statesman  of  the  day,  was  at  this 
time  at  the  head  of  loyal  levies  which  he  had  raised  in  Hunan,  nucleus  of 
the  Imperialist  forces  of  the  Central  Provinces. 


82 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


a profound  knowledge  of  the  Classics  would  hence- 
forth protect  China’s  rulers  against  the  mechanical 
inventions  of  the  West ; but  it  is  significant  that, 
even  when  he  had  realised  this  truth,  it  never  occurred 
to  him  to  go  abroad,  as  young  Ito  went  from  Japan, 
to  study  for  himself  at  first  hand  the  secrets  of  the 
barbarians’  strength. 

Concerning  his  debut  as  an  official,  some  of  the 
main  facts  have  been  recorded  in  the  preceding 
chapter.  In  the  absence  of  authoritative  evidence 
from  official  documents  (most  of  which  were  destroyed 
in  1900)  some  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  actual  time 
and  place  of  his  entry  into  public  life.  We  are  justi- 
fied, however,  in  rejecting  the  statement,  commonly 
accepted  by  English  writers,  that  as  a private  citizen 
he  displayed  his  patriotic  loyalty  for  the  dynasty 
by  raising  a force  of  militia  to  fight  the  Taipings. 
This  is  a legend,  which  most  probably  grew  out  of 
the  fact  that  most  of  the  moneys  collected  by  the 
Hofei  Treasury  (where  Li  held  an  official  post  in 
1854-55)  were  handed  over  to  Tseng  Kuo-fan  for 
military  purposes.  Li’s  career  as  a secretary  on 
Tseng’s  staff  may  be  said  to  have  begun  not,  as  the 
records  have  it,  in  1853,  but  in  1855.  Although  his 
subsequent  promotion  was  rapid,  it  was  not  until 
four  years  later,  when  Tseng’s  skilfully-organised 
mobile  army  had  begun  to  achieve  definite  results 
against  the  rebels,  that  Li’s  fame  as  a military  com- 
mander became  something  more  than  local.  His 
military  successes  were  rewarded,  as  was  usual,  by 
advancements  in  the  Civil  Service  : he  became  a 
Taotai  in  1856  and  acting  provincial  judge  in  the 
following  year.  It  was  only  in  i860,  after  he  had 
come  into  contact  with  Ward,  Burgevine,  and  Gordon, 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


83 


and  with  the  foreign  community  of  Shanghai,  in  his 
capacity  as  Governor  of  Kiangsu,  that  he  emerged 
from  the  ruck  of  mandarin  officialdom  and  began  to 
display  those  qualities  and  methods  of  administration 
which  eventually  brought  him  greatness  and  world- 
wide fame. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  influence 
which  Gordon  exercised  on  Li  Hung-chang,  by  direct- 
ing his  mind  towards  the  moral  aspect  of  European 
civilisation  and  by  suggesting  to  his  acute  intelligence 
the  possible  truth  and  ethical  value  of  a code  of 
morality  essentially  different  from  that  of  his  own 
country.  It  is  true  that  this  good  seed  became 
choked  in  after  years  by  the  thorns  of  cynicism, 
which  sprang  from  his  subsequent  relations  with 
Europeans  of  a less  heroic  type,  but  in  the  ’sixties  it 
had  a powerful  influence  on  his  mind.  How  strong 
it  was  at  the  time  of  his  first  viceregal  appointment 
(Hukuang,  1867)  is  proved  by  the  spirit  and  the  letter 
of  the  famous  Memorial  which  he  submitted  to  the 
Throne  in  that  year — a document  which  leaves 
no  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  sincerity  of  his  convic- 
tions at  that  period,  and  which  remains  an  abiding 
monument  to  his  statesmanship. 

The  Throne  had  at  that  date  called  upon  all  the 
high  provincial  authorities,  by  secret  decree,  for 
confidential  advice  as  to  the  best  means  of  heading 
off  the  ambitious  designs  of  foreigners  in  connection 
with  the  impending  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin. 
Peking  had  realised  the  new  dangers  which  had  come 
to  threaten  the  Celestial  Empire  by  reason  of  the  arma- 
ments and  commercial  policies  of  the  encroaching 
European,  but  neither  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  nor  the 
Emperor’s  chief  representatives  in  the  provinces  had 


84 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


realised  that  their  rigid  attitude  of  contemptuous 
superiority  was  no  longer  compatible  with  China’s 
most  evident  helplessness.  A few  may  have  had 
glimmerings  of  the  truth,  but  if  so  they  lacked  the 
moral  courage  to  confess  it.  Li  Hung-chang,  youngest 
of  the  Viceroys  (he  was  then  forty-four),  not  only 
perceived  the  fundamental  facts  of  the  situation,  but 
boldly  faced  them.  Omitting  those  passages  of  his 
Memorial  which  are  concerned  with  the  diplomatic, 
commercial,  and  missionary  questions  of  the  moment, 
the  following  extracts  deserve  attention  : 

“ The  humble  opinion  of  the  writer  is,  that  in  con- 
ducting business  with  foreigners  the  point  of  the 
greatest  importance  is  to  avoid  exciting  their  con- 
tempt ; that  contempt  once  excited,  they  will  thwart 
us  at  every  turn,  and  even  in  affairs  that  are  really 
practicable,  they  will  contrive  a thousand  schemes 
and  devices  to  throw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their 
practicability.  But  if  they  feel  respect  for  China, 
all  matters  can  be  mutually  arranged  ; and  even 
difficult  questions  can  be  settled  by  compromise  or 
agreement. 

“ Foreigners,  however,  are  not  the  only  persons  who 
are  influenced  by  this  feeling  : it  animates  alike  the 
minds  of  the  whole  human  race. 

“ It  is  often  said  that  foreigners  are  crafty  and 
malign  and  full  of  unexpected  ruses  : but  is  it  not 
the  fact  that  Chinese  are  the  same  ; or  rather  that  the 
outrageous  craft  and  malignity  of  the  Chinese  exceeds 
even  that  of  foreigners  ? The  truth  is,  that  at 
present  foreigners  are  powerful  and  the  Chinese  feeble. 
And  whence  arises  the  power  of  the  former  ? It 
certainly  is  not  innate  in  them,  but  depends  upon  the 
fact  that  ‘ the  requisites  of  Government  are  sufficiency 
of  food,  sufficiency  of  military  equipment,  and  the 
confidence  of  the  people  in  their  ruler  ’ (Confucian 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


§5 


Analects).  And  how  is  the  weakness  of  China  to  be 
accounted  for  ? This  also  is  not  innate,  but  is  a 
result  of  the  truth  of  the  above  axiom  not  being 
sufficiently  realised.  The  present  condition  of  foreign 
countries  resembles  that  of  China  before  the  union, 
or  is  perhaps  even  still  more  formidable. 

“ In  the  course  of  time  foreigners  came  to  China, 
opened  numerous  marts,  and  conveyed  their  mer- 
chandise everywhere.  They  traded  at  as  many  as 
five  ports,  and  all  with  no  other  object  than  that 
of  making  the  wealth  of  China  contribute  to  their 
own.  A little  consideration  shows  that  those  who 
ventured  to  come  to  this  country  must  have  placed 
their  reliance  upon  something  to  have  rendered 
them  so  fearless  ; and  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason 
why  that  which  they  confided  in  should  not  also 
become  a source  of  confidence  to  China. 

“ Should  they,  however,  take  advantage  of  their 
strength  to  impose  upon  our  weakness  by  dividing 
our  territory  and  sharing  among  them  the  fat  of  the 
land,  in  such  a pressing  crisis  the  greatest  firmness 
would  be  necessary.  But  there  need  be  no  great 
apprehension  of  such  a contingency,  for  the  simple 
reason  that,  with  the  exception  of  Russia,  foreign 
countries  are  all  too  distant  from  China,  and  the 
acquisition  of  its  territory  would  be  nothing  but  an 
embarrassment  to  them. 

“ The  fact  is,  that  the  prosperity  of  foreign  countries 
is  inseparably  connected  with  the  welfare  of  the 
Chinese  people  ; and  instead  of  draining  that  people 
to  the  last  drop,  would  they  not  rather  prefer  to  use, 
without  exhausting — to  take,  and  still  leave  a 
residue  ? 

“ The  present  occasion  of  treaty  revision  with  the 
English  is  a most  important  juncture.  The  English 
treaty  once  disposed  of,  there  will  be  no  difficulty 
with  the  other  Powers.  The  danger  to  be  appre- 
hended is  that  during  the  revisionaof  next  year  they 


86 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


will  employ  coercion  to  extort  concession.  This, 
however,  may  be  known  previously,  and  should  it 
be  the  case,  it  will  of  course  be  necessary  to  select 
experienced  troops  and  able  officers  to  confront  them. 
Should  nothing  of  the  sort  occur,  negotiations  should 
be  entered  upon. 

“ In  short,  supposing  we  are  to  cherish  a feeling 
of  revenge  and  devise  schemes  to  subvert  foreign 
Powers,  it  will  be  necessary  to  wait  until — with  large 
armies  and  abundant  supplies,  with  no  rebel  or 
Mohamedan  outbreaks  in  the  provinces,  and  no 
difficulties  in  the  capital — we  can  cope  with  them 
without  hesitation.  We  shall  be  a match  then  for 
all  adversaries  ; but  otherwise  we  cannot  engage  in 
a rash  and  random  conflict.  Even  when  it  is  sup- 
posed that  we  are  ready  for  the  struggle,  it  will 
still  be  necessary  to  exercise  extreme  and  continual 
caution,  and  to  wait  until  our  spirit  is  high,  and 
our  aspect,  therefore,  formidable.  Then  should  there 
be  no  war,  the  question  would  be  disposed  of  ; but 
in  the  event  of  our  taking  the  field,  it  would  not  be 
unvictoriously. 

“ The  Memorialist,  however,  has  had  several  years’ 
experience  in  conducting  business  with  foreigners, 
and  is  thoroughly  familiar  with  their  character. 
He  has  found  that,  no  matter  what  they  are  engaged 
in,  they  act  honourably  without  deceit  or  false- 
hood. But  although  it  is  possible  to  acquire  a 
general  knowledge  of  their  mode  of  action  in  the  con- 
duct of  their  own  affairs,  yet  there  is  no  means  of 
becoming  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  details 
and  motives  of  their  conduct.  Their  bearing,  how- 
ever, in  military  matters  affords  clear  evidence  of 
their  straightforwardness.  There  is  an  instance  of 
the  Englishman  Gordon,  late  commander-in-chief 
at  Soochow,  who,  having  organised  3,000  troops  of 
the  Ever-victorious  Army,  took  the  field  against  the 
rebels.  Subsequently,  at  the  capture  of  Soochow, 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


87 


the  Memorialist  himself  observed  that  officer  person- 
ally leading  in  advance  of  his  troops  with  a courage 
and  sangfroid  worthy  of  all  praise.  He  subsequently 
became  the  recipient  of  the  Imperial  commendation 
and  reward. 

“ The  writer  has  also,  in  conjunction  with  Tseng 
Kuo-fan,  acting  Viceroy  of  the  two  Kiang,  been 
associated  with  foreigners  in  organising  foreign- 
drilled  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  in  making  arrange- 
ments for  the  building  of  steam-vessels.  He  is 
thoroughly  convinced  that  they  are  actuated  by 
upright  and  amicable  principles,  and  entertain  no 
feelings  of  animosity  towards  China.  With  the 
knowledge  of  these  facts  before  us,  it  is  possible  to 
draw  our  conclusions  upon  other  matters. 

“ It  is  from  these  considerations,  therefore,  that 
the  writer  suggests  the  policy  to  be  pursued  in  inter- 
course with  foreigners.  There  seems  to  be  no  neces- 
sity to  dispose  of  the  several  questions  hastily  and  on 
the  instant,  nor  do  the  resident  foreign  Ministers  at 
Peking  apparently  intend  to  insist  upon  an  immediate 
settlement. 

“ It  would  be  well  if  His  Majesty  on  attaining  his 
majority  were  himself  to  adopt  the  policy  suggested, 
and  in  that  case  no  difficult  questions  would  arise.” 

Three  years  after  this  masterly  exposition  of  a 
policy  to  which  Li  Hung-chang  remained  consistently 
faithful  throughout  his  career,  he  succeeded  Tseng 
Kuo-fan  as  Viceroy  of  Chihli.  In  this,  the  most 
important  satrapy  of  the  Empire  and  the  diplomatic 
outpost  of  the  capital,  he  continued  to  serve  the 
Throne,  without  intermission,  for  quarter  of  a 
century.  Such  continuous  tenure  of  one  office  was 
opposed  to  all  constitutional  usage,  but  the  Empress 
Dowager  was  a law  unto  herself  and  accustomed  to 
make  her  own  precedents  in  such  matters.  She  was  a 


88 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


good  judge  of  men,  and  her  selective  ability  was 
certainly  justified  in  Li.  Although  frequently 
reproached  by  jealous  or  Jingo  detractors  for  tolerat- 
ing the  Viceroy’s  conciliatory  tactics,  she  soon 
learned  by  experience  that  there  was  not  one  among 
them  capable  of  saving  China’s  “ face,”  in  a contest 
with  Europeans,  as  Li  could  save  it  ; that  none  of 
them  could  parley,  as  he  could,  with  the  enemy  at 
the  gate. 

The  principles  professed  and  methods  adopted  by 
Li  in  his  relations  with  foreigners  will  be  fully  dealt 
with  hereafter.  Considering  them  solely  in  relation 
to  his  position  as  a Chinese  official,  however,  the 
important  fact  stands  out  that,  in  this  sphere  of  his 
activities,  at  all  events,  he  sedulously  practised  coram 
publico , the  principles  which  he  proclaimed  in  the 
Memorial  above  quoted  and  on  many  other  occasions. 
In  so  doing,  he  exposed  himself,  as  he  was  well  aware, 
to  the  charge  of  truckling  to  foreigners  ; he  was 
frequently  accused  of  cowardice  and  treason  on  this 
account,  and  denounced  and  impeached  for  it  by  the 
Censors,  whilst  Chang  Chih-tung  and  other  dreamers 
of  vain  dreams  mocked  at  him  for  his  conciliatory 
methods.  That  his  proclivities  were  essentially 
pacific  there  is  no  manner  of  doubt ; but  his  traducers 
ignored  the  fact  that  they  were  based  on  his  definite 
and  perfectly  correct  appreciation  of  China’s  incapa- 
city to  resist  attack.  He  was  never  too  proud,  but 
only  too  wise,  to  fight  : at  the  same  time  he  alone 
made  some  show  of  systematic  effort  to  remove  from 
his  country,  as  Japan  had  done,  the  reproach  of  her 
weakness.  It  was  his  object  to  reorganise  the  de- 
fences of  Northern  China  (provincial  autonomy  would 
have  prevented  him  from  going  further)  and,  in  the 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


89 


meanwhile,  to  agree  with  his  adversary  quickly  in 
any  case  of  dangerous  dispute.  This  at  least  was  a 
policy ; had  he  been  given  to  recrimination,  he  might 
justly  have  pointed  out  to  his  critics  that  none  of 
them  had  ever  suggested  a better  one,  or  indeed 
any  coherent  policy  at  all.  And  he  could  also  have 
pointed  out  with  justifiable  pride  that,  by  sternly 
checking  all  attacks  upon  foreigners  within  the 
limits  of  his  jurisdiction,  he  had  done  more  than 
any  of  his  Viceregal  contemporaries  to  limit  the 
European  Powers’  pretexts  and  opportunities  of 
aggression.  (It  was  the  general  opinion  amongst  all 
classes  of  the  community  in  1900  that,  if  Li  Hung- 
chang  had  remained  at  Tientsin,  the  Boxer  rising 
would  never  have  extended  beyond  the  borders  of 
Shantung.) 

Despite  the  number  of  memorial  shrines  and 
posthumous  honours  conferred  on  Li  Hung-chang, 
and  the  reverence  in  which  his  name  was  held  after 
his  death  by  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  and  the  orthodox  Con- 
fucianist  Mandarinate,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  his 
reputation  for  administrative  and  diplomatic  ability 
was  greater  abroad  than  amongst  his  own  people. 
Omne  ignotum  pro  magnifico.  Li’s  plans  and  prepara- 
tions for  arming  and  reforming  China  seldom  lost 
anything  in  size  or  sagacity  when  described  by  the 
foreign  journalists  and  globe-trotters  who  continually 
sought  and  found  access  to  his  Yamen.  The  Viceroy 
had  speedily  learned  from  his  intercourse  with 
foreigners  the  value  of  a good  Press  ; the  world- 
wide belief  in  China’s  martial  activities  which  he  was 
able  to  create  by  the  help  of  enthusiastic  journalists 
was  not  the  least  of  his  achievements,  inasmuch  as 
it  secured  for  China  abroad  the  respect  due  to  a great 


9° 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


and  growing  Power.  All  Chinese  officials  who  came 
into  contact  with  European  diplomacy,  and  notably 
the  Chinese  Legations  abroad,  united,  for  reasons 
that  should  have  been  obvious,  in  proclaiming  the 
genuineness  of  China’s  rapid  “ awakening  ” ; so  that, 
from  1885  to  1894  the  vision  of  the  Yellow  Peril 
increased  in  Europe  and  America  and  finally 
attained  to  serious  dimensions.  Among  the  many 
books  published  abroad  concerning  China  at  that 
period  there  were  few  which  did  not  contain  chapters 
on  “ China  arming  ” and  “ the  awakening  of  the 
giant  the  opinions  (never  quite  disinterested)  of 
the  German  Emperor  and  Sir  Robert  Hart  were 
freely  quoted  in  support  of  these  ideas  ; and  all  the 
prophets  united  to  swell  the  chorus,  which  proclaimed 
Li  Hung-chang  as  the  master-builder  of  the  new 
dispensation.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  consider 
in  due  course  what  were  his  qualifications  for  that 
onerous  task  and  what  the  results  of  his  twenty  years 
of  naval  and  military  organisation.  For  the  present, 
suffice  it  to  say  that,  while  Li  was  able  to  efater 
le  bourgeois  abroad,  and,  through  the  medium  of  the 
foreign  Press,  to  create  an  exaggerated  impression  of 
China’s  military  efficiency  and  resources,  his  own 
countrymen  of  the  educated  classes  never  accepted 
him  or  his  activities  at  anything  like  the  valuation 
placed  upon  them  in  England,  or  America,  or  Russia. 
His  Viceregal  colleagues  in  particular,  while  fully 
approving  his  face-saving  policy,  must  have  been 
well  aware  that  the  foundations  on  which  all  this  new 
prestige  rested  were  just  as  fundamentally  unsound 
as  any  other  administrative  business  in  China.  They 
knew  that,  behind  the  imposing-looking  fleet  and  the 
forts  with  their  modern  armament,  the  mandarin 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


91 


squeeze-system  was  flourishing  and  extending  its 
operations  with  a vigour  inspired  by  new  oppor- 
tunities. They  found,  in  the  manifold  and  lucrative 
activities  of  his  kinsmen  and  proteges , overwhelming 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  his  military  and  naval 
schemes  were  still  subject  to  all  the  traditional  abuses 
of  nepotism  and  peculation  ; in  other  words,  that 
Li  was  one  of  themselves,  an  unmitigated  Chinese 
official,  and  that  the  results  of  his  administration  were 
therefore  not  likely  to  be  very  different  from  those 
produced  by  his  colleagues  in  other  parts  of  the 
Empire.  Nor  was  it  possible  for  anyone  acquainted 
with  the  facts  of  the  situation  to  believe  in  the 
efficiency  and  disinterested  service  of  naval  and 
military  officials,  who  owed  their  appointments 
entirely  to  family  influence  and  provincial  clan 
interests.  The  Chinese,  at  all  events,  were  under  no 
delusions  in  this  matter  ; it  is  certain  that  during  the 
period  immediately  preceding  the  Japanese  war, 
when  the  civilised  world  had  come  to  regard  Li 
Hung-chang  as  the  embodiment  of  patriotic  and  far- 
seeing  wisdom,  his  countrymen  admired  him  chiefly 
for  the  ability  with  which  he  had  discovered  and 
exploited  for  the  benefit  of  his  family  and  friends 
new  fields  of  profitable  “ squeeze.” 

Li’s  long-recognised  position  as  China’s  chief 
word-warrior  at  the  portals  of  Peking  ; his  great 
wealth  ; the  powerful  clan  forces  represented  by  his 
Viceregal  troops  ; and  above  all,  the  time-tested 
support  of  the  Empress  Dowager — all  these  were 
factors  which  combined  to  secure  for  him  the  admira- 
tion, if  not  the  respect,  of  his  fellow-officials.  They 
admired  his  astuteness,  his  energy,  his  infinite 
resource  in  a tight  place  ; and  many,  no  doubt, 


92 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


admired  his  purse-filling  proclivities  for  precisely  the 
same  cynical  reasons  that  they  despised  the  quixotic 
personal  integrity  of  poor  but  honest  officials  like 
Tso  Tsung-tang  and  Chang  Chih-tung.  At  the  same 
time,  Li  was  never  popular  with  his  countrymen  and, 
in  spite  of  his  diplomacy,  had  many  powerful  enemies 
in  high  places.  To  him,  as  to  all  successful  officials  in 
China,  it  fell  to  know  the  bitterness  of  undeserved 
disgrace  on  more  than  one  occasion,  even  before  the 
humiliation  of  the  war  with  Japan  had  placed  a 
keen  weapon  of  justifiable  reproach  in  the  hands  of 
his  foes. 

Many  a time,  especially  during  the  course  of  the 
war  with  France  (1884),  Li  found  himself  denounced 
and  impeached  by  the  firebrands  of  the  war  party 
at  Court  and  by  their  hireling  censors,  for  concluding 
the  conventions  by  which  he  hoped  to  check  the 
advance  of  the  conquering  foreigner.  At  other  times, 
in  crises  brought  about  by  ignorance  at  Peking  and 
official  apathy  in  the  provinces,  the  whole  burden 
of  retrieving  an  impossible  situation  was  forced  upon 
him,  as,  for  example,  in  the  Tongking  evacuation 
Convention.  In  all  such  cases,  after  making  the  best 
of  a bad  bargain,  Li  was  savagely  attacked  by  the 
war-at-any-price  fanatics  of  the  capital  and  accused 
of  handing  over  the  sacred  soil  of  the  Empire  to  the 
barbarians.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  constant  pro- 
tection given  to  him  by  the  Old  Buddha,  he  must 
assuredly  have  gone  down  before  some  of  the  furious 
onslaughts  that  were  made  against  him.  As  it  was, 
secure  in  the  favour  of  the  all-powerful  Empress, 
he  stood  firm,  compared  their  denunciations  to  “ the 
howling  of  dogs,”  and  disdained  to  adopt  the  usual 
method  of  retaliation  by  hiring  censors  to  impeach 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


93 


his  accusers.  After  the  Japanese  war,  however, 
even  the  Empress  Dowager  did  not  dare  to  reinstate 
Li  with  undiminished  power  in  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty. 
She  herself  was  bitterly  disappointed  at  the  collapse 
of  his  naval  and  military  defences  and  chagrined 
beyond  measure  at  the  humiliation  inflicted  upon  her 
Government  by  the  terms  of  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty. 
The  subsequent  agitation  of  Young  China,  the 
Emperor’s  Reform  movement,  the  development  of 
Palace  intrigues  on  definite  lines  of  cleavage  between 
Manchus  and  Chinese,  all  culminating  in  the  Boxer 
movement  of  1900 — these  things  she  naturally 
ascribed  to  the  loss  of  prestige  which  the  dynasty  had 
suffered  as  the  result  of  China’s  ignominious  defeat  at 
the  hands  of  Japan.  Being  as  she  was,  a woman  of 
moods,  it  was  inevitable  that  her  mind  should  be 
influenced  by  the  intense  feeling  which  Li’s  signature 
of  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Count  Ito  aroused  all  over 
the  country.  With  one  accord  all  the  high  pro- 
vincial officials,  Manchus  and  Chinese  alike,  had 
memorialised  against  ratification  of  the  Treaty  and 
advised  continuance  of  the  war.  Liu  K’un-yi,  from 
the  indignant  depths  of  his  dotage,  announced  his 
intention  of  fighting  to  the  death  before  he  would 
consent  to  the  cession  of  Chinese  territory,  quite 
oblivious  of  the  fact  that  he  had  nothing  to  fight 
with.  Chang  Chih-tung,  his  rival  of  many  years, 
added  his  voice  to  “ the  howling  of  the  dogs,” 
denouncing  the  colleague  whom,  three  years  before, 
he  had  addressed  in  a fulsome  eulogy  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  devout  patriotic  virtue.  Several  secret 
memorials  advocated  the  execution  of  Li  Hung-chang 
and  his  chief  adherents  as  “ a warning  to  traitors.” 
But  Tzu  Hsi,  despite  her  chagrin,  remained  true 


94 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


to  the  statesman  who  had  served  her  with  unswerv- 
ing loyalty  for  nearly  forty  years.  She  did  not 
restore  him  to  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty,  but  she  took 
steps  to  protect  his  life  and  to  find  work  for  him 
elsewhere. 

Li’s  appointment  as  Envoy  to  the  Coronation  of 
the  Tzar  (189 6)  was  undoubtedly  arranged  by  the 
Empress  Dowager,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Russian 
Minister,  as  the  best  means  of  placing  him  beyond  the 
reach  of  his  enemies,  affording  him  at  the  same  time 
a breathing  space  and  an  opportunity  of  recovering 
his  “ lost  face.  ” 

For  five  years  after  the  war  with  Japan,  Li  remained 
virtually  out  of  office,  for  the  posts  to  which  he  was 
appointed,  after  returning  from  his  tour  abroad, 
were  obviously  sinecures  or  stopgaps.  Les  absents  ont 
toujours  tort.  During  the  summer  of  his  triumphal 
progress  through  Europe  and  America  his  enemies  had 
been  busy  at  Peking,  and  they  had  found  occasion,  in 
the  very  magnificence  of  the  reception  accorded  to 
him  by  the  Governments  of  the  Powers,  to  suggest 
to  the  Empress  and  to  her  courtiers  that  the  Viceroy 
had  forgotten  something  of  that  duty  of  humble 
allegiance  upon  which  Tzu  Hsi  was  ever  wont  to 
insist.  Furthermore,  there  had  been  Palace  intrigues 
and  new  combinations  of  parties  at  Peking  in  which 
Li’s  interests  had  suffered  during  his  absence.  Li 
Lien-ying,  the  Chief  Eunuch,  his  close  and  confi- 
dential associate  of  many  years,  was  still  with  him  in 
the  matter  of  the  secret  Russian  combination  against 
Japan  ; for  that  sleek  rogue  had  quickly  realised  the 
possibilities  of  that  arrangement  with  all  its  lucrative 
traffic  in  concessions.  But  with  regard  to  the  growing 
hostility  between  the  Manchus  and  Conservative 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


95 


mandarins  on  one  side,  and  Young  China  and  the 
Progressives  on  the  other,  the  Chief  Eunuch  was 
vocationally  in  sympathy  with  the  reactionaries, 
whilst  Li’s  wider  wisdom  committed  him,  if  not  to  the 
Progressives,  at  least  to  a middle  way  of  compromise. 
Therefore,  although  the  outer  world  was  surprised, 
there  was  nothing  to  astonish  those  who  understood 
the  inner  history  of  Palace  events  when,  upon  his 
return  from  abroad,  an  Imperial  edict  deprived  him 
of  his  ranks  and  titles.  The  alleged  cause  of  his 
degradation  was  that  he  had  trespassed  in  the 
grounds  of  the  Summer  Palace  after  an  Imperial 
audience.  This  decree  was  evidently  intended  to 
remind  him  of  the  number  and  activity  of  his  enemies 
and  of  the  expediency  for  refreshing  the  active 
sympathy  of  his  friends  at  Court  by  means  of  the 
largesse  usual  on  such  occasions.  The  largesse  was 
no  doubt  forthcoming,  for  Li  himself  was  wont  to 
speak  with  bitterness  of  the  large  sums  extracted  from 
him  on  the  occasion  of  his  visits  to  Peking  at  this 
period.  It  produced  the  desired  effect,  for  soon 
afterwards  his  honours  and  titles  were  restored  and 
he  was  appointed  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen — an  Irish 
promotion  which,  according  to  common  report  cost 
him  Tls. 39,000. 

Li’s  subsequent  appointment  to  be  Viceroy  of 
Canton,  early  in  1900,  becomes  extremely  interesting 
in  the  light  of  the  events  which  followed  it.  The 
conditions  under  which  it  was  conferred  and  under- 
taken help  us  to  gauge  the  master  motives  which 
determined  his  actions  in  this,  the  last  year  of  his 
life.  The  British  Legation  claimed  at  the  time  that 
his  removal  from  the  Metropolitan  Province  was  a 
triumph  for  British  diplomacy  and  a rebuff  for 


96 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Russia,  but  neither  the  Foreign  Office  nor  the  Legation 
at  Peking  was  distinguished  for  intelligent  anticipa- 
tion of  events  between  1898  and  1900.  Li’s  appoint- 
ment to  Canton  showed,  firstly,  that,  although  the 
Empress  Dowager  was  then  already  deeply  com- 
mitted to  Prince  Tuan  and  his  Boxer  chiefs,  she  was 
still  Li’s  patron  and  protector.  It  showed  that  Li 
himself  foresaw  the  storm  which  was  brewing  and 
desired  to  be  as  far  removed  from  its  centre  as  pos- 
sible. Finally,  it  proved  that  the  reactionaries  at 
Peking  recognised  in  Li  Hung-chang  a formidable 
opponent.  When  the  Boxer  madness  was  at  its 
height,  and  the  idea  of  driving  the  foreigner  into  the 
sea  still  appeared  practicable  to  hotheads  like  Kang 
Yi  and  Hsii  Tung,  the  latter  was  wont  to  declare 
that  success  could  never  be  completely  assured  unless 
Jung  Lu  and  Li  Hung-chang  were  slain.1  There 
is  no  doubt  that  before  she  committed  herself  defi- 
nitely to  approval  of  the  policy  and  proceedings  of 
Prince  Tuan,  Her  Majesty  TzuHsi  had  been  repeatedly 
warned  by  Li  of  their  hopelessness.  But  she  was 
torn  between  hopes  and  fears  too  strong  to  be  over- 
come by  any  one  man’s  counsel ; nor  could  she  avoid 
being  influenced  by  the  atmosphere  of  racial  ani- 
mosity between  Manchus  and  Chinese,  which  charac- 
terised the  final  phases  of  the  Boxer  movement.  Li 
strove  bravely  to  bring  home  to  her  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  her  folly  ; eventually  he  went  south 
with  the  firm  conviction  in  his  mind  that  his  services 
as  mediator  would  speedily  be  required,  and  that  once 
more  he  would  be  called  upon  to  stand  between 
China  and  the  consequences  of  her  rulers’  purblind 
ignorance  and  arrogance. 

1 Vide  “ Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  Peking,”  p.  450. 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


97 


The  Boxers’  claims  to  supernatural  powers  and 
invincibility  having  been  exploded  by  the  victorious 
advance  of  the  Allies  from  Tientsin,  Tzu  Hsi’s  hopes 
of  deliverance  from  the  hated  foreigner  were  at 
an  end.  With  them  ended  also  her  fears  of  Prince 
Tuan,  Kang  Yi,  and  their  fellow-fanatics ; forth- 
with she  became  once  more  the  Old  Buddha,  pru- 
dent in  counsel,  of  many  devices  ; and,  in  order  to 
retrieve  what  was  left  of  a desperate  situation,  called 
upon  Li  Hung-chang  for  assistance.  In  a decree 
issued  a fortnight  before  the  relief  of  the  Lega- 
tions she  appointed  him  to  his  old  post  as  Viceroy 
of  Chihli,  bidding  him  come  north  in  hot  haste,  “ there 
being  urgent  need  of  a diplomat  versed  in  foreign 
affairs.”  Li  was  an  old  man  and  tired  ; he  was 
suffering  severely  from  the  illness  which  ended  his 
life  in  the  following  year.  Yet  never  for  a moment 
did  it  occur  to  him  to  decline  the  dangerous  and  dis- 
agreeable task  assigned  to  him.  Loyalty  to  the  Throne 
(generally  represented  by  the  Empress  Dowager)  was 
for  him  no  matter  of  lip-service  or  opportunism ; 
throughout  his  whole  career  he  professed  and  prac- 
tised it  with  consistency  and  courage,  as  the  first 
duty  of  a scholar  and  a public  servant.  On  this  occa- 
sion, being  weary  and  irritable,  he  could  not  resist 
the  very  natural  impulse  to  say  “ I told  you  so,” 
and  at  the  same  time  to  make  of  his  return  to 
his  old  post  an  opportunity  for  recovering  some  of 
the  “ face  ” which  he  had  lost  in  1896.  He  replied 
to  Tzu  Hsi’s  urgent  message,  expressing  gratitude 
for  the  confidence  thus  bestowed  upon  him  ; but 
“ he  could  not  help  recalling  the  folly  which  has 
now  destroyed  that  structure  of  reformed  adminis- 
tration which  during  my  twenty  odd  years  as 

L.H.  H 


98 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Chihli  Viceroy  I was  able  to  build  up  not  unsuc- 
cessfully.” 1 

Li  Hung-chang’s  unswerving  loyalty  to  the  Throne 
constitutes  one  of  the  most  remarkable  character- 
istics of  the  man  ; it  influenced  his  career  in  many 
directions.  It  was  a loyalty  based  on  Confucianist 
principles,  and  as  such  was  occasionally  superior  to, 
and  independent  of,  his  personal  devotion  to  the 
Empress  Dowager.  He  was  strictly  orthodox,  for 
example,  and  opposed  to  the  personal  and  uncon- 
stitutional policy  of  Tzu  Hsi,  when,  after  the  coup 
d’etat  at  the  end  of  1898,  she  planned  the  deposi- 
tion of  His  Majesty  Kuang  Hsu  and  the  elevation 
of  Prince  Tuan’s  son  to  the  throne.  At  this  crisis 
Li  boldly  took  the  lead,  and  secured  the  support 
of  the  Nanking  Viceroy  in  protesting  on  grounds 
of  State  policy  against  the  course  of  action  pro- 
posed. He  was  always  a staunch  Conservative 
where  the  Throne  was  concerned  and  a stickler  for 
the  observance  of  precedents  and  established  tradition. 
Once  only  he  violated  tradition  and  his  own  con- 
science in  a sudden  crisis  : his  closest  relations  with 
the  Empress  Dowager  date  from  that  day  when, 
bringing  his  Anhui  troops  at  her  bidding  to  Peking, 
he  assisted  her  to  break  the  regular  line  of  succession 
after  the  death  of  her  son  Tungchih  (1875).  On  that 
occasion,  supporting  her  policy  in  placing  the  infant 
Kuang  Hsu  on  the  throne,  he  earned  her  life-long 
gratitude,  but  his  action  was  a violation  of  the  laws 
of  legitimate  succession  and  as  such  was  condemned 
by  the  orthodox.2  But,  however  irregular,  his  action 
did  not  amount  to  the  sin  of  rebellion  against  the 

1 Vide  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,”  p.  387. 

2 Idem,  Chapter  IX. 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


99 


enthroned  Son  of  Heaven.  Thereafter,  in  his  private 
and  personal  capacity,  he  was  the  faithful  henchman 
of  Tzu  Hsi  and  ready  in  most  things  to  do  her 
bidding ; yet  as  an  official  he  stoutly  opposed  her 
when  she  contemplated  a crime  against  the  wretched 
Emperor,  her  nephew. 

Contemporary  opinion  among  his  own  country- 
men, cynical  after  the  manner  of  the  East,  is  wont 
to  attribute  his  action  on  both  these  critical  occasions 
to  the  Viceroy’s  far-seeing  regard  to  his  own  private 
interests.  Such  cynicism  may  well  be  justified  in 
reference  to  his  course  of  action  in  1875,  for  he  had 
then  everything  to  gain  by  the  continuance  of  Tzu 
Hsi’s  Regency  and  the  selection  of  a baby  Emperor. 
But  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  he,  like  his  Imperial 
mistress,  repented  of  the  evil  done  on  that  occasion 
in  violation  of  all  Confucian  principles  of  govern- 
ment. In  1898  his  personal  and  vested  interests 
were  still  dependent  on  the  favour  of  the  Empress 
and  the  goodwill  of  her  Chief  Eunuch,  whereas  the 
Emperor  and  his  Cantonese  reformers  aimed  at 
placing  Young  China  in  power.  To  this  policy,  Li 
was  naturally  opposed  in  so  far  as  his  private 
interests  were  concerned.  His  action  in  joining 
with  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys  to  prevent  the  deposi- 
tion and  taking-off  of  the  Emperor  may  therefore 
reasonably  be  ascribed  to  something  higher  and 
wiser  than  personal  considerations. 

It  has  been  said  of  Li  Hung-chang  that  at  more 
than  one  period  of  his  career,  and  especially  during 
the  Taiping  rebellion,  he  cherished  secret  ambitions 
to  the  throne.  Gordon  referred  to  this  rumour  in 
letters  written  from  China  in  1863,  but  does  not 
appear  to  have  attached  more  importance  to  it  than 


IOO 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


it  deserved.  Again  in  1900,  before  Russia  had  shown 
her  hand  and  while  there  was  still  much  discussion 
amongst  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  as  to  the 
expediency  of  allowing  the  Manchus  to  return  to 
power,  Li  Hung-chang’s  name  was  frequently  men- 
tioned as  the  possible  founder  of  a native  dynasty. 
But,  as  Sir  Robert  Hart  observed  at  the  time,  and 
as  China’s  recent  history  has  conclusively  demon- 
strated, there  was  absolutely  nothing  to  be  gained 
by  the  removal  of  the  Manchus,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  no  individual  or  family  in  China  possessed 
influence  and  authority  sufficient  to  rule  the  country 
with  the  consent  and  respect  of  the  people.  Li  Hung- 
chang  in  his  wisdom  knew  that  it  was  best  for  China 
that  the  Throne  should  remain,  undisturbed,  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  Empire’s  social  system  and  the 
corner-stone  of  the  national  cult  of  ancestors.  He 
was  under  no  delusions  as  to  the  unfitness  of  his  own 
family  to  establish  a dynasty.  He  supported  the 
Manchus’  return,  not  because  he  loved  them  or 
because  they  were  good  rulers,  but  because  they  were 
there.  His  policy  was  a judicious  compound  of  ortho- 
doxy, expediency,  and  of  personal  loyalty  to  Tzu  Hsi. 
In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that 
reasons  very  similar  to  those  put  forward  by  Li 
Hung-chang  in  1901  to  justify  his  support  of  the 
Manchu  dynasty  were  cited  in  1912  by  the  famous 
Confucianist  scholar,  Liang  Ch’i-ch’ao,  as  arguments 
against  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  scheme  of  establishing  a 
Chinese  dynasty  in  his  own  person. 

Li  Hung-chang’s  ascendant  influence  over  the 
Empress  Dowager  became  most  firmly  established 
after  the  coup  de  main  of  1875  ; thereafter,  exercised 
either  directly  or  through  the  eunuch  Li  Lien-ying, 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


IOI 


it  made  itself  felt  continually  as  a dominant  force 
at  Court  and  in  the  Government  Boards.  In  1884, 
when  Tzu  Hsi  had  removed  Prince  Kung  from  the 
Tsung-li  Yamen  and  replaced  him  by  Prince  Ch’ing 
(notorious  trafficker  in  offices),  with  the  Emperor’s 
father,  Prince  Ch’un,  as  a figure-head  chief  of  the 
Government,  Li’s  position  became  one  of  paramount 
authority,  especially  as  regards  foreign  affairs.  It 
was  at  this  period  that  he  became  converted  to  the 
necessity  for  centralisation  of  the  country’s  naval 
and  military  forces,  and  endeavoured,  with  the  help 
of  Prince  Ch’un,  to  have  the  Navy  Department  and 
its  coast  defences  transformed  from  the  provincial 
to  an  Imperial  basis.  Years  before,  during  the  Taiping 
rebellion,  he  had  deliberately  wrecked  the  Sherard- 
Osborn  flotilla  scheme  rather  than  allow  this  new 
force,  under  foreign  supervision  and  control,  to  be 
used  by  Peking  independently  of  the  provincial 
authorities.  Now,  as  Viceroy  of  Chihli,  he  was  led 
by  force  of  circumstances  to  perceive  the  advantages 
of  centralisation  ; and  as  the  result  of  his  judicious 
representations,  a Board  of  Admiralty  was  established 
at  Peking,  with  himself  as  its  executive  chief  at 
Tientsin.  In  all  these  matters  Li  did  nothing  until 
assured  of  the  approval  and  support  of  Her  Majesty 
Tzu  Hsi.  He  shrewdly  guessed  that  the  idea  of  cen- 
tralising authority  at  Peking  would  appeal  to  her  if 
it  could  be  made  to  appear  feasible,  and  that  the 
possession  of  an  imposing  fleet  at  the  sea-gates  of 
Taku  would  increase  her  sense  of  Imperial  dignity. 
But  neither  she  nor  Li  Hung-chang  realised  (or  if 
they  did,  they  ignored)  the  fact  that  the  centralisa- 
tion of  armed  forces  could  never  be  achieved  without 
preliminary  centralisation  of  reformed  finances.  For 


102 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


ten  years  the  naval  scheme  looked  promising  enough, 
until  with  the  Japanese  war  the  bubble  burst  ; during 
those  years  the  administrative  rottenness  inseparable 
from  mandarin  ideas  of  finance  remained  unexposed 
and  to  some  extent  unsuspected.  But  Li  himself 
must  have  been  fully  aware  of  the  hopelessness  of 
achieving  either  centralisation  or  security.  He  knew 
that  the  money  which  the  Board  of  Revenue  should 
have  held  available  for  the  fleet  and  fortifications 
had  for  a long  time  been  steadily  diverted,  by  order 
of  Her  Majesty,  for  the  rebuilding  and  decoration  of 
the  Summer  Palace ; and  he  knew  that  of  the  sums 
which  actually  reached  Tientsin  for  admiralty  pur- 
poses a very  considerable  portion  had  adhered  to  the 
supple  fingers  of  his  rapacious  son-in-law,  Chang 
P’ei-lun,  not  to  mention  that  which  found  its  way 
into  his  own  privy  purse.  Yet,  until  the  storm  broke 
and  his  jerry-built  edifice  of  sham  defences  collapsed, 
never  did  he  or  any  other  responsible  member  of  the 
Board  of  Admiralty  officially  complain  of  a state  of 
affairs  which  was  bound  to  cost  the  country  dear. 
It  was  only  at  an  Imperial  audience  in  1896,  after 
the  debacle , that  Li  ventured  to  remind  Her  Majesty 
that  a navy  deprived  of  its  maintenance  funds  was 
never  likely  to  be  either  efficient  or  well  equipped. 
Had  his  own  conscience  been  clear  in  the  matter  of 
finance,  he  might  have  defended  himself  by  explain- 
ing some  other  significant  facts  and  figures  bearing 
on  the  causes  of  the  ignominious  collapse  of  the 
Paper  Dragon,  but,  being  wise  in  his  generation, 
he  preferred  to  maintain  a tactful  silence  and  to 
trust  to  the  grateful  protection  of  Tzu  Hsi  and  the 
help  of  the  Chief  Eunuch  ; wherein  his  wisdom  was 
justified. 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


103 


Amongst  the  memorials  sent  in  at  or  about  the 
time  of  the  Shimonoseki  negotiations  denouncing 
Li  Hung-chang  as  responsible  for  China’s  humiliation, 
there  was  one  which  particularly  incensed  the  Viceroy, 
because  of  its  very  plain  speaking  on  the  financial 
aspects  of  the  situation.  This  was  a memorial  by  the 
Censor  An  Wei-chun ; the  views  which  it  expressed 
were  undoubtedly  those  of  the  great  majority  of 
Li’s  critics  and  colleagues.  The  same  things  might 
have  been  said,  with  equal  justice,  of  almost  every 
high  official  in  China  except  the  two  Yangtsze  vice- 
roys ; but  as  a rule  such  things  are  not  said  openly 
of  a great  man  under  the  Celestial  system  of  govern- 
ment, unless  the  facts  are  notoriously  flagrant  or 
the  person  denounced  is  believed  to  be  irretrievably 
disgraced.  Under  that  system  the  man  who  is  hope- 
lessly down  is  fair  game,  but  even  so,  the  washing  of 
financially  dirty  linen  is  avoided  unless  the  unfortunate 
offender  possesses  enough  of  this  world’s  goods  to  make 
his  impeachment  appeal  to  covetousness  in  high  places ; 
these  are  the  unwritten  laws  of  the  silent  warfare  that 
is  waged  eternally  in  and  about  the  Forbidden  City. 
Li  took  his  chances  like  every  other  player  in  that 
great  game  with  his  eyes  open  ; and  he  never  forgot 
the  protective  value  of  a well-filled  purse.  An  Wei- 
chun’s  Memorial,  with  its  references  to  the  way  in 
which  his  purse  was  filled,  was  unsportsmanlike  in 
its  brutal  frankness ; Li  bitterly  resented  its  readiness 
to  wash  the  mandarin  wardrobe  in  public,  for  it 
implied  the  end  of  his  career.  Nevertheless  as  an 
exposure  of  Chinese  official  methods  in  general,  and 
those  of  Li  Hung-chang  in  particular,  the  document 
is  not  without  permanent  interest  : 

“ Li  Hung-chang  has  invariably  advanced  himself 


io4  LI  HUNG-CHANG 

because  of  his  relations  with  foreigners,  and  thus 
been  led  to  conceive  an  inflated  opinion  of  his  own 
merits.  The  c dwarf  bandits  ’ 1 having  rebelled, 
he  seems  to  have  been  afraid  that  the  large  sums  of 
money,  saved  from  numerous  peculations,  which  he 
had  deposited  in  Japan  might  be  lost  ; hence  his 
objections  to  the  war.  When  the  decree  declaring 
war  reached  him,  his  disappointment  was  great, 
and  he  showed  his  resentment  and  treachery  by 
providing  the  ‘ dwarf  bandits  ’ with  supplies  and 
munitions  of  war.  His  only  hope  was  that  the 
‘ dwarfs  ’ would  prove  victorious  and  his  prophecy 
would  thus  be  justified  ; to  this  end  he  curtailed  the 
supplies  for  our  troops  at  the  front,  diverting  the 
funds  for  the  same  to  his  own  pockets.  He  would 
strongly  oppose  all  those  who  urged  a vigorous 
prosecution  of  the  campaign,  rejoicing  at  our  defeats 
and  deploring  our  successes.  All  the  military  com- 
manders of  the  forces  under  his  orders  humbly 
complied  with  his  wishes,  and  invariably  ran  away  at 
the  first  sight  of  the  enemy.  The  Censorate  has  been 
full  of  Memorials  denouncing  the  treacherous  and 
unpatriotic  action  of  Li  Hung-chang,  so  that  there 
is  no  need  for  me  to  say  anything  further  on  this 
subject. 

“ But  I would  like  to  add  that  Generals  Yeh  and 
Wei,  who  have  been  cashiered  and  whose  arrest 
has  been  decreed,  are  at  this  very  moment  in  hiding 
at  Tientsin  ; they  have  made  the  Viceroy’s  Yamen 
itself  a place  of  refuge  for  absconding  criminals.  This 
is  a matter  of  common  knowledge  and  undoubtedly 
true.  Then  again  we  have  the  case  of  Ting  Ju-chang, 
who  was  ordered  to  be  arrested,  but  who  persuaded 
Li  Hung-chang  to  intercede  for  him,  on  the  plea  that 
he  was  indispensable  to  China,  being  in  possession  of 
a mysterious  secret,  an  American  invention  which  he 
alone  could  manipulate,  whereby  all  surrounding 

1 l.e.t  the  Japanese  (literal  translation). 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


105 


objects  might  be  rendered  invisible.  Li  Hung-chang 
actually  had  the  audacity  to  make  mention  of  this 
ridiculous  invention  in  addressing  your  Majesty,  and 
it  seems  to  me  that  if  he  is  to  be  permitted  to  refer 
to  fables  and  unclean  magic  of  this  kind,  he  is  treating 
the  Throne  with  shameless  disrespect.  Nevertheless, 
none  of  your  Majesty’s  Councillors  have  ever  dared 
to  oppose  him,  possibly  because  they  themselves  are 
too  far  gone  in  senile  decay  to  be  able  to  bear  any 
further  burden  of  distress.  Their  thoughts  are  far 
away,  wool-gathering,  or  it  may  be  that  they  too 
have  been  smitten  with  fear  at  the  thought  of  this 
marvellous  invention  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  whereby 
the  landscape  may  be  completely  befogged.  If  so, 
the  fact  would  account  for  the  nebulous  tendencies 
of  their  policy,  and  for  their  remaining  in  ignorance 
of  Li  Hung-chang’s  remarkable  mendacity. 

“ The  Imperial  Decree  whereby  Shao  Yu-lien  and 
Chang  Yin-huan  have  been  appointed  Plenipoten- 
tiaries to  discuss  terms  of  peace  has  not  yet  been  made 
public,  because  the  Grand  Council  is  actually  afraid 
openly  to  mention  the  word  peace,  notwithstanding 
that  they  failed  utterly  in  prosecuting  the  war  and 
in  dignified  insistence  on  our  lawful  rights.  Their 
action  appears  to  me  like  that  of  a thief  who,  having 
stolen  a bell,  shuts  his  ears  while  carrying  it  away, 
blissfully  forgetting  that  everybody  else  can  hear 
its  tinkling.  They  do  not  seem  to  realise,  these 
Councillors,  that  throughout  the  whole  Empire 
everybody  is  already  aware  of  the  fact  that  we  are 
suing  for  peace.  Japan  having  objected  to  Shao  on 
personal  grounds,  the  Grand  Council  has  now  actually 
gone  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  in  his  place  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  son,  Li  Ching-fang,1  should  be  appointed. 
This  is  simply  an  outrage.  Li  Ching-fang  is  nothing 
more  than  the  son-in-law  of  a Japanese  traitor  who 
calls  himself  Chang  Pang-chang,  a man  whom  I have 


1 At  that  time  Chinese  Minister  in  London. 


io6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


already  impeached.  If  such  unspeakable  traitors  are 
permitted  to  go  to  Japan,  nothing  will  suit  the 
Japanese  better,  and  the  negotiations  must  inevitably 
result  in  our  being  badly  cheated  by  these  per- 
nicious robbers.  Japan’s  strength  is  purely  super- 
ficial ; as  a matter  of  fact,  she  is  rotten  to  the  core  ; 
if  now  we  are  debarred  from  compelling  Japan  to 
fight  a decisive  battle,  if  we  meekly  accept  terms 
dictated  by  these  low-born  dwarfs,  we  are  simply 
in  the  position  of  a tributary  State,  and  cannot  be 
described  as  equals  in  any  treaty  that  may  be  made. 
In  other  words,  our  glorious  Empire  is  not  only  being 
ruined  by  muddlers,  but  sold  by  traitors.  There  is 
not  a single  subject  of  the  Throne  who  does  not 
gnash  his  teeth  with  rage,  and  long  to  sink  them  in  the 
flesh  of  Li  Hung-chang. 

“ There  are  not  lacking  people  who  declare  that  this 
humiliating  policy  of  peace  has  been  prompted  by  the 
Empress  Dowager’s  Chief  Eunuch,  Li  Lien-ying. 
For  myself,  I do  not  care  to  attach  undue  importance 
to  tea-house  gossip,  but  as  the  Empress  Dowager  has 
now  handed  over  the  reins  of  government  to  your 
Majesty,  how  can  you  possibly  justify  your  position 
before  your  ancestors  and  to  your  subjects,  if  you 
permit  her  still  to  dictate  to  you,  or  to  interfere  in 
the  business  of  the  State  ? What  sort  of  a person  is 
this  Li  Lien-ying,  who  dares  to  interfere  in  government 
matters  ? If  there  be  any  truth  whatsoever  in  the 
rumour,  it  is  assuredly  incumbent  upon  your  Majesty 
to  inflict  severe  punishment  on  this  creature,  if  only 
because  of  that  house-law  of  your  dynasty  which  for- 
bids eunuchs  to  concern  themselves  in  State  affairs. 

“ The  truth  is  that  the  Throne  has  been  intimidated 
by  Li  Hung-chang,  and  has  taken  his  statements  for 
granted,  while  the  Grand  Council,  chiefly  composed  of 
Li’s  humble  and  obedient  servants,  shields  him  from 
detection  and  punishment,  fearing  that,  if  thwarted, 
he  may  raise  the  standard  of  rebellion.  Its  members 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


107 


accordingly  do  their  best  to  justify  him  in  the  eyes  of 
your  Majesty,  failing  to  realise  that  he  has  always  been 
a traitor  at  heart.  His  is  the  will,  if  not  the  power,  to 
rebel.  His  army  is  composed  of  corrupt  and  useless 
creatures  quite  devoid  of  any  military  knowledge  or 
instincts,  while  his  troops  are  ever  on  the  verge  of 
mutiny,  because  they  are  always  defrauded  of  their 
pay.  They  are  quite  deficient  in  esprit  de  corps , and 
the  small  foreign  forces  lately  organised  at  Tientsin 
would  more  than  suffice  to  overcome  Li  Hung-chang 
and  all  his  host.  The  truth  of  these  statements  can 
easily  be  verified.  Long  ago,  if  he  had  had  the  power, 
he  would  surely  have  rebelled  ; but  as  he  cannot  do 
so,  he  contents  himself  with  bullying  your  Majesty 
and  disregarding  your  Imperial  decrees.  He  totally 
ignores  the  existence  of  the  Empress  Dowager  and 
of  your  Majesty,  a fact  which  may  be  inferred  from  his 
daring  to  insult  your  intelligence  with  his  mysterious 
powers  of  conferring  invisibility. 

“ I am  covered  with  shame  and  amazement. 
My  only  hope  is  that  the  Throne  will  now  display 
the  majesty  of  its  wrath,  and,  after  disclosing  Li 
Hung-chang’s  treason  to  all  men,  will  put  this  traitor 
to  death.  By  this  means  our  troops  would  at  once  be 
inspired  to  valour,  and  the  ‘ dwarf  bandits  ’ would  be 
completely  annihilated.  At  the  same  time,  I would 
ask  you  to  be  so  good  as  to  behead  me  also,  as  a 
fitting  punishment  for  this  plain  speaking.  Your 
Majesty’s  Imperial  ancestors  are  present  in  the  spirit, 
and  they  bear  me  witness.  I am  quite  easy  in  my 
mind  as  to  the  issue,  and  I therefore  expose  the 
innermost  thoughts  of  my  heart  and  lay  them  before 
your  Majesty,  anxiously  begging  for  your  Imperial 
decision.” 

The  reference  to  her  Chief  Eunuch’s  responsibility 
for  the  causes  of  China’s  defeat  was  a weapon  oft 
wielded  by  the  Progressives  and  the  Cantonese  party 


io8 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


in  the  south,  but  on  this  occasion  the  direct  attack 
served  to  wound  Tzu  Hsi’s  sensitive  pride  and  there- 
fore to  strengthen  her  determination  to  protect 
Li  Hung-chang.  The  whole  official  hierarchy  of  China 
was  united  in  denouncing  her  protege  and  vilifying 
his  conception  of  China’s  international  relations, 
but  she  paid  no  heed  nor  wavered  in  her  course. 
The  only  reply  vouchsafed  to  An  Wei-chiin  was  a 
rescript  in  which  he  was  dismissed  from  office  and 
banished  to  the  post-roads  of  the  Kunsuh  border. 
Said  Tzu  Hsi  (in  a decree  signed  by  the  Emperor) : — 

“ Owing  to  the  seriousness  of  recent  events,  we 
have  been  particularly  anxious  of  late  to  receive  and 
attend  to  the  unprejudiced  suggestions  of  our  Censors, 
and  we  have  abstained  from  punishing  any  of  them, 
even  when  they  have  made  use  of  improper  expres- 
sions in  addressing  us.  With  the  gracious  consent  of 
Her  Majesty  the  Empress  Dowager,  we  have  given 
particular  attention  to  all  projects  whereby  the 
welfare  of  our  people  may  be  advanced,  and  all 
our  people  must  by  this  time  be  aware  of  our  sincere 
desire  to  promote  good  government.  In  spite  of  this 
the  Censor  An  Wei-chun  has  to-day  submitted  a 
Memorial  based  entirely  upon  rumours,  and  con- 
taining the  following  sentence  : — ‘ How  can  you  pos- 
sibly justify  your  position  before  your  ancestors  and 
to  your  subjects,  if  you  permit  the  Empress  Dowager 
still  to  dictate  to  you,  or  to  interfere  in  the  business 
of  the  State  ? ’ 

“ Language  of  this  kind  reveals  depths  of  audacity 
unspeakable,  the  unbridled  licence  of  a madman’s 
tongue.  Were  we  to  fail  in  inflicting  stern  punish- 
ment in  a case  of  this  kind,  the  result  might  well  be 
to  produce  estrangement  between  Her  Majesty  the 
Empress  and  ourselves.  The  Censor  is,  therefore, 
dismissed  from  office  and  sentenced  to  banishment 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL  109 

at  the  post-roads,  on  the  western  frontier,  where 
he  will  expiate  his  guilt  and  serve  as  a wholesome 
warning  to  others.  His  Memorial  is  handed  back 
to  him  with  the  contempt  it  deserves.” 

As  events  proved,  Li  lived  to  requite  these  benefits 
in  1900,  and  in  his  turn  to  save  the  Empress  Dowager 
from  the  consequences  of  her  folly.  His  statecraft 
in  playing  off  Russia  against  the  Powers  in  the  peace 
negotiations  at  Peking  paved  the  way  to  her  safe 
return  to  undiminished  authority  and  saved  the 
life  of  the  Chief  Eunuch,  Li  Lien-ying.  The  energy 
and  ability  with  which  the  aged  counsellor,  then  in 
his  seventy-seventh  year,  conducted  these  negotia- 
tions, won  for  him  the  respect  of  Chinese  and  foreigners 
alike.  His  last  services  to  his  sovereign  and  his 
country  were  the  greatest  of  his  career  ; it  is  safe 
to  say  that  no  other  official  in  China  could  have 
achieved  anything  like  the  results  which  Li  secured 
under  the  Peking  Protocol  of  1901. 

In  the  opinion  of  his  principal  Viceregal  colleagues, 
from  the  days  of  Tseng  Kuo-fan  to  those  of  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai,  Li  owed  most  of  his  success  in  life  to  the 
favour  of  the  Empress  Dowager,  and  this  favour 
they  undoubtedly  attributed  almost  as  much  to  his 
shrewd  business  instincts  and  skilful  traffic  in  palm- 
oil  as  to  his  exceptional  ability  as  administrator 
and  diplomat.  Amongst  his  contemporaries  he  was 
never  popular  : there  was  always  a distinctly  marked 
consensus  of  sentiment  against  him  in  high  official 
circles,  and  this  was  partly  due  to  the  good  opinion  in 
which  he  was  held  by  foreigners.  The  Mandarinate  of 
China  has  never  been  a mutual  admiration  society  ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  is  a fierce  struggle  for  place 
and  power,  in  which  the  Oriental  proclivity  to  envy, 


I IO 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


hatred,  and  malice  finds  continual  scope.  Every 
high  official  in  the  public  service  is  liable  to  attack 
at  any  time  that  his  enemies  and  rivals  may  consider 
it  safe  and  opportune  to  conspire  for  his  undoing. 
Making  all  due  allowance  for  these  facts,  it  is  not 
possible  to  ascribe  solely  to  envy  or  malice  the 
suspicion  and  hostility  displayed  towards  Li  by 
men  like  Tso  Tsung-tang  and  Chang  Chih-tung,  or 
their  resentment  of  his  conciliatory  attitude  towards 
foreigners.  Their  feelings  were  often  a genuine 
manifestation  of  patriotism,  as  they  understood  it. 
Time  after  time,  when  China  had  been  shorn  of  terri- 
tory and  humiliated  in  the  course  of  negotiations 
conducted  by  Li,  all  China  heard  his  praises  sung 
by  the  despoiler.  Thus,  in  the  war  with  France 
(1884-85)  it  learned  that  the  French  Government  had 
refrained  from  inflicting  on  Port  Arthur  the  destruc- 
tion meted  out  to  the  Foochow  arsenal,  because 
of  its  regard  for  “ notre  ami  Li  Hung-chang,”  and 
that  it  had  subsequently  waived  its  claim  to  in- 
demnity on  the  same  grounds.  Ten  years  later 
the  Japanese  Government  practically  insisted  on  the 
appointment  of  Li  as  peace  negotiator  at  Shimonoseki, 
and  no  sooner  was  his  task  accomplished  than  the 
Russian  Government  exercised  its  influence  at  Peking 
to  have  him  sent  as  Special  Envoy  to  the  Coronation 
of  the  Tzar.  To  the  Chinese  mind  the  praise  of 
an  alien  necessarily  affords  good  ground  for  suspicion, 
and  Li  was  accordingly  suspect.  His  chief  rival, 
Chang  Chih-tung,  a closet  philosopher  of  great 
pen-fierceness,  gave  him  no  credit  for  wisdom  in 
recognising  China’s  inability  to  oppose  the  Western 
nations  by  force  of  arms  ; on  the  contrary,  he  was 
wont  to  ascribe  his  policy  to  motives  of  cowardice 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


hi 


or  corruption.  Similarly,  Tso  Tsung-tang,  a blunt- 
mannered  soldier  with  a lofty  but  completely  erro- 
neous idea  of  his  country’s  greatness,  was  at  no  pains 
to  conceal  his  contempt  for  Li’s  tactics  of  conciliation. 
When  Li  became  Superintendent  of  Northern  Trade 
at  Tientsin  in  1871,  Tso  occupied  the  same  position 
in  the  Yangtsze,  and  their  bitter  rivalry  became  the 
talk  of  every  Yamen  in  the  country.  In  those  days, 
following  close  upon  the  massacre  of  French  mission- 
aries at  Tientsin,  Li’s  avowed  determination  to  permit 
no  outbreaks  against  foreigners  increased  his  unpopu- 
larity with  the  great  majority  of  his  countrymen, 
just  as  it  did  when  he  refused  to  be  beguiled  into  the 
ranks  of  Imperial  Boxerdom  in  1900.  Tso  learned 
before  he  died  the  lesson  which  Li  had  grasped  in 
his  youth,  namely,  that  a nation  unarmed  should 
refrain  from  causes  of  strife,  and  he  was  magnani- 
mous enough  to  make  amends  ; but  most  of  the  high 
provincial  officials,  his  contemporaries,  remained  in 
complacent  ignorance  of  this  truth  till  the  end.  Thus, 
during  the  war  with  Japan  and  after  the  fall  of  Port 
Arthur,  when  the  Emperor  called  upon  all  the  high 
provincial  authorities  for  memorials  of  advice  as  to 
the  continuance  of  hostilities,  more  than  two-thirds 
of  the  replies  advocated  fighting  on  to  the  bitter  end 
rather  than  consent  to  any  cession  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory. None  of  the  memorialists  had  any  knowledge 
of  fighting,  nor  any  intention  of  taking  any  active 
part  in  the  struggle  : their  views,  collectively  con- 
sidered, constitute  an  unconscious  but  eloquent 
testimonial  to  the  superior  wisdom  of  the  Viceroy 
whom  they  affected  to  despise  as  a truckler  to  the 
barbarian. 

Chang  Chih-tung’s  relations  with  Li  Hung-chang 


1 12 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


were  those  of  a rival  and  a critic,  but  he  was  always 
distinguished  by  empiricism  of  a thoroughly  visionary 
kind,  whereas  Li’s  policy  was  based  on  intelligent 
recognition  of  actualities.  It  was  in  1880,  at  the 
time  of  the  Kuldja  crisis  with  Russia,  that  Chang 
first  made  his  mark  as  a trenchant  critic  of  political 
affairs,  but  his  success  in  that  role  was  due  to  his 
scholarly  literary  style  and  to  the  ignorance  of  his 
public  rather  than  to  any  weight  of  solid  argument 
on  his  side.  He  professed  then,  as  in  later  years,  to 
be  a fervent  admirer  of  Li’s  abilities,  but  the  Memorial 
which  he  addressed  to  the  Throne  (June  1st,  1880), 
advising  against  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Livadia, 
contained  ample  evidence  not  only  of  parlous  ignor- 
ance of  the  subject  under  discussion,  but  of  querulous 
ill-will  towards  his  colleague.  After  advising  repudia- 
tion of  the  Treaty  and  the  execution  of  Ch’ung  Hou 
(the  envoy  who  had  concluded  it),  he  proceeded  to 
expound  China’s  chances  of  a successful  war  with 
Russia.  In  so  doing,  he  made  an  indirect  attack  on 
Li  by  urging  the  Throne  to  compel  Li  Hung-chang  to 
justify  the  trust  reposed  in  him  and  to  turn  to  account 
the  vast  expenditure  incurred  in  his  naval  and  mili- 
tary preparations.  The  following  paragraphs  of  this 
Memorial  are  instructively  typical : 

“ On  the  conspicuous  talents  of  Li  Hung-chang 
China  rests  her  hopes.  The  enormous  outlay  of 
millions  of  taels,  spent  year  after  year  in  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions  of  war,  has  been  incurred  with 
the  view  to  preparing  for  just  such  a crisis  as  now 
exists.  If,  after  all  this  preparation,  we  cannot 
fight  even  one  battle,  of  what  use  are  the  officials 
in  whom  your  Majesty  trusts  ? On  my  knees,  I 
beg  your  Majesty  to  issue  an  Edict  to  Li  Hung-chang, 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


ii3 

ordering  him  to  carry  out  your  Majesty’s  policy 
without  the  slightest  alteration  and  holding  him 
personally  responsible  for  its  success.  He  should  be 
ordered  to  select  his  staff,  drill  his  troops  and  improve 
our  fortifications  by  German  methods.  He  should 
be  informed  that  if  our  forces  fight  and  win,  your 
Majesty  will  reward  them  with  titles  and  honours  ; 
if  they  lose,  your  Majesty  will  deal  with  them  severely. 

“ With  the  2,800,000  taels  that  this  Treaty  would 
give  Russia  for  the  rendition  of  Ili,  we  should  hire 
good  soldiers  from  Europe.  They  would  surely  fight 
for  us,  because  the  ultimate  object  of  Russia  in  her 
advance  on  Kashgaria  is  to  effect  an  entrance  into 
India  from  behind.  Not  only  China,  but  England 
also  is  menaced.  If  therefore  Li  Hung-chang  were 
to  make  it  plain  to  the  British  Minister  that  the 
lower  jawbone  is  useless  without  the  upper  one  and 
that  without  lips  the  teeth  will  get  cold,  England 
would  be  bound  to  make  common  cause  with  us.” 

Chang,  the  “ scholarly  bungler,”  the  stupid,  honest 
visionary  and  patient  pursuer  of  industrial  wild  geese, 
was  always  jealous  of  Li’s  more  practical  and  profit- 
able intelligence  ; he  was  jealous,  too,  of  Li’s  high 
place  in  the  favour  of  Tzu  Hsi.  But  as  a Confucianist 
scholar  and  a staunch  Conservative,  he  could  not 
help  recognising  and  admiring  his  great  rival’s  loyalty 
to  the  Empress  ; also,  like  Tso  Tsung-tang,  he  was 
forced  in  the  end,  by  the  events  of  1900,  to  admit 
that  Li’s  conciliatory  methods  in  dealing  with  the  outer 
barbarians  had  been  wiser  than  those  of  the  ignorant 
fire-eaters  who  denounced  him.  On  the  occasion  of 
Li’s  seventieth  birthday  (March,  1892),  when  the  whole 
official  hierarchy  and  the  Court  united  in  doing 
honour  to  the  great  Viceroy,  Chang  delivered  himself 
of  a florid  address  of  congratulation  in  his  best 
super-classical  manner.  This  eulogy  created  more 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


1 14 

attention  in  literary  than  in  political  circles.  Chang’s 
tongue  was  often  in  his  cheek  on  such  occasions, 
but  his  heart  was  in  the  artistry  of  his  pen,  and 
he  savoured  his  scholarship  like  rich  wine.  Intel- 
lectually regarded,  the  results  were  generally  dis- 
appointing, but  the  literati  admired  them  none  the 
less,  having  always  been  educated  to  the  principle 
“ take  care  of  the  sounds  and  the  sense  will  take 
care  of  itself.”  The  fact  is  retrospectively  interesting 
that,  only  two  years  before  the  collapse  of  Li’s  impos- 
ing coast  defences  and  naval  squadron,  Chang  Chih- 
tung,  pen-warrior  and  prop  of  the  Empire,  should 
have  addressed  him  in  these  words  of  fulsome  praise  : 

“ Krupp  guns  protect  every  river,  masked  batteries 
are  hidden  in  unsuspected  spots,  one  fort  supports 
another,  hills  are  tunnelled,  towers  raised,  soldiers 
hide  within  the  walls,  secret  passages  provide  exit. 
Possible  foes  encircle  us,  even  as  the  Great  Bear 
encompasses  the  Polar  Star  ; right  and  left  we  face 
as  the  changing  moon.  Let  enemies  advance,  you 
are  protected  against  them  on  every  side.” 

With  an  intellectual  equipment  of  this  kind  at 
the  very  summit  of  officialdom  in  China,  and  the 
whole  mandarin  structure  founded  on  “make-believe,” 
small  wonder  that  Chang  Chih-tung  and  those 
who  thought  like  him  turned  fiercely  upon  Li  in 
the  hour  of  defeat.  Even  after  he  had  secured  the 
assistance  of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  to  compel 
Japan  to  restore  the  Liaotung  peninsula  to  China, 
both  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys  continued  to  voice  the 
official  hierarchy’s  demand  for  a scapegoat  by  breath- 
ing fiery  denunciations  against  him  and  demanding 
repudiation  of  his  Treaty.  Inspired  and  directed  by 
their  example,  the  whole  pack  of  Censors  started 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


1 15 

in  full  cry,  clamouring  for  the  death  and  destruction 
of  Li  and  all  his  adherents,  who  were  described  as 
traitors  to  the  country.  Fortunately  for  Li  and  for 
China,  at  this  critical  juncture  one  of  his  sturdiest 
antagonists,  Weng  Tung-ho  (the  Emperor’s  tutor), 
was  led  to  realise  the  folly  of  continuing  the  war. 
Being  an  honest  man,  he  urged  the  Emperor  to  ratify 
the  Treaty,  and  his  advice  carried  the  day.  When, 
thanks  to  Tzu  Hsi’s  effective  protection,  the  howling 
pack  had  been  kennelled,  Li’s  head  was  timely 
secured  on  his  shoulders  by  provisional  arrangements 
which  removed  him  from  Tientsin  and  from  personal 
danger  ; thereafter,  as  the  more  enlightened  of  his 
colleagues  realised  that  the  old  man  was  not  likely 
to  become  a negligible  force,  they  began  once  more  to 
praise  the  astuteness  which  had  been  able  yet  again 
to  snatch  benefits  for  China  out  of  the  conflicting 
interests  of  her  invaders  and  oppressors. 

Nevertheless,  his  unique  reputation  as  chief  prop 
and  pillar  of  State  had  been  very  seriously  damaged 
in  the  eyes  of  the  great  body  of  his  countrymen. 
The  military  and  naval  preparations  which  had  dis- 
tinguished him  above  all  his  colleagues  had  been 
tested  and  proved  to  be  worth  for  practical  purposes 
little  more  than  the  mediaeval  bows  and  arrows  of 
the  Peking  Field  Force.  His  twenty-five  years’ 
prestige  as  a successful  adaptor  of  Western  military 
methods  had  crumbled  away,  reducing  him  swiftly 
to  the  level  of  the  customary  provincial  satrap  ; 
indeed,  most  of  his  accusers,  becoming  wise  after  the 
event,  declared  that  his  warships  and  arsenals 
had  never  been  anything  more  than  cunning  devices 
for  the  enrichment  of  the  Li  family.  From  the  height 
of  his  predominant  position  he  fell  headlong  in  1895 

X 2 


1 1 6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


to  depths  of  derision.  But  for  all  that,  he  was  able 
during  the  six  remaining  years  of  his  life,  by  his 
indomitable  energy  and  by  the  courage  and  resource 
of  his  diplomacy,  to  recover  something  of  his  former 
prestige.  In  his  refusal  to  accept  any  defeat  as  final, 
lies  one  of  Li’s  chief  claims  to  greatness. 

Our  study  of  his  career  as  an  official  would  not  be 
complete  without  some  reference  to  his  multifarious 
and  progressive  activities  in  the  sphere  of  financial 
and  industrial  enterprise.  In  his  long  tenure  of  the 
post  of  Superintendent  of  Northern  Trade  he  was 
necessarily  brought  into  constant  contact  with  foreign 
traders,  consular  officials,  and  would-be  concession- 
aires, and  in  the  supervision  and  transaction  of 
foreign  business  he  conceived  and  put  into  execution 
many  schemes  calculated  to  bring  profit  to  his 
adherents  and  to  himself.  His  capacity  for  business 
was  undoubtedly  of  a very  high  order.  Had  it  been 
directed  to  the  advancement  of  national  instead  of 
personal  interests,  had  his  recognition  of  the  necessity 
for  the  development  of  China’s  economic  resources 
been  more  patriotic  and  disinterested,  he  might  have 
achieved  far-reaching  results  and  conferred  lasting 
benefits  on  his  country.  Unfortunately  the  various 
enterprises  which  he  promoted  or  protected  were  all 
conducted  on  lines  calculated  to  produce  the  maxi- 
mum of  immediate  profit  for  the  officials  concerned 
without  any  consistent  regard  for  sound  business 
methods  and  honest  finance.  The  trail  of  peculation 
and  nepotism  was  over  them  all,  producing  inevitable 
results  of  bad  management  and  slack  service.  Rail- 
ways, mines,  cotton  mills,  silk  filatures,  telegraphs, 
shipping — in  all  these  enterprises  Li  displayed 
remarkable  perception  of  the  opportunities  offered 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


117 

for  developing  profitable  trade,  based  on  a perfectly 
legitimate  policy  of  “ China  for  the  Chinese  ” ; but 
the  men  and  methods  that  he  employed  were  seldom 
of  the  kind  to  make  that  policy  successful. 

In  the  days  before  the  advent  of  the  foreign  trader, 
with  his  imposed  rights  of  residence  and  industrial 
activities,  it  was  usually  the  custom  of  Chinese 
officials  to  invest  their  money  in  native  banks,  pawn- 
shops, rice,  real  estate,  and  valuable  curios.  All 
these  offered  remunerative  opportunities  for  the 
investment  of  capital  and  the  employment  of  friends 
and  relatives,  but  they  were  liable  to  seizure  at  the 
hands  of  covetous  rulers  and  to  destruction  in  times 
of  civil  strife.  The  results  of  many  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  manifold  activities  in  the  making  and  invest- 
ing of  money  have  never  been  fully  disclosed,  for 
China  knows  neither  a Somerset  House  nor  Income 
Tax  Commissioners,  and  he  was  too  cautiously 
prudent  to  put  all  his  eggs  into  such  conspicuous 
baskets  as  the  “ China  Merchants  ” Shipping  Company 
or  the  Peking  Syndicate.  Common  report  in  China 
credited  him  before  the  Japanese  war  with  the  posses- 
sion of  a vast  fortune  and  with  having  invested  a 
large  proportion  of  it  in  real  estate  and  pawnshops. 
The  “ Memoirs  ” contain  a reference  to  this  particular 
feature  of  his  private  finances,  which  deserves  notice 
if  only  because  many  of  his  relatives  (who  have 
hitherto  allowed  these  spurious  records  to  circulate 
without  protest)  were  probably  to  some  extent 
beneficiaries  of  Li’s  commercial  activities  and 
acquainted  with  his  methods  : 

“ It  seems  that  in  the  Western  world  the  small 
money-lender,  or,  perhaps  better,  the  lender  of  small 
sums,  is  a person  despised  by  the  general  public. 


1 1 8 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


That  is  because  he  squeezes  the  blood  of  those  who 
borrow.  That  is  why  the  ‘ pawnbroker  ’ is  an 
undesirable  person  in  the  community. 

“ However,  I can  say  that,  while  many  of  the 
statements  made  regarding  me  as  the  owner  of  most 
of  the  loan  offices  in  China  are  without  doubt  much 
exaggerated,  I am  interested  largely  in  such  establish- 
ments in  some  of  the  provinces.  Nor  am  I ashamed 
of  such  interest.  On  the  other  hand,  I am  glad  that 
so  often  have  I been  able  to  help  poor  people  with 
small  loans,  either  upon  their  goods,  their  labour,  or 
just  their  promise.  It  is  not  seemly  that  I write  of 
my  own  virtues,  but  it  is  surely  the  privilege  and 
duty  of  every  man  to  defend  his  name  and  character 
when  attacked.  Therefore,  I will  say  that,  though 
I have  made  a comfortable  amount  of  wealth  from 
my  loan  offices,  it  has  not  been  made  by  excessive 
interest  charges.  If  I had  been  a hard  man  to  all 
those  who  had  borrowed  from  my  agents  and  were 
unable  to  pay  I would  to-day  be  one  of  the  richest 
men  in  the  world.  And  then,  too,  I have  never 
used  what  wealth  was  graciously  given  me  by  the 
good  gods  for  evil  purposes.  I have  bought  neither 
honours  nor  offices.  I would  cut  my  face  with  a 
knife  rather  than  accept  an  office  or  an  honour  by 
purchase. 

“ It  is  true  that  I have  loaned  large  sums  to  the 
provinces,  and  even  to  the  Throne,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  certain  honours  were  stripped  from  me 
when  the  Government  was  greatest  in  my  debt.” 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Li  had  “ lent  ” large  sums 
of  money  to  the  Throne,  but  the  word  “ Throne  ” 
in  this  instance  must  be  held  to  refer,  not  to  the 
Government,  but  to  Tzu  Hsi  and  her  Chief  Eunuch 
Li  Lien-ying.  Similarly  the  Empress  “ lent  ” Li 
large  sums  (estimated  at  eight  million  taels)  out  of 
her  private  hoard  of  gold  in  1894  as  a grant  in  aid 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


n9 

of  his  war-chest  against  Japan — belated  conscience- 
money,  a partial  refund  of  moneys  “ squeezed  ” 
by  the  Palace  out  of  navy  appropriations.  The  fact 
is  that  both  Li  and  his  august  mistress  were  quite 
unable  to  administer  any  public  business  without 
considering,  in  the  first  instance,  its  effect  upon  their 
private  fortunes.  For  this  reason,  and  with  some 
plausibility,  it  was  frequently  charged  against  Li 
by  his  enemies  that  his  conciliatory  policy  in  negotiat- 
ing treaties  involving  concessions  of  Chinese  territory 
was  prompted  by  his  desire  to  avoid  the  large  expen- 
diture which  war  must  impose  upon  him  personally. 
In  peace  and  war  all  moneys  that  came  into  his  hands 
for  State  purposes  became  permanently  and  inex- 
tricably merged  in  his  private  funds.  To  Europeans 
this  may  seem  an  impossible  state  of  affairs,  but  to 
the  Chinese  it  is  simply  typical  mandarin  finance, 
recognised  and  sanctioned  by  long-established  tradi- 
tion. That  Li  practised  it  merely  proves  that  the 
mandarin  cannot  modify  the  system  which  has 
produced  him.  He  certainly  regarded  the  waging 
of  war,  just  as  he  had  always  regarded  the  preparation 
of  naval  and  military  defences,  as  a matter  primarily 
affecting  his  own  pocket. 

On  this  subject  there  will  be  more  to  be  said  when 
we  come  to  consider  Li  in  the  capacity  of  a naval  and 
military  administrator.  The  fact  that  his  private 
interests  obscured  his  vision  to  the  detriment  of  even 
the  highest  national  interests  confided  to  his  charge 
is  undeniable.  In  a Memorial  addressed  to  the 
Throne  by  members  of  the  Hanlin  Yuan  in  December, 
1894,  it  was  declared  that  he  had  invested  millions  in 
Japanese  coal-mines  and  that  his  adopted  son, 
Li  Ching-fang  (late  Minister  to  Japan),  had  also 


120 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


large  investments  in  that  country.  These  statements 
may  have  been  greatly  exaggerated,  or  even  un- 
founded, but  they  represented  a general  consensus 
of  suspicion  and  a reflection  on  Li’s  practice  of  com- 
bining public  affairs  with  private  speculation. 

Li  was  the  pioneer  in  the  development  of  a type  of 
official  trading  organised,  more  or  less,  on  the  model 
of  European  joint-stock  companies,  but  distinguished 
by  the  fact  that  the  enterprises  which  he  established 
were  always  managed  for  and  by  officials.  It  required 
no  extraordinary  intelligence  to  perceive  that  trading 
monopolies,  protected  by  a powerful  Viceroy,  not 
only  against  foreigners,  but  against  Chinese  competi- 
tion, should  prove  extremely  lucrative.  The  best 
known  of  Li’s  official  enterprises  was  the  China 
Merchants  Steam  Navigation  Company,  inaugurated 
in  1880  with  funds  partly  provided  by  Li  himself 
and  partly  by  public  subscription.  This  undertaking, 
managed  by  Chinese  officials  of  Li’s  entourage, 
assisted  in  certain  directions  by  foreign  experts,  and 
officered  by  Englishmen  and  Americans,  became  a 
milch-cow  of  extraordinary  productivity  and,  despite 
wholesale  peculation,  continued  to  show  large  profits 
for  many  years.  As  Superintendent  of  Northern 
Trade,  Li  secured  for  this  company,  ostensibly  in 
the  public  interest,  a monopoly  of  freights  for  tribute 
rice  and  other  Government  supplies.  In  the  same  way 
he  obtained  the  support  of  Peking  in  preventing  the 
Governor  of  Formosa  and  other  Chinese  shipping 
owners  from  competing  with  his  steamers  in  the 
Yangtsze  trade.  In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  from  the  early  ’eighties  onwards  the  Li  family  ? 
rapidly  increasing  in  power  of  wealth  in  its  native 
province  of  Anhui,  came  eventually  to  dominate  the 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


I 2 1 


rice  trade  of  that  all-important  centre  of  supply. 
Then,  in  1884,  by  the  improved  working  of  the  Kai- 
ping  coal  mines  and  the  construction  of  the  railway 
connecting  them  with  Tientsin,  Li  not  only  provided 
his  steamers  with  cheap  fuel,  but  increased  the 
profitable  complexity  of  his  official  trading.  In  the 
same  way  he  supported  the  establishment  of  cotton 
and  silk  factories  at  Shanghai ; all  these  enterprises 
were  offshoots  and  extensions  of  the  official  trading 
organisation  conducted  under  his  authority  by  his 
able  but  notoriously  unscrupulous  henchman,  Sheng 
Kung-pao.  The  business  of  these  factories  remained 
an  official  monopoly  and  preserve  until  1895,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  Li,  as  Superintendent  of  Northern 
Trade,  was  able  to  obstruct  the  importation  of 
machinery  by  competing  European  companies. 
Nevertheless,  so  flagrant  was  the  corruption  of  all 
business  under  the  direct  or  indirect  administration 
of  Sheng  Kung-pao,  that  the  profits  of  these  enter- 
prises were  usually  of  the  invisible  kind.  Sheng, 
the  great  pluralist  and  bomme  d'affaires , was  for  many 
years  Director  of  the  Imperial  Chinese  Telegraphs 
and  of  the  China  Merchants  Steam  Navigation 
Company.  Commonly  known  to  his  intimate  asso- 
ciates as  “ the  old  fox,”  he  acted  as  Li  Hung-chang’s 
business  agent  and  go-between  at  Shanghai,  and  in 
that  capacity  achieved  a national  — almost  an  inter- 
national— reputation  for  grasping  avarice  and 
venality.  His  supple  and  tenacious  hands  manipu- 
lated the  profitable  preliminaries  of  several  railway 
and  mining  concessions  to  European  financiers, 
from  which  China  was  destined  to  reap  a perennial 
harvest  of  trouble.  After  Li’s  fall  from  greatness  in 
1894  Sheng  skilfully  tacked  and  trimmed.  His 


122 


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politics  had  always  been  of  the  denationalised  type, 
more  concerned  with  money  than  with  measures ; 
and  money  served  him  well.  He  continued  to  repre- 
sent Li’s  principles  and  interests  and  to  trade  with 
foreign  concessionaires  in  the  spirit  of  “ apres  nous  le 
deluge ,”  intriguing  impartially  with  Belgians,  French, 
Russians,  and  English  in  turn.  Sheng  Hsuan-huai 
(to  give  him  his  full  name)  was  Li’s  ame  damnee, 
just  as  Li  Lien-ying  was  Tzu  Hsi’s  or  (to  come  to  more 
recent  events)  as  Liang  Shih-yi  was  Yuan  Shih- 
k’ai’s.  In  such  associations  the  patron  cannot  be 
held  blameless  of  the  offences  committed  by  the 
protege  ; much  of  the  disrepute  arising  from  Sheng’s 
operations  attached  itself  to  Li  Hung-chang. 

From  1897  onwards,  the  question  of  railway  con- 
struction was  too  closely  involved  with  the  political 
aspirations  of  the  European  Powers  in  China  to  make 
it  an  attractive  field  for  independent  Chinese  enter- 
prise ; moreover,  it  rapidly  became  complicated  by 
the  claims  to  local  autonomy  advanced  by  the 
provincial  authorities  and  gentry  all  over  the  Empire. 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find  that  Li’s 
activities  in  this  direction  were  confined  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  Tientsin-Shanhaikuan  line  (at  one 
time  probably  the  most  profitable  enterprise  of  its 
kind  in  the  world),  in  the  finances  of  which  he  took 
the  keenest  interest.  For  the  rest,  he  professed 
himself  a staunch  advocate  of  railways  as  the  best 
means  of  developing  the  economic  resources  of  the 
country,  and  as  early  as  1889  he  had  convinced  the 
Empress  Dowager  of  the  advisability  of  inaugurating 
a national  scheme  of  trunk  lines  ; but  his  interest  in 
the  subject  of  railways  beyond  the  limits  of  his  own 
Viceregal  jurisdiction  was  not  sufficient  to  induce 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


123 

him  to  take  up  arms  in  earnest  against  the  then 
reactionary  policy  of  the  Emperor’s  advisers. 

Finally,  there  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  delicate 
question  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  official  record  as  a grower 
and  seller  of  opium.  In  this  matter  he  was  no  better 
and  no  worse  than  the  majority  of  his  colleagues, 
whose  perfectly  obvious  policy  it  has  been  since  i860 
to  take  advantage  of  the  anti-opium  activities  of 
European  and  American  benevolent  idealists  to  put 
an  end  to  the  Indian  opium  trade  and  thus  to  secure 
a highly  lucrative  monopoly  in  the  native  article  for 
the  Mandarinate.  As  a champion  of  unctuous  Chinese 
rectitude  and  an  eloquent  exponent  of  British  immo- 
rality in  regard  to  the  opium  trade,  Li  was  glad  to 
be  conspicuous ; but  his  cynical  blindness  to  the 
persistent  hypocrisy  of  the  Chinese  Government’s 
attitude  in  the  matter  was  after  all  no  worse  than  that 
of  those  British  and  American  missionaries  and  poli- 
ticians who  have  persistently  chosen  to  ignore,  not 
only  the  obvious  purposes  of  Chinese  official  policy 
in  this  matter,  but  the  unpleasant  fact  that  English 
and  Japanese  enterprise  has  widely  substituted 
morphia  for  opium,  with  deplorable  results.  The 
measures  adopted  for  the  suppression  of  the  opium 
trade  in  China  were  always  visionary  and  frequently 
suspect,  for  the  reason  that  those  who  supported 
them  were  compelled  to  ascribe  continuity  of  authority 
and  honesty  of  purpose  to  the  Chinese  mandarin  ; 
thus  the  sincere  reform  movement  led  by  a small 
minority  of  enthusiasts  in  England  and  China  became 
a strong  weapon  in  the  hands  of  those  Chinese  officials 
who  perceived  great  prospect  of  lucrative  opportunities 
in  the  abolition  of  the  Indian  trade.  Thus,  in  1881, 
we  find  Li  Hung-chang  writing  to  the  reverend  secre- 


124 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tary  of  the  Society  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Opium 
Trade  a letter  (diligently  circulated  throughout  the 
civilised  world)  in  which  he  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  Society  would  support  “ China’s  efforts  to  escape 
from  the  thraldom  of  opium.”  He  was  reluctantly 
compelled  to  admit  that  “ the  poppy  is  still  surrepti- 
tiously grown  in  some  parts  of  China,  notwithstanding 
the  laws  and  frequent  Imperial  edicts  prohibiting  its 
cultivation.”  Dr.  G.  E.  Morrison,  The  Times  corre- 
spondent, travelling  through  Central  China  in  1894, 
described  the  “ surreptitious  ” growth  more  concisely 
by  observing  that  “ from  the  time  he  left  Hupeh  till 
he  reached  the  boundary  of  Burmah,  he  was  never 
out  of  sight  of  the  poppy,”  to  which  the  significant 
statement  was  added  that  the  largest  growers  of  the 
poppy  in  China  were  the  family  of  Li  Hung-chang  ! 
In  this  cynical  combination  of  public  professions  of 
virtue  with  the  private  pursuit  of  profit,  Li  was  merely 
acting  in  strict  accordance  with  the  immemorial 
traditions  of  his  class.  Later  on  his  adopted  son, 
“ Lord  ” Li  Ching-fang,  was  equally  eloquent,  as 
Minister  abroad,  on  the  subject  of  China’s  impending 
deliverance  from  the  opium  scourge,  but  the  poppy 
continued  nevertheless  to  flourish  (“  for  medical 
purposes  ”)  on  his  ancestral  estates  in  Anhui. 

As  a keen  trader,  Li  Hung-chang  dealt  in  opium 
just  as  he  dealt  in  rice  or  any  other  staple  commodity. 
As  a Chinese  official,  he  was  undoubtedly  anxious 
to  see  the  Indian  trade  abolished,  partly  as  a matter 
of  amour-propre , but  principally  in  order  to  consolidate 
in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  Government  a monopoly 
which  promised  to  be  even  more  lucrative  than  the 
Salt  Gabelle,  and  more  easily  handled.  He  knew  that 
this  monopoly  could  never  be  established  so  long  as 


AS  CHINESE  OFFICIAL 


125 


British  merchants  were  free  to  import  opium  (no 
matter  how  high  the  revised  duties),  and  so  long  as 
Hongkong  and  Macao  continued  to  serve  as  depots 
for  the  Kuangtung  contraband  trade.  At  the  same 
time  he  realised  that  the  only  means  of  bringing 
pressure  to  bear  on  the  British  and  Indian  Govern- 
ments was  moral  pressure  of  the  kind  produced  by 
a Press  and  platform  crusade  in  the  name  of  Christian 
principles,  by  appeals  to  religious  sentiment  and 
humanitarian  idealism.  As  a matter  of  national 
policy,  therefore,  he  endeavoured  by  all  means  to 
create  that  pressure,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
great  majority  of  Chinese  (as  distinct  from  Manchu) 
officialdom  acted  upon  similar  motives  of  amour- 
propre  and  calculating  expediency.  The  small  mino- 
rity of  sincere  supporters  of  the  anti-opium  movement 
served,  like  its  missionary  advocates,  to  mislead  the 
world  at  large  concerning  its  ultimately  utilitarian 
purposes.  But  in  this  matter  Li  Hung-chang  was 
neither  a pioneer  nor  an  independent  thinker.  He 
was  simply  a Chinese  official,  and  as  such  his  actions 
were  determined  by  class  bias  and  personal  interest. 


CHAPTER  IV 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT  : RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE  ; JAPAN 

We  come  now  to  consideration  of  Li  Hung-chang’s 
career  in  the  sphere  of  diplomacy,  of  the  manifold 
activities  which  he  displayed  in  the  conduct  of  his 
country’s  relations  with  foreign  countries  during  a 
period  of  thirty  years — that  is  to  say,  from  1870, 
when  he  assumed  the  Viceroyalty  at  Tientsin,  to  the 
day  of  his  death  in  1901.  The  world-wide  fame  to 
which  he  attained  (as  I have  said,  far  higher  abroad 
than  that  which  he  achieved  at  home)  must  unques- 
tionably be  ascribed  to  his  pre-eminence  in  the  field 
of  diplomacy  rather  than  to  his  achievements  as  an 
administrator  or  military  organiser.  For  thirty  years 
he  stood  unrivalled,  the  Indispensable  Man,  the  word- 
warrior  par  excellence , guardian  of  the  diplomatic 
approaches  to  Peking,  chief  exponent  of  China’s 
grievances,  and  mitigator  of  the  pains  and  penalties 
periodically  exacted  from  her  in  defeat. 

In  the  foregoing  chapter,  referring  to  Li’s  famous 
memorial  of  1867  on  China’s  foreign  policy,  it  was 
observed  that  throughout  his  subsequent  career  he 
remained  consistently  faithful  to  the  fundamental 
principles  which  he  proclaimed  on  that  occasion. 
To  the  intelligence  which  recognised  the  necessity 
for  a policy  of  cautious  conciliation  in  dealing  with 
physical  forces  hitherto  undreamt  of  in  China’s 
philosophy,  and  to  the  courage  which  frankly  faced 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


127 


that  necessity,  must  be  ascribed  Li  Hung-chang’s 
remarkable  ascendancy  over  the  Empress  Dowager 
Tzu  Hsi,  and  the  unbroken  continuity  of  her  pro- 
tective favour.  It  was  his  distinctive  merit  and  the 
secret  of  his  paramount  influence  with  the  masterful 
ruler  of  China  that,  almost  alone,  he  realised  that  the 
West’s  invention  of  steam-power  and  scientific  war- 
fare had  put  an  end  to  the  Middle  Kingdom’s  ancient 
assumption  of  superiority  and  policy  of  aloofness. 
As  far  as  internal  policies  were  concerned,  he  remained, 
like  Tzu  Hsi,  faithful  to  the  principles  and  traditions 
of  statecraft  which  centuries  of  experience  had  proved 
to  be  effective  in  preserving  the  authority  of  auto- 
cratic government  and  the  homogeneous  civilisation 
of  the  race.  In  the  domain  of  foreign  politics  he 
endeavoured  to  find  a middle  way  of  compromise, 
whereby  those  principles  and  traditions  might  be 
maintained  and  China  at  the  same  time  be  enabled 
to  adapt  herself  to  a rapidly  changing  environment. 
This  was  the  keynote  and  constant  inspiration  of  his 
diplomacy.  Tainted  though  they  were  by  personal 
ambition  and  greed  of  gain,  Li’s  efforts  in  this  direc- 
tion were  undeniably  courageous  and  patriotic  accord- 
ing to  his  lights. 

Not  that  he  loved,  or  even  admired,  the  European 
or  the  Western  type  of  civilisation.  On  the  contrary, 
all  the  record  of  his  life  and  writings  goes  to  show 
that,  while  recommending  conciliation  of  the  outer 
barbarian  as  a matter  of  prudence,  he  remained  from 
first  to  last  convinced  of  the  moral  superiority  of 
China’s  social  and  political  traditions.  Just  as  Tzu 
Hsi  in  1900  staked  all  on  the  forlorn  hope,  offered 
her  by  the  Boxers,  of  driving  the  foreigner  into  the 
sea,  so  Li  would  undoubtedly  have  supported  the 


128 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


same  policy  of  exclusiveness,  had  he  not  realised  its 
futility  at  an  early  stage  of  his  career.  Knowing  that 
it  was  not  practical,  he  devoted  his  energies  to  the 
alternative  policy  of  mitigating  the  force  of  the 
Western  impact  and  of  establishing  some  sort  of 
modus  vivendi  between  East  and  West,  by  Fabian 
tactics  of  opportunism,  and  by  the  time-honoured 
expedient  of  “ setting  one  barbarian  against  the 
other.”  If  the  policy  was  to  be  ultimately  successful, 
it  was  essential  that  the  military  and  naval  defences 
of  China  should  at  the  same  time  be  reorganised  on 
the  scientific  principles  of  the  West.  Li  faced  this 
hopeless  task  (hopeless  because  he  faced  it  practically 
single-handed)  with  indomitable  energy.  For  years 
he  sought  to  put  an  end  to  the  anomalous  situation 
created  by  China’s  assumption  of  moral  superiority 
and  her  actual  defencelessness.  As  Mr.  Michie  very 
justly  observed,  he  endeavoured  to  put  an  end  to 
this  anomalous  situation 

“ by  levelling  down  the  hereditary  and  preposterous 
pretensions  of  the  Chinese  Government  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  by  levelling  up  its  natural 
strength,  so  that  China  might  be  able  to  hold  her  own, 
peaceably  and  confidently,  in  the  comity  of  nations. 
To  this  end,  he  constituted  in  his  own  person  the 
adaptable  joint  round  which  Chinese  and  foreign 
relations  might  revolve  with  smoothness  and  safety. 
In  this  conception  of  the  true  basis  of  international 
intercourse,  there  is  no  evidence  of  Li  Hung-chang 
having  had  a single  sympathiser  among  his  country- 
men ; and  of  course  his  solitary  efforts  were  wholly 
inadequate  to  give  effect  to  the  idea.”  1 

After  the  final  collapse  of  the  Taiping  rebellion, 

1 Article  in  Blackwood , December,  1901. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


129 


at  the  time  when  Li  had  achieved  fame  and  the  high 
rank  of  Viceroy  at  Wuchang,  his  reputation  amongst 
foreigners  (chiefly  based  on  the  stormy  record  of  his 
relations  with  Gordon  and  Captain  Sherard-Osborn) 
was  that  of  an  extremely  able,  but  very  “ slim,5’ 
mandarin.  The  estimate  of  his  character  recorded 
in  1867  by  Captain  Sherard-Osborn  (commander  of 
a flotilla  of  gunboats  which  the  Chinese  Government 
had  purchased  in  England  to  aid  in  the  suppression 
of  the  Taipings  *)  undoubtedly  represents  the  general 
opinion  of  Europeans  at  the  Treaty  Ports  in  those 
days,  and,  although  in  certain  respects  modified  by 
the  subsequent  course  of  political  events,  it  firmly 
represents  the  opinion  which  British  diplomacy 
(e.g.,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  in  1883  and  Sir  Claude  Mac- 
donald in  1900)  continued  to  hold  of  him  to  the  end. 
Captain  Osborn’s  views  (published  in  Parliamentary 
Papers,  China  No.  2,  1864)  are  therefore  permanently 
valuable  and  deserving  of  attention  : 

“ Futai  Li  ” (he  wrote)  “ is  an  able  Chinaman,  and 
as  unprincipled  as  all  Chinese  officials.  His  plan 
would  be  to  render  me  powerless,  and  then  to  use  or 
toss  me  aside,  just  as  he  does  all  European  leaders 
in  his  force.  He  is  a civilian  by  education,  ruling  over 
military  and  naval  affairs  without  the  slightest  know- 
ledge of  either.  . . . Having  secured  the  services  of 
an  excellent  officer  in  Major  Gordon,  who  appears  to 
have  entered  his  service,  not  that  of  the  Emperor  of 
China,  . . . Futai  Li  proceeds  to  render  him  power- 
less, and  to  hamper  his  action  in  two  ways  : first  by 
depriving  him  of  the  means  to  carry  out  any  decisive 
measures,  and  next  by  placing  in  exactly  similar 
positions  a number  of  other  Europeans,  and  playing 


1 For  the  history  of  this  abortive  expedition,  vide  Michie’s  “ Englishman 
in  China.” 


130 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


one  off  against  the  other.  Major  Gordon  wishes  to 
attack  Soochow  Foo,  and  asks  for  one  hundred  Euro- 
peans. The  Futai  agrees,  but  says  the  hundred  men 
must  only  be  engaged  for  one  month.  Gordon  declines 
to  enter  into  any  such  agreement,  seeing  its  injustice 
and  folly.  The  Futai  insults  him  by  questioning  his 
desire  to  fight  the  rebels,  and  proposes  that  the 
assaulting  column  should  be  formed  of  all  European 
officers  in  his  employ,  and  that  over  their  bodies  the 
Chinese  would  advance  to  victory. 

“ Again,  what  faith  can  I have  in  any  mandarin’s 
listening  to  my  advice  as  a subordinate,  when  I am 
told  by  General  Brown,  commander-in-chief  of  our 
military  forces  in  China,  and  the  superior  of  the 
Futai,  that  he  will  listen  to  no  advice  or  suggestion 
the  general  offers,  and  that  he  purposely  avoids  all 
conference  with  him  ; and  when  an  interview  is 
sought  by  General  Brown,  insolently  replies  that  he  is 
too  busy  to  see  him  ? ” 

Writing  after  Li  Hung-chang’s  death,  Mr.  Michie, 
always  a staunch  and  sympathetic  apologist  for  the 
great  Viceroy,  gives  a very  different  impression  of 
his  policy.  Making  all  due  allowance  for  Mr.  Michie’s 
personal  friendship  and  professional  relations  with 
Li,  his  conception  of  the  Viceroy’s  purposes  and 
methods  would  appear  on  the  whole  to  be  more 
unbiassed  and  more  trustworthy  than  that  set  down 
in  wrath  by  Captain  Osborn.  According  to  Mr. 
Michie  : 

“ Li  has  been  held  representative  of  all  that  is 
tortuous,  wily,  intriguing,  and  so  forth,  while  in 
point  of  fact,  if  we  regard  his  career  in  broad  outline, 
his  central  aim  appears  to  have  been  simple  enough. 
He  was  a pilot  whose  business  it  was  to  keep  the  ship 
off  the  rocks.  In  order  to  do  so,  he  had  to  menager 
the  captain,  conciliate  the  crew,  and  avoid  collision 
with  other  craft.  It  was  really  a humble  role  he 
had  to  play,  and  frequent  humiliations  attended  it. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


131 

Opportunism,  the  study  of  tides,  winds  and  currents, 
the  movements  of  other  vessels  which  observed  no 
rules  of  the  road,  were  the  necessary  conditions  of 
safety.  To  secure  this,  sacrifices  had  from  time  to 
time  to  be  made,  cargo  had  to  be  jettisoned,  and 
the  courses  changed  to  avoid  collision.  Occasionally 
the  situation  was  redeemed  by  bluff,  but  in  a great 
majority  of  cases,  safety  was  purchased  by  conces- 
sions, graceful  or  otherwise.  Thus  Japan  was  bought 
off  in  1874  by  the  payment  of  an  indemnity.  Again, 
in  1885,  to  avoid  a war  which,  after  all,  would  pro- 
bably not  have  taken  place,  Japan  was  admitted  to 
a partnership  with  China  in  the  control  of  Korea, 
always  a fatal  arrangement  for  the  softer  partner. 
About  the  same  period,  peace  with  France  was  pur- 
chased by  the  cession  of  Tongking,  and  in  1894  he 
would  probably  have  surrendered  China’s  interest 
in  Korea.  . . . These  concessions,  however,  though 
purchasing  peace,  were  all  steps  in  the  downward 
course  of  China,  logically  leading  up  to  the  cession 
of  Manchuria  to  the  demands  of  Russia.” 

Looked  at  in  this  light,  the  basic  motive  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  policy  as  a diplomat  would  appear  to  have 
been  the  preservation  of  peace,  whensoever  possible, 
and,  if  war  was  forced  upon  him  by  the  fixed  purposes 
of  the  foreigner  or  the  folly  of  his  own  countrymen, 
to  make  terms  with  the  enemy  as  quickly  as  he  could. 
Mr.  Michie’s  estimate  of  the  role  which  Li  played  in 
conducting  China’s  foreign  affairs  is  a fair  one,  so  far 
as  it  goes  ; but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  he  omits 
consideration  of  the  important  fact  that  the  per- 
formance of  Li’s  duties  as  pilot  was  frequently  affected 
by  his  anxiety  for  his  private  interests  in  the  ship’s 
cargo.  Furthermore,  in  partial  refutation  of  Mr. 
Michie’s  views  and  of  the  peace-at-any-price  theory, 
the  opinion  has  been  strongly  expressed  by  observers 


K 2 


132 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


on  the  spot  that  he  was  a consenting,  if  not  the 
determining,  party  to  the  events  in  Korea  which 
enabled  Japan  to  make  war  on  China  in  1894.  This 
important  question  will  be  discussed  in  its  proper 
place  when  we  come  to  consider  the  record  of  Li 
Hung-chang’s  relations  with  Japan  ; but  it  may  here 
be  said  that  the  dogmatic  assertions  made  by  English 
writers  on  both  sides  of  the  controversy  are  all  alike 
incapable  of  positive  proof,  for  the  reason  that  all 
documentary  evidence  bearing  on  the  matter  was 
destroyed  during  the  Boxer  tumults  of  1900. 

Li  Hung-chang’s  career  in  international  diplomacy 
may  be  said  to  have  begun  with  his  appointment  as 
Viceroy  of  Chihli  and  Superintendent  of  Northern 
Trade  in  June,  1870.  The  immediate  cause  of  his 
transfer  from  the  Viceroyalty  at  Wuchang  in  that 
year  was  the  Chinese  Government’s  fear  that  France 
would  declare  war  on  account  of  the  serious  riot  that 
had  taken  place  at  Tientsin.  In  this  anti-Christian 
tumult  the  French  Consulate  and  Cathedral  had  been 
destroyed,  the  French  Consul  and  sixteen  French 
nuns  murdered.  Ably  advised  by  Mr.  Hart  (Inspector- 
General  of  the  Imperial  Maritime  Customs),  Li  took 
over  from  Ch’ung  Hou  and  Tseng  Kuo-fan  the  conduct 
of  local  negotiations  with  the  French  authorities,  and 
in  three  months  he  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  a 
settlement  of  the  French  Government’s  claims.  His 
task  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the  knowledge  that 
France  was  not  in  a position  at  that  time  to  exact 
reparation  from  China  by  force  of  arms  ; this  know- 
ledge he  used  with  praiseworthy  tact  and  skill  and  in 
the  end  emerged  from  a very  difficult  situation,  having 
saved  the  imperilled  face  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment and  the  lives  of  the  Chinese  officials  immediately 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


T33 


responsible  for  the  outbreak.  Upon  the  crucial 
point  of  the  inviolability  of  the  mandarin’s  person, 
Li  stood  firm  on  this  occasion,  as  on  all  others  ; in 
consequence  of  this  attitude,  and  of  the  particularly 
brutal  nature  of  the  massacre,  public  feeling  ran 
high  against  him  in  the  European  communities  of 
Hongkong,  Shanghai,  and  the  Treaty  Ports.  Never- 
theless, the  settlement  which  he  succeeded  in  effect- 
ing was  welcome  to  all  parties  at  Peking,  and 
the  manner  in  which  he  conducted  the  negotiations 
with  M.  de  Rochechouart,  the  French  Minister, 
made  a great  impression  upon  the  Diplomatic  Body. 
Indeed,  it  was  evident  to  all  concerned  that  had 
not  the  French  representative  wisely  transferred  the 
negotiations  from  the  capital  to  Li’s  Yamen  in 
Tientsin,  no  satisfactory  solution  of  the  question 
could  have  been  reached  ; for  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
of  that  date  was  hopelessly  ignorant,  incompetent, 
and  arrogant. 

From  this  crisis,  and  from  the  conspicuous  ability 
with  which  Li  handled  it,  arose  the  curious  situation 
in  which  European  diplomacy  found  itself  for  many 
years  to  come.  It  was  bound  by  treaty  and  routine 
procedure  to  negotiate  with  the  Foreign  Office  at 
Peking,  but  ultimately  it  was  dependent  upon  the 
decisions  of  the  Viceroy  at  Tientsin,  and  frequently 
compelled  to  seek  his  officially  irresponsible  inter- 
vention in  order  to  put  an  end  to  humiliating  dead- 
locks at  the  capital.  The  anomalous  situation  thus 
created  suited  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  since  it  enabled 
its  lotus-eating  members  at  any  time  to  refer  weary 
Ministers  to  Li  Hung-chang  and  then,  if  it  suited  them, 
to  repudiate  his  unofficial  negotiations.  It  also  suited 
Li  Hung-chang,  for  it  invested  his  Viceroyalty  with 


134 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


increased  dignity  and  new  importance  and  thus  gave 
him  two  things  which  he  dearly  loved,  power  and 
opportunities  of  lucrative  patronage. 

The  policy  of  evading  definite  issues  in  difficult 
situations  by  endless  circumlocution  was  no  new  thing 
with  the  rulers  of  China,  as  the  Macartney  and 
Elgin  missions  had  conclusively  proved.  But  in 
dealing  with  European  diplomacy,  after  the  Treaty 
of  Tientsin  had  been  forced  upon  them,  they  needed 
something  more  delicate  in  methods  of  evasion  than 
those  which  had  sufficed  in  the  days  of  the  East  India 
Company.  They  found  it  in  the  new  diplomacy  of 
Li  Hung-chang.  As  Superintendent  of  Northern 
Trade  he  was  invested  with  preliminary  responsibility 
and  local  authority  in  nearly  every  question  brought 
before  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  by  foreigners,  and  the 
Yamen  was  therefore  bound  to  consult  him  in  all  such 
matters  before  coming  to  a final  decision.  At  the 
same  time,  as  he  was  never  actually  a member  of  the 
Yamen  till  after  the  war  with  Japan,  his  advice,  even 
when  given  with  sincere  conviction,  was  not  neces- 
sarily binding  upon  that  august  assembly.  His 
position  was  used  by  Peking  as  justification  for  endless 
procrastination  and  evasion  of  the  Spendell  and 
Jorkins  type.  Energetic  Ministers  ( e.g .,  Sir  Harry 
Parkes)  found  the  position  thus  created  intolerable. 
Many  a diplomat  exhausted  his  energies  and  damaged 
his  reputation  in  “ pounding  the  feather  bed  ” of 
Oriental  elusiveness.  Others,  seeking  the  line  of  least 
resistance,  found  it  in  dealing,  unofficially  or  indirectly, 
with  the  Viceregal  Yamen  at  Tientsin.  As  years  went 
on  the  actual  conduct  of  foreign  affairs — their  nego- 
tiation to  the  point  at  which  the  Yamen  might  profit- 
ably come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Legation  con- 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT  135 

cerned — passed,  therefore,  more  and  more  into  the 
hands  of  Li  Hung-chang. 

It  will  always  be  to  the  great  Viceroy’s  credit  that, 
while  preserving  the  face  of  the  Chinese  Government 
and  protecting  his  official  colleagues  (as  in  the  matter 
of  the  Tientsin  massacre),  he  displayed  from  the  very 
first  day  on  which  he  assumed  control  at  Tientsin  an 
uncompromising  determination  to  maintain  law  and 
order  within  the  limits  of  his  jurisdiction,  and  par- 
ticularly to  repress  all  anti-foreign  outbreaks.  Upon 
his  arrival  in  the  north  he  issued  a proclamation  to 
the  people  reminding  them  that  he  had  an  efficient 
force  of  troops  at  his  disposal,  “ seasoned  in  warfare 
against  rebels,”  and  that  any  attempt  at  lawlessness 
would  be  sternly  repressed.  That  he  meant  what  he 
said  he  proved  on  more  than  one  occasion,  and  to 
such  purpose  that  foreign  lives  and  property  remained 
safe  in  Chihli  throughout  all  his  long  term  of  office. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  attitude  displayed  by 
Li  Hung-chang  in  this  respect  coincided  exactly 
with  that  which  he  had  advocated  in  his  famous 
Memorial  of  1867 — an  attitude  of  temporising  con- 
ciliation, based  on  recognition  of  the  foreigner’s 
military  superiority  and  admission  of  the  impos- 
sibility of  maintaining  China’s  ancient  policy  of 
exclusiveness.  While  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  and  most 
of  his  fellow-Viceroys  regarded  the  Tientsin  Treaty 
as  the  accidental  and  temporary  conclusion  of  a 
foreign  raid,  his  wider  vision  perceived  it  to  be  only 
the  first  wave  of  a resistless  flood.  It  was  therefore 
his  continuous  policy,  despite  the  censure  of  his 
countrymen,  to  give  effect  to  this  Treaty  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  preserve  the  substance  of  China’s  birth- 
right while  affording  the  foreigner  no  fresh  ground 


136 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


for  aggression.  In  this  matter  he  was  unquestionably 
wiser  than  his  generation,  and  admirable  in  the 
courage  of  his  opinions.  His  countrymen,  less  en- 
lightened, frequently  denounced  him  as  “ the  friend 
of  foreigners,”  failing  to  appreciate  the  subtlety  of 
his  methods  or  the  fact  that,  while  he  understood  the 
European  better  than  they  did,  he  remained  always 
whole-heartedly  Chinese  in  his  ideas,  as  befitted  a 
good  Confucianist.  His  originally  high  conception 
of  European  morality  and  ethics  became  considerably 
modified  as  his  knowledge  of  the  world  increased, 
and  as  the  effect  of  Gordon’s  influence  upon  him  gave 
place  to  the  cynicism  produced  in  his  mind  by  hungry 
concessionaires  and  place-seekers.  In  the  same  way 
his  opinion  of  missionary  enterprise  became  tinged 
in  later  years  with  a cynicism  of  which  he  showed 
no  signs  in  the  ’seventies.  But,  for  all  that,  he  re- 
mained to  the  end  of  his  days  conscious  of,  and 
impressed  by,  the  fact  that  the  European  (and  par- 
ticularly the  Anglo-Saxon)  code  of  morals,  whatever 
its  shortcomings,  does  produce  a type  of  official  whose 
word  may  be  implicitly  accepted.  In  public  and  in 
private  life  he  frequently  displayed  his  appreciation 
of  this  un-Oriental  virtue,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that 
his  appreciation  was  sincere,  even  when  he  took 
advantage  of  it  for  his  own  ends. 

After  the  settlement  of  the  Tientsin  massacre  of 
French  Catholics,  the  next  important  diplomatic 
negotiations  entrusted  to  Li  Hung-chang  arose  out 
of  the  murder  of  a British  consular  officer,  Mr.  Mar- 
gary.  This  officer  had  been  detached  from  the 
Legation  at  Peking  for  service  with  an  expedition 
sent  by  the  Indian  Government  early  in  1875,  to 
explore  the  trade  routes  through  Burmah  into  south- 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


137 


western  China.  He  had  been  provided  with  a passport 
in  due  form  by  the  Chinese  Government  ; neverthe- 
less, his  murder  was  proved  to  have  been  the  result 
of  a conspiracy  in  which  the  King  of  Burmah  and  the 
Chinese  Governor-General  of  Yunnan,  Tsen  Yii-ying, 
were  both  implicated.  The  British  Government, 
acting  upon  the  advice  of  Sir  Thomas  Wade  (then 
Minister  at  Peking),  decided  to  insist  upon  the  direct 
responsibility  of  the  Chinese  authorities.  This  course 
was  politically  justifiable,  because  Tsen  had  never 
tolerated  interference  or  advice  by  the  Central 
Government  within  the  limits  of  his  Viceroyalty  ; 
also  because,  under  the  Chinese  system  of  govern- 
ment, the  high  provincial  authorities  are  directly 
responsible  for  whatsoever  disorder  occurs  within 
their  jurisdiction.  Sir  Thomas  Wade  accordingly 
demanded,  in  the  name  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty, 
that  Tsen  Yu-ying  should  be  ordered  to  come  to 
Peking  and  there  stand  trial  for  neglect  of  duty. 
Had  the  British  Government  and  the  Legation 
possessed  more  practical  knowledge  of  fundamental 
mandarin  principles,  such  a demand  would  never 
have  been  put  forward,  except  as  a pretext  prelimi- 
nary to  war,  for,  as  the  post-Boxer  settlement  proved 
twenty-five  years  later,  the  official  hierarchy  is  pre- 
pared to  abandon  money  and  territory,  everything 
and  anything,  rather  than  sacrifice  the  pride  of  its 
caste  in  the  person  of  its  dignitaries.  In  the  case  of 
the  Tientsin  massacre,  the  French  Government  had 
demanded  only  the  punishment  of  comparatively 
small  officials — a Prefect  and  a District  Magistrate — 
but  even  this  demand  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  in  a secret 
Memorial  to  the  Throne,  had  described  as  “ boundless 
insolence,  to  be  rejected  ten  thousand  times.”  But 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


138 

in  the  Margary  case  the  British  Minister  demanded, 
for  the  murder  of  one  consular  official,  what  amounted 
to  the  public  humiliation  of  the  entire  Mandarinate 
in  the  person  of  a Viceroy.  And  even  in  Peking  the 
man  in  the  street  knew  that  there  was  no  danger  of 
war.  Consequently,  until  the  arrival  on  the  scene  of 
Li  Hung-chang,  introducing  a style  of  diplomacy  less 
exasperating  than  the  crude  methods  of  the  Yamen, 
the  British  Minister’s  position  became  more  and  more 
difficult  and  humiliating.  For  eighteen  months  he 
was  compelled  to  allow  his  claims  for  reparation  to 
remain  the  subject  of  perpetually  futile  discussion. 
The  only  result  of  his  labours  was  the  appointment 
of  a joint  Commission,  for  the  purpose  of  investi- 
gating the  murder  of  Mr.  Margary  on  the  spot.  To 
this  Commission  the  Chinese  Government,  with 
characteristic  effrontery,  nominated  as  its  represen- 
tatives Li  Hung-chang’s  brother  (Viceroy  at  Wu- 
chang), Li  Han-chang,  and  Tsen  Yu-ying  himself. 
Investigation  of  the  outrage  by  such  a Commission 
could  only  lead  to  a protracted  discussion  of  side- 
issues  ; the  Chinese  would  never  have  dared  to 
appoint  it,  had  they  not  been  convinced  that  the 
British  Minister’s  periodical  threats  of  war  were  not 
meant  to  be  taken  seriously.  Eventually,  despairing 
of  any  solution,  and  hoping  to  frighten  the  Yamen, 
Wade  made  up  his  mind  to  leave  Peking  ; he  went 
to  Shanghai  in  order,  as  he  said,  to  be  in  direct  tele- 
graphic communication  with  London.  Confronted 
by  something  that  looked  like  resolute  action,  the 
Chinese  Government  became  alarmed  and  forthwith 
appointed  Li  Hung-chang  as  High  Commissioner  to 
settle  the  question.  Li,  advised  by  Mr.  Robert  Hart, 
had  hitherto  played  a silent,  but  none  the  less  effec- 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


139 


tive,  part  in  the  long-drawn  farce  of  the  Peking 
negotiations.  At  one  stage  he  had  negotiated  with 
the  British  Minister  (at  Tientsin)  in  regard  to  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  arranged  for  the  appointment 
thereon  of  his  brother  Li  Han-chang,  and  at  the  same 
time  had  pledged  the  Government  to  serious  con- 
sideration of  Sir  Thomas  Wade’s  demands.  But  such 
conciliatory  measures  as  he  had  promised  had  all 
been  promptly  repudiated  by  the  Yamen,  and  matters 
had  relapsed  into  the  status  quo  ante. 

The  Chefoo  Convention,  in  which  the  Margary  case 
was  finally  disposed  of,  was  a notable  triumph  for 
Li  Hung-chang’s  diplomacy  as  High  Commissioner, 
and  nothing  more.  It  left  no  room  for  doubt  as  to 
his  remarkable  talent  in  the  matter  of  setting  one 
barbarian  against  the  other  and  in  judging  to  a nicety 
the  aggressive  capabilities  of  his  opponents.  Long 
before  his  own  emergence  upon  the  scene,  he  had  so 
directed  the  course  of  negotiations  at  Peking  that 
the  Yunnan  outrage  had  gradually  become  inextri- 
cably mixed  up  with  the  question  of  the  revision  of 
the  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  a question  in  which  the  Chinese 
Government  took  much  more  interest  than  in  the 
murder  of  a British  official,  and  in  which  other  Treaty 
Powers  were  equally  interested.  Having  achieved 
this  result  and  complicated  the  issues,  it  was  an  easy 
matter  for  him  to  persuade  the  representatives  of 
France,  Germany,  Russia,  the  United  States,  and 
other  Powers  that  they  were  directly  interested  in 
the  “ commercial  questions  ” to  be  discussed  at  the 
Chefoo  Conference  (into  which  the  British  Minister 
had  been  beguiled),  and  to  obtain  from  them  much 
valuable  information  and  advice,  in  return  for 
promises  of  the  kind  which  competitive  diplomacy 


140 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


is  wont  to  appreciate.  He  learned  through  these 
channels,  and  by  means  of  the  judicious  information 
from  London  supplied  to  him  regularly  by  the  In- 
spector-General of  Customs,  that  the  British  Minister’s 
threats  of  coercion  would  never  lead  to  the  firing  of 
a gun  or  the  landing  of  a man  in  anger  ; in  fact,  that 
the  British  Government  was  heartily  sick  of  the 
whole  business  and  would  be  glad  to  welcome  its 
conclusion  by  any  plausible  face-saving  arrangement. 
Li  Hung-chang,  on  his  side,  once  he  had  secured  com- 
plete immunity  for  the  Yunnan  Viceroy  in  the  Margary 
case,  was  quite  willing  to  agree  to  the  usual  payment 
of  blood-money  for  the  life  of  a British  official  ; but 
he  balanced  this  graceful  concession  by  obtaining 
conditions  by  which  China  might  expect  a consider- 
able addition  to  the  duties  on  Indian  opium  and  new 
revenues  from  lekin  1 on  foreign  imports. 

The  success  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  diplomacy,  from 
the  Chinese  point  of  view,  was  sufficiently  demon- 
strated by  the  hostile  reception  accorded  to  the 
Chefoo  Convention  by  the  Chambers  of  Commerce 
at  Shanghai  and  Hongkong.  “ Far  better,”  said  the 
representative  of  the  Shanghai  merchants,  “ to  revert 
to  the  clear  and  simple  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tientsin.  New  elements  of  obscurity  have  now  been 
introduced,  and  if  twenty  years  have  been  spent 
wrangling  over  the  comparatively  simple  wording 
of  this  Treaty,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  no  person  now 
living  will  see  the  end  of  the  controversies  which  will 
rage  over  the  indefinite  arrangements  set  forth  in 
the  Chefoo  Convention.”  Thus,  as  a result  of  the 

1 An  internal  tax  levied  on  trade  in  transit,  determined  in  its  scope  and 
incidence  by  the  rapacities  and  opportunities  of  local  authorities.  The 
British  Government  has  attempted  on  more  than  one  occasion  to  abolish  or 
limit  by  treaty  this  form  of  taxation,  but  without  results. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


I4I 

British  Government’s  errors  of  policy  and  vacillation 
and  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  masterly  diplomacy,  the 
negotiations  arising  out  of  the  murder  of  a British 
consular  officer  in  Central  China  ended  in  providing 
the  Chinese  with  an  opportunity  of  undermining 
many  of  the  trading  rights  conferred  on  foreigners 
under  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin  and  of  securing  a sub- 
stantial increase  of  Customs  revenue.  The  opposition 
and  criticism  of  British  merchants  prevented  the 
ratification  of  the  Chefoo  Convention  for  nine  years  ; 
but  China  lost  nothing  by  waiting,  for  the  subsequent 
activities  of  the  Marquis  Tseng  in  London  and  of 
Sir  Robert  Hart  in  Peking,  all  concentrated  on  the 
vital  question  of  increased  revenues,  resulted  in  the 
“ Additional  Article  ” signed  by  Lord  Salisbury  in 
July,  1885,  which  established  a Chinese  imperium  in 
imperio  for  revenue-collecting  purposes  in  the  British 
Colony  of  Hongkong,  and  brought  Peking  consider- 
ably nearer  to  its  ultimate  object,  a monopoly  in  the 
native  opium  trade. 

Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Chefoo  Convention, 
Li  Hung-chang  recorded  the  results  of  his  negotia- 
tions and  the  settlement  of  the  Margary  case  in  a 
Memorial  to  the  Throne  (October  5th,  1876).  Having 
secured  a signal  triumph  over  the  British  represen- 
tative and  vindicated  the  principle  of  the  personal 
inviolability  of  the  mandarin,  he  could  afford  to  be 
magnanimous  in  the  matter  of  reassurances  for  the 
future.  At  the  same  time,  he  seized  the  opportunity 
to  utter  a strong  word  of  warning  to  his  countrymen. 
The  manner  in  which  Li  laid  stress  in  this  Memorial 
on  the  necessity  for  stricter  observance  of  the  Treaties, 
coincided  so  closely  with  the  views  which  he  had  pro- 
claimed in  1867  that  we  are  justified  in  regarding 


142 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


them  as  a sincere  expression  of  his  sentiments.  After 
the  murder  of  Mr.  Margary,  a Circular  had  been 
addressed  by  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  under  pressure, 
to  the  provincial  authorities  reminding  them  that, 
by  treaty,  foreigners  travelling  with  passports  were 
entitled  to  protection.  Referring  to  this  document 
in  his  Memorial,  Li  Hung-chang  observed  : 

“ It  is  now  my  duty  to  request  your  Majesties  to 
issue  a Decree,  directing  the  Viceroys  and  Governors 
to  pay  respectful  attention  to  your  earlier  Decree 
and  to  issue  new  and  strict  orders  to  all  their  subor- 
dinates, to  give  effect  to  the  wishes  of  the  Govern- 
ment with  a view  to  the  preservation  of  friendly 
relations  with  foreign  States,  and  to  remember  that 
whenever  a foreigner  is  travelling  in  the  interior  with 
a passport,  they  must  behave  towards  him  with  full 
recognition  of  his  treaty  rights.  It  should  be  clearly 
proclaimed  that  he  must  be  duly  protected  and  that, 
if  serious  harm  should  befall  him  as  the  result  of 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  local  officials  to  take  the 
necessary  precautions,  the  provincial  authorities 
will  be  held  directly  responsible.  Proclamations  to 
this  effect  should  be  posted  in  every  prefecture  and 
district,  so  that  throughout  the  country  everyone  may 
know  the  relations  in  which  Chinese  and  foreigners 
stand  to  each  other.  If  this  be  done,  there  should 
be  no  occasion  for  misunderstandings  in  future.  If 
your  Majesties  deign  to  approve  these  suggestions, 
the  Yamen  should  proceed  to  draft  the  proclamation 
to  be  forwarded  to  the  provincial  authorities  for  their 
guidance.” 

Li  Hung-chang  was  well  aware  that  the  Chinese 
Government  had  escaped  reprisals  and  humiliation 
on  this  occasion  chiefly  because  Great  Britain  was 
at  the  time  occupied  with  more  pressing  matters 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


H3 


nearer  home  ; but  he  was  also  aware  that  persistent 
disregard  of  the  treaties  or  the  repetition  of  officially- 
instigated  outrages  must  sooner  or  later  involve  China 
in  hostilities  against  which  she  would  be  defenceless, 
and  in  the  meanwhile  alienate  from  her  the  sympa- 
pathies  of  well-disposed  nations.  He  knew  that 
England  and  France  were  not  the  only  possible  sources 
of  difficulty  and  danger.  To  his  far-seeing  eye  the 
Japanese  cloud,  no  bigger  than  a man’s  hand  in  1870, 
already  loomed  darkly  on  the  near  horizon.  Had  he 
not  invoked  the  assistance  of  Sir  Thomas  Wade,  in 
the  very  year  of  the  Margary  outrage,  to  buy  off  Japan 
in  her  high-handed  invasion  of  Formosa  ? The 
Japanese,  as  he  well  knew,  were  ready  and  eager  to 
quarrel,  and  Russia  was  beginning  to  display  an 
ominous  and  aggressive  interest  in  the  disturbed 
condition  of  Kashgaria. 

The  indemnity  paid  by  China  in  1874  to  JaPan> 
to  recoup  her  for  the  expenses  of  the  Formosan  expe- 
dition, was,  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Michie,  “ a transaction 
which  really  sealed  the  fate  of  China,  in  advertising 
to  the  world  that  here  was  a rich  Empire  which  was 
ready  to  pay,  but  not  ready  to  fight.”  For  those  who 
had  eyes  to  see  and  ears  to  hear,  the  incident  was 
unmistakably  a proof  of  the  inherent  weakness  of 
the  world’s  most  ancient  civilisation,  and  the  subse- 
quent history  of  the  Middle  Kingdom  has  been  nothing 
more  than  the  natural  development  of  the  symptoms 
then  revealed.  But  the  next  ten  years  for  China  and 
for  Li  Hung-chang  were  years  of  grace — a breathing 
space,  in  which,  had  the  country  been  educated  to 
perception  of  its  true  position,  it  might  have  prepared 
to  meet  the  coming  storms. 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


*44 


Relations  with  France. 

The  first  of  these  storms  broke  in  1884,  as  the  result 
of  the  advance  of  France  through  Annam  (Cochin 
China  and  Tongking)  to  the  borders  of  Kuangtung 
and  Kuangsi.  The  adventurous  and  ambitious  policy 
of  France,  and  the  development  of  her  great  dreams 
of  a colonial  empire  realised  at  China’s  expense  in 
those  regions,  were  undoubtedly  attributable  in  great 
measure  to  the  French  Government’s  recollection  of 
the  indignities  suffered  at  Tientsin  in  1870,  and  of 
the  advantage  which  Li  Hung-chang  had  taken  on 
that  occasion  of  the  insuperable  embarrassments  of 
the  Republic.  While  French  expeditions  were  steadily 
advancing  through  Annam  in  the  later  ’seventies,  the 
Chinese  Government  did  nothing,  either  by  military  or 
diplomatic  measures,  for  the  protection  of  that  vassal 
kingdom.  Later,  when  Captain  Riviere’s  expedi- 
tion had  given  palpable  indications  of  a danger- 
ously ambitious  programme,  the  Chinese  Minister 
in  Paris  (Marquis  Tseng  Chi-tse)  was  instructed 
to  inform  the  French  Government  that  any  attack 
on  Sontay  and  Bacninh  would  be  regarded  as  a 
casus  belli.  These  cities  were  taken  by  the  French 
forces  in  the  spring  of  1884,  and  not  only  was  the 
Tsung-li  Yamen  incapable  of  devising  any  means  of 
active  resistance,  but  it  became  consumed  with 
unconcealed  anxiety  as  to  the  possibility  of  an  attack 
upon  Canton.  To  Li  Hung-chang,  as  usual,  fell  the 
task  of  averting  this  calamity. 

After  the  Gamier  expedition  in  1874,  France  had 
concluded  a Treaty  with  the  King  of  Annam,  which 
was  officially  communicated  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  May,  1875,  and  formally  acknowledged, 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


H5 


without  protest,  by  Prince  Kung.  The  King’s  vassal- 
dom  was  of  so  tenuous  a character,  and  his  own  field 
of  vision  so  limited,  that  he  did  not  consider  it 
necessary  to  make  any  communication  to  Peking 
on  the  subject  of  this  Treaty  until  1882.  At  this  date 
he  made  up  his  mind  as  to  the  respective  merits  and 
demerits  of  King  Log  and  King  Stork  and  thought 
fit  to  appeal  to  his  suzerain  for  help  against  the 
encroachments  of  France.  In  the  Treaty  of  1874,  t^ie 
intention  of  the  French  Government  to  establish  a 
protectorate  over  Annam  had  been  made  unmistak- 
ably clear,  and  the  Chinese  seem  to  have  realised  in 
a vague  sort  of  way  that  its  provisions  were  incom- 
patible with  the  maintenance  of  their  ancient 
suzerainty,  hitherto  recognised  by  the  Annamite 
tribute  missions  to  Peking.  Nevertheless,  they  lacked 
energy  and  courage  to  face  the  definite  issue,  and 
matters  were  allowed  to  drift  on  the  time-honoured 
“ wait  and  see  ” principle,  China’s  rights  lapsing  by 
default  as  the  French  invasion  advanced.  The  capture 
of  the  citadel  of  Hanoi  (April,  1882)  finally  compelled 
them  to  take  action  of  some  sort.  Chinese  troops 
were  accordingly  sent  to  co-operate  with  the  “ Black 
Flag  ” irregulars,  who,  as  local  levies,  had  been 
waging  guerilla  warfare,  not  altogether  unsuccessfully, 
in  Tongking.  The  course  of  the  subsequent  war  and 
protracted  negotiations,  finally  concluded  by  the 
restoration  of  peace  in  April,  1885,  need  not  be 
described  in  detail  here  ; students  of  Chinese  history 
will  find  it  well  and  fairly  compiled,  from  official 
documents,  by  M.  Cordier  in  the  second  volume  of 
his  “ Histoire  des  Relations  de  la  Chine  ” (Paris,  1902). 

The  part  played  by  Li  Hung-chang  throughout 
this  affair  was  markedly  and  consistently  conciliatory. 


146 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Indeed,  at  many  stages  of  the  diplomatic  conflict  he 
stood  out  boldly  in  opposition  to  the  policy  and  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  and  the  war  party  of 
the  Court  at  Peking,  and  frankly  proclaimed  to  friends 
and  foes  alike  his  disapproval  of  the  tactless  intransi- 
geance  of  Marquis  Tseng,  the  Chinese  Minister  in  Paris. 
His  pacifism  was  characterised,  however,  as  events 
proved  and  as  both  sides  subsequently  were  forced  to 
admit,  by  far-seeing  wisdom.  Had  his  policy  not  been 
hampered  by  the  stupid  blundering  of  the  Tsung-li 
Yamen,  had  the  Treaty  which  he  concluded  with 
Captain  Fournier  in  May  1884,  been  allowed  to  stand, 
China  would  have  saved  a hundred  million  taels  and 
France  a war  which  conferred  but  little  glory  on  her 
arms. 

Towards  the  end  of  1882  Li  scored  an  important 
initial  success  over  the  French  Minister  (M.  Bouree)  by 
inducing  him  to  conclude  an  arrangement  (Shanghai, 
December  20th)  by  virtue  of  which,  in  return  for 
the  evacuation  by  the  Chinese  forces,  France  was 
pledged  to  a formal  undertaking  to  respect  the 
sovereign  rights  and  territory  of  Annam.  Tongking 
was  to  be  divided  into  two  zones,  Chinese  and  French 
spheres  of  influence  respectively.  But  this  arrange- 
ment was  repudiated,  and  M.  Bouree  recalled,  by 
the  French  Government,  which  declined  to  recognise 
China’s  right  to  intervene  in  regard  to  Annam  or  to 
assert  her  suzerain  influence  in  Tongking.  Li’s 
diplomatic  success  on  this  occasion  was  the  more 
notable  in  that  he  knew,  and  M.  Bouree  might  have 
guessed,  that  Prince  Kung  and  the  “ howling  dogs  ” 
of  the  war  faction  at  Peking  would  have  rejected 
the  agreement  and  thus  have  placed  Li  in  the  un- 
pleasant position  which  the  French  Minister  came  to 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


H7 

occupy.  Three  months  later,  under  orders  from 
Peking,  Li  informed  the  French  representative  that 
China  would  never  consent  to  be  ignored  in  regard  to 
the  affairs  of  her  tributary  vassal ; that  a special 
mission  from  the  King  of  Annam  had  just  arrived  at 
Peking  to  ask  for  protection  ; that  the  Chinese 
forces  had  been  ordered  to  reoccupy  their  former 
posts  in  Tongking  ; and  that  Li  himself  was  about  to 
proceed  to  Canton  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Chinese  Army.  Thereupon  M.  Ferry,  “ le  Tonkinois,” 
took  immediate  steps  to  reinforce  the  French  troops 
in  Cochin  China,  and  it  really  seemed  as  if  Li  would 
be  compelled,  much  against  his  will,  to  abandon  the 
field  of  diplomacy  for  that  of  active  hostilities.  In 
April  the  French  Chamber  passed  a supplementary 
naval  vote  of  five  and  a half  million  francs  for  Tong- 
king, and  M.  Tricou  was  transferred  from  Tokyo  to 
replace  M.  Bouree  at  Peking,  with  instructions  to 
deal  “ amicably  but  very  firmly  ” with  the  Chinese 
Government. 

M.  Tricou,  arriving  at  Shanghai  on  June  6th,  met 
there  Li  Hung-chang,  ostensibly  en  route  for  Canton 
to  take  up  his  military  command.  It  is  interesting 
to  speculate  as  to  the  motive  of  Li’s  temporarily 
bellicose  attitude,  assumed  in  contradiction  to  all 
his  avowed  policy.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  his  journey  south  was  never  more  than  a “ bluff,” 
intended  as  much  for  the  benefit  of  the  war  party  in 
Peking  as  to  impress  the  French.  In  any  case,  it 
carried  him  no  farther  than  Shanghai.  “ The  firm- 
ness of  our  attitude,”  wrote  M.  Tricou  to  his  Govern- 
ment on  July  20th,  “ has  sufficed  to  keep  him  here 
a month  and  to  prevent  him  from  proceeding  to 
take  over  command  of  the  southern  provinces.” 


148 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


M.  Tricou  advised  his  Government  at  this  juncture 
to  act  vigorously,  by  blockading  the  coast  of  Annam 
and  by  sending  reinforcements  to  Tongking.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Marquis  Tseng  in  Paris,  acting  in 
close  touch  with  the  war  party  at  Peking,  had  done 
his  utmost  from  the  outset  to  discredit  Li’s  con- 
ciliatory policy  ; he  now  informed  the  Yamen  that 
neither  the  French  Parliament  nor  Press  desired  to 
embark  on  a serious  campaign  in  the  Far  East.  Li, 
seriously  embarrassed  by  the  abuse  of  hireling 
scribes  in  the  Censorate,  fiercely  accused  of  treachery 
and  cowardice,  had  requested  the  Yamen  before  he 
left  Tientsin  for  the  south  to  allow  the  negotiations  to 
be  entrusted  exclusively  to  Tseng.  But  in  July,  as 
the  French  preparations  for  war  continued,  Tseng 
became  frightened  at  the  seriousness  of  the  situation, 
and,  the  Yamen  reacting  to  his  fears,  Li  was  speedily 
recalled  to  Chihli.  M.  Tricou  met  him  again  at 
Tientsin  in  September,  and,  in  the  course  of  amicable 
negotiations  then  resumed,  Li  (vindictive  for  once) 
urged  him  to  complain  to  the  Yamen  of  the  provo- 
cative attitude  of  Marquis  Tseng.  In  October, 
France  having  blockaded  the  Annamese  coast  and 
sent  reinforcements  to  Tongking,  Li  washed  his 
hands  of  the  whole  business,  openly  denounced  Tseng’s 
attitude,  and  requested  the  Yamen  to  relieve  him 
of  all  further  part  in  the  negotiations.  He  told 
M.  Tricou  quite  frankly  that  “the  Yamen  was  living 
in  a world  of  dangerous  illusions.”  This  did  not 
prevent  him  at  the  same  time  from  endeavouring  to 
induce  the  United  States  and  other  Powers  to  inter- 
vene for  China’s  benefit.  Real  inactivity  was  never 
possible  for  him,  but  at  this  stage  of  the  question  his 
just  indignation  made  him  as  anxious  to  stultify  the 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


1 49 


Tsung-li  Yamen  and  Tseng  in  the  eyes  of  the  Empress 
Dowager  as  to  get  the  better  of  the  French  Minister. 

On  November  16th,  1883,  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
sent  to  the  French  Minister  and  to  the  representatives 
of  all  the  Treaty  Powers  at  Peking  an  official  Note, 
setting  forth  China’s  position  with  reference  to  Annam. 
The  presence  of  Chinese  troops  in  Tongking  was 
frankly  admitted,  as  well  as  the  intention  to  oppose 
by  force  any  advance  of  French  troops  in  that  direc- 
tion. Herein  may  be  traced  the  supple  hand  of  Li, 
for  the  Marquis  Tseng  had  officially  and  repeatedly 
declared  in  Paris  that  there  were  no  Chinese  troops 
in  Tongking.  As  a result,  Tseng  was  made  to  look 
ridiculous  and  the  Yamen  was  compelled  to  disavow 
him,  whereupon  the  way  was  at  last  open  for  Li  to 
recover  full  control  of  the  situation.  In  March,  1884, 
the  Chinese  Government  found  matter  for  serious 
reflection  in  the  fall  of  Bacninh  and  Sontay.  In 
April,  Prince  Kung,  who  for  twenty-four  years  had 
been  practically  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  was 
removed  from  office  by  the  Decree  of  the  Empress 
Tzu  Hsi,  together  with  most  of  his  bellicose  colleagues 
of  the  Yamen.  From  this  date  onwards  the  influence 
of  Li  Hung-chang  became  paramount,  his  pacific 
counsels  prevailed,  and  his  policy  of  reorganising 
the  country’s  military  and  naval  services  began  to 
assume  form  and  substance,  under  the  favourable 
auspices  of  the  Empress  and  Prince  Ch’un,  the  Seventh 
Prince.  He  had  played  the  waiting  game  and  he  had 
won,  though  the  final  justification  of  his  pacific 
policy  in  regard  to  France  was  not  achieved  until  a 
year  later.  With  the  assistance  of  his  loyal  hench- 
man, Herr  Gustav  Detring  (Commissioner  of  Customs 
at  Tientsin),  he  succeeded,  within  a month  of  the  fall 


150 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


of  Prince  Kung,  in  concluding  terms  of  peace  with 
Captain  Fournier.  This  naval  officer,  who,  as  com- 
mander of  the  V olta , had  previously  established  cordial 
relations  with  Li  and  Herr  Detring,  had  been  suddenly 
invested  by  the  French  Government  with  pleni- 
potentiary powers  to  negotiate  for  a settlement  of 
all  matters  in  dispute,  thus  emphasising  the  fact 
(of  which  Li  was  quite  aware)  that  the  French  had 
become  decidedly  nervous  about  the  possible  cost  of 
their  great  adventure  in  the  Far  East.  By  the  Li- 
Fournier  Convention,  Li,  acting  on  his  own  initiative 
but  with  the  secret  approval  of  the  Empress,  agreed 
to  terms  which  practically  ceded  Tongking  to  France, 
but  which  eliminated  all  French  claims  to  a money 
indemnity.  Both  parties  appeared  to  be  relieved  at 
this  solution  : M.  Ferry  telegraphed  his  hearty  con- 
gratulations to  Li,  who  replied  in  equally  cordial  terms. 

But  the  end  was  not  yet.  By  the  terms  of  this  Con- 
vention China  was  pledged  to  the  immediate  with- 
drawal of  all  her  forces  from  Tongking.  Four  days 
after  its  signature,  however,  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
declared  (whether  in  good  or  bad  faith  we  know 
not)  that  nothing  beyond  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
had  been  definitely  settled.  On  May  17th,  Captain 
Fournier,  at  a long  interview  with  Li,  endeavoured  to 
persuade  him  to  fulfil  the  spirit  of  his  agreement  by 
fixing  precise  dates  for  the  evacuation  of  Langson 
and  the  other  posts  then  held  by  the  Chinese  troops. 
Li  had  been  willing  enough  to  give  a general  under- 
taking ; but  to  request  the  Central  Government  to 
give  definite  orders  to  the  military  authorities  for 
evacuation  was  another  matter.  However,  a memo- 
randum of  dates  was  drawn  up,  agreed  to  by  Captain 
Fournier  and  (according  to  his  account)  by  Li.  By 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


151 

the  terms  thereof  Langson  was  to  have  been  evacuated 
on  June  6th.  On  the  19th  the  French  military 
authorities,  under  instructions,  demanded  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Chinese  garrison  ; but  the  Chinese 
commander  very  properly  declined  to  withdraw, 
having  received  no  orders  to  do  so,  either  from  the 
Yamen  or  from  Li.  The  Yamen  could  not  possibly 
have  sent  any,  be  it  noted,  for  they  had  been  told 
nothing  of  Li’s  arrangements  with  Captain  Fournier  ; 
and  Li  himself  had  thought  it  best  to  send  no  reply 
to  the  urgent  message  in  which  the  Langson  com- 
mander had  asked  him  for  instructions.  According  to 
Mr.  Michie,  the  Viceroy  hoped,  and  even  hinted,  that 
the  French  forces  on  the  spot  would  be  able  to  deal 
with  the  situation  so  as  to  secure  their  objects  without 
his  having  to  commit  himself  officially  any  further — 
an  arrangement  very  typical  of  Li’s  necessities  and 
their  effect  on  his  diplomacy.  But,  unfortunately 
for  all  concerned,  the  French  force  sent  against 
Langson  was  insufficient,  and,  coming  against  a 
veteran  “ Black  Flag  ” contingent,  it  was  repulsed. 
Hostilities  were  thereupon  resumed,  and  continued 
(without  any  great  determination  on  either  side) 
until  April,  1885. 

Li  placed  on  Captain  Fournier  the  blame  for  the 
“ misunderstanding  ” which  had  thus  led  to  the 
renewal  of  war,  and  the  Yamen,  greatly  encouraged 
by  this  timely  discomfiture  of  the  French  troops, 
determined  that  Langson  and  Laokay  must  continue 
to  be  occupied  by  the  Chinese  forces  until  the  whole 
frontier  question  should  have  been  finally  discussed. 
At  this  juncture  Sir  Robert  Hart  was  authorised, 
upon  the  cautious  advice  of  Li,  to  proceed  to  Shanghai 
and  there  to  endeavour  to  open  fresh  negotiations 


152 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


with  the  newly-arrived  French  Minister,  M.  Patenotre. 
The  idea  underlying  this  move  was  to  involve 
M.  Patenotre  in  semi-official  pourparlers  either  with 
Sir  Robert  Hart  at  Shanghai  or  with  Li  himself  at 
Tientsin,  and  thus  to  prevent  him  from  coming  to 
close  quarters  with  the  Yamen  ; in  other  words,  to 
secure  a further  confusion  of  the  issues.  But  M. 
Patenotre  was  not  to  be  thus  beguiled.  The  French 
Government  was  definitely  opposed  to  any  formal 
declaration  of  war  ; its  policy  had  been  cryptically 
defined  : “ de  continuer  d’agir  avec  vigueur,  sans  qu’il 
y ait  etat  de  guerre  entre  les  deux  pays.”  In  spite  of 
these  limitations,  M.  Patenotre  was  able  to  obtain 
permission  to  present  an  ultimatum  demanding 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Chinese  forces  from 
Tongking.  Two  days  before  the  Yamen  had  mag- 
nanimously informed  the  French  Legation  that  China 
would  not  insist  upon  an  indemnity  ! Both  sides 
in  fact  were  boldly  bluffing.  On  July  19th  the  Viceroy 
of  Nanking  was  appointed  to  negotiate  with  the 
French  Minister  (still  at  Shanghai),  and  the  Yamen 
at  Peking  obtained  an  extension  of  the  period  named 
in  the  French  ultimatum,  which  Li  required  in  order 
to  arrange  a transfer  of  the  vessels  of  his  “ China 
Merchants  ” fleet  to  the  American  flag.  At  the  same 
time  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  secretary  resident  in  London 
was  engaged,  under  his  chief’s  telegraphic  direction, 
in  conducting  semi-official  negotiations  in  Paris — 
truly,  a multitude  of  counsellors.  Li’s  movements 
at  this  stage  became  temporarily  embarrassed  by 
the  appearance  at  Peking  of  the  old  fire-eating 
General  Tso  Tsung-tang  (the  conqueror  of  Kash- 
garia),  who  begged  the  Empress  Dowager  to  pay  no 
further  heed  to  counsels  of  conciliation,  but  to 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT  153 

institute  a vigorous  campaign  and  drive  the  French 
out  of  Saigon  itself. 

It  had  now  become  clear  that  nothing  less  than 
forcible  measures  would  convince  the  fossilised  man- 
darins of  the  Yamen.  The  French  proceeded,  there- 
fore, to  bombard  Foochow,  destroying  a large  number 
of  Chinese  war-junks  in  the  river  Min,  and  to  blockade 
Formosa.  But  at  this  stage  Li  began  to  reap  the 
harvest  of  his  bread  upon  the  waters  of  conciliation. 
After  Foochow,  M.  Ferry  refused  to  permit  Admiral 
Courbet  to  attack  Port  Arthur,  lest  in  so  doing  he 
should  bring  about  the  disgrace  of  “ notre  ami  Li 
Hung-chang.”  The  French  Government  had  reached 
a mood  of  hesitation  of  which  Li  took  skilful  advan- 
tage, and  this  the  more  readily  because  he  knew  that 
the  Empress  Dowager  was  becoming  seriously  per- 
turbed at  the  heavy  cost  of  the  war,  which  was 
rapidly  draining  her  privy  purse.  But  for  a while  he 
held  his  hand  ; Sir  Robert  Hart  was  put  forward  to 
negotiate  through  the  Customs’  London  secretary 
with  M.  Ferry  in  Paris.  Early  in  March  the  French 
Government  was  glad  to  hear  from  Sir  Robert  Hart 
that  he  had  been  authorised  by  a secret  Decree  to 
discuss  terms  of  peace,  without  reference  either  to 
Li  Hung-chang  or  the  Chinese  Ministers  abroad. 
Hart  went  so  far  as  to  request  that  Li  should  not  be 
informed  of  this  special  mission.  Three  days  later, 
however,  Li  himself  formally  communicated  to  the 
French  Consul  at  Tientsin  the  fact  that  the  Yamen 
had  invested  Hart  with  full  powers  to  negotiate  ! 
As  a matter  of  fact,  Hart  and  Li  were  in  close  com- 
munication and  agreement  throughout,  but  both 
were  firm  believers  in  the  advantages  to  be  gained 
by  the  mystification  and  multiplication  of  negotiators. 


i54 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


On  this  occasion  luck  was  on  their  side.  Mr.  J.  D. 
Campbell,  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  London  secretary, 
succeeded  in  concluding  a Protocol  for  the  suspension 
of  hostilities  with  the  French  Foreign  Office  on 
April  4th  ; by  this  instrument  it  was  agreed  that  the 
signature  of  a final  Treaty  at  Peking  would  follow  and 
that  it  would  be  based  generally  on  the  terms  of  the 
Li-Fournier  Convention  of  May,  1884.  A week  before 
the  conclusion  of  this  Protocol  it  was  known  in  China 
as  well  as  in  France,  that  the  French  troops  had 
suffered  a severe  reverse  at  Langson.  M.  Ferry, 
naturally  concluding  that  China  would  no  longer 
recognise  the  Paris  negotiations,  decided  to  say 
nothing  about  them  or  the  Protocol  to  the  Chambers  ; 
he  preferred  to  bow  to  the  storm  of  hostile  criticism 
which  followed  the  Langson  defeat  and  resigned 
office. 

But  Li  was  now  firmly  in  the  saddle,  and,  victory 
or  no  victory,  neither  he  nor  the  Empress  Dowager 
had  any  intention  of  continuing  the  war.  On  J une  9th, 
therefore,  he  signed  the  final  Treaty  of  Peace  with 
M.  Patenotre,  who  came  from  Peking  to  Tientsin 
for  the  purpose.  The  French  Senate  expressed  its 
satisfaction  at  the  results  achieved  in  this  campaign, 
which  regulated  the  position  of  France  in  Tongking 
and  in  the  protectorate  over  Annam.  But  China, 
having  neither  indemnity  to  pay  nor  further  territory 
to  cede,  and  being  able  to  boast  of  a military  success 
as  the  concluding  act  of  the  war,  was  equally  satisfied 
with  the  Treaty,  which  saved  the  face  of  all  the  digni- 
taries concerned.  As  far  as  Li  was  concerned,  events 
had  fully  justified  his  policy  and  his  patience,  since 
both  sides  had  finally  seen  fit  to  accept  the  terms  of 
settlement  which  he  had  independently  secured  a 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


155 


year  before.  All  being  satisfactorily  arranged,  he 
wrote  a personal  letter  to  M.  de  Freycinet  (Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs)  on  June  23rd,  in  which  he  took 
occasion  to  express  his  great  regard  for  M.  Patenotre 
and  for  the  French  Consul  at  Tientsin,  M.  Ristel- 
hueber.  In  this  letter  occurs  an  illuminating  passage, 
very  typical  of  Li’s  diplomatic  methods,  as  follows  : 

“ At  my  request,  you  have  authorised  M.  Ristel- 
hueber’s  return  to  France.  It  occurred  to  me,  in 
making  this  request,  that,  if  you  were  to  question 
him  with  regard  to  the  various  matters  at  present 
under  consideration,  the  results  might  be  advan- 
tageous both  for  you  and  for  us.  I am  therefore  very 
grateful  to  you.  Your  Consul  will  not  fail  to  explain 
to  you  in  detail  and  categorically  my  wish  to  establish 
close  relations  with  France,  and  to  discuss  with  you 
the  nature  of  the  mutual  assistance  which  our  coun- 
tries should  henceforward  be  able  to  render  to  each 
other.” 

With  good  reason  Li  attached  no  small  importance 
to  the  intimate  personal  relations  which,  by  his  charm 
of  manner,  geniality,  and  tact,  he  so  frequently 
established  with  Europeans — opponents  as  well  as 
friends.  On  many  occasions  the  admiration  and 
sympathy  which  his  indomitable  energy,  courage, 
and  resource  won  from  his  antagonists  was  worth 
a great  deal  more  to  China  than  all  her  expenditure 
on  forts  and  arsenals.  This  was  the  case,  as  we  have 
seen,  with  M.  Jules  Ferry  ; it  was  even  more  notably 
so  in  1895  with  Count  Ito  in  the  Shimonoseki  negotia- 
tions. Li  thoroughly  understood  the  value  of  the 
human  equation  in  politics,  and  knew  how  to  make 
use  of  the  goodwill  of  those  whom  he  bound  to  himself 
by  personal  ties  of  sympathy  and  esteem. 


i5  6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


In  dealing  with  his  own  Government  he  had  gene- 
rally to  reckon  with  men  and  ideas  of  a different 
stamp,  but  his  ready  adaptability  was  seldom  at 
fault.  Compare,  for  example,  the  letter,  quoted  above, 
to  M.  de  Freycinet  with  the  following  passage  from  the 
Memorial  in  which  he  forwarded  to  the  Throne  the 
text  of  his  Treaty  of  Peace  : 

“ After  the  great  victory  at  Langson,  the  prowess 
of  our  Imperial  troops  inspires  terror  in  our  enemies  ; 
the  whole  world  resounds  with  spontaneous  applause. 
Seeing  that  France  is  smitten  with  sincere  repentance, 
China  may  lay  down  her  arms.  Thanks  to  the  un- 
swerving fortitude  of  your  Imperial  Majesties,  France 
has  been  led  to  abandon  her  perfidious  intentions  of 
extorting  money  from  China,  and  China’s  magnani- 
mity towards  her  has  been  strikingly  displayed.” 

Li’s  prestige  at  Court  and  throughout  the  Empire, 
which  had  suffered  considerably  at  the  hands  of  the 
war  party  in  1884,  was  completely  restored  with  the 
conclusion  of  this  peace.  In  October  he  made  an 
almost  triumphal  visit  to  Peking,  when  Prince 
Ch’un  came  to  call  upon  him  in  person,  and  he  had 
several  confidential  audiences  with  Her  Majesty 
Tzu  Hsi.  The  result  of  these  interviews  was  the 
Imperial  sanction  for  his  policy  of  “ armed  prepared- 
ness ” (entailing  lavish  expenditure  under  his  Vice- 
regal direction)  and  the  inauguration  of  that  period 
of  his  career  in  which  his  power  and  prestige  reached 
their  zenith.  It  lasted  ten  years — that  is  to  say, 
until  the  Japanese  war-cloud,  looming  ever  darker 
on  the  horizon,  had  burst  and  exposed  the  real 
weakness  of  the  Paper  Dragon’s  lath-and-plaster 
structure. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


157 


Relations  with  Japan. 

At  an  early  period  of  his  diplomatic  career  Li  had 
occasion  to  realise  that  his  relations  with  the  envoys 
of  Japan  must  be  conducted  on  principles  very  dif- 
ferent from  those  which  served  him  in  dealing  with 
the  European  Powers.  His  unerring  instinct  in 
politics  taught  him,  even  before  1874,  the  vital 
difference  between  the  military  adventures  of  England 
and  France  and  the  racial  and  economic  forces  which 
underlie  and  determine  the  inevitable  expansion  of 
Japan.  It  was  in  1874  that  China  first  had  serious 
cause  to  realise  the  nascent  power  and  ambitions  of 
Dai  Nippon  ; in  that  year  Li  Hung-chang  thought 
it  prudent  and  possible  to  conceal  from  the  world 
China’s  defenceless  condition  by  the  expedient  of 
buying  off  the  Japanese  forces  which  had  invaded 
Formosa  on  the  flimsiest  of  pretexts.  In  that  same 
year  also  he  discovered  that  the  devices  of  evasion 
and  circumlocution  which  usually  served  his  pur- 
poses in  dealing  with  Europeans  were  useless  when 
applied  to  the  Japanese,  themselves  pastmasters  in 
the  arts  and  crafts  of  Oriental  diplomacy.  The 
Japanese  Commissioner,  Soyeshima,  entrusted  by 
his  Government  with  the  settlement  of  the  Formosa 
question,  gently  but  firmly  declined  to  discuss  matters 
with  Li,  and  insisted  on  transacting  his  business  with 
the  Central  Government  direct.  The  Embassy  which 
subsequently  reached  Peking  did  not  even  trouble 
to  call  on  the  Viceroy  at  Tientsin.  Li’s  first  experi- 
ences with  the  Japanese  were  sufficiently  humiliating 
to  increase  his  instinctive  dislike  and  fear  of  them  ; 
sufficient  to  account  for  his  ceaseless  efforts  of  later 
years  to  intimidate  them  by  the  advertisement  of 


i58 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


imposing  forces,  and  to  check  them  by  conceding  to 
other  Powers  vested  interests  in  the  regions  chiefly 
menaced  by  Japanese  ambition. 

Throughout  every  phase  of  his  diplomatic  career 
we  find  evidence  of  his  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the 
danger  which  threatened  from  the  East  was  more 
formidable  than  from  the  West,  because  the  interests 
and  ambitions  of  the  European  Powers  were  not 
centred,  like  those  of  Japan,  on  territorial  expansion 
at  China’s  expense. 

In  1876  occurred  the  first  ominous  warning  and 
clear  indication  of  the  direction  which  that  expan- 
sion was  bound  to  take — a direction  pre-determined 
by  Japan’s  geographical  conditions,  by  her  most 
treasured  memories  of  mediaeval  history,  and  by  her 
rapidly-increasing  economic  pressure.  In  that  year 
Japan  took  her  first  step  towards  the  conquest  of 
Korea,  China’s  most  important  tributary  vassal 
and  strategical  stronghold,  by  concluding  an  indepen- 
dent Commercial  Treaty  with  the  King  of  the  Land 
of  the  Morning  Calm.  Even  the  purblind  apathy  of 
the  Chinese  Government  could  not  fail  to  realise 
the  significance  of  this  step,  clearly  portending,  as  it 
did,  a challenge  to  the  suzerainty  of  the  Dragon 
Throne.  But  there  was  no  man  about  that  throne 
capable  of  initiating  any  offensive  or  defensive  policy 
to  meet  the  situation  thus  created.  The  impending 
struggle  was  generally  realised  at  Peking,  but  the 
drifting  policy  prevailed,  until,  in  the  last  resort, 
Li  Hung-chang  was  called  upon.  He  promptly 
advised  that  the  best  means  of  checking  Japan’s 
ambitions  lay  in  opening  Korea  to  the  whole  world. 
This  was  done  by  the  conclusion  of  Commercial 
Treaties  between  the  Korean  King  and  the  foreign 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


T59 


Powers  in  1882.  In  July  of  that  year  a riot  organised 
by  the  ex-Regent,  the  King’s  reactionary  father, 
resulted  in  the  burning  of  the  Japanese  Legation  at 
Seoul.  Thereupon  Li,  ordered  to  find  some  means  of 
averting  a crisis,  despatched  one  of  his  faithful 
henchmen,  Ma  Chien-chung,  to  Korea  with  a con- 
siderable naval  and  military  force.  Japan,  though 
anxious  to  assert  her  rights,  was  not  yet  ready  for  a 
conclusive  test  of  strength.  Ma’s  diplomacy  was  all 
conciliatory  ; it  ended  by  the  Chinese  seizing  the 
person  of  the  ex-Regent,  who  was  transported  as  a 
State  prisoner  to  Paoting-fu,  in  Chihli.  At  the 
same  time  Korea  sent  a mission  of  apology  to  Japan 
and  paid  an  indemnity. 

The  following  extracts  from  a letter  written  by  Li 
Hung-chang  on  October  23rd,  1879,  to  Su  Shan,  an 
official  of  the  Court  at  Seoul  (a  letter  not  intended  for 
publication),  throw  valuable  light  on  his  policy  in 
dealing  with  Japan  and  the  motives  which  inspired 
it.  They  also  serve  to  explain  his  real  sentiments 
towards  the  Japanese  : 

“ You  tell  me  of  the  relations  of  your  Government 
with  Japan.  The  Japanese  are  of  a proud  and  over- 
bearing nature ; extremely  ambitious  and  wily, 
they  advance  step  by  step,  and  I fully  realise  that 
your  task  is  an  extremely  difficult  one  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  your  Government  is  compelled  to  grant  their 
demands  according  to  circumstances.  When  I met 
the  Korean  Envoy  last  year  I had  already  read  the 
letter  in  which  you  told  me  repeatedly  that  the 
Japanese  had  asked  you  to  convey  an  expression  of 
their  desire  to  preserve  good  relations  with  us,  and 
the  hope  that  we  should  set  our  minds  at  rest,  as 
they  were  perfectly  frank  and  sincere. 

“ In  my  ignorance  it  seems  to  me  that  from  olden 


i6o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


times  the  relations  between  neighbouring  States  are 
easily  explained  : two  countries,  from  having  been  at 
enmity,  may  come  together  in  the  bonds  of  a common 
interest.  Where  no  such  ground  of  mutual  advantage 
exists,  they  soon  cease  to  agree  and  become  enemies. 
It  is  wise  policy  to  conceal  from  the  Japanese  what 
we  know  concerning  their  lack  of  sincerity  : we  should 
be  on  our  guard,  avoid  all  subjects  of  dispute,  and 
thus  preserve  friendly  relations.  For  this  reason  I 
advised  you  in  my  last  letter  not  to  show  your 
suspicions,  since  they  would  only  afford  pretexts 
against  you.” 

After  referring  to  the  financial  and  economic 
causes  impelling  Japan  to  seek  relief  in  territorial 
expansion,  and  advising  Korea  to  organise  secretly 
her  military  defences,  observing  carefully  meanwhile 
all  her  treaty  obligations,  his  letter  continues  : 

“ All  the  political  leaders  of  China  are  convinced 
that,  in  these  matters,  prevention  is  better  than  cure. 
You  may  say  that  the  simplest  way  to  avoid  trouble 
would  be  to  shut  oneself  in  and  be  at  peace.  Alas, 
as  far  as  the  East  is  concerned,  this  is  not  possible. 
There  is  no  human  agency  capable  of  putting  a stop 
to  the  expansionist  movement  of  Japan  : has  not 
your  Government  been  compelled  to  inaugurate  a 
new  era  by  making  a Treaty  of  Commerce  with  them  ? 
As  matters  stand,  therefore,  is  not  our  best  course  to 
neutralise  one  poison  by  another,  to  set  one  energy 
against  another  ? You  should  seize  every  opportunity 
to  establish  treaty  relations  with  Western  nations, 
of  which  you  would  make  use  to  check  Japan. 

“ There  exists  in  the  West  a general  rule  that  a 
nation  may  not  seize  the  territory  of  another  without 
good  cause  ; but  international  law  acts  only  as  a 
protective  force  in  the  case  of  the  Powers  with  com- 
mon commercial  interests.  Last  year  Turkey  was  the 
victim  of  Russia’s  aggression  ; but  at  the  moment 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


161 


when  she  was  about  to  succumb,  England  called  the 
other  nations  to  consult  together,  whereupon  Russia 
promptly  called  off  her  forces.  If  Turkey  had  per- 
sisted in  isolation  such  as  yours,  she  would  have  be- 
come the  prey  of  Russia.  Belgium  and  Denmark, 
two  small  States  in  Europe,  have  made  treaties  with 
all  the  Powers  : therefore,  no  one  dares  to  oppress 
or  injure  them.  Have  we  not  here  an  example  of  the 
best  remedy  of  weakness  against  force  ? ” 

Against  the  menace  of  Japan,  and  with  an  eye  also 
on  Russia,  Li  advises  therefore  the  making  of  Treaties 
of  Commerce  with  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
the  United  States  (“  far-distant  countries,  whose  only 
object  would  be  to  trade  with  your  kingdom  ”), 
the  establishment  of  a Customs  tariff,  and  the  sending 
of  Korean  Ministers  abroad.  The  letter  then  concludes  : 

“ The  nations  of  the  West  have  taken  advantage  of 
our  misfortunes  to  impose  their  will  upon  us  by  force. 
The  argument  they  used  in  the  making  of  their 
treaties  was  armed  men  ; thus,  as  you  are  aware, 
the  execution  of  their  treaties  has  become  a source 
of  continual  difficulties.  Now,  if  your  Government 
were  to  take  the  initiative  of  its  own  free  will  and 
before  they  resort  to  violence,  the  Western  Powers 
would  be  so  surprised  that  they  could  hardly  be 
exacting.  By  this  method  of  procedure  your  country 
would  be  able  to  maintain,  without  affording  them 
pretext  for  protest,  its  prohibition  against  the  sale 
of  opium,  the  preaching  of  the  Christian  religion, 
and  other  corrupting  influences.  . . . Since  you  are 
aware  of  the  strength  of  your  adversaries,  use  all 
possible  means  to  divide  them  ; go  warily,  use  cun- 
ning— thus  will  you  prove  yourselves  good  strate- 
gists.” 

It  was  the  strategy  which  Li  himself  consistently 
practised  in  the  wider  arena  of  Peking. 

L.H. 


M 


162 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


After  the  crisis  of  1882  the  Japanese  menace  to 
China’s  suzerainty  began  to  be  realised  in  many 
quarters.  One  of  its  results  was  a Memorial  presented 
to  the  Throne  by  Chang  P’ei-lun,  Li’s  son-in-law, 
and  a very  thorn  in  his  flesh,  urging  offensive  and 
defensive  preparations  against  Japan.  Li  was  ordered 
by  the  Throne  to  report  on  these  proposals.  His 
Memorial  in  reply  has  frequently  been  cited  by 
foreign  writers  as  evidence  of  his  intention  to  attack 
Japan,  and  therefore  of  his  direct  responsibility  for 
the  disastrous  war  of  1894.  But,  as  a matter  of  fact, 
this  Memorial,  read  in  the  light  of  all  his  previous 
policy  and  subsequent  actions,  contains  little  or 
nothing  more  than  a frank  recognition  of  Japan’s 
aggressiveness,  coupled  with  an  equally  frank  admis- 
sion of  China’s  helplessness. 

At  the  outset  he  expressed  “ his  entire  concurrence 
with  the  views  of  Chang  P’ei-lun,  namely,  that  it  is 
necessary  for  us  to  prepare  for  a war  with  Japan, 
and  that  consequently  we  must  develop  our  naval 
armaments  in  order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  this  object.” 
But  he  proceeded  to  remind  the  Throne  that,  as  the 
result  of  Count  Ito’s  mission  to  Europe,  “ there  is 
always  a probability  that,  in  the  event  of  a conflict 
between  China  and  Japan,  foreign  Powers  might 
side  with  Japan  against  us.” 

He  then  proceeded  to  submit  counsels  of  wise 
caution  : 

“ But  let  us  remember  the  two  great  principles, 
the  motive  force  of  which  has  a paramount  influence 
— the  moral  power  of  reason,  which  distinguishes 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  the  material  power  of 
strength,  which  becomes  might  when  opposed  to 
weakness.  Morally  we  are  undoubtedly  in  our  right 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


163 

on  the  question  of  the  Loo-Choo  Islands,  and  mate- 
rially China  is  a large  and  strong  Empire,  superior 
to  Japan.  If  we  only  organise  our  resources,  develop 
our  army  and  navy,  we  shall  gain  the  respect  of  even 
the  more  powerful  of  the  foreign  nations,  who  will 
rank  us  with  the  Great  Powers,  and  then  Japan  will, 
of  course,  not  venture  to  carry  out  any  hostile  designs 
against  us  (by  means  of  a foreign  alliance). 

“ But  if  Japan  should,  perchance,  discover  pre- 
maturely what  our  plans  in  preparing  for  a cam- 
paign against  her  are,  the  direct  consequences  will 
be  that  the  Japanese  Government  and  people  would 
at  once  reunite  and  pull  together  ; that  they  would 
enter  into  a close  alliance  with  foreign  Powers,  and 
accumulate  money  by  augmenting  the  national 
debt  ; that  their  naval  power  would  be  increased 
by  the  building  and  purchasing  of  ships  ; and  that 
thus  we  would  be  placed  in  a disadvantageous 
position,  pregnant  with  danger. 

“ Japan  has  now  for  years  earnestly  studied 
Western  systems,  and,  though  her  success  is  so  far 
only  an  outward  one,  still  her  fleet  must  be  admitted 
to  be  equal  to  ours.  Therefore,  I should  consider  it 
hazardous  to  send  our  fleet  to  Japan  to  fight  in  the 
enemy’s  own  waters.  My  humble  opinion  is,  let 
us  not  lose  sight  of  our  plan  of  invading  Japan,  but 
let  us  not  commit  the  mistake  of  doing  this  in  a 
hurried  manner.  First  of  all,  our  navy  must  be 
thoroughly  organised  before  we  can  think  of  an 
invasion. 

“ Your  Majesty  has  graciously  ordered  me  to  under- 
take the  responsibility  of  preparing  the  plan  for  the 
invasion  of  Japan.  Allow  me,  therefore,  to  state  that 
I consider  this  question  one  of  the  utmost  importance 
for  the  Empire,  and  I fear  that  unless  all  the  Ministers 
of  the  Cabinet  and  the  Viceroys  of  all  the  provinces 
agree  together,  and  assiduously  work  for  years  to 
come,  any  such  attempt  would  be  a failure. 


164 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


“ If  your  Cabinet  Ministers  and  Viceroys  will  agree 
together  and  your  Majesty  will  rule  over  them  all, 
in  conformity  with  your  own  august  decisions,  then 
the  invasion  of  Japan  can  be  thought  of,  but  it  is 
decidedly  better  not  to  place  the  responsibility  of 
this  enterprise  on  my  shoulders  alone. 

“ Chang  P’ei-lun,  in  his  Memorial,  says  that  the  want 
of  success  of  our  policy  was  mainly  caused  by  the  fact 
that  the  decisions  of  our  Cabinet  were  rather  unsettled, 
and  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministers  not  clearly 
defined.  I recognise  this  as  being  perfectly  true,  and 
constituting  an  indisputable  fact. 

“ To  give  an  instance.  The  necessity  of  creating 
a strong  navy,  and  therefore  the  decision  to  build 
ships  of  war,  was  fully  agreed  upon  by  all  the  Minis- 
ters and  Viceroys,  and  as  funds  were  absolutely 
necessary  in  order  to  purchase  armaments  as  well 
as  for  the  maintenance  of  the  army,  the  financial 
department  of  our  Government  fixed  upon  an  annual 
appropriation  of  four  million  taels  for  the  expenditure 
of  the  navy  and  for  the  purposes  of  coast  defence. 
This  amount  was  to  be  provided  from  the  revenue 
of  the  inland  Custom  duties.  Unfortunately  the 
estimate  of  the  income  was  not  founded  on  any  solid 
basis,  and  it  was  afterwards  found  that  the  expenses 
of  collecting  the  revenue  in  every  province  exceeded 
the  amount  collected.  Besides,  the  amounts  collected 
in  the  provinces  of  Fukien  and  Kwangtung  were 
spent  there,  and  nothing  was  paid  by  them  into  the 
Imperial  Treasury.  In  consequence,  my  department 
received  not  the  amount  of  four  millions,  which 
had  been  decided  upon,  but  only  one-fourth  of  that 
sum.  This  deficiency  in  the  income  had  for  its  natural 
consequence  that  it  prevented  the  growth  of  our 
navy  and  the  organisation  of  our  coast  defences.” 

Li’s  conclusion  of  his  Memorial  was  expressed  in 
the  following  terms  : “ That  it  is  above  all  necessary 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


165 

to  strengthen  our  country’s  defences,  to  organise 
a powerful  navy,  and  the  aggressive  steps  against 
Japan  should  not  be  undertaken  in  too  great  a 
hurry.”  1 In  fact,  a cautious  policy  of  “ wait-and-see.” 

Japan  having  obtained  a locus  standi  in  Korea 
by  her  Treaty  with  the  King  in  1882,  the  subsequent 
history  of  the  Hermit  Kingdom  becomes  an  inextri- 
cable tangle  of  plots  and  counterplots  organised  by 
Koreans,  Japanese,  and  Chinese  in  turn — an  inter- 
minable embroglio  of  treasons,  stratagems,  and 
spoils.  After  the  seizure  and  removal  of  the  ex- 
Regent,  Li  secured  the  appointment  of  one  of  his  own 
ablest  lieutenants,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  to  be  Chinese 
Resident  at  the  Korean  Court,  supported  by  a small 
but  efficient  body  of  troops.  He  also  emphasised  the 
position  of  the  suzerain  Power  by  obtaining  control 
of  the  telegraph  monopoly  in  Korea  and  by  creat- 
ing a Korean  branch  of  the  Imperial  Maritime 
Customs  under  the  direction  of  Sir  Robert  Hart.2 
But  the  intrigues  and  agitation  at  Seoul  continued, 
until  in  1884  they  resulted  in  another  outbreak  of 
assassination  and  rioting,  in  which  the  Palace  was 
attacked  by  Korean  and  Japanese  conspirators 
and  defended  by  Chinese  troops.  The  Japanese 
Legation  was  burnt  by  the  mob,  and  the  Minister 
with  his  guard  fought  their  way  from  Seoul  to  the 
coast. 

The  Japanese  Government  was  well  aware  that 
China,  with  the  Tongking  war  on  her  hands,  was  in 
no  position  to  resist  pressure  in  Korea.  From  the 

1 This  Memorial  was  published  in  The  Times , January  19th,  1895. 

2 Its  chief  Commissioner  was  Baron  von  Mollendorff,  a picturesque 
figure  on  the  crowded  stage  of  Seoul.  He  was  eventually  succeeded  by  Mr. 
(now  Sir)  J.  McLeavy  Brown,  who  for  several  years  held  a very  remarkable 
position  as  confidential  adviser  and  paymaster  of  the  sorely  troubled  King. 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


1 66 

Japanese  point  of  view  there  was  therefore  no  neces- 
sity for  military  demonstrations ; diplomacy,  of  the 
masterful  kind  which  Count  Inouye  and  Count  Ito 
understood,  would  surely  suffice  to  put  an  end  to 
China’s  suzerainty  and  to  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  forceful 
methods  of  asserting  it.  An  Embassy  under  Count 
Ito  proceeded,  therefore,  to  Peking  in  March,  1885. 
Finding  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  in  a more  than  usually 
gelatinous  condition,  Ito  was  only  too  glad  to 
negotiate  with  Li  Hung-chang  at  Tientsin,  and  the 
Yamen  was  equally  glad  to  be  rid  of  a troublesome 
business.  Li,  as  was  his  wont,  bowed  gracefully, 
but  with  mental  reservations,  to  the  inevitable.  By 
the  Treaty  which  he  concluded  with  Count  Ito, 
China’s  suzerainty  was  surrendered  in  substance, 
though  the  shadow  of  her  empty  title  remained.  Li 
himself  and  a few  other  Chinese  officials  had  begun 
to  realise  the  supreme  strategic  importance  of  the 
Korean  peninsula,  but  generally  speaking  the  con- 
clusion of  this  momentous  Treaty,  harbinger  of  the 
great  upheaval  to  come  in  the  Far  East,  attracted 
at  the  time  but  little  attention  as  compared  with 
the  more  spectacular  proceedings  of  the  French. 
For  China  it  was  the  first  irrevocable  step  upon  the 
downward  path  of  Imperial  decadence  ; for  Japan, 
the  first  milestone  passed  on  her  predestined  path  of 
Imperial  expansion.  In  admitting  Japan  to  a 
condominium  in  Korea,  Li  virtually  surrendered  the 
stronghold  and  placed  Japan  in  a position  thereafter 
to  dominate  China’s  external  policy.  As  far  as  the 
Viceroy  was  concerned,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he 
hoped,  by  convincing  the  Central  Government  of 
the  dangers  ahead,  to  retrieve  the  situation  at  some 
future  date.  His  subsequent  activities  were  certainly 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


167 


directed,  within  the  limited  means  at  his  disposal, 
towards  the  organisation  of  naval  and  military  forces 
and  the  preparation  of  diplomatic  schemes,  with  a 
view  to  preventing  Japan  from  consolidating  her 
position.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten,  also,  that  at  this 
time  he  stood  practically  alone,  expected  by  the 
Throne  to  devise  ways  and  means  single-handed 
of  protecting  China  against  the  invading  sea  of 
troubles.  He  had  the  French  on  his  hands  at  this 
time,  and  the  difficulty  with  Japan  had  followed 
close  upon  the  dispute  with  Russia  over  the  question 
of  Kuldja  and  the  Treaty  of  Livadia.  Under  the 
circumstances  his  statesmanship  was  bound  to  base 
itself  on  Fabian  strategy ; of  this,  the  Memorial 
above  quoted  affords  clear  proof.  But  in  the  end  all 
his  efforts  proved  vain.  He  was  undone,  and  his 
undoing  was  due  as  much  to  the  self-satisfied  stupidity 
of  Peking  officialdom  as  to  the  intelligence  and 
strength  of  his  opponents. 

Thus,  in  1885,  were  sown  the  seeds  of  trouble  in 
Korea  from  which  ten  years  later  was  to  spring  a 
whirlwind  of  disaster  for  China.  In  all  his  subse- 
quent handling  of  the  Korean  question  Li  endeavoured 
to  put  a bold  face  upon  a situation  which  he  knew  to 
be  delicate  and  dangerous.  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  as 
Resident,  proved  himself  a pastmaster  in  diplomatic 
intrigue  and  bluff,  successfully  maintaining  all  the 
outward  and  habitual  signs  of  effective  suzerainty. 
But  both  the  Viceroy  and  his  lieutenant  realised  from 
the  outset  the  inexorable  purposes  that  lay  behind 
the  suave  words  and  insidious  proceedings  of  Japan’s 
representatives  at  Seoul.  They  knew  that  China’s 
position  as  a Great  Power,  and  possibly  her  very 
existence,  was  menaced  by  the  steady  scientific 


i68 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


organisation  and  increase  of  Japan’s  political  and 
military  forces.  It  was  often  remarked  by  close 
observers  that,  in  dealing  with  the  Japanese,  Li  very 
rarely  adopted  the  semi-genial,  semi-hectoring  atti- 
tude with  which  he  was  wont  to  impress  European 
diplomacy. 

For  several  years  after  the  signing  of  the  Li-Ito 
Treaty  China  clung  desperately  to  the  empty  figment 
of  her  suzerainty  in  Korea.  In  1890  Imperial  Envoys 
from  Peking  were  received  by  the  Korean  Court 
with  pomp  and  circumstance  and  all  the  ancient 
ceremonial  of  vassaldom.  These  things  were  due  to 
the  incurable  arrogance  and  conservatism  of  Peking 
officialdom  and  to  the  occasionally  injudicious  pro- 
ceedings of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  (whose  persona]  haughti- 
ness increased  as  his  influence  became  paramount 
at  the  Court  of  Seoul)  rather  than  to  any  imprudent 
initiative  on  the  part  of  Li  Hung-chang.  In  any  case, 
they  served  to  irritate  the  Japanese  Government 
and  to  increase  its  desire  and  preparations  for  a 
final  reckoning.  The  materials  for  producing  a crisis 
rapidly  increased,  in  the  form  of  Japanese  immigrants 
and  colonists  by  the  thousand,  each  one  of  whom 
could  be  relied  upon  to  provide  protests  from,  or 
grievances  against,  the  Korean  authorities.  The  road 
to  conquest  was  being  steadily  paved  by  means  of 
economic  penetration,  and,  in  the  process,  the  unfor- 
tunate Koreans  were  rapidly  reduced  to  the  con- 
dition of  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for 
the  alien  invader.  Small  wonder  if  malcontents 
amongst  them  increased  in  number  and  activity. 
The  position  of  the  Koreans  was  sufficiently  desperate, 
after  a few  years  of  this  Japanese  penetration,  to 
account  for  the  insurrection  which  broke  out  in  1894, 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


169 


without  attributing  it  to  any  direct  instigation  of  the 
Japanese  Government.  Had  it  been  necessary,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  more  or  less  official  Japanese  agents 
would  have  been  found  to  foment  sedition  and 
rebellion  amongst  the  Koreans,  even  as  they  have 
done  on  more  than  one  occasion  in  China  during  the 
past  ten  years.  But  as  every  Japanese  adventurer 
and  earth-hungry  colonist  who  drifted  to  Korea  from 
1885  to  1894  was  in  a very  real  sense  an  agent  provo- 
cateur, the  Government  at  Tokyo  could  well  afford 
to  await  the  inevitably  resultant  crisis,  which  would 
provide  it  with  the  opportunity  to  replace  Chinese 
moribund  suzerainty  by  an  effective  Japanese  pro- 
tectorate. 

When  the  crisis  occurred,  it  found  the  Peking 
Government,  as  usual,  full  of  sound  and  fury,  but 
ignorant  as  ever  concerning  the  nature  of  the  problem 
and  the  strength  of  the  forces  with  which  China 
was  confronted.  It  found  Li  intent,  as  was  his  wont, 
on  discovering  some  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  which 
should  preserve  the  outward  composure  of  China’s 
“ face  ” whilst  avoiding  the  stern  arbitrament  of  war. 
It  has  been  frequently  asserted  by  writers  and 
diplomatists,  speaking  with  the  voice  of  authority, 
that  Li  welcomed,  if  he  did  not  provoke,  the  war  with 
Japan  in  1894.  The  assumption  was  natural  enough 
for  those  who  looked  only  upon  the  surface,  who  saw 
in  Li  the  only  high  official  in  the  Empire  who  had 
ever  devoted  money  and  energy  to  the  organisation  of 
considerable  naval  and  military  forces  on  Western 
lines.  It  was  natural  also  for  those  who  were  accus- 
tomed to  identify  him  with  the  bellicose  sentiments 
of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  because  they  heard  these 
sentiments  applauded  and  endorsed  by  some  of  the 


170 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


foreign  experts  and  advisers  attached  to  the  Viceregal 
Yamen.  Nevertheless,  the  few  who  were  in  a position 
to  know  the  truth  from  first-hand  information — 
notably  Sir  Robert  Hart,  Herr  Gustav  Detring, 
and  Mr.  Pethick,  Li’s  confidential  secretary — knew 
that  Li,  while  bound  to  comply  with  direct  orders, 
did  everything  in  his  power  to  restrain  the  bombastic 
valour  of  the  septuagenarians  of  the  Yamen  and  to 
urge  counsels  of  watchful  prudence.  The  present 
writer  was  at  that  time  acting  in  a confidential 
capacity  under  Sir  Robert  Hart,  and  had  occasion  in 
the  course  of  his  duties  to  see  sufficient  documentary 
evidence  of  Li’s  desire  for  caution  and  conciliation. 
In  the  light  of  this  evidence  it  is  impossible  to  avoid 
the  conclusion  that  the  war  was  none  of  his  seeking  ; 
that  it  was  thrust  upon  him,  partly  by  the  force  of 
circumstances  which  played  into  Japan’s  hands, 
and  partly  by  the  crass  folly  of  the  war  party  (the 
young  Emperor’s  party)  in  Peking.  Unfortunately, 
none  of  this  documentary  evidence  is  in  existence. 
As  already  mentioned,  all  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  archives  at 
Peking  and  Herr  Detring’s  private  papers  at  Tientsin 
were  destroyed  by  the  Boxers  in  1900  ; Mr.  Pethick’s 
carefully-kept  diary  disappeared  mysteriously  on  the 
day  of  his  death  in  1901.  But,  documents  apart, 
anyone  who  carefully  studies  the  record  and  results 
of  Li’s  policy  in  dealing  with  Japan  can  hardly  fail 
to  realise  how  little  he  stood  to  gain,  and  how  much  to 
lose,  by  risking  all  upon  the  chances  of  war  against 
a Power  which,  as  he  well  knew,  was  infinitely  better 
armed  and  better  prepared  than  China. 

In  this  matter, as  in  others, English  opinion  has  never 
been  quite  fair  to  Li  Hung-chang  as  a diplomat.  This 
is  mainly  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  fact  that  his  percep- 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


171 


tion  of  the  Japanese  menace  in  Korea  compelled  him 
to  look  for  help  to  Russia,  and  to  place  himself  under 
obligations  to  that  Power,  at  a time  when  the  friends 
of  Russia  were  necessarily  suspect  in  England.  From 
1890  onwards,  British  diplomats  and  British  mer- 
chants came  to  regard  Li  and  his  ever  intriguing 
henchman,  Sheng  Kung-pao,  as  irretrievably  com- 
mitted to  support  of  the  Franco-Russian  schemes  in 
Central  China,  a point  of  view  which  made  little  or 
no  allowance  for  the  exigencies  of  China’s  dangers  and 
difficulties  in  Korea  and  Manchuria.  Sir  Claude 
MacDonald’s  avowed  suspicion  and  dislike  of  Li 
fairly  represented  the  opinion  of  his  countrymen 
at  Shanghai  and  Hongkong,  and  if  we  consider  only 
the  rival  railway  and  bank  ambitions  which  came  to  a 
head  in  the  Battle  of  Concessions,  as  the  result  of 
Russia’s  forward  policy  in  1898,  it  was  to  some  extent 
justified,  though  short-sighted.  But  British  public 
opinion  overlooked  the  fact  that,  in  making  advances 
to  Russia,  Li  was  simply  following  his  habitual 
policy  of  setting  one  barbarian  against  the  other, 
and  in  condemning  him  on  the  ground  of  his  Russian 
policy  it  was  sometimes  unfair  to  him  on  others.  Thus, 
Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  writing  to  The  Times  from 
Peking  in  1896, 

“ found  it  difficult  to  reconcile  the  theory  that  Li 
was  anxious  to  avoid  war  with  the  attitude  which 
China  persisted  in  maintaining  towards  Japan,  and 
more  especially  with  the  policy  consistently  pursued 
by  his  Resident  (Yuan  Shih-k’ai)  in  Korea.  Indeed, 
the  whole  purpose  of  his  armaments  was  to  enable 
him  some  day  to  chastise  the  Japanese  upstarts, 
for  whom,  with  the  incorrigible  pride  of  his  race,  he 
cannot  even  now  conceal  his  contempt.  That  his  own 


172 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


preparations  for  war  were  less  successful  than  those 
of  the  Japanese  does  not  alter  the  spirit  or  the 
intention  in  which  they  were  conceived.  No  one  in 
China  questioned  the  invincibility  of  his  ironclads  and 
armies,  and  all  that  can  be  charitably  said  on  his 
behalf  is  that  he  himself  probably  never  realised  how 
entirely  the  contagion  of  greed  and  ignorance,  starting 
from  his  own  Yamen,  had  unfitted  them  for  anything 
but  the  spectacular  displays  over  which  he  was  so  fond 
of  presiding.” 

Sir  Valentine  Chirol’s  opinion  undoubtedly  repre- 
sented that  of  the  British  Legation  throughout  this 
period  ; nevertheless,  in  the  light  of  Li’s  previous 
and  subsequent  policy,  there  is  good  ground  for 
asserting  that  all  his  military  and  naval  preparations 
were  intended  to  be  defensive,  not  offensive,  and  that 
he  himself  was  well  aware  of  their  inherent  weakness 
and  its  ineradicable  causes.  As  Mr.  Michie  put  the 
case  in  a very  able  retrospect  of  his  career, 

“ Li  Hung-chang  knew  that  China  was  hopelessly 
handicapped  by  inferior  weapons,  defective  intelli- 
gence and  chaotic  counsels  ; that  such  show  of  naval 
and  military  force  as  she  possessed  was  an  exotic 
flower  without  a root,  which  would  be  blown  away 
at  the  first  gust.  Moreover,  he  knew  that  if  war 
with  Japan  ensued,  its  whole  burden  would  fall  upon 
himself.  Most  strenuously,  therefore,  did  he  oppose 
every  measure  out  of  which  any  pretext  for  hostilities 
could  be  extracted.” 

Even  the  small  expedition  of  troops  sent  by  China, 
at  the  urgent  request  of  the  Korean  King,  was  de- 
spatched in  direct  opposition  to  Li’s  advice.  His 
warnings  were  overruled  by  the  Court,  and  Li,  bowing 
to  the  inevitable,  made  the  best  of  the  forces  at  his 
disposal.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  at  this  momentous 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


173 


crisis  the  Empress  Dowager  was  disposed  to  share  Li’s 
opinion;  but  for  the  time  being  she  was  more  concerned 
with  domestic  than  with  foreign  politics  and  had  deter- 
mined to  give  the  young  Emperor  his  head,  whose 
advisers  were  all  for  declaring  war  against  the  “ Yellow 
Dwarfs.”  Already  at  this  date  the  opposing  forces 
of  the  Empress’s  and  Emperor’s  parties  were  ranging 
themselves  for  the  internal  struggle  which  culminated 
in  the  coup  d'etat  of  1898.  Li  was  above  all  things 
the  Empress’s  man,  and  it  was  therefore  the  policy 
of  the  Emperor’s  party  in  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  and 
at  Court  to  deride  his  counsels  and  to  accuse  him  of 
unpatriotic  cowardice.  Li  was  thus  forced  into  a 
disastrous  war,  which  he  would  gladly  have  avoided  ; 
his  consolation,  when  defeat  loomed  inevitable,  lay 
in  the  fact  that  he  had  foreseen  it  and  in  his  exclusive 
knowledge  of  Russia’s  intention  in  the  last  resort 
to  prevent  Japan  from  annexing  any  portion  of 
Chinese  territory  on  the  mainland. 

The  military  and  naval  aspects  of  this  war,  which 
eventually  relegated  China  to  a position  of  permanent 
inferiority,  will  be  dealt  with  in  due  course.  For  the 
present  we  are  concerned  only  with  Li’s  diplomacy, 
and  it  is  at  the  stage,  when  overwhelmed  and  dis- 
credited by  defeat,  that  we  find  it  marked  by  admir- 
able qualities  of  courage  and  resource.  His  armies 
melted  away  before  their  well-disciplined  enemy  ; his 
much-vaunted  fleet  was  led  into  action  at  the  Yalu 
by  a German  military  officer.  The  whole  imposing 
structure  of  his  make-believe  defences  collapsed — 
China  was  utterly  defeated  by  land  and  sea  ; but 
his  spirit  remained  undaunted,  his  energy  undimi- 
nished, and  his  clear  vision  and  knowledge  of  inter- 
national affairs  preserved  China  for  the  time  being 


x74 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


from  utter  humiliation  and  dismemberment.  For 
years  he  had  foreseen  the  inevitable  rivalry  of  Russia 
and  Japan  in  Korea  ; on  his  advice,  since  1894,  the 
Government  at  Peking  had  treated  Russia  with 
marked  consideration  and  courtesy.  In  the  bitterness 
of  his  defeat,  humiliated  by  his  enemies  at  Court, 
small  wonder  that  he  was  willing  to  pay  almost  any 
price  to  Russia  in  return  for  the  prospect  of  revenge. 
His  subsequent  relations  with  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment were  not  the  result  of  any  sudden  impulse,  but 
of  defensive  plans  long  and  carefully  laid. 

No  sooner  had  the  Central  Government  at  Peking 
and  the  world  at  large  realised  the  completeness  of 
China’s  collapse  and  begun  to  consider  some  of  its 
immediate  consequences,  than  Li’s  enemies  turned 
with  one  accord  upon  him.  Led  by  the  Censor  An 
Wei-chiin,  a number  of  Hanlin  scholars  submitted 
a long  Memorial  to  the  Throne,  in  which  they  fiercely 
attacked  the  Viceroy  and  demanded  his  impeachment. 
In  this  document  he  was  described  as  “ the  incom- 
petent, arrogant,  unprincipled  official  who,  by  his 
conduct  of  affairs,  has  so  endangered  the  interests 
of  the  State  that  his  name  stinks  in  the  nostrils  of 
his  countrymen.”  As  an  example  of  the  kind  of 
scurrilous  abuse  to  which  the  Censorate  gave  expres- 
sion the  following  will  serve  : 

“ It  is  moreover  a matter  of  common  knowledge  that 
Li  has  millions  of  taels  invested  in  Japanese  coal 
mines  at  Ch’a  Shan,  that  his  son  (Li  Ching-fong)  has 
established  three  business  houses  in  Japan,  that  greed 
of  gain  has  so  clouded  his  intellect  that  the  Japanese 
can  do  with  him  whatever  they  like,  that  the  news 
of  a defeat  suffered  by  China  elates  him  and  a Chinese 
victory  fills  him  with  depression.” 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


l7S 


Not  even  the  Empress  Dowager  could  have  ignored 
the  agitation  which  clamoured  for  application  of 
the  principle  of  individual  responsibility  to  the  case 
of  the  Viceroy  who  had  so  long  held  supreme  power. 
The  war  was  practically  ended  by  the  surrender  of 
Wei-hai-wei  in  February,  1895.  Some  months  before 
Li  had  been  deprived  of  his  Yellow  Jacket  and  other 
honours  to  mark  the  Throne’s  displeasure  at  the 
defeat  of  the  Imperial  forces  ; but  he  had  remained 
in  office,  a sure  sign  that  Tzu  Hsi  had  no  intention 
of  allowing  him  to  be  thrown  to  the  yelping  pack. 
Already  in  November,  1894,  acting  upon  his  advice 
and  that  of  Prince  Kung  (recalled  to  high  office  in 
October),  a peace  mission  had  been  despatched  to 
Tokyo  in  the  person  of  Herr  Detring.  Li  was  severely 
criticised  for  thus  sending  a foreigner  of  compara- 
tively low  rank  instead  of  an  Imperially  appointed 
Ambassador,  and  his  critics  attributed  his  action 
to  contempt  for  the  “ Wojen  ” ; but  the  real  explana- 
tion of  his  action  lay  much  deeper  than  was  commonly 
suspected.  As  a matter  of  fact,  the  idea  of  Herr 
Detring’s  mission  originated  in  Germany,  and  Li  was 
led  to  adopt  it  because  he  clearly  perceived  its  pur- 
pose and  utility  as  the  first  move  in  the  policy  which 
was  to  unite  Germany,  France,  and  Russia  in  con- 
certed action  to  deprive  Japan  of  the  fruits  of  victory. 
The  actual  originator  of  the  scheme  was  Herr  von 
Brandt,  for  eighteen  years  German  Minister  in  China, 
who  had  left  China  in  1883.  This  able  diplomat  had 
established  cordial  relations  with  Li  Hung-chang 
during  his  residence  at  Peking,  and  these  were  not 
allowed  to  lapse  after  his  departure.  Li  liked  him 
personally  and  appreciated  his  wide  experience  of 
men  and  affairs.  At  the  time  of  the  Kuldja  dispute, 


176 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Herr  von  Brandt  won  the  Viceroy’s  gratitude  by  the 
judicious  counsel  which  he  gave  to  both  sides.  He 
had  served  his  Government  for  many  years  at  St. 
Petersburg,  and  was  therefore  well  qualified  to  advise 
Li  as  to  the  most  effective  line  of  argument  in  dealing 
with  Russia.  Later,  his  knowledge  of  Russian  affairs 
enabled  him  to  interpret  Japanese  policy  at  Peking 
to  his  own  Government  in  such  a manner  as  to  lead 
the  German  Government  to  identify  itself  with 
Russia’s  aims,  keeping  all  the  while  a sharp  eye  on 
the  prospects  of  compensative  advantages  for  the 
Fatherland. 

After  the  battle  of  the  Yalu  (September,  1894),  on 
Li’s  advice,  the  Chinese  Government  requested  Herr 
von  Brandt  to  undertake  a special  mission,  as  Chinese 
Ambassador-Extraordinary,  to  lay  China’s  case  before 
the  Great  Powers  and  to  solicit  their  intervention. 
Von  Brandt  prudently  declined  the  appointment, 
but  volunteered  his  services  to  act  at  Berlin  as  the 
Chinese  Government’s  confidential  adviser  and  corre- 
spondent. The  offer  was  accepted,  whereupon  he 
proceeded  with  characteristic  energy  and  ability  to 
organise  German  opinion  in  favour  of  China  and 
against  Japan.  The  task  required  tact,  for  His 
Majesty  the  Kaiser  and  many  Germans  in  high  places 
had  to  be  converted  from  suspicion  of  Russia  and  from 
sympathy  for  the  Japanese  ; it  also  required  con- 
siderable personal  acquaintance  and  influence  with 
the  Press.  Von  Brandt  possessed  both  these  qualifi- 
cations. The  articles  which  he  wrote  and  edited  on 
the  Far  Eastern  situation  were  widely  reproduced 
in  England  and  France  ; his  propaganda  gradually 
convinced  the  directors  of  “ big  ” business  in  Germany 
(including  Krupp’s)  that  in  supporting  Japanese 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


177 


ambitions  they  would  be  backing  the  wrong  horse. 
The  result  of  his  activities  was  to  unsettle  commercial 
opinion  in  England  and  to  bring  Germany  and  France 
together  in  support  of  Russia’s  policy  of  preventing 
any  annexation  of  Chinese  territory  by  Japan. 

On  November  3rd,  the  Japanese  having  entered 
Manchuria  and  threatening  Port  Arthur,  China  made 
a supplicatory  appeal  to  the  Powers,  but  was  advised 
to  endeavour  in  the  first  instance  to  come  to  terms 
directly  with  Japan.  Complying  with  this  advice 
(which  von  Brandt  had  naturally  anticipated),  the 
Detring  mission  was  decided  upon.  In  despatching  it, 
Li  Hung-chang  wrote  a personal  letter  to  Count  Ito, 
requesting  him  to  favour  Herr  Detring  with  an  inter- 
view “ that  he  may  convey  and  make  known  my 
sentiments.”  As  the  reader  will  have  noted  in  the 
case  of  the  Li-Fournier  Convention,  Li’s  diplomacy 
preferred  indirect  to  direct  methods  of  approach  and 
laid  stress  on  the  value  of  the  human  equation.  But 
in  the  present  instance  the  chief  object  of  the  mission, 
so  hurriedly  arranged,  was  to  provide  the  Viceroy 
(and  behind  him  the  Empress  Dowager  and  peace 
party)  with  time  and  means  to  weather  the  storm 
which  he  knew  would  break  out  at  Peking  whenever 
Port  Arthur  should  fall.  Having  been  named  by 
Imperial  Decree  as  the  medium  of  communication 
between  Herr  Detring  and  the  Throne,  Li’s  own  position 
was  likely  to  remain  secure  so  long  as  the  mission 
lasted  ; without  it,  the  loss  of  Port  Arthur  might  have 
brought  about  a sudden  and  fatal  termination  of  his 
career.  The  Detring  mission  was,  before  all  else,  a 
device  to  avert  that  calamity. 

The  Japanese  Press  with  one  voice  described  the 
mission  as  a premeditated  insult.  Herr  Detring  was 

L.H.  N 


178 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


treated  with  much  rudeness,  and  scant  respect,  was 
shown  for  the  German  flag.  All  this  had  been  antici- 
pated by  Li  and  served  his  purposes.  The  next  move, 
also  engineered  by  the  Viceroy,  was  an  offer  of  media- 
tion from  the  United  States,  as  a preliminary  to  which 
Colonel  Denby,  United  States  Minister  at  Peking, 
persuaded  Prince  Kung  to  recall  the  Detring  mission. 
This  naturally  led  to  a decided  movement  of  support 
for  China  in  Germany,  of  which  Herr  von  Brandt 
took  prompt  advantage.  In  January  a second  Chinese 
mission,  under  Chang  Yin-huan,  was  despatched  to 
Tokyo,  as  the  result  of  American  mediation.  It  was 
supported  by  the  blessing  of  the  Diplomatic  Body 
and  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  Ministers 
in  both  countries,  but  the  Japanese  Government 
refused  to  recognise  its  defective  credentials.  All 
these  abortive  negotiations  led  to  an  increase  of  sym- 
pathy for  China  abroad  and  gained  time  for  the 
determination  of  Russia’s  policy  of  intervention. 
The  European  Concert,  made  in  Germany,  now  began 
to  take  definite  shape  ; its  inception  was  subsequently 
commemorated  by  Herr  Krupp’s  present  of  a portrait 
of  himself  to  Li.  On  February  19th,  1895,  in  com- 
pliance with  an  Edict,  Li  handed  over  charge  of  the 
Viceroy’s  Yamen  at  Tientsin  to  Wang  Wen-shao 
and  reported  for  audience  at  Peking.  The  Emperor, 
who  received  him  with  marked  coldness,  had  mean- 
while commanded  all  the  high  provincial  authorities 
to  memorialise  the  Throne  with  regard  to  the  question 
of  concluding  peace  ; most  of  the  replies  were  in 
favour  of  coming  to  terms  with  Japan,  provided  that 
these  involved  no  surrender  of  territory.  The  time 
was  now  ripe  for  Li  to  emerge  and  to  negotiate  in 
person  ; he  had  learned,  through  Herr  von  Brandt, 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


179 


that  any  cession  of  territory  demanded  of  him  would 
be  annulled  by  the  intervention  of  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France.  At  the  suggestion  of  Count  Ito,  he  was 
appointed  Envoy  to  Japan,  with  full  powers  to  con- 
clude peace,  and  in  March,  1895,  he  left  China — for 
the  first  time  in  his  life.  He  was  in  his  seventy-second 
year,  and  his  health  was  bad  ; but  he  accepted  the 
thankless  task  before  him  with  all  his  indomitable 
courage. 

At  no  period  of  his  career  did  Li  display  a more 
admirable  front  to  friends  and  foes  than  during  the 
negotiations  that  led  up  to  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki. 
On  March  24th,  after  his  third  conference  with  Count 
Ito,  he  was  wounded  in  the  face  by  a pistol  shot  fired 
by  a Japanese  fanatic.  The  wound  was  not  severe, 
but  it  gained  for  him  universal  sympathy  and  an 
unconditional  armistice,  granted  by  the  Emperor 
of  Japan.  The  old  man,  staunchly  insisting  on 
continuing  the  negotiations  on  his  sick-bed,  conveyed 
to  the  civilised  world  a fine  impression  of  cultivated 
stoicism,  in  keeping  with  the  best  traditions  of  Con- 
fucian  scholarship,  which  could  hardly  fail  to  evoke 
general  admiration. 

To  those  who  followed  the  course  of  the  Shimono- 
seki negotiations,  the  position  of  China’s  Envoy 
appeared  to  be  one  of  utter  humiliation  and  their 
results  sufficiently  disastrous.  But  looking  back 
upon  those  negotiations  in  the  light  of  the  knowledge 
which  Li  possessed  of  Russia’s  determination  to 
intervene,  they  become  invested  with  a grim  kind 
of  humour,  which  Li  himself  must  have  greatly 
relished.  Reassured  on  the  question  of  territorial 
demands,  his  object  was  to  conclude  a Treaty  which 
would  put  an  end  to  hostilities  and  to  reduce  as  much 


N 2 


i8o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


as  possible  the  amount  of  the  pecuniary  indemnity 
which  Japan  demanded.  In  this  he  was  successful. 
On  April  18th,  the  Treaty  was  signed,  but  not  before 
Li  had  received  assurances  from  Berlin,  through 
Herr  Detring  and  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  that  effective 
Russian  intervention  would  follow.  On  the  20th  Li 
returned  to  Tientsin. 

Twenty-one  days  only  were  allowed  for  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  Treaty.  The  exchange  of  ratifications 
was  completed  at  Chefoo  on  the  twenty-first  day, 
but  in  the  meanwhile  Russia,  Germany,  and  France 
had  come  to  a final  agreement  for  joint  intervention. 
For  several  days  the  destinies  of  Japan  hung  peri- 
lously in  the  balance.  The  Russian  Fleet,  backed 
by  French  and  German  squadrons,  was  ready  to 
attack  the  Japanese  in  the  Gulf  of  Pechili.  Had  these 
Powers  decided  (as  was  at  first  proposed)  to  prevent 
the  ratification  of  the  Treaty,  Japan  would  have  been 
compelled  to  fight,  and,  had  her  fleet  been  destroyed, 
her  armies  in  the  Liaotung  peninsula  would  have 
been  at  Russia’s  mercy.  But  England  remained  a 
dangerously  doubtful  factor,  and  the  allies’  diplomacy 
concluded  to  let  the  ratification  proceed.  Thus  a 
new  crisis  was  averted. 

The  Chinese  Court  and  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  were 
aware  of  Russia’s  intentions  and  had  ordered  Li  to 
sign  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty.  Nevertheless,  his 
return  to  Chihli  after  the  signature  was  the  signal  for 
an  outburst  of  fierce  execration  from  all  sides.  The 
high  provincial  officials,  knowing  nothing  of  the  inter- 
national situation,  denounced  the  Treaty  as  a base 
surrender  of  China’s  sacred  soil  and  Li  as  a corrupt 
traitor.  Only  the  staunch  support  of  the  Empress 
Dowager  saved  him  from  the  capital  punishment 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


1 8 1 


demanded  by  his  accusers.  Prince  Kung  also  inter- 
vened to  protect  him,  wisely  perceiving  in  the 
machinations  of  the  Emperor’s  party  at  Court  the 
beginnings  of  the  movement  against  Tzu  Hsi  and  the 
Manchu  clans  which  came  to  a head  three  years  later. 
The  Memorials  of  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys  and  Li’s 
other  critics  were  “ filed  for  reference  ” ; Li  himself, 
deprived  of  his  honours  and  titles,  was  summoned 
to  Peking  (August,  1895)  and  directed,  as  a member  of 
the  Grand  Council,  to  arrange  the  details  of  the  new 
Commercial  Treaty  with  Japan — another  thankless 
task.  From  this  date  commence  the  active  but  gene- 
rally undisclosed  relations  of  Count  Cassini,  the  Russian 
Minister,  with  Li  and  with  the  Empress  Dowager’s 
Chief  Eunuch,  Li  Lien-ying,  relations  which  Young 
China  has  always  denounced  as  corrupt,  but  which 
(be  this  as  it  may)  were  the  inevitable  result  of  Li’s 
conception  of  the  necessities  of  the  political  situation. 

The  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  was  ratified  at  Chefoo 
on  May  8th,  1895.  Three  days  earlier  the  Japanese 
Government  had  yielded  to  the  joint  demands  of 
Russia,  Germany,  and  France  and  agreed  to  the 
retrocession  of  South  Manchuria  (Fengtien)  to  China 
in  consideration  of  an  increased  indemnity.  On 
October  16th  Li  Hung-chang  was  appointed  with 
full  powers  to  settle  with  Baron  Hayashi  at  Peking 
the  arrangements  for  Japan’s  evacuation  of  the 
Liaotung  peninsula.  Bitterly  sweet,  indeed,  must 
have  been  his  reflections  during  these  days  of  Japan’s 
prudent  surrender  to  superior  force ; nevertheless 
his  attitude  towards  Baron  Hayashi  was  that  of  a 
courteous  and  sympathetic  spectator,  rather  than  an 
exponent  of  retributive  justice. 

In  spite  of  the  triumph  of  his  diplomacy,  Li’s 


i8z 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


enemies  at  Court  were  still  actively  working  for  his 
complete  elimination  from  public  life.  Weng  Tung- 
ho,  the  Imperial  Tutor,  an  honest,  patriotic  official, 
had  come  round  to  his  side  ; but  the  Emperor 
received  him  almost  brutally  on  his  return  from 
Japan,  compelling  the  aged  Viceroy  to  approach  the 
throne  on  his  knees.  It  was  chiefly  to  remove  him 
from  further  risk  of  dangerous  conspiracies  that  the 
Russian  Minister  suggested,  and  the  Empress  Dowager 
approved,  the  plan  of  sending  him  as  Special  Envoy 
to  attend  the  coronation  of  Tzar  Nicholas  II.  at 
Moscow.  The  Tsung-li  Yamen  had  originally 
designated  Wang  Chih-ch’un  for  this  mission,  an 
official  of  comparatively  low  rank,  whose  only  qualifi- 
cation lay  in  the  fact  that  he  had  been  sent  to  Russia 
in  1894  to  convey  the  Chinese  Government’s  con- 
dolence upon  the  death  of  Alexander  III.  But  Count 
Cassini  had  little  difficulty  in  persuading  the  Tsung-li 
Yamen  that  if  the  Government  could  not  persuade 
an  Imperial  Prince  to  go  to  Moscow,  the  preserva- 
tion of  “ face  ” required  at  least  a man  of  Viceregal 
rank  ; and  who  more  suitable  than  Li  ? So  the 
yellow  jacket  and  the  peacock’s  feather  and  the 
purple  rein  reappeared  amongst  the  great  man’s 
insignia  ; four  Customs  Commissioners  (English, 
French,  German,  and  American)  were  told  off  to  guide 
his  Excellency’s  feet  in  their  respective  countries  ; 
a great  farewell  banquet  was  given  in  his  honour 
by  the  Municipal  Council  at  Tientsin,  and  on 
March  28th,  1896,  Li  Hung-chang,  with  a large  suite 
and  a magnificent  coffin,  set  out  to  see  for  himself 
the  world  of  the  outer  barbarians.  With  the  same 
keen  zest  and  physical  vitality  which  distinguished 
Tzu  Hsi  he  cast  from  him  his  heavy  burden  of  care, 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


183 


forgot  his  three  score  years  and  three,  and  started 
off  on  his  triumphal  round  of  globe-trotting  with  all 
the  eager  zest  of  a schoolboy. 

Henceforward  his  diplomacy  in  relation  to  Japan 
was  framed  and  dominated  by  the  obligations  which 
he  had  incurred  towards  Russia.  He  did  not  live  to 
see,  though  he  was  able  to  forecast,  the  inevitable 
result  of  the  position  which,  on  his  initiative,  Russia 
had  assumed  as  arbiter  of  the  destinies  of  Korea, 
and  the  rival,  therefore,  of  Japan.  He  knew  that 
Russia  would  exact  payment  for  the  help  given  to 
China  in  the  hour  of  her  defeat,  and  he  was  prepared 
to  pay  it.  Count  Cassini,  with  whom  he  held  long 
secret  conferences  before  leaving  for  Moscow,  had  no 
difficulty  in  persuading  him  that,  if  Japan  was  to  be 
restrained  from  further  attacks  upon  Manchuria, 
Russia  must  be  given  a strong  foothold  and  strategic 
advantages  in  that  region.  No  time  was  lost  in  pre- 
paring the  ground  : in  December,  1895,  the  new 
understanding  had  been  cemented  by  the  creation 
of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  and  plans  laid  for  Russia’s 
policy  of  “ peaceful  penetration  ” by  means  of  the 
Eastern  Siberian  Railway.  After  the  coronation,  and 
the  conclusion  of  a “ mutual  benefits  ” convention 
between  Li  and  Prince  Lobanow  at  St.  Petersburg, 
Li’s  boats  were  burned  as  far  as  Japan  was  concerned. 
In  his  private  interviews  with  the  young  Tzar,  whose 
personality  greatly  impressed  him,  he  was  assured 
that  Russia  had  no  designs  on  Chinese  territory  and 
that  her  motives  in  protecting  Korea  against  Japan 
were  purely  self-defensive.  Knowing  what  we  know 
of  Li’s  cynicism  concerning  Russia’s  ambitious 
designs  at  the  time  of  the  Kuldja  dispute,  his  sincere 
belief  in  these  assurances  may  be  questioned  ; never- 


184 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


theless,  it  is  certain  that  upon  his  return  to  Peking 
he  persuaded  the  Empress  Dowager  to  accept  them 
and  to  rely  henceforward  upon  the  good  faith  and 
disinterested  friendship  of  Russia.  After  the  Boxer 
rising  in  1900,  Her  Majesty,  at  all  events,  made  good 
use  of  that  friendship,  saving  her  own  Imperial 
dignity  and  the  heads  of  several  of  her  kinsmen  by 
virtue  thereof,  so  that,  as  far  as  the  Manchus  were 
concerned,  Li’s  policy  was  justified.  For  himself 
and  his  diplomacy,  his  relations  with  the  world 
in  general  were  greatly  simplified,  after  Russia’s 
occupation  of  Port  Arthur  in  the  winter  of  1897, 
by  allowing  her  to  become  the  paramount  Power  at 
Peking  and  to  head  off  all  other  Powers  in  their 
designs  and  demands  upon  the  Sick  Man’s  Estate. 
He  probably  realised  before  he  died  in  1901  that 
King  Log  was  likely  to  prove  quite  as  hard  a task- 
master as  King  Stork,  and  that  interest  was  accumu- 
lating at  a ruinous  rate  on  Russia’s  advances  of 
friendly  co-operation  ; but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  he 
could  never  have  anticipated  that  the  crass  ignor- 
ance and  incapacity  of  the  rulers  of  China  would 
have  brought  about  the  situation  which  has  gradually 
developed  within  the  last  few  years,  or  foretold  the 
spoliation  of  China,  by  virtue  of  a working  agree- 
ment between  Russia  and  Japan.  There  could  be 
no  better  testimony  to  the  foresight  and  shrewdness 
of  Li  Hung-chang  than  the  rapid  decline  of  China’s 
fortunes  since  his  death.  The  blear-eyed  ineptitude 
of  the  fossilised  mandarins  who  directed  the  nation’s 
affairs  after  the  passing  of  Tzu  Hsi,  afforded  Japanese 
diplomacy  opportunities  which  could  never  have  been 
realised  had  Li  remained  to  direct  China’s  foreign 
relations. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


185 

In  1897  Japan  saw  Port  Arthur,  her  chief  prize  of 
war,  pass  with  the  consent  of  China  into  the  hands 
of  Russia  ; and  from  that  day  the  whole  Japanese 
nation  set  itself  to  prepare  for  the  life  and  death 
struggle  which  was  bound  to  follow.  At  the  same  time 
Japanese  activities  in  China  were  not  relaxed,  but 
only  diverted  in  direction.  At  the  Chinese  Court 
Li  soon  found  evidence  of  Japanese  influences 
working  through  the  Reform  party,  the  youthful 
advisers  of  His  Majesty  Kuang  Hsii.  With  Young 
China,  Russia  could  have  no  sympathy  ; its  pro- 
gramme, as  proclaimed  by  Imperial  Edicts  in  1898, 
suggested  the  possibility  of  reforms  which,  if  carried 
out,  could  not  fail  to  interfere  seriously  with  Russian 
designs.  The  Empress  Dowager  and  her  Manchu 
kinsmen  being  of  the  same  mind  (though  for  very 
different  reasons),  Li  Hung-chang,  the  Great  Pro- 
gressive, found  himself  irretrievably  committed  to  the 
cause  of  the  reactionaries.  Thus  gradually  he  was 
forced,  by  the  commitments  of  his  pledges  given  to 
Russia  and  by  his  antagonism  to  Japan,  to  support 
a policy  in  home  affairs  which,  after  the  coup  d'etat, 
led  directly  to  the  Boxer  rising,  to  widespread  dis- 
affection, and  the  beginnings  of  the  anti-dynastic 
revolution.  Within  the  limits  of  his  vision,  far 
wider  than  that  of  his  contemporaries,  his  diplomacy 
before  and  after  the  war  with  Japan  was  instinct 
with  prudence  and  wisdom  ; but  even  to  the 
wisest  of  men  it  is  not  given  to  foresee  all  the  far- 
reaching  consequences  of  their  actions  or  the  infinite 
complexity  of  the  causes  which  determine  national 
movements  and  international  relations. 


CHAPTER  V 


li  as  diplomat  ( continued) 

Relations  with  Russia.  Tour  Abroad.  The 

Peace  Negotiations  of  1900. 

Taking  a broad  view  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  diplomatic 
relations  with  Russia  and  comparing  them  with  his 
attitude  towards  Japan,  one  gathers  a cumulative 
impression  that,  whereas  he  was  generally  afraid  of 
his  Japanese  antagonists  and  the  forces  which  lay 
behind  them,  he  had  no  such  uneasy  feelings  in  deal- 
ing with  Russia’s  representatives.  From  an  early 
stage  of  his  career,  in  fact  towards  the  close  of  the 
Taiping  rebellion,  he  had  reason  to  perceive  that 
Russia  had  by  no  means  abandoned  her  hopes  of 
attaining  the  fulfilment  of  MouraviefJ’s  dreams. 
Her  “ drang  nach  Osten ,”  with  the  objective  of  an 
ice-free  port  on  the  Pacific,  became  a danger  to  be 
reckoned  with  from  1885  onwards.  But,  while  he 
realised  this  danger,  Li  appears  to  have  felt  that  the 
exigencies  of  Russia’s  position  as  a European  Power 
rendered  it  much  less  formidable  and  immediate  than 
the  menace  of  Japanese  aggression.  It  would  seem, 
moreover,  that  Li’s  policy  was  very  frequently  in- 
fluenced by  personal  sympathy  with  the  Russian 
temperament  and  culture,  with  their  easy-going 
semi-Asiatic  fatalism,  their  admixture  of  adminis- 
trative autocracy  and  social  democracy.  He  admired 
the  Tzar’s  far-flung  dominions,  the  unbroken  tradi- 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


187 


tions  of  his  unfettered  autocracy,  his  Government’s 
kindly  contempt  for  the  “ stupid  people.”  Politically 
speaking,  there  may  have  been  something  permanently 
reassuring  for  the  Court  of  Peking  and  its  high  officials 
in  the  fact  that,  for  close  on  two  hundred  years  before 
the  overseas  barbarians  came  with  their  armies  to 
Peking,  the  Russians  had  been  represented  there  by 
a permanent  mission  and  had  conducted  themselves 
peacefully  and  with  all  due  respect. 

Sentiment  apart,  as  we  have  already  had  occasion 
to  observe,  Li  Hung-chang’s  diplomacy  was  always 
more  concerned  with  men  than  with  methods,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  his  dealings  with  Russia  after 
1895  were  greatly  influenced  by  the  strong,  and  to 
him  sympathetic,  personalities  of  the  Tzar,  of  Count 
Cassini  and  Count  de  Witte.  Of  all  the  Japanese 
diplomats  with  whom  he  came  in  contact,  the  only 
one  who  appeared  to  him  as  a human  being,  as  some- 
thing more  than  a machine-made  exponent  of  dis- 
tasteful ideas,  was  Count  Ito.  The  typical  Envoy 
of  Dai  Nippon,  cold-bloodedly  polite,  was  wont  to 
freeze  the  exuberance  of  Li’s  genial  ways,  of  the 
boisterous  and  sometimes  impertinent  familiarity 
which  he  adopted  towards  Russians  and  Anglo- 
Saxons. 

Li  Hung-chang’s  first  contact  with  Russian  diplo- 
macy occurred  in  1862,  when  M.  Petchloff,  a Secretary 
of  the  Legation  at  Peking,  was  sent  down  to  confer 
with  him  and  other  Chinese  authorities  on  the  subject 
of  Russia’s  proposed  co-operation  with  the  British 
and  French  forces  against  the  Taiping  rebels.  As  far 
as  Li  was  concerned,  he  had  had  trouble  enough  with 
the  “ Ever-victorious  Army  ” of  foreign  mercenaries 
under  Ward  and  Burgevine,  and  certainly  had  no 


1 88 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


desire  to  see  another  semi-independent  military  force 
established  within  the  limits  of  his  jurisdiction.  It 
ultimately  transpired,  however,  that  the  Russian 
Government’s  chief  intention  at  this  time  was  to  gain 
“ face  ” at  Peking  by  a timely  display  of  sympathy 
and  promises  of  help,  for  no  military  force  was  actually 
available,  and  none  was  ever  despatched.  A consign- 
ment of  rifles  and  ordnance  was  sent  via  Mongolia  to 
Peking,  but  there  were  justifiable  doubts  in  well- 
informed  quarters  whether  these  arms  were  ever 
intended  to  be  used  against  the  Taipings.  The  part 
which  General  Ignatieff  had  played  two  years  before, 
when  Lord  Elgin  and  Baron  Gros  were  knocking  at 
the  gates  of  Peking,  was  quite  sufficient  to  justify 
the  allies’  feelings  of  uneasy  suspicion  ; moreover, 
Prince  Kung  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  induced  to  make  the  gallant  Russian  General 
a present  of  the  Primorski  province  and  the  harbour 
of  Vladivostock  in  consideration  of  his  alleged  (but 
purely  imaginary)  services  in  “ persuading  ” the 
English  and  French  representatives  to  withdraw  their 
troops  from  Peking  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty. 
The  slimness  displayed  by  the  Russians  on  that  his- 
toric occasion  was  of  the  kind  that  Li  would  naturally 
admire,  especially  as  in  this  instance  he  himself  was 
not  the  chief  victim.  In  fact,  Russia’s  whole  policy 
of  watchful  waiting  ; her  stealthy  preparations  for 
the  day  of  opportunities  which  her  rulers  foresaw  in 
China’s  increasing  necessities  ; her  methods  of  peace- 
ful, almost  benevolent,  absorption  of  China’s  slackly 
held  dependencies  in  the  north-west  ; her  readiness 
to  withdraw  from  situations  that  threatened  any 
serious  difficulties  ; above  all,  her  ceremonious  con- 
sideration for  China’s  “ face  ” and  for  the  shadow  of 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


189 


her  dwindling  prestige — all  these  things  naturally 
combined  to  make  Li  admire  the  Russian  way  of 
doing  things,  even  while  he  suspected  their  motives. 
Li’s  was  a temperament  which  might  fear  the  gift- 
bearing Greeks,  but  which  greatly  preferred  them  to 
the  barbarians  who  brought  no  largesse. 

Russia’s  next  opportunity  for  advancing  her  pur- 
poses of  peaceful  penetration  occurred  in  Kashgaria, 
as  the  result  of  Yakub  Beg’s  successful  revolt  against 
China’s  loosely-exercised  authority  in  that  region. 
For  many  years  Russia  had  been  slowly  but  surely 
moving  eastwards  towards  the  Valley  of  Ili  (Kuldja) 
through  the  Khanate  of  Khokand.  In  1851  Colonel 
Kovalesky  had  concluded  a “ Commercial  Treaty  ” 
providing  for  the  presence  of  a Russian  consul  and 
a Russian  settlement  at  Ili.  In  1863  a rising  of  the 
Tungani  tribe  expelled  the  representatives  of  China’s 
sovereignty  from  a large  part  of  Kashgaria.  There- 
after the  insurrection  under  Yakub  Beg  increased 
and  spread.  Kashgar,  Yarkand,  Khotan,  Sarikol, 
one  strong  place  after  another,  fell  into  his  hands, 
and  it  seemed  for  a time  as  if  a great  new  Empire 
were  destined  to  arise  from  amidst  the  chaos  of  inter- 
tribal strife  in  Central  Asia.  During  this  period 
Yakub  was  a personage  to  be  reckoned  with.  England 
sent  two  special  missions  to  his  Court  at  Yarkand 
(1870  and  1873),  and  the  Russians  recognised  his 
authority  by  concluding  a Commercial  Treaty  with 
him  in  1872.  In  the  meanwhile,  however,  the 
forces  of  the  Tzar  were  steadily  pegging  out  claims 
to  a reversion  of  the  “ great  inheritance  ” which  the 
Manchu  Emperor  Ch’ien  Lung  had  won  by  arms  for 
China  and  which  was  now  slipping  from  the  hands 
of  his  degenerate  descendants.  In  1865  the  Govern- 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


190 

ment  of  Russian  Turkestan  was  created,  after  the 
taking  of  Tashkend.  Finally,  in  1871,  a Russian  force 
occupied  Ili,  on  the  ground  that  the  anarchy  prevailing 
in  Kashgaria  had  become  a serious  menace  to  Russian 
interests.  Ili  had  been  lost  to  Peking  by  the  insurrec- 
tion of  1866,  and  it  did  not  then  appear  probable  that 
she  would  be  able  to  resume  the  government  of  the 
turbulent  Mahomedans  with  the  military  forces  at 
her  disposal.  Regarding  the  situation  in  this  light, 
M.  Vlangaly,  Russian  Minister  at  Peking,  informed 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen  that,  as  soon  as  the  Kirghiz 
tribes  were  pacified  and  the  frontiers  secured,  Ili 
would  be  restored  to  China.  But  Russia’s  hopes  of 
remaining  in  justifiable  possession  were  unexpectedly 
frustrated  by  Tso  Tsung-tang’s  victorious  campaign, 
which  put  an  end  to  Yakub  Beg  and  his  rebellion  in 
1 877,  retaking  the  eight  cities  of  Turkestan  and  leaving 
a devastated  country  along  all  his  line  of  march.  The 
time  had  now  come  for  Russia  to  redeem  her  promise, 
but  she  found  plausible  pretexts  for  delaying  the 
evacuation  of  Kuldja  (Ili)  and  for  complicating  the 
question  by  several  side-issues.  Ch’ung  Hou,  a relative 
of  Prince  Kung,  was  thereupon  sent  to  Russia  to  settle 
the  matter  ; he  arrived  at  St.  Petersburg  in  December, 
1898.  An  easy-going  mandarin,  without  claims  to 
any  special  knowledge  of  the  question  under  discus- 
sion, he  agreed  to  the  payment  of  five  million  roubles 
for  the  expenses  of  the  Russian  occupation  and  to 
the  opening  of  a new  caravan  route  for  the  Russian 
brick-tea  trade  ; finally,  on  his  own  initiative,  against 
the  instructions  of  the  Yamen,  he  consented  to  a 
“ rectification  of  the  frontier,”  which  left  Russia  in 
possession  of  seven-tenths  of  the  province,  including 
its  most  important  strategical  points  and  Ch’ien 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


191 

Lung’s  famous  military  road  over  the  Muzart  Pass. 
Ch’ung  Hou  suffered  not  only  from  complete  ignorance 
of  the  geography  of  Kashgaria,  but  from  acute  nos- 
talgia ; his  one  and  only  idea  was  to  get  back  to  China 
as  quickly  as  possible.  Accordingly  at  Livadia,  where 
the  Tzar  was  in  residence,  he  signed  the  Treaty  which 
bears  that  name  (October,  1879)  and  promptly  left 
for  home.  In  his  haste  he  had  conceded  to  Russia 
as  much  as  she  might  reasonably  have  claimed  after 
a victorious  war.  Returning  to  Peking  in  January, 
1880,  he  found  himself  cashiered  and  handed  over  to 
the  Board  of  Punishments  and  finally  condemned  to 
death.  At  this  stage  of  the  matter  Li  Hung-chang 
comes  prominently  upon  the  scene. 

Ch’ung  Hou,  as  above  mentioned,  was  a relative 
of  Prince  Kung,  who,  with  Li  Hung-chang,  was 
striving  to  keep  in  check  the  anti-foreign  and  generally 
Chauvinistic  tendencies  of  the  reactionary  party  at 
Peking  headed  by  Prince  Ch’un  (father  of  the  young 
Emperor)  and  by  Tso  Tsung-tang.  Led  by  the  British 
Minister  (Sir  Thomas  Wade),  the  Diplomatic  Body 
addressed  remonstrances  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen, 
intimating  that  the  execution  of  this  diplomatic  Envoy 
could  not  fail  to  prejudice  the  Chinese  Government 
in  the  opinion  of  the  civilised  world.  But  the  reaction- 
aries, whose  views  were  voiced  by  the  Viceroy  Chang 
Chih-tung  (the  “ scholarly  bungler  ” of  later  days), 
pressed  for  the  death  penalty,  on  the  grounds  that 
“ our  half-witted  Envoy  has  been  cajoled  and  bullied 
by  the  Russians,  so  that  for  every  cash  they  have 
spent  they  are  to  receive  a hundredfold.”  I have 
already  had  occasion  to  refer  to  the  memorial  by 
Chang  Chih-tung  from  which  these  words  are  quoted. 
The  whole  document  gives  a very  fair  idea  of  Chang’s 


192 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


political  sagacity  and  of  the  causes  of  his  lifelong 
rivalry  with  Li  Hung-chang.  Advocating  war  to  the 
knife  with  Russia,  he  said  : 

“ Let  your  Majesty  command  Tso  Tsung-tang 
and  Kin  Shun  to  detach  from  their  staff  generals 
natives  of  Manchuria,  versed  in  warfare,  and  send 
them  east  to  await  orders.  Should  we  be  defeated 
at  the  outset,  we  have  only  to  stand  firm  for  a few 
months,  and  the  Russians  will  surely  give  ground 
and  disperse. 

“ Tientsin  is  the  outpost  of  your  Majesty’s  capital. 
But  Russia’s  warships  are  debarred  by  English  and 
French  maritime  laws  from  leaving  the  Black  Sea, 
and  if  these  troops  come  to  China  in  merchant  vessels 
it  will  be  a very  different  business  from  ironclads. 
China’s  hopes  centre  here  on  the  conspicuous  ability 
of  Li  Hung-chang,”  etc.,  etc.1 

Chang  Chih-tung’s  views  were  echoed  by  an  almost 
unanimous  chorus  of  the  Censors,  who  stigmatised 
Li  Hung-chang’s  policy  of  graceful  concessions  as 
deliberate  and  venal  treason.  For  a time  his  position 
was  extremely  uncomfortable,  not  to  say  dangerous  ; 
but  events  proved  on  this  occasion,  as  on  many  others, 
that  his  was  the  only  brain  at  Peking  capable  of 
appreciating  the  international  exigencies  of  the  situa- 
tion and  of  making  them  serve  the  ends  which  he 
considered  advantageous  to  China.  He  knew,  and 
made  good  use  of  the  knowledge,  that  England  and 
France  were  both  anxious  (though  for  very  different 
reasons)  to  dissuade  Russia  from  embarking  on  a 
policy  of  military  adventure  in  the  Far  East.  He 
knew  also  that  the  war  party  at  St.  Petersburg  would 
not  easily  persuade  the  Russian  Government  to 


1 For  the  conclusion  of  this  passage,  vide  Chapter  III.  pp.  112-3,  ante. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


!93 


embark  on  an  Asiatic  campaign,  even  though  it 
had  been  able  to  secure  an  imposing  naval  demon- 
stration in  Chinese  waters.  Paying,  therefore,  no 
heed  whatsoever  to  the  clamour  of  the  “ howling 
dogs,”  he  proceeded,  by  diplomacy  of  the  kind  which 
he  thoroughly  understood,  to  bring  into  play  argu- 
ments which  eventually  brought  about  the  reprieve 
of  Ch’ung  Hou,  the  complete  discomfiture  of  his  own 
antagonists  at  the  capital,  and  a satisfactory  revision 
of  the  Treaty  of  Livadia.  These  results,  as  usual,  he 
achieved  almost  single-handed  and  because  he  was 
able  to  convince  the  badly-informed  but  astute 
Empress  Dowager  that  the  course  advocated  by  the 
war  party  could  only  end  in  disaster.  (And  here  we 
may  digress  to  observe  that  he  would  no  doubt  have 
been  equally  successful  in  the  identically  similar  policy 
which  he  advocated  in  1894,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
fact  that  Japan  was  then  fully  determined  upon  war.) 

To  induce  the  Russians  on  the  one  hand  to  agree  to 
a revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Livadia,  and  on  the  other 
to  create  a conciliatory  temper  at  the  Tsung-li  Yamen, 
it  was  necessary  for  Li  to  bring  good  advice  and 
pressure  of  a disinterested  kind  to  bear  on  both  sides. 
The  French  and  British  Ministers  were  willingly  led 
to  approach  the  Yamen  and  to  urge  the  remission 
of  the  death  sentence  on  Ch’ung  Hou  ; as  a result, 
the  Marquis  Tseng  at  St.  Petersburg  was  authorised 
to  inform  the  Russian  Government  that  this  had 
been  done.  Li,  anxious  to  end  matters,  telegraphed 
to  Tseng,  on  his  own  account,  advising  him  not  to 
haggle  over  trifles  in  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  ; he 
knew,  but  ignored  the  fact,  that  the  Minister  of  War 
was  telegraphing  from  Peking  in  the  opposite  sense. 
The  Russian  Government  was  placated  and  satisfied 

L.H.  O 


J94 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


by  the  surrender  of  the  Yamen  in  the  matter  of  Ch’ung 
Hou  and  allowed  itself  to  be  persuaded  into  further 
negotiations,  and  this  the  more  readily  because  the 
Governor  of  Eastern  Siberia  had  solemnly  declared 
himself  unable  to  cope  with  Tso  Tsung-tang’s  forces, 
in  the  event  of  war,  without  heavy  reinforcements. 

Remembering  Gordon’s  views  on  the  subject  of 
China’s  military  forces  and  his  world-wide  prestige, 
Li  conceived,  and  confided  to  Sir  Robert  Hart  for 
discreet  execution,  the  idea  of  asking  that  famous 
knight-errant  to  hasten  to  Peking,  there  to  advise  the 
Chinese  Government  in  the  matter  of  peace  or  war. 
Gordon  was  particularly  busy  at  that  time,  preparing 
to  tilt  at  certain  windmills  that  had  attracted  his 
attention  in  India  and  Zanzibar  ; nevertheless,  he 
started  off  for  China  at  a moment’s  notice  and  had 
made  up  his  mind  how  to  deal  with  the  problem 
before  he  arrived  there.  Solvitur  ambulando.  Before 
his  arrival  at  Shanghai,  Peking  and  all  the  world 
knew  that  he  was  going  to  advise  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  make  peace  at  any  price  and  that  he  con- 
sidered Li  Hung-chang’s  modern  armaments  to  be 
so  much  waste  of  money.  The  Yamen  had  been 
led  by  Li  to  suppose  that  Gordon  would  take  com- 
mand of  the  Manchurian  armies  and  with  them 
proceed  to  defeat  Russia  ; they  were  therefore  greatly 
chagrined  at  hearing  the  nature  of  his  opinions  as 
published  in  the  Shanghai  Press.  His  advice  was 
promptly  dispensed  with,  and  a telegram  (of  which 
he  took  no  notice)  was  sent  to  him  by  Sir  Robert  Hart 
requesting  him  not  to  come  to  Peking.  He  came, 
had  breathless  interviews  with  Li,  Prince  Kung,  and 
other  Ministers,  after  which  he  returned  straightway 
to  England.  The  advice  which  he  gave,  though 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


*95 


distasteful  to  the  war  party,  undoubtedly  influenced 
them  to  adopt  a less  bellicose  attitude  ; at  the  same 
time  it  provided  them  with  a new  weapon  against 
Li,  since  his  foreign-drilled  army  and  his  fleet  were 
pronounced  by  Gordon  to  be  powerless  to  save  China 
from  humiliation.  But  Li,  having  attained  his  object, 
kept  his  own  counsel.  The  Treaty  of  Livadia  was 
reopened  and  fresh  terms  negotiated  by  the  Marquis 
Tseng  at  St.  Petersburg,  with  the  result  that  in  the 
end  China’s  face  was  saved  by  Russia’s  restitution 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  territory  in  dispute.  By 
the  new  Treaty  (February  12th,  1 88 1)  the  Tekkes 
Valley  and  the  Muzart  Pass  remained  in  Chinese 
hands,  and  the  fact  that  Russia  was  entitled  to  retain 
possession  of  certain  strategical  coigns  of  vantage 
was  not  emphasised  by  either  party  in  the  negotia- 
tions. Diplomatically,  China  had  achieved  a notable 
success,  and  Li  Hung-chang  emerged  from  the  fray 
with  new  and  well-won  feathers  in  his  cap. 

Nevertheless,  the  war  party  was  far  from  being 
routed,  nor  were  its  leaders  by  any  means  pleased 
with  the  terms  of  the  revised  Treaty.  For  the  time 
being  they  were  compelled  to  accept  a solution  which 
met  with  the  approval  of  Her  Majesty  Tzu  Hsi,  but 
the  firebrands  of  the  following  of  Tso  Tsung-tang 
made  no  secret  of  their  discontent.  That  doughty 
warrior  returned  to  Peking  at  the  end  of  February, 
1 88 1,  and  lost  no  time  in  denouncing  the  new  Treaty 
at  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  in  a spirit  and  in  words  very 
similar  to  those  adopted  by  the  Boxer  leaders  twenty 
years  later.  The  contempt  which  he  felt  for  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  adoption  of  Western  ideas,  and  his  policy 
of  conciliation,  was  unconcealed  ; he  believed  im- 
plicitly in  the  power  of  China’s  numbers  to  defeat 


196 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Russia  or  any  other  European  State.  He  described 
the  new  Treaty  as  a cowardly  arrangement  and 
advised  the  Throne  to  “ make  an  end,  once  and  for 
all,  of  all  the  obnoxious  foreigners,  whose  presence 
creates  grave  difficulties  and  dangers  for  the  Empire.” 
How  deeply  the  mandarin  mind  was  infected  with 
this  purblind  ignorance  and  pride  of  race,  the  history 
of  the  next  twenty  years  was  destined  to  prove,  in 
the  series  of  disasters  and  humiliations  which  left 
the  Empire  bankrupt  and  broken  in  1901.  Against 
that  ignorance  and  arrogance  it  was  Li  Hung-chang’s 
endless  task  to  struggle  : un  borgne  parmi  les  aveugles. 
But  his  successful  handling  of  the  Kuldja  incident 
had  raised  him  in  the  favour  of  the  Empress  Dowager, 
who  thereafter  was  by  no  means  inclined  to  encourage 
the  fulminations  of  Tso  Tsung-tang.  In  November, 
1881,  Li  killed  two  notable  birds  with  one  stone  : he 
secured  the  removal  of  his  rival  Liu  K’un-yi  from 
the  Viceroyalty  of  Nanking,  and  artfully  made  his 
peace  with  Tso  by  having  him  appointed  to  that 
important  post. 

Ten  years  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Kuldja  affair 
the  Tzarevitch  (now  Emperor)  Nicholas  turned  the 
first  sod  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  at  Vladi- 
vostock,  after  a voyage  through  India,  China,  and 
Japan.  The  Chinese  Court,  still  firmly  rooted  in  its 
tradition  of  ineffable  superiority,  had  not  seen  fit  to 
invite  him  to  Peking,  and  Chang  Chih-tung,  as  Viceroy 
at  Wuchang,  had  displayed  super-classical  foolishness 
by  treating  Russia’s  future  Emperor  with  gross  dis- 
courtesy. But  Russia  showed  no  open  resentment  ; 
no  protests  were  addressed  to  Peking,  nor  any  in- 
vidious comparisons  made  between  the  reception 
accorded  to  the  Tzarevitch  in  China  and  that  which 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


197 


he  had  received  in  Japan.  The  commencement  of 
the  great  trunk  railway,  which  was  soon  to  place 
Manchuria  at  Russia’s  mercy,  was  a portent  which 
might  have  conveyed  its  warning  to  any  Government 
that  had  eyes  to  see  and  ears  to  hear  : even  so  was 
Russia’s  meek  acceptance  of  rebuffs  and  rudeness  ; 
but  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  had  neither.  As  for  Li  Hung- 
chang,  the  menace  of  Japan’s  forward  policy  in  Korea 
seemed  to  him  so  much  more  immediate  than  any 
other  of  the  dangers  which  threatened  his  defenceless 
country,  that  from  the  outset  he  regarded — or  pro- 
fessed to  regard — the  “ peaceful  penetration  ” of 
Russia  as  a protective  rather  than  a disruptive  force. 
And  Russia,  on  her  side,  had  no  desire  to  see  the 
Chinese  Government  either  efficient  or  enlightened  ; 
the  longer  it  persisted  in  its  hide-bound  medievalism, 
the  easier  would  it  be,  in  the  coming  days  of  oppor- 
tunity, to  add  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  the  north- 
western provinces  to  the  great  Asiatic  dominions  of 
the  Tzar,  and  this  by  simple  force  of  gravitation. 

Five  years  after  the  performance  of  the  interest- 
ing inaugural  ceremony  by  the  Tzarevitch  at  Vladi- 
vostock  (China  having  meanwhile  been  ignominiously 
defeated  by  Japan)  Russia  commenced  to  reap  with- 
out bloodshed  the  first  harvest  of  her  far-seeing  and 
patient  statecraft.  The  growth  of  Japanese  power 
by  land  and  sea  had  raised  new  and  serious  problems 
in  the  development  of  that  statecraft  ; Russian 
diplomacy  had  not  been  able  to  prevent  Japan  from 
waging  war  on  China,  but  it  had  been  able  eventually 
to  deprive  her  of  the  fruits  of  victory  and  to  bind 
China,  and  particularly  Li  Hung-chang,  under  bonds 
of  heavy  obligations.  Russia  had  insisted  on  her 
right  to  guarantee  the  loan  raised  by  China  for  the 


198 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


payment  of  the  Japanese  indemnity,  and  by  this 
and  other  means  had  acquired  a preponderant  position 
at  Peking.  Within  a year  of  the  signature  of  the 
Shimonoseki  Treaty,  Russia  was  in  actual  (albeit 
diplomatically  unrecognised)  control  of  Manchuria, 
and  thereafter  continued  to  consolidate  her  position 
in  that  rich  territory  by  further  processes  of  “ peaceful 
penetration,”  by  conquest  of  railway  and  bank,  by 
trading  conventions,  mining  and  timber  concessions, 
and  other  devices,  in  all  of  which  Li  Hung-chang 
was  directly  or  indirectly  concerned.  China’s  sanction 
to  the  extension  of  the  Eastern  Siberian  Railway  to 
a terminus  on  the  Liaotung  coast  was  not  the  least 
of  the  graceful  concessions  which  Li  was  constrained 
to  make  at  Moscow  in  1896  as  the  price  of  Russia’s 
protective  friendship.  The  hoisting  of  the  Russian 
flag  at  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  (1898)  was  merely 
the  logical  corollary  of  that  concession  and  a further 
instalment  on  account  of  China’s  gratitude.  Through- 
out the  stormy  period  of  the  Battle  of  Concessions 
(1898-99)  British  diplomacy  in  the  Far  East  struggled 
aimlessly  and  fitfully  against  the  “ steam-roller  ” 
advance  of  Franco-Russian  encroachments  on  Chinese 
sovereignty.  The  unequal  struggle  continued  until 
the  Boxer  rising  (1900)  afforded  Russia  the  kind  of 
opportunity  for  which  her  practical  policy  was  ever 
in  wait  and  provided  her  with  the  necessary  pretext 
for  military  occupation  of  the  Manchurian  provinces. 
Thereupon  (January,  1902)  followed  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  casting  before  it  the  shadow  of  the 
great  struggle  to  come  for  the  possession  of  that 
desirable  and  fertile  land. 

It  is  reasonable  to  suppose — indeed  there  is  proof — 
that  before  his  death  (November  7th,  1901),  and  in 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


T99 


the  course  of  his  negotiations  regarding  the  Peace 
Protocol  and  Boxer  Indemnity,  Li  Hung-chang  had 
begun  to  realise  that  the  price  which  China  had  paid, 
and  was  continuing  to  pay,  for  Russia’s  “ friendship  ” 
was  practically  the  same  as  that  which  Japan  had 
endeavoured  to  exact  as  the  result  of  her  victories. 
There  is  an  entry  in  the  bogus  “ Memoirs,”  pur- 
porting to  have  been  written  at  Peking  after  the 
Viceroy’s  return  from  Shimonoseki,  which  sounds 
plausibly  like  Li’s  latter-day  opinions  : — 

“ Russia  is  to-day  our  greatest  friend  and  our  most- 
to-be-feared  enemy.  She  is  our  friend  because  Great 
Britain  and  France  pose  as  friends  also.  She  wishes 
to  be  a better  friend  than  they.  She  is  our  greatest 
enemy,  because  what  the  Russians  call  the  trend  of 
her  destiny  makes  her  so.  She  dominates  all  Northern 
Asia  and  hopes  some  day  to  have  preponderating 
influence  in  China.  She  will  help  us  to  keep  Japan 
out,  because  she  herself  wants  to  get  in.” 

Elementary  enough,  but  most  of  the  ideas  underlying 
Chinese  statecraft  are  elementary.  Their  subtlety  lies 
chiefly  in  their  application. 

In  his  negotiations  with  Count  Cassini  at  Peking, 
and  later  with  M.  de  Witte  at  Moscow,  Li  certainly 
opened  a door  for  Russia’s  preponderant  influence  in 
China.  His  enemies  at  home  and  abroad  never  hesi- 
tated to  assert  that  both  he  and  the  Chief  Eunuch, 
Li  Lien-ying,  derived  very  considerable  pecuniary 
profit  from  these  negotiations.  The  enormous  for- 
tunes which  both  acquired,  and  their  unconcealed 
greed  of  gain,  would  sufficiently  account  for  these 
accusations,  which  in  any  case  were  never  susceptible 
of  proof.  But  whether  his  intimate  relations  with 
Count  Cassini  and  other  Russian  agents  were  inspired 


200 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


by  patriotic  or  personal  motives,  the  position  gradu- 
ally assumed  by  Russia  in  Manchuria  must  ultimately 
have  led  him  to  reflect  that  “ he  who  sups  with  the 
devil  should  have  a long  spoon.” 

Judging  from  the  Memorials  submitted  by  Li  to  the 
Throne  after  his  return  from  abroad  in  1896,  he  was 
convinced  by  M.  de  Witte  that  Russia’s  object  in  ex- 
tending her  Siberian  Railway  system  into  Chinese  terri- 
tory was  essentially  political  and  based  on  a sincere 
desire  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  China.  The  agree- 
ment thereafter  entered  into  was  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a secret  alliance,1  by  virtue  of  which  Russia 
guaranteed  China’s  independence  and  the  integrity 
of  the  Empire,  while  China  reciprocated  by  allowing 
Russian  railway  extensions  in  Manchuria.  Li  laid 
stress,  it  is  true,  on  the  possible  dangers  of  those  rail- 
way extensions  ; he  endeavoured  to  persuade  M.  de 
Witte  to  permit  China  to  build  them  with  her  own 
money.  But  on  this  point  the  Finance  Minister  was 
immovable.  It  was  a case  of  “ no  railway,  no  alliance.” 
Then  came  the  memorable  audiences  with  the  Tzar, 
who  urged  Li  to  cast  from  his  mind  all  unworthy 
suspicions  : what  harm  could  China  incur  by  giving 
a railway  concession  to  a Russo-Chinese  bank  in  which 
her  interests  were  fully  protected  ? The  end  of  a 
long  course  of  banquets  and  interviews  was  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Manchurian  Railway  Convention  and 
the  secret  Treaty  signed  by  Li  and  Prince  Lobanow. 
Thanks  to  the  persuasive  energy  of  Count  Cassini 
(who  had  remained  in  close  touch  with  Li’s  friends 
at  the  Chinese  Court),  the  Treaty  was  ratified  by  the 


1 In  a telegram  addressed  to  the  Tzar  by  the  Empress  Dowager  in  July, 
1900,  she  referred  definitely  to  the  existence  of  this  Treaty  of  Alliance. 
Vide  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,”  p.  336. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


201 


Chinese  Government  on  September  30th,  1896 — three 
days  before  Li’s  return  to  Tientsin.  It  was  fiercely 
opposed  by  several  members  of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen, 
but  the  Empress  Dowager’s  orders  settled  the  matter. 
The  mauvaises  langues  of  Young  China  in  Canton  were 
wont  to  declare  that  the  Chief  Eunuch  divided  with 
Her  Majesty’s  privy  purse  the  substantial  douceur 
disbursed  by  the  Russian  Minister  on  this  occasion. 

The  attitude  and  actions  of  the  Tzar’s  representa- 
tives in  the  Far  East  after  1897  conveyed  an  impres- 
sion very  different  from  that  which  Li  had  gathered 
from  those  private  audiences  with  His  Majesty  in 
1896,  when  the  Tzar  had  completely  won  him  by  his 
“ exquisite  deference  ” and  his  earnest  solicitude  for 
China’s  future  welfare.  No  doubt  but  that  (as  Li 
subsequently  reported  to  Tzu  Hsi)  the  Viceroy  had 
expressed  a fear  that  zealous  and  ambitious  agents 
might  not  prove  equally  sympathetic  ; but  the  die 
was  cast,  Russia  had  held  off  the  conquering  Japanese, 
and  the  price  of  her  services,  whatever  it  might  be, 
must  be  paid.  And  Li,  believing  ever  in  the  possi- 
bility of  creating  dissension  amongst  the  barbarians, 
undoubtedly  foresaw  that  Russia’s  “ temporary 
measures  of  military  occupation  ” in  Manchuria  and 
on  the  Korean  border  must  inevitably  precipitate 
war  between  her  and  Japan.  Had  his  expert  hand 
been  at  the  helm  when  that  war  took  place  and 
during  the  subsequent  three  years’  breathing  space, 
China  would  assuredly  not  have  been  so  helpless  and 
apathetic  a spectator  of  the  events  which  eventually 
led  up  to  the  Russo-Japanese  entente,  and  finally 
sealed  the  fate  of  the  northern  dependencies. 

But  the  Boxer  rising  created  a situation  in  which, 
owing  to  the  Empress  Dowager’s  connivance  in  that 


202 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


movement,  Li  Hung-chang’s  statecraft  was  tempo- 
rarily nonplussed  and  his  diplomatic  strategy  brought 
to  nought.  It  was  a situation  which,  so  soon  as  the 
Legations  had  been  relieved,  compelled  him  at  all 
costs  to  look  to  Russia  for  help.  He  needed  her  assist- 
ance to  secure  the  ends  which  for  the  moment  had 
become  all-important,  namely,  the  restoration  of  his 
Imperial  mistress  to  her  throne  with  the  least  possible 
loss  of  face  and  the  utmost  feasible  mitigation  of 
China’s  punishment.  He  knew  full  well,  as  the  Court 
must  have  known,  that  the  price  to  be  paid  for  this 
help  would  be  heavy,  but  there  was  no  alternative. 
Moreover,  the  aged  Viceroy’s  humiliating  experiences 
at  the  hands  of  the  foreign  community  at  Shanghai 
and  the  allied  naval  authorities  at  Tientsin,  while 
proceeding  north  from  Canton  in  obedience  to  Tzu 
Hsi’s  decree,  had  greatly  embittered  him.  He  had 
felt  it  deeply  that  foreigners,  and  particularly  English- 
men, should  treat  him  as  a suspect,  who  had  always 
been  a staunch  supporter  of  law  and  order,  who  had 
never  permitted  any  anti-foreign  outrage  within  the 
limits  of  his  Viceroyalty.  His  conscience  was  clear, 
at  all  events,  of  all  complicity  in  the  Boxer  rising. 
More  than  that,  as  subsequent  events  proved,  he  had 
displayed  rare  courage,  at  a time  when  all  his  col- 
leagues sat  trembling  on  the  fence,  in  Memorials 
boldly  denouncing  the  Empress  Dowager’s  encourage- 
ment of  Prince  Tuan  and  urging  her  to  make  peace 
with  the  outraged  Powers  at  all  costs.1  When,  there- 
fore, he  found  himself  and  his  mission  regarded  with 
distrust  and  contempt,  when  he  perceived  that  the 
British  official  attitude  was  in  a great  measure  uncon- 
nected with  the  actual  crisis  and  due  to  his  close 

1 Vide  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager.” 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


203 


relations  with  Russia  since  1896,  and  when  he  finally 
contrasted  this  attitude  with  the  courteous  considera- 
tion and  helpfulness  shown  him  by  the  Russian 
authorities,  he  would  have  been  more  than  human 
had  he  not  accepted  the  help  thus  tactfully  offered, 
let  the  price  be  what  it  might. 

As  'Times  correspondent  the  present  writer  had 
occasion  to  discuss  the  Boxer  crisis  and  its  results 
with  Li  Hung-chang  during  his  residence  at  Shanghai 
(July  2 1 st  to  September  14th,  1900).  The  aged 
Viceroy’s  physical  strength  was  fast  waning  at  this 
time.  He  walked  supported  by  servants  and  seemed 
to  be  very  frail.  But  the  indomitable  spirit  of  the 
man  was  in  no  wise  quenched,  his  mind  showed  no 
signs  of  weariness,  and  his  eyes  flashed  with  all  their 
wonted  fire  when  anger  moved  him.  He  did  not 
attempt  to  dissemble  his  wrath  at  the  discourtesy  of 
the  Consular  Body,  which  had  determined  not  to 
call  upon  him,  and  of  the  Municipality,  which  had 
limited  his  personal  retinue  to  twenty  men.  He  pro- 
fessed to  be  indignant  also  at  the  British  public’s 
reiterated  demand  for  a direct  communication  from 
the  besieged  Legations.  He  had  given  his  word  that 
they  were  safe,  and  was  not  that  sufficient  ? Even 
then,  fighting  a lone  hand,  spurned  by  the  foreigner 
and  suspected  by  many  of  his  countrymen,  he  con- 
tinued to  display  the  curious  combination  of  naive 
complacency  and  bold  assurance,  which  characterised 
his  diplomatic  intercourse  with  foreigners.  On 
July  23rd  his  proposed  remedy  for  the  situation  (then 
critical)  was  that  the  Powers  should  telegraph  to  the 
allied  commanders  in  North  China  and  put  a stop 
to  their  advance  on  Peking.  As  for  himself,  he  did 
not  propose  to  go  north  until  certain  that  the  Empress 


204 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Dowager  had  seen  the  error  of  her  ways  and  was 
ready  to  make  amends — which  statement  was  in 
substance  identical  with  that  contained  in  his  admoni- 
tory Memorial  to  the  Throne. 

But  while  cut  off  from  all  official  business  at  Shang- 
hai, Li  was  busy  preparing  a way  of  comparatively 
dignified  rehabilitation  for  his  august  mistress  with 
the  help  of  Russia.  His  residence  in  the  Model 
Settlement  was  at  the  house  of  the  Cantonese  Liu 
Hsiieh-hsun  (organiser  of  the  erstwhile  notorious 
“ White  Pigeon  ” lottery),  who  had  been  sent  by 
Tzu  Hsi  on  a secret  mission  to  Japan  the  year  before. 
To  this  house  came  daily  for  long  conferences  Sheng 
Kung-pao,  Li’s  ame  damnee  and  financial  agent, 
commonly  known  to  his  intimates  as  the  Old  Fox. 
And  to  them  as  time  went  on,  foregathered,  sepa- 
rately and  discreetly,  certain  members  of  the  Consular 
Body,  which  had  collectively  refused  to  recognise  the 
Viceroy.  Sheng  Kung-pao  was,  amongst  other  things, 
Director  of  the  Imperial  Chinese  Telegraphs ; under 
Li’s  direction  the  wires  were  kept  busy  at  this  period 
between  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  St.  Petersburg.  On 
July  31st  Li  received  a long  telegram  from  the  Chinese 
Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  conveying  the  welcome 
information  that  the  Russian  Government  would  do 
its  best  to  assist  China  out  of  her  difficulties,  if  the 
Empress  Dowager  would  disavow  the  Boxers  without 
further  delay  and  ask  for  peace. 

On  July  3rd  Russia  had  subscribed  to  the  terms 
of  the  Circular  Note  issued  by  the  United  States, 
in  which  were  laid  down  certain  fundamental  prin- 
ciples for  common  action  between  the  allied  Powers. 
Previously  thereto  (June  16th)  she  had  declared  her 
inten-tion  to  co-operate  with  the  Powers  for  the 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


205 


restoration  of  order  and  meanwhile  to  preserve  the 
status  quo.  Her  undertaking  to  protect  China  from 
the  wrath  of  other  Powers  was  a natural  consequence 
of  the  secret  Treaty  negotiated  by  Li  in  1896,  but  the 
situation  was  all  the  more  delicate  because  the  terms 
of  that  Treaty  had  never  been  disclosed.  Under  the 
circumstances,  what  Russia  meant  by  the  status  quo 
was  by  no  means  the  same  thing  as  that  referred 
to  by  Mr.  Secretary  Hay.  But  Russia  was  not 
greatly  troubled  by  sentimental  scruples  in  the 
matter,  and,  to  do  her  justice,  her  Minister  at 
Peking  (M.  Pavlow)  had  frankly  informed  Sir 
Claude  MacDonald,  as  far  back  as  October,  1897, 
that  “ the  Russian  Government  did  not  intend  that 
the  provinces  of  China  bordering  on  the  Russian 
frontier  should  come  under  the  influence  of  any 
nation  except  Russia.” 

The  results  of  the  telegraphic  communications 
which  passed  between  Li  and  St.  Petersburg  were 
very  speedily  made  manifest,  after  the  relief  of  the 
Legations,  in  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  Minister 
and  military  commanders.  The  change  effected  by 
M.  de  Giers  from  the  role  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment’s indignant  victim  to  that  of  its  sympathetic 
friend  was  almost  too  sudden  to  be  artistic  ; public 
opinion  in  China,  mindful  of  the  barbarities  inflicted 
by  order  of  the  Court  upon  defenceless  missionaries, 
regarded  it,  indeed,  as  indecent.  The  siege  of  the 
Legations  was  raised  on  August  14th  ; on  the  9th 
Tzu  Hsi,  preparing  for  flight,  appointed  Li  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  to  negotiate  with  the  Powers,  adding 
the  significant  order  that  he  was  to  “ confer  by 
telegraph  with  their  respective  Foreign  Offices  in 
order  to  put  a stop  to  hostilities.”  At  the  end  of 


206 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


August,  having  received  definite  assurances  both 
from  Russia  and  Japan  that  the  sacred  person  of 
Her  Majesty  would  be  protected,  Li  telegraphed  a 
Memorial  to  the  fleeing  Court,  requesting  that  the 
Yangtsze  Viceroys  and  Prince  Ch’ing  should  be 
commanded  to  assist  him  in  the  peace  negotiations  ; 
meanwhile,  he  continued  to  reside  at  Shanghai. 
By  the  beginning  of  September  his  understanding 
with  Russia  had  begun  to  bear  fruit  ; the  three 
Manchurian  provinces  were  under  Russian  military 
occupation,  and  the  Russian  Government  had  prac- 
tically declared  them  to  be  outside  the  sphere  of 
concerted  international  action.  On  September  7th 
General  Grilsky  held  a solemn  thanksgiving  service 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Amur  opposite  to  Blago- 
vestchensk.  The  prophetic  words  of  Mouravieff  were 
at  last  fulfilled,  “ Sooner  or  later,  this  bank  also 
will  be  ours.” 

On  August  2 1 st  Li  Hung-chang  telegraphed  to 
Wu  Ting-fang,  Chinese  Minister  at  Washington, 
urging  the  United  States  Government  to  suspend 
hostilities,  to  withdraw  its  troops  and  appoint  peace 
negotiators.  On  the  25th  the  Russian  Legation  issued 
a Circular  Memorandum  so  similar  in  wording  to 
this  despatch  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the 
common  origin  of  the  documents.  On  September  8th 
the  Russian  representative  independently  suggested 
that,  if  the  Court  would  agree  to  return  at  once,  the 
Powers  would  proceed  to  evacuate  Peking,  and  on 
the  following  day  Li  telegraphed  urging  the  Court 
to  return.  Again,  on  the  13th  he  telegraphed  to 
Jung  Lu,  begging  him  to  persuade  Her  Majesty 
to  repudiate  Prince  Tuan  and  all  his  works  and  to 
announce  her  immediate  return  to  the  capital.  The 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


20  7 


Russian  Legation  in  the  meanwhile  had  endeavoured 
to  “ make  good  ” by  removing  itself  and  the  Russian 
forces  to  Tientsin,  but  as  nobody  followed  this 
transparent  move,  and  as  the  other  Powers  were  evi- 
dently determined  to  negotiate  at  Peking,  it  quietly 
returned  in  October. 

Li,  informed  of  the  arrival  of  Prince  Ch’ing  at 
Peking,  obeyed  the  insistent  orders  of  the  Court 
and  left  Shanghai  for  the  north  on  September  14th. 
Once  again  the  treatment  accorded  to  him  by  the 
British  and  other  authorities  at  Tientsin  contrasted 
strongly  with  the  extravagant  solicitude  for  his 
welfare  displayed  by  the  Russians,  and  probably 
stiffened  the  old  man’s  determination  to  put  his  whole 
trust  in  them  and  let  the  future  take  care  of  itself. 
At  least  he  could  always  count  on  Tzu  Hsi’s  approval 
and  support,  for  the  Russian  Legation  had  already 
proceeded  to  earn  her  gratitude  by  protecting  a 
number  of  her  Boxer  henchmen,  and  by  promising 
to  keep  the  Chief  Eunuch’s  name  off  the  black  list 
of  the  Powers.  The  Russian  Minister,  moreover, 
had  moved  heaven  and  earth  to  have  Li  accepted 
as  Negotiator  Plenipotentiary  by  the  Diplomatic 
Body,  and  had  succeeded,  in  spite  of  the  sceptical 
hesitation  of  the  British,  American,  and  Italian 
representatives. 

Li  returned,  therefore,  to  the  north,  and  for  the 
last  time  took  upon  his  aged  shoulders  the  task  of 
making  atonement  for  the  purblind  folly  of  his  poli- 
tical adversaries.  Before  leaving  Shanghai  he  sent 
in  a Memorial  to  the  Throne  impeaching  Prince  Tuan 
and  his  accomplices,  and  signed  it  not  only  with  his 
own  name  but  with  those  of  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys 
Liu  K’un-yi  and  Chang  Chih-tung,  taking  their 


208 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


consent  for  granted.  In  this  Memorial  he  declared 
that  there  could  be  no  prospect  of  successful  negotia- 
tions unless  the  Boxer  leaders  were  severely  dealt  with. 
Chang,  as  usual,  saw  fit  to  differ,  and  disowned  the 
Memorial,  but  Her  Majesty  was  persuaded  to  decree 
the  punishment  of  her  late  advisers,  and  Li  was  thus 
placed  in  a position  to  face  the  Diplomatic  Body  with 
something  of  his  usual  assurance.  Indeed,  relying 
upon  the  support  of  the  Russian  Legation,  he  gradu- 
ally adopted  an  attitude  which  gave  no  little  offence 
to  the  representatives  of  other  Powers.  In  November, 
for  example,  he  sent  a characteristically  impertinent 
despatch  to  the  Legations  complaining  of  the  conduct 
of  the  allied  forces  in  the  Paotingfu  expedition,  and 
even  proposed  to  bring  Chinese  troops  to  the  capital 
“ to  assist  in  maintaining  order.”  His  residence  at 
the  capital  was  guarded  by  Cossacks,  and  his  rela- 
tions with  the  Russian  Minister  were  of  the  closest. 
All  his  eggs,  in  fact,  were  now  in  the  Russian  basket. 

But  although  the  Empress  Dowager  and  many  of 
her  high  officials  were  duly  grateful  for  Russia’s 
protection,  Li  speedily  perceived  that  the  price  of 
that  protection  would  be  heavy  and  that  he  himself 
would  infallibly  be  denounced  as  a traitor  by  the 
Court,  the  Censors,  and  his  colleagues  for  advocating 
its  payment  in  whole  or  part.  The  terms  of  the 
Manchurian  Convention,  following  close  upon  the 
signature  of  the  Peace  Protocol,  were  published 
towards  the  end  of  October.  They  revealed  to  the 
world  the  price  which  Russia  proposed  to  exact  for 
her  disinterested  friendship,  and  evoked  immediate 
and  angry  protests  from  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys. 
Li  was  once  more  placed  in  a very  difficult  situation. 
In  March  he  had  assured  the  Throne  that  Russia’s 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


209 


military  occupation  of  Manchuria  was  merely  tem- 
porary. After  the  signature  of  the  Peace  Protocol 
(September  7th)  the  Court,  relying  on  this  assurance, 
ordered  him  and  his  colleagues  to  present  a formal 
demand  to  the  Russian  Minister  for  the  evacuation 
of  the  three  provinces  and  for  the  restoration  to  China 
of  the  Shanhaikuan  Railway.  Prince  Ch’ing,  with 
characteristic  bad  faith,  threw  over  his  colleague  and 
supported  the  absurd  views  of  the  Court.  Li  made 
appeal  to  Her  Majesty’s  common  sense  by  asking 
what  alternative  course  was  open  to  him.  What 
hope  was  there,  for  instance,  of  effective  support 
against  Russia  from  either  England  or  Japan  ? This 
was  at  the  end  of  October.  The  old  man,  between  the 
devil  of  M.  Lessar,  insistently  pressing  for  his  pound 
of  flesh,  and  the  deep  sea  of  China’s  utter  helplessness, 
had  not  the  physical  strength  to  bear  up  against  the 
troubles  which  now  crowded  upon  him.  The  Yangtsze 
Viceroys  had  jointly  memorialised  against  ratifi- 
cation of  the  Manchurian  Convention,  and  the  Court 
approved  their  advice.  The  Manchus  had  eaten  their 
cake,  but  still  wished  to  have  it.  Li  was  ordered  to 
remind  his  Russian  friends  of  their  repeated  promises 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  China,  which  the  proposed 
Convention  was  calculated  to  destroy.  But  M.  Lessar, 
angrily  importunate,  and  mindful,  no  doubt,  of  things 
privily  said  and  done  by  Li  when  the  “ friendship  ” 
was  most  needed,  left  him  no  peace.  The  Japanese 
were  also  showing  signs  of  irritable  curiosity  ; Eng- 
land, though  preoccupied  in  the  Transvaal,  was 
evidently  perturbed,  and  it  was  therefore  necessary 
from  the  Russian  point  of  view  to  confront  them  with 
a fait  accompli , spontaneously  “ conceded  ” by  the 
Chinese  Government. 


L.H. 


210 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


At  the  beginning  of  November  Li  took  to  his  bed, 
where  the  relentless  M.  Lessar  continued  to  harry 
him  to  the  last.  On  the  7th  he  gave  up  the  ghost. 
It  was  probably  a source  of  grim  satisfaction  to  him 
in  the  end  that,  with  unanswerable  finality,  he  had 
thus  evaded  a difficult  and  delicate  situation.  He 
left  to  Prince  Ch’ing  and  Wang  Wen-shao  the  task  of 
satisfying  M.  Lessar,  and  if  his  unappeased  spirit 
hovered  over  Peking,  as  they  discussed  the  terms  of 
the  Convention  concluded  five  months  later,  he  must 
have  derived  no  small  satisfaction  from  contemplation 
of  the  helpless  inefficiency  of  his  erstwhile  colleagues 
and  critics. 

Even  admitting  that  his  diplomatic  relations  with 
Russia  were  characterised  by  a hand-to-mouth 
Micawber  opportunism,  even  conceding  the  possibility 
of  a Baconian  readiness  to  derive  personal  profit 
from  his  country’s  embarrassments,  it  was  impossible 
to  deny  that  every  move  of  his  game  was  made  with  a 
reasonable  and  definite  purpose,  based  generally  on 
clear  recognition  of  China’s  necessities  and  on 
intelligent  perception  of  the  broader  outlines  of  inter- 
national politics.  Therein  he  differed  from  all  the 
fine  flower  of  Chinese  officialdom,  from  the  hide- 
bound Conservatives  of  the  old  regime  as  well  as  from 
the  progressives  of  Young  China,  who,  one  and  all, 
remained  incapable  of  initiating  any  practical  line  of 
policy  based  on  knowledge  of  men  and  events  outside 
the  Middle  Kingdom.  How  far  Li  himself  believed 
in  the  possibility  of  disinterested  Russian  “ friend- 
ship ” must  remain  matter  for  surmise.  From  what 
we  know  of  his  character  and  methods,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  believe  that  he  was  under  no  delusions 
in  the  matter  ; that  he  made  friends  of  the  mammon 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


21 1 


of  Muscovy  simply  because  friends  of  some  sort  were 
imperatively  required  in  1895,  and  that  he  hoped  to 
find  means  to  evade  full  payment  on  the  day  of 
reckoning.  His  calculations  as  to  the  proximity  of 
that  day  were  upset  by  no  fault  of  his,  but  by  the 
folly  of  the  Empress  in  countenancing  the  Boxer 
movement,  which  gave  Russia  her  opportunity. 

No  account  of  Li’s  career  as  a diplomat  would  be 
complete  without  some  reference  to  his  triumphal 
progress  through  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
It  was  an  expedition  in  many  ways  remarkable. 
With  the  exception  of  his  mission  to  Japan  the  year 
before,  it  was  the  first  time  that  China’s  foremost 
authority  on  foreign  affairs,  then  seventy-three  years 
of  age,  had  ever  been  abroad  ; nevertheless,  he 
preserved  throughout  all  the  journey  an  imperturb- 
able sangfroid  and  an  attitude  of  nil  admirari,  rarely 
losing  an  opportunity  of  suggesting  to  the  sovereigns 
and  statesmen  of  the  West  the  moral  inferiority  of 
their  mushroom  civilisation  as  compared  with  that 
of  his  own  country.  His  speeches  and  manners 
served  to  provide  the  world’s  Press  for  six  months 
with  a subject  of  exotic  interest  : for  his  manner  of 
discussing  men  and  things  combined  an  Arcadian 
type  of  naivete  with  jocular  criticism  and  an  enfant 
terrible  manner  of  asking  impertinent  questions. 
Anyone  who  had  known  Li  in  his  own  Yamen  at 
Tientsin  could  be  under  no  delusions  as  to  the 
impression  which  he  meant  to  produce.  His  attitude 
was  deliberately  planned  with  a view  to  creating 
about  himself  an  atmosphere  of  Oriental  subtlety  and 
mystification.  To  create  this  atmosphere  he  used  the 
Press,  especially  in  America,  with  all  the  journalistic 
instinct  of  an  election  agent  ; the  airs  and  graces 


212 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


which  he  gave  himself  in  the  European  capitals 
would  have  done  credit  to  a prima  donna.  He  set 
himself  to  epater  le  bourgeois  wherever  he  went,  and 
his  policy  was  fully  justified  by  its  results.  After  his 
return  to  China  he  remarked  to  one  of  his  English 
friends  in  Tientsin  that  the  ignorance  of  China’s 
officials  in  regard  to  European  affairs  was  no  greater 
than  that  of  Europe’s  statesmen  in  regard  to  China. 
Yet  there  is  no  doubt  that  what  the  aged  statesman 
had  seen  in  his  travels  had  given  him  food  for  sober 
thought,  and  for  the  rest  of  his  life  his  attitude 
towards  foreigners  was  more  courteous  and  less 
jocular  than  in  the  days  before  his  pilgrimage. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  first  object  of  the  Empress 
Dowager  in  sending  Li  to  the  Coronation  of  Tzar 
Nicholas  II.  was  to  put  him  beyond  the  reach  of  his 
enemies  and  critics  at  Court  ; also  to  enable  him  to 
recover  something  of  the  prestige  lost  in  the  Shimono- 
seki  Treaty,  by  negotiating  a definite  entente  with 
Russia  in  regard  to  future  defence  against  Japanese 
aggression.  It  would  have  been  difficult  for  the  Old 
Buddha  to  support  Li  at  Tientsin  against  the  Censors’ 
attacks,  immediately  after  the  collapse  of  his  expen- 
sive armaments,  without  risking  something  of  her 
own  reputation.  His  presence  at  the  capital  was 
equally  inexpedient,  and  Count  Cassini’s  invitation 
for  him  to  attend  the  Coronation  fell  in  conveniently 
with  Her  Majesty’s  wishes.  The  extension  of  his 
journey  to  England,  France,  Germany,  the  Nether- 
lands, and  America  was  also  in  the  nature  of  a 
breathing-space  : at  the  same  time  Li  hoped  to  com- 
bine business  with  pleasure  by  persuading  the  British 
Government  (as  the  party  most  interested)  to  agree  to 
a 50  per  cent,  increase  in  the  Maritime  Import  duties. 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


213 


In  Europe  and  America  little  or  nothing  was  known 
of  Li’s  precarious  position  in  his  own  country  ; every- 
where he  was  received  with  almost  royal  honours, 
the  impression  being  general  that  his  diplomatic 
mission  was  the  crowning  honour  conferred  by  the 
Throne  on  China’s  most  distinguished  statesman. 
Neither  Li  nor  his  astute  Interpreter-Secretary, 
Lo  Feng-loh,  did  anything  to  disturb  this  opinion, 
nor  that  which  credited  him  with  the  intention  of 
placing  large  orders  for  armaments,  railway  material, 
and  warships.  On  the  contrary,  wherever  he  went 
the  Imperial  Envoy  visited  dockyards  and  arsenals, 
pricing  their  output  with  the  ardour  of  a commercial 
traveller,  but  placing  no  orders,  for  the  good  reason 
that  he  possessed  neither  funds  nor  authority  for  the 
purpose.  But  being  heralded  as  dispenser-in-chief 
of  China’s  future  favours,  Li’s  reception  in  England, 
France,  and  Germany  was  such  as  to  increase  the 
cynicism  of  his  Confucian  soul  in  regard  to  the 
alleged  superiority  of  Western  morals  and  manners. 
Never  before,  as  M.  Cordier  justly  observes,1  had 
Europeans  displayed  to  the  Chinese  such  lack  of 
dignity  or  such  depravity  in  their  fierce  greed  of 
gain  ; and  the  net  result  was  to  leave  them  out  of 
pocket  and  out  of  countenance. 

Mr.  Alexander  Michie’s  admirable  work  “ The 
Englishman  in  China  ” gives,  within  certain  limits, 
a very  accurate  and  interesting  analysis  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  activities  during  his  Viceroyalty  of  Chihli ; 
but  the  book,  though  published  in  1900,  is  curiously 
silent  on  the  subject  of  the  grand  tour  abroad.  This 
is  the  more  regrettable  because  no  authentic  account 
has  ever  been  forthcoming  of  the  aged  statesman’s 
1 “ Histoire  des  Relations  de  la  Chine.” 


214 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


thoughts,  words,  and  deeds  during  that  memorable 
expedition.  How  supremely  interesting,  had  it  been 
possible,  to  obtain  an  authentic  record  of  the  wan- 
derer’s sincere  opinions  of  Bismarck,  Krupp,  Glad- 
stone, Lord  Salisbury,  and  President  Cleveland  ; 
to  know  what  he  thought  in  his  heart  of  the  civilisa- 
tion which  he  saw  in  such  haste,  of  the  German  Army 
and  the  British  Fleet  ! What  he  gave  out  to  the 
journalists  was  almost  all  chaff,  of  the  kind  in  which 
he  was  usually  pleased  to  indulge,  or  impertinences 
unseemly  in  a guest.  The  voluminous  diary  kept 
until  1901  by  his  faithful  American  secretary  and 
confidant,  Mr.  Pethick,  would  no  doubt  have  cast 
much  light  on  these  matters,  but  unfortunately  it 
has  never  been  found  since  his  death,  so  that  the 
world  will  probably  never  know  whether,  in  the  silent 
sessions  of  his  inner  thoughts,  Li  Hung-chang  main- 
tained his  supercilious  nil  admirari  pose  and  his 
habit  of  invidious  comparisons. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  devote  any  great  space  to 
consideration  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  diplomatic  relations 
with  Great  Britain,  for  the  reason  that  from  the  time 
when  he  assumed  the  direction  of  his  country’s 
foreign  relations  (that  is  to  say,  from  about  1870) 
England’s  policy  in  China  had  been  reduced  from  the 
Imperial  to  the  Free  Trade  commercial  basis.  Li 
was  not  slow  to  perceive  the  paralysing  effect  of  Cob- 
denism  on  our  diplomacy  as  an  Asiatic  Power  and  to 
forecast  the  results  of  the  doctrine  of  laisser  faire , 
which  found  its  expression  in  the  Far  East  after  the 
passing  of  Lord  Palmerston. 

For  some  years  after  the  war  of  i860,  and  the 
active  part  played  by  England  in  the  suppression  of 
the  Taiping  rebellion,  the  magnitude  and  importance 


LI  AS  DIPLOMAT 


215 


of  British  interests  and  pioneer  trade  in  China  con- 
tinued to  be  recognised  by  British  policy,  but  from 
1870  onwards  a marked  change  took  place  in  our 
attitude  and  actions  at  Peking.  The  regime  then 
introduced  reflected  the  new  spirit  that  had  come  over 
the  Foreign  Office,  and  the  new  theories  of  sentimental 
and  invertebrate  commercialism  which  had  gradually 
undermined  the  Palmerstonian  tradition.  Under 
the  administration  of  Mr.  John  Bright  at  the  Board 
of  Trade,  was  inaugurated  the  policy  of  nerveless 
vacillation,  of  alternate  coercion  and  conciliation, 
that  rapidly  reduced  our  diplomatic  and  consular 
services  in  China  to  the  condition  of  apathetic  help- 
lessness which,  generally  speaking,  has  characterised 
them  ever  since.  To  diminish  the  possibilities  of 
friction  by  diminishing  the  points  of  contact  became 
the  official  mot  d’ordre  in  all  our  relations  with  the 
Chinese,  so  that,  to  the  detriment  of  Britain’s  and 
China’s  interests  alike,  our  policy  vacillated  between 
spasmodic  insistence  on  our  treaty  rights  and  flimsy 
condonement  of  their  violation,  violent  protests 
against  the  encroachments  of  other  Powers  on  China’s 
sovereign  rights,  followed  by  futile  attempts  to  restore 
our  prestige  by  acts  of  the  same  kind. 

Li  Hung-chang’s  acute  political  instincts  were 
seldom  at  fault  in  gauging  the  spirit  in  which  diplo- 
matic representations  were  framed  and  the  chances 
for  and  against  forcible  measures  in  the  event  of  their 
being  rejected  or  evaded.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
after  the  Margary  incident  and  the  Chefoo  Convention 
he  formed  a shrewdly  accurate  idea  of  the  causes 
which  had  brought  about  so  marked  a change  in  the 
statesmanship  of  the  country  which  had  opened  the 
doors  of  China  to  foreign  trade.  His  knowledge  of 


21 6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Great  Britain’s  domestic  affairs  was  not  sufficient 
for  him  to  analyse  the  deterioration  of  our  foreign 
policy  produced  by  the  Cobdenite  ethics  of  indus- 
trialism, by  cosmopolitan  finance,  and  Quakerism  in 
high  places  ; but  he  recognised  the  essential  fact  that 
the  politicians  who  controlled  England’s  destinies  were 
weary  and  afraid  of  their  burden  of  empire.  Even- 
tually he  came  to  regard  the  British  as  a nation  of 
shopkeepers,  a people  whose  national  ideal  was  to 
buy  in  the  cheapest  and  sell  in  the  dearest  market, 
whose  whole  policy  in  China  was  to  preserve  its  vested 
trade  interests  by  all  possible  means,  except  the  only 
means  by  which  an  Asiatic  nation  is  impressed. 

In  coming  to  this  conclusion,  and  consistently 
acting  upon  it  in  his  diplomatic  relations  with 
British  officials,  he  erred  no  doubt,  for  he  confused 
the  character  of  the  British  people  with  that  of  the 
type  of  Government  which  had  been  evolved  by  the 
party  machine  ; but  in  this  matter  he  erred  in 
good  company,  and  the  error  involved  him  in  no 
immediate  penalties. 

As  a Chinese  official,  Li  Hung-chang  was  true  to 
type  in  that  he  yielded  nothing  to  reason,  everything 
to  fear.  The  ultimately  convincing  argument  with 
him,  as  with  all  the  mandarinate,  was  force.  He 
had  all  the  Oriental’s  contempt  for  those  who  demon- 
strate with  force  and  are  reluctant  or  afraid  to  use 
it — Britain’s  frequent  role  in  China  between  1885 
and  1905.  But,  politics  apart,  he  owned  to  a very 
sincere  admiration  for  the  trustworthy  qualities 
which  distinguish  the  British  official  and  merchant, 
and  had  many  friends  among  them. 


CHAPTER  VI 


LI  AS  NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR 

In  Europe,  and  amongst  foreigners  in  China, 
Li  Hung-chang’s  claims  to  greatness  have  generally 
been  associated  with  his  diplomatic  career,  while  his 
fellow-countrymen  have  attributed  his  pre-eminence 
chiefly  to  his  activities  as  military  commander  and 
organiser  of  the  Empire’s  defences.  So  true  is  it, 
that  such  honour  as  is  given  to  a prophet  in  his 
own  country  is  usually  indiscriminating  and  wide 
of  the  mark.  In  China,  as  elsewhere,  a public  man 
may  find  himself  with  a reputation  for  administrative 
ability  whose  real  claim  to  distinction  lies  in  a 
neat  style  of  writing  philosophic  essays.  European 
opinion,  looking  to  the  parlous  condition  of  affairs 
in  China  in  1894,  greatly  admired  the  courage  and 
dexterity  displayed  in  Li’s  diplomacy  during  and 
after  the  peace  negotiations  with  Japan.  His  subse- 
quent journey  round  the  world  was  justly  regarded 
as  a memorable  tour  de  force , which  enhanced  his 
reputation  for  statesmanship  of  a subtle  and  pic- 
turesque kind.  But  as  far  as  the  Chinese  were  con- 
cerned, his  prestige,  built  up  on  naval  and  military 
display,  reached  its  zenith  before  the  Japanese  war 
and  thereafter  collapsed.  In  fact,  amongst  many  of 
his  official  colleagues,  the  debacle  of  his  much-vaunted 
naval  and  military  preparations  was  widely  denounced 
as  proof  of  his  unfitness,  not  only  for  high  office, 
but  for  further  existence.  As  we  have  seen,  only  the 


218 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


t 

intervention  of  the  Old  Buddha  saved  him  from 
paying  the  extreme  penalty  for  that  failure  ; in  the 
hour  of  national  humiliation  and  defeat,  all  the  very 
real  services  which  he  had  rendered  to  the  State  in 
the  field  of  diplomacy  and  statecraft  were  forgotten 
or  ignored. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  his  naval  and  military 
administration  was  a magnificent  sham  and  a failure  : 
in  the  hour  of  trial  it  was  bound  to  be  ignominiously 
exposed.  But  Europeans,  unacquainted  with  the 
infinite  collective  capacity  of  the  Chinese  for  “ make- 
believe,”  naturally  ask  themselves  how  it  could  ever 
have  been  possible  for  Li  Hung-chang’s  colleagues 
and  critics  to  regard  it  for  years  with  every  appear- 
ance of  complete  confidence  and  fervent  admiration. 
From  the  Empress  Dowager  herself  down  to  the  ninth- 
button  subordinates  of  every  provincial  Yamen, 
there  was  never  any  lack  of  accurate  information 
concerning  the  inner  workings  of  the  Pei-yang  fleet 
or  the  parlous  condition  of  the  military  forces  of 
Chihli  ; for  all  such  things  are  matters  of  common 
knowledge  in  China,  and  their  discussion  occupies  a 
very  considerable  portion  of  every  official’s  time.  But 
in  the  East,  as  in  the  West,  nothing  succeeds  like 
success,  and  so  long  as  the  clay  feet  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  fierce  military  figure  had  not  been  exposed 
by  the  rude  shocks  of  war,  so  long  was  he 
entitled  to  wealth  and  fame  as  its  maker  and  chief 
impresario. 

To  Europeans  it  must  also  be  matter  for  surprise 
that  the  organisation  of  national  (as*  distinct  from 
provincial)  defence,  naval  as  well  as  military,  should 
have  been  entrusted  for  years  to  one  man,  and  that 
man  already  sufficiently  burdened  by  the  administra- 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  219 


tion  of  the  Metropolitan  Province  and  a vast  amount 
of  diplomatic  and  commercial  business.  The  explana- 
tion lies  chiefly  in  the  fact  that  none  of  his  Viceregal 
colleagues  possessed  the  energy  or  the  desire  to 
initiate  new  military  methods  based  on  Western 
science,  much  less  to  construct  and  organise  a navy 
on  the  European  model.  Li  brought  to  the  task 
not  only  very  exceptional  energy,  but  vast  ambition 
and  an  implicit  belief  in  himself.  Moreover,  as  the 
result  of  his  success  in  suppressing  the  Taiping 
rebellion,  he  enjoyed  the  favour  of  the  Throne  to 
a degree  which  gave  him  command  of  more  funds  for 
his  various  schemes  than  any  other  Viceroy  could 
ever  hope  to  dispose  of.  And  by  the  same  favour 
he  was  raised  to  a pitch  of  independent  authority, 
wherein  he  could  generally  afford  to  ignore  the  attacks 
of  the  Censors,  which  none  of  his  colleagues  (with  the 
possible  exception  of  Chang  Chih-tung)  could  do. 

Nevertheless,  in  considering  what  he  attempted 
and  what  he  achieved,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  certain 
questions  : How  far  did  Li  Hung-chang  deceive  himself 
as  to  the  value  of  his  naval  and  military  armaments  ? 
How  far  was  his  shrewd  and  practical  mind  misled 
to  believe  that  he  could  hope  to  rival  the  Western 
Powers  or  Japan  by  purchasing  ships  and  guns  while, 
at  the  same  time,  he  took  no  serious  steps  to  educate 
and  discipline  the  men  that  handled  them  ? Could 
his  acute  intelligence  have  sincerely  believed  in  the 
possibility  of  rivalling  the  foreigner  in  strength,  so 
long  as  the  administration  of  his  forces  remained 
subject  to  the  demoralising  influences  of  mandarin 
corruption  and  slovenly  inefficiency  ? Mr.  Michie’s 
views  on  this  subject 1 constitute  an  able  and  sympa- 

1 “ The  Englishman  in  China.” 


220 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


thetic  apologia  for  the  great  Viceroy,  whom  for  a time 
he  served.  In  his  opinion,  full  comprehension  of  the 
secret  of  the  foreigner’s  strength  was  never  vouch- 
safed to  Li ; he  remained  throughout  “ the  one-eyed 
man  among  the  blind,”  groping  after  something  which 
he  could  only  guess  at.  Teachers  from  Europe  and 
America  were  employed  in  the  country  and  natives 
sent  abroad  to  be  instructed  ; but  the  spirit  of  the 
new  instruction  was  never  allowed  to  vitalise  the 
organisation,  and  consequently  all  the  knowledge 
that  was  acquired  by  both  methods  remained  barren 
and  unfruitful.  Thus  Li  Hung-chang’s  efforts  fell 
short  of  their  object,  and  China  continued  to  be  “ the 
land  of  moral  force  for  the  iron-shod  physical  forces 
to  trample  on.” 

No  doubt  this  is  true  ; but  it  would  be  much  easier 
to  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  Li’s  efforts  and  to 
sympathise  with  their  magnificent  failure  had  he 
himself  possessed  and  endeavoured  to  inculcate 
“ the  spirit  of  the  new  instruction.”  It  is  a melan- 
choly and  undeniable  fact,  however,  that  in  the  essen- 
tial matter  of  personal  probity  Li  did  nothing, 
either  by  example  or  precept,  to  sow  the  seeds  of  that 
new  faith,  without  which  all  his  works  were  nothing 
worth.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  matter  of  venality 
and  nepotism,  his  administration  was  notoriously 
lax,  and  compared  unfavourably  with  that  of  many 
of  his  less  brilliant  colleagues.  Indeed,  as  will  be 
shown,  the  Viceroy  surrounded  himself  from  the 
outset  with  a horde  of  needy  relatives  and  greedy 
henchmen,  and  in  the  heyday  of  his  power  (1886 — 
1894)  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  both  the  army  and 
the  navy  had  become  milch  cows  for  the  benefit  of 
his  family  and  followers  ; the  financial  element 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  221 


dominated  and  paralysed  both  services.  In  the  hands 
of  these  men,  by  training  and  temperament  utterly 
incapable  of  any  kind  of  honestly  conscientious  work, 
Li’s  Yamen  at  Tientsin  became,  like  that  of  Prince 
Ch’ing  at  Peking,  a market-place  for  the  sale  of  jobs, 
offices,  and  honours.  Probably  the  most  shameless 
perpetrator  of  these  abuses  was  Li’s  son-in-law, 
Chang  P’ei-lun  (of  whom  more  hereafter ) ; his 
brother  also,  the  Viceroy  Li  Han-chang,  was  known 
all  over  the  Empire  as  the  “ bottomless  purse  ” ; 
while  the  exploits  of  certain  of  his  sons  in  the  matter 
of  unblushing  peculation  were  a byword.  Finally, 
Li’s  intimate  relations  with  the  notoriously  corrupt 
Chief  Eunuch,  Li  Lien-ying,  his  own  insatiable  love 
of  money,  and  the  vast  fortune  which  he  made  as 
Viceroy — all  these  things  are  undeniable.  They 
compel  us  to  the  conclusion  that,  however  earnest 
and  patriotic  his  objects  may  have  been  at  the  outset 
of  his  Viceregal  career,  it  was  eventually  the  canker 
of  corruption,  spreading  rapidly  from  himself  through- 
out every  branch  of  the  public  service  under  his 
orders,  which  made  both  his  army  and  his  navy  no 
better  than  empty  husks.  In  their  greed  of  gain,  he 
and  his  entourage  forgot  their  duty  to  the  State. 
In  1890  he  allowed  his  followers  to  drive  Captain 
Lang,  R.N.,  from  the  Chinese  navy  and  thus  to  wreck 
the  only  disciplined  and  efficient  force  at  his  disposal. 
From  that  time  forward  fleet  and  arsenals  were  run, 
with  Li’s  knowledge  and  tacit  consent,  as  semi- 
commercial undertakings,  and  to  the  results  of  this 
mandarin  administration  (closely  watched  by  Japan) 
China’s  humiliating  defeat  was  undoubtedly  due. 

Both  before  and  after  that  defeat  Li  Hung-chang’s 
apologists  endeavoured  to  show  that  his  failure  to 


222 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


organise  efficient  national  defences  was  in  large 
measure  due  to  the  decentralisation  of  government 
in  China,  and  that  his  attempts  at  centralisation  were 
stultified  by  the  opposition  and  independent  authority 
of  the  provincial  Viceroys.  In  a sense  it  is  true  that 
the  reforms  which  he  introduced  remained  local 
efforts  and  that  no  consistent  system  was  ever 
imposed  on  the  provinces  by  the  Central  Government. 
For  this  reason  the  authorities  in  charge  of  the 
arsenals  at  Canton,  Foochow,  Nanking,  and  other 
places  continued  each  to  carry  out  his  own  ideas, 
entrusting  their  management  to  friends  and  relations 
without  technical  knowledge  or  clearly-defined  duties. 
But  Li  Hung-chang  himself  was  at  heart  an  orthodox 
supporter  of  the  provincial  tradition.  In  the  crucial 
case  of  the  Lay-Osborn  flotilla  (1861)  as  Governor 
of  Kiangsu,  he  had  fought  tooth  and  nail  against 
the  Central  Government’s  attempt  to  establish  an 
Imperial  navy  independent  of  all  provincial  authority, 
and  he  had  compelled  Peking  to  abandon  the  scheme. 
Later,  as  Viceroy  of  the  Metropolitan  Province,  his 
ambition  prompted  him  to  favour  measures  tending 
towards  centralisation  of  the  Executive,  but  never 
with  any  definite  conviction  or  determination.  He 
set  an  example  and  claimed  the  credit  of  energetic 
reforms,  but  the  army  which  he  trained,  the  forts 
he  built,  the  fleet  he  collected,  the  arsenals  and 
military  schools  which  he  established,  were  all  em- 
phatically provincial ; and  when  war  came  with 
Japan  it  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a one-man 
war,  as  far  as  the  rest  of  China  was  concerned.  The 
difference  between  his  naval  and  military  schemes 
and  those  of  the  southern  viceroys,  between  the 
Nanyang  and  the  Pei-yang  squadrons  of  the  modern 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  223 


Chinese  fleet,  was  rather  a matter  of  energy  than  of 
inspiration  ; and  that  energy  which  enabled  him, 
for  example,  to  create  naval  ports  at  Port  Arthur  and 
Wei-hai-wei  was  chiefly  due  to  the  special  advantages 
which  he  enjoyed  for  obtaining  the  funds  necessary 
for  such  experiments  from  the  Board  of  Revenue. 

Li’s  navy  was  provincial,  his  army  territorial ; in 
these  matters,  like  all  his  Viceregal  colleagues,  he 
followed  the  immemorial  tradition  of  his  country  ; 
but  there  is  nothing  in  his  life’s  record  to  show  that 
he  ever  attempted  seriously  to  uproot  that  tradition 
or  to  put  an  end  to  a system  which  obviously  stulti- 
fied at  the  outset  all  hope  of  organising  effective 
national  defences  against  the  Powers  of  the  West. 
If  we  inquire  why  a man  of  his  exceptional  ability 
should  have  continued,  without  protest,  to  work 
under  a system  which,  as  his  intelligence  must  have 
warned  him,  was  foredoomed  to  failure  in  the  day  of 
national  peril,  we  are  again  confronted  by  the 
supreme  importance  of  the  financial  element  under- 
lying all  these  questions.  The  provincial  system  of 
administration  is  merely  a development  of  the  feudal 
family  system,  and  nepotism,  with  all  its  abuses, 
is  therefore  bred  in  its  very  bones — instinctive. 
Under  the  provincial  system  Li  Hung-chang  could 
(and  did)  provide  offices  for  his  relatives  and  depen- 
dants, besides  giving  employment  to  large  numbers 
of  his  fellow-provincials.  Even  his  foreign-drilled 
troops  were  recruited  in  Anhui,  and  most  of  their 
officers  were  members  of  his  own  clan.  Admiral 
Ting,  in  command  of  the  Pei-yang  squadrons,  was  a 
native  of  Anhui  ; but  several  of  his  foreign-educated 
officers  were  Fukhien  men  (Jaute  de  mieux ),  and  the 
result,  after  the  departure  of  Captain  Lang  in  1890,  was 


224 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


a chaos  of  clan  intrigues  and  indiscipline  quite  suffi- 
cient in  itself  to  account  for  the  Japanese  victory. 
Li  recognised  and  accepted  this  system,  which 
amounted  ab  initio  to  the  abandonment  of  every 
sound  military  principle.  He  and  all  his  relatives 
profited  continually  by  its  inherent  abuses,  well 
content  if,  at  the  same  time,  they  were  able  to  create 
at  home  and  abroad  an  impression  of  martial  energy 
and  definite  purposes.  What  actually  happened 
when  the  “ bluff  ” was  exposed,  we  know  from  the 
testimony  of  those  Europeans  who  worked  and 
fought  loyally  in  the  Viceroy’s  service  ; their  state- 
ments prove  conclusively  that  in  official  peculation 
lay  the  immediate  cause  of  China’s  defeat.  Li  was 
cognisant  and  tolerant  of  that  corruption,  and 
therefore  directly  responsible  for  the  fiasco  of  his 
imposing  armaments.  The  cause  of  failure  lay  in 
himself  as  much  as  in  the  materials  at  his  disposal. 

If  we  look  back  to  the  foundations  of  Li’s  reputation 
as  an  authority  on  military  affairs,  that  is  to  say  to  the 
days  of  his  association  with  Gordon,  we  find  that  the 
qualifications  which  he  displayed  were  those  which 
one  would  naturally  expect  in  a mandarin  scholar — 
to  wit,  brilliant  theories  about  strategy,  a strong 
dislike  for  dangerous  places,  a pretty  talent  for 
despatch-writing,  and  constant  attention  to  his  duties 
and  perquisites  as  Paymaster-General.  His  relations 
with  Gordon,  on  his  own  admission,  involved  a con- 
tinual struggle  on  Gordon’s  part  to  obtain  the  pay  due 
to  his  troops  and  on  his  part  to  evade  payment. 
Burgevine,  a capable  soldier,  went  over  to  the  enemy 
because  of  similar  money  quarrels  with  Li. 

In  the  premeditated  massacre  of  the  rebel  chiefs, 
as  in  the  money  reward  which  he  offered  by  proclama- 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  225 


tion  for  the  person  of  Burgevine,  alive  or  dead,  he 
showed  that  his  conception  of  the  business  of  warfare 
had  not  been  greatly  modified  from  the  Oriental  model 
by  reason  of  his  intercourse  with  British  officers.  Of 
political  strategy  and  foresight  he  had  good  store  ; 
but  his  military  tactics  were  almost  as  primitive  and 
rudimentary  as  those  of  his  eminent  colleague  Chang 
Chih-tung,1  dating  back  to  the  days  of  the  Ming 
dynasty,  of  bows  and  arrows,  intimidation  by  loud 
shouting,  and  the  wearing  of  fierce  masks.  In  his 
conduct  of  the  campaign  against  the  Nienfei  rebels 
(1866-67)  fortune  favoured  him  again  ; for  these  out- 
laws, who  had  defeated  Seng  Ko-lin-sin  in  1865,  and 
defied  the  efforts  of  Tseng  Kuo-fan  to  disperse  them 
in  Shansi  and  Hupei,  were  in  reality  an  offshoot  of 
the  Taiping  insurrection,  and  after  the  restoration  of 
order  on  the  Yangtsze  they  disintegrated  and  became 
dwindling  bands  of  wandering  marauders.  Yet  even 
in  dealing  with  these  rebel  bands  Li’s  ideas  of  strategy 
led  him  always  to  avoid  direct  attacks  and  pitched 
battles  ; his  method  was  to  draw  a cordon  of  troops 
round  a disaffected  area  and,  by  stopping  supplies, 
to  “ drive  the  Nienfei  into  the  sea.”  This,  being 
interpreted,  generally  meant  driving  them  into  adjoin- 
ing provinces,  whose  authorities  then  became  liable 
for  their  suppression,  or  for  the  payment  of  funds 
(to  Li)  for  that  purpose.  But  the  despatches  in  which 
Li  described  the  strenuous  ardours  of  his  campaigns, 
the  strength  of  the  enemy,  and  his  financial  necessities, 
were  justly  regarded  by  Chinese  scholars  as  models 
of  their  kind  and  proof  of  his  fitness  to  command  an 
army. 

1 Who  solemnly  advised  the  Throne  that  the  best  way  to  defeat  the 
Japanese  would  be  to  dig  pits  or  traps  in  the  sand  at  their  landing  places. 

L.H.  Q 


226 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


In  the  field  of  political  knowledge  and  common 
sense  Li  was  sufficiently  far  ahead  of  his  generation 
to  perceive  that  under  Chinese  leadership  the  Chinese 
army  could  never  hope  to  hold  the  field  against 
European  troops,  and  he  was  brave  enough  to  defy 
conservative  opinion  by  engaging  foreign  instructors 
for  his  training  schools  and  foreign  experts  for  his 
forts,  arsenals,  and  dockyards.  Herein,  indeed,  lay 
his  chief  claim  to  merit  as  the  administrator  of  naval 
and  military  affairs  : his  knowledge  of  a vital  truth 
to  which  his  colleagues  remained  blind,  and  the 
courage  to  act  single-handed  upon  that  knowledge. 
When  he  came  to  the  Viceroyalty  of  Chihli  in  1870 
and  took  over  from  Tseng  Kuo-fan  troops  which,  as 
Chinese  levies  went,  were  above  the  average,  he  might 
easily  have  rested  on  his  Taiping  laurels.  But  his 
introduction  to  European  methods  of  warfare  during 
his  association  with  Ward,  Burgevine,  and  Gordon, 
and  the  experiences  which  he  had  gained  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  arsenal  at  Nanking,  had  made  a 
powerful  impression  on  his  active  mind.  Forthwith 
he  proceeded  to  work  energetically  at  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  his  Viceregal  army  and  the  construction  of 
a navy  on  Western  models.  In  explaining  and  justi- 
fying his  policy  to  the  Throne  he  stated  that  his  object 
in  employing  foreign  advisers  and  introducing  foreign 
appliances  was  to  bring  China  to  a state  of  defence 
capable  of  effectively  resisting  foreign  aggression. 
If  Japan  could  do  this,  why  not  China  ? His  object 
was  a legitimate  one  and  his  argument  apparently 
sound  ; but  both  were  nullified,  after  twenty-five 
years  of  effort,  by  his  inability  to  preserve  his  naval 
and  military  administration  from  the  demoralisation 
of  mandarin  corruption. 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  227 


It  is  unnecessary  here  to  recapitulate  in  detail  the 
various  measures  of  reorganisation  and  reforms  insti- 
tuted by  Li  Hung-chang  between  1870  and  1894. 
To  all  outward  appearances  they  were  eminently 
successful.  Under  Captain  Lang,  R.N.,  the  Pei-yang 
squadron  (two  ironclads,  six  cruisers,  and  subsidiary 
vessels)  had  attained  to  a degree  of  efficiency  which 
made  it  a force  worthy  of  serious  consideration.  The 
fortifications  of  the  naval  ports  of  Port  Arthur,  Talien- 
wan,  and  Wei-hai-wei,  built  and  equipped  under  the 
direction  of  Herr  von  Hanneken  (Li’s  confidential 
German  adviser  on  military  matters),  were  considered 
practically  impregnable,  and  his  foreign-drilled  troops 
were  popularly  supposed  to  be  as  good  as  those  of 
any  other  Power.  The  Chinese  Dragon  was  reputed, 
in  fact,  to  be  a very  formidable  creature.  But  those 
who  had  occasion  to  look  beneath  the  surface  knew 
by  what  gimcrack  expedients  and  artful  shams  of 
make-believe  the  appearance  of  force  and  cohesion 
was  maintained  in  a body  which  actually  possessed 
neither.  Sympathetic  and  optimistic  advisers  like 
Sir  Robert  Hart  and  Herr  Detring,  understanding 
nothing  of  military  matters,  may  possibly  have  been 
deceived  by  the  glittering  exterior  of  the  counterfeit 
presentment,  but  technical  experts  of  every  kind, 
and  especially  those  in  the  Viceroy’s  service,  knew 
that  the  whole  structure,  on  which  his  reputation  and 
the  safety  of  the  country  depended,  was  rotten  at 
the  core. 

To  deal  first  with  the  navy.  The  organisation  of 
the  Pei-yang  squadron  represented  the  work  of  over 
two  decades  ; it  reached  its  highest  numerical  point 
in  1886,  its  highest  efficiency  in  1890.  In  1891  the 
squadron’s  visit  to  Japan  under  Admiral  Ting  created 


228 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


so  great  an  impression  that  large  additions  to  the 
Japanese  navy  were  promptly  put  in  hand.  The 
smartness  and  discipline  of  the  Chinese  crews  (mostly 
Shantung  and  Chekiang  men)  had  long  been  subject 
for  favourable  comment.  Li’s  last  triennial  inspection 
of  the  coast  naval  defences  (1893)  partook  of  the 
nature  of  a triumphal  progress.  There  was  his  life- 
work,  plain  for  all  men  to  see  and  admire  : his  forts 
and  schools,  railways  and  dockyards,  ships  and  guns, 
all  bright  with  paint  and  polish.  The  guns  boomed 
salutes,  myriads  of  Dragon  flags  greeted  his  coming 
and  going  ; his  colleague  and  guest,  the  Governor 
of  Moukden,  was  greatly  impressed.  So  also  was 
the  “ Old  Buddha,”  who  shortly  afterwards  bestowed 
on  him  the  triple-eyed  peacock’s  feather,  the  highest 
honour  of  its  kind  to  which  a Chinese  subject  could 
aspire.  So  also  was  the  Press,  in  China  and  abroad, 
for  Li  was  never  disposed  to  hide  his  lights  under  a 
bushel,  and  his  “ own  correspondents  ” were  numerous 
and  duly  appreciative  on  such  occasions.  This  was  the 
heyday  of  the  Viceroy’s  fame  ; but  already  the  clouds 
were  gathering  fast  on  the  horizon  that  were  to  obscure 
for  ever  the  sunshine  of  his  prosperity.  In  the  mind’s 
eye,  as  one  sees  him  returning  from  that  highly 
successful  exposition  of  his  handiwork,  amidst  a 
chorus  of  praise  and  thanksgiving,  one  cannot  but 
wonder  how  far  the  old  man  was  himself  deceived, 
how  far  acquiescent  in  this  magnificent  framework 
of  illusion.  For  all  around  him,  on  the  decks  of  his 
ships,  in  every  office  of  his  Yamen,  were  sleek  rogues 
of  his  own  appointing  who  were  selling  the  safety 
of  the  State  in  their  haste  to  put  money  in  their 
purses. 

How  far,  for  instance,  was  he  a consenting  party 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  229 


to  the  intrigues  of  the  three  Fukhien  captains  which 
ended  in  the  resignation  of  Captain  Lang  and  his 
subordinate  British  instructors  (1890)  and  led  to  the 
swift  demoralisation  of  the  fleet  ? How  far  was  his 
acquiescence  in  their  conspiracy  due  to  the  waning 
of  his  physical  energies  ? Impartial  examination  of 
the  facts  leads  us  to  the  conclusion  that  Li  himself 
was  primarily  to  blame  for  this  disastrous  business. 
With  his  habitual  reluctance  to  invest  even  the  best 
of  his  foreign  advisers  with  real  authority,  the  Viceroy 
had  resorted  to  duplicity  when,  on  renewing  his  agree- 
ment, Lang  had  insisted  on  being  given  adequate 
executive  powers  as  co-admiral  with  Ting.  Only 
during  the  latter’s  temporary  absence  did  Lang 
discover  that  his  official  Chinese  rank  (like  Gordon’s) 
was  nothing  but  a sham.  Commodore  Liu,  one  of 
the  three  conspirators  whose  object  was  to  oust  him 
from  his  position,  insisted  then  on  assuming  command 
of  the  fleet,  and  Li  supported  him.  Having  thus 
got  rid  of  the  foreigner,  the  three  captains  (Lin,  Liu, 
and  Fong — all  Fukhien  men)  proceeded  to  work  the 
navy  as  a commercial  undertaking  for  their  own 
benefit.  The  results  were  immediate  and  disastrous. 
The  various  supply  departments,  relieved  of  all 
honest  supervision  and  discipline,  speedily  became 
demoralised.  To  prepare  the  fleet  for  war  was  the 
last  thing  that  the  conspirators  desired  ; on  the 
contrary,  they  relied  on  Li  Hung-chang’s  concilia- 
tory diplomacy  to  keep  the  peace,  whilst  they  shared 
the  profits  of  a “ make-believe  ” fighting  force. 
Four  years  were  enough  to  complete  the  process  of 
disintegration,  of  which  the  Japanese  were  thoroughly 
informed. 

The  Cantonese  Lim  Boon-keng,  friend  of  the 


230 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Reform  leader,  Kang  Yu-wei,  writing  in  1900,1 
rightly  says  that  the  causes  which  led  to  Captain 
Lang’s  resignation  explain  also  the  failures  of  nearly 
all  the  new  schemes  adopted  by  China.  “ Jealousy 
between  foreign  experts  and  ignorant  native  superior 
officers,  bad  pay  for  the  students  and  officers,  nepo- 
tism, and  a bad  policy,  are  among  the  reasons  which 
account  for  the  miserable  fiasco  of  China’s  attempt 
to  assimilate  the  military  and  naval  systems  of 
Europe.”  Native  delicacy  prompted  him,  no  doubt, 
to  omit  official  dishonesty  from  the  list  of  these  con- 
tributory causes  of  disaster. 

When  the  crisis  came,  brought  about  by  the  struggle 
for  Korea,  Li’s  much-vaunted  navy  had  become 
almost  as  useless  for  fighting  purposes  as  the  mediaeval 
towers  with  their  painted  guns  on  the  walls  of  Peking. 
Did  Li  realise  its  condition  ? Again  we  are  compelled 
to  believe  that  he  did,  for  when  the  Court  and  Yamen 
urged  him  to  send  forth  the  fleet  to  avenge  the  sinking 
of  the  Kowshing  he  kept  it  as  long  as  possible  care- 
fully confined  to  the  Gulf  ports.  It  was  at  this 
juncture,  if  report  speaks  truly,  that  he  sent  a secret 
memorial  to  Tzu  Hsi,  intimating  that  the  navy’s 
condition  was  not  what  it  might  have  been  had  Her 
Majesty  not  insisted  on  diverting  Admiralty  funds 
to  the  rebuilding  and  furnishing  of  her  Summer 
Palace.  But  the  Yamen  would  hear  of  no  excuses. 
The  Censors  joined  in  a shrill  chorus  of  taunts  and 
reproaches,  and  Li  was  forced  to  send  his  ships  to 
meet  their  fate  at  the  battle  of  the  Yalu. 

Every  European  in  the  Tientsin  arsenal  was  well 
aware  that  the  cowardice  of  Admiral  Ting’s  captains 

1 “ The  Chinese  Crisis  from  Within,”  by  “ Wen  Ching  ” (London,  Grant 
Richards,  1901). 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  231 


and  the  deficiencies  of  his  ships  meant  impending 
disaster.  That  gallant  but  incapable  commander 
knew  it  also,  and  on  his  advice  Li  hurriedly  stiffened 
his  personnel  with  a handful  of  brave  and  faithful 
foreigners  in  the  Chinese  Government’s  service. 
Without  the  leadership  and  courageous  example  of 
Herr  von  Hanneken,  Captains  Tyler,  McGiffen, 
McClure,  and  other  Europeans,  there  would  have  been 
no  stand  against  the  enemy,  but  only  an  ignominious 
flight  and  fiasco.  Herr  von  Hanneken,  after  narrowly 
escaping  death  on  the  Kowshing  (July  25th),  was 
appointed  chief  of  staff  and  “ adviser  ” to  Admiral 
Ting.  From  Wei-hai-wei  he  reported  to  the  Viceroy 
in  August  that  the  fleet  was  practically  destitute  of 
ammunition,  and  he  urged  that  the  arsenals  at  Tient- 
sin should  be  ordered  to  forward  a full  supply  of  shells 
with  all  speed.  But  the  shells  were  not  in  stock,  and 
no  amount  of  activity  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Stewart  and 
the  foreign  staff  could  provide  the  quantity  required. 
The  fleet  went  forth  in  September  with  fourteen  shells 
per  gun,  and  these  loaded  with  light  practice  charges. 
The  notorious  Chang  P’ei-lun,  Li’s  son-in-law  and 
champion  “ squeezer  ” of  his  Yamen,  was  at  this  time 
in  charge  of  the  Ordnance  Supply  Department. 
China’s  naval  defeats  were  caused  partly  by  his 
wholesale  peculations  and  partly  by  the  treacherous 
cowardice  of  the  sea-going  officers  who  connived  at 
his  dishonesty  and  shared  his  plunder. 

Two  years  before  the  war  Li  Hung-chang,  urged 
by  Herr  von  Hanneken,  had  sanctioned  an  order  for 
the  purchase  from  Krupp’s  of  a large  quantity  of 
heavy  shells  for  the  ten-inch  guns  of  the  two  ironclads 
Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen.  But  the  order  was  never 
executed,  for  Chang  P’ei-lun  disapproved  of  wasting 


232 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


money  on  explosives,  and  his  friends  Captains 
Liu,  Lin,  and  Fong  shared  his  views.  (It  would  be 
interesting  to  know  whether  Li  was  informed  of  this 
“ economy  ” and  on  what  terms  he  agreed  to  it.) 
So  China’s  two  ironclads  went  into  action  on 
September  17th,  at  the  battle  of  the  Yalu,  with  three 
heavy  shells  between  them.  Of  these  three,  one,  fired 
by  Gunner-Instructor  Hekmann  (of  Krupp’s),  hit  and 
nearly  destroyed  the  Japanese  flagship  Matsushima. 
Had  the  proper  quantity  of  ammunition  been  forth- 
coming for  these  heavy  guns,  the  battle  of  the  Yalu 
might  well  have  gone  in  China’s  favour,  for  Admiral 
Ting  was  a fighting  man  and  his  crews  were  mostly 
staunch.  But  the  battleships’  big  guns  were  useless  ; 
and  for  the  rest  of  their  armament  Chang  P’ei-lun’s 
ideas  of  economy  compelled  them,  towards  the  end 
of  the  engagement,  to  use  non-explosive  steel  shot  for 
their  smaller  ordnance.  So  that  it  is  strictly  correct 
to  say  that  the  battle  of  the  Yalu  was  lost  by  reason  of 
the  peculations  of  Li’s  son-in-law,  Chang  P’ei-lun. 
And  for  these,  as  for  Chang’s  presence  in  his  Yamen, 
Li  himself  must  be  held  to  blame.  He  could  not 
pretend  to  be  ignorant  of  his  relative’s  evil  reputation, 
for  it  had  frequently  been  brought  to  the  notice  of 
the  Throne  by  indignant  Memorials  of  the  Censorate  ; 
but  Li  had  always  protected  him.  Four  months 
later  Chang  was  cashiered  and  banished  on  a charge 
of  having  had  corrupt  dealings  with  a Japanese  spy. 

A month  elapsed  after  the  battle  of  the  Yalu  before 
the  order  for  shells  for  the  battleships’  heavy  guns 
was  finally  despatched.  They  arrived  in  China  too 
late  for  delivery  at  Wei-hai-wei,  where  the  blockaded 
fleet  was  making  a last  desperate  stand.  Again,  in 
this  reputedly  formidable  stronghold,  the  gallant  Ting 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  233 


found  the  task  of  defence  impossible,  afloat  and 
ashore,  because  of  the  inefficiency  and  corruption  of 
the  Viceregal  supply  departments.  He  was  loyally 
supported  by  a few  staunch  Europeans,  under  Admiral 
McClure  and  Captain  Tyler,  but  the  odds  against  him 
were  too  heavy,  and  the  disastrous  end  was  a foregone 
conclusion  from  the  day  of  the  Japanese  investment 
of  the  port.  At  the  Itao  fort,  out  of  104  rounds  of 
shell,  only  four  were  found  to  be  filled,  one  with 
powder  and  three  with  sand.  The  sighting  mirrors 
of  the  eight-inch  disappearing  Armstrong  guns  had 
been  stolen,  and  the  breech-blocks  were  out  of  order. 
Chaos  and  confusion  reigned  throughout  the  garrison, 
and  the  Governor  of  Shantung,  anxious  to  shift  the 
blame  for  his  own  delinquencies  on  to  other  shoulders, 
worked  rather  against  Admiral  Ting  than  with  him. 
A feature  of  the  siege  was  the  large  number  of  Chinese 
traitors  in  Japanese  pay  among  the  garrison  ; it  was 
probably  due  to  the  reports  of  one  or  more  of  these 
that  charges  were  made  against  the  Admiral  at 
Peking  which  led  to  his  being  ordered  in  December 
to  hand  over  his  command  and  proceed  to  the  capital 
for  punishment.  This  order  was  subsequently 
rescinded  through  Li’s  influence  and  because  of  a 
vigorous  protest  from  all  the  foreign  officers  on 
Ting’s  staff  ; but  it  sufficed  to  take  the  heart  out  of 
that  gallant  man  at  a time  when  he  deserved  to 
receive  all  possible  assistance  and  encouragement. 
On  February  12th,  at  the  end  of  his  resources,  Ting 
surrendered  the  fortress  and  harbour  to  Admiral 
Ito,  and  on  the  same  day  committed  suicide,  in 
accordance  with  the  best  classical  tradition.  With 
him  died  General  Chang,  commandant  on  Liukung 
Island,  a relative  of  Li  Hung-chang.  On  the  day 


234 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


before  the  capitulation  Ting  had  been  led  to  expect 
reinforcements  from  the  Governor  of  Shantung, 
but  they  came  not.  Instead,  there  came  orders 
from  Li  directing  the  Admiral  to  abandon  the  for- 
tress if  necessary,  but  to  take  his  fleet  out  to  some  other 
port,  a despatch  drafted  possibly  by  Chang  P’ei-lun, 
or  some  other  rogue  of  the  Viceregal  Yamen,  to  fill 
whose  purse  these  good  men  were  sent  to  their 
defeat  and  death. 

Li  Hung-chang  was  sincerely  attached  to  Ting 
(a  genial,  honest  man),  and  deplored  his  death.  He 
admired  the  worthy  Admiral’s  manner  of  exit  from 
a world  in  which  the  force  of  events  and  the  treachery 
of  his  subordinates  had  defeated  everything  but 
his  stout  heart.  Admiral  Ito,  with  the  gallantry 
and  good  feeling  which  distinguish  the  military  caste 
of  Japan,  paid  high  honour  to  the  memory  of  his 
unfortunate  opponent,  and  had  his  body  conveyed 
with  fitting  state  to  Chefoo.  Before  the  surrender 
of  the  fortress  he  had  made  more  than  one  attempt, 
in  accordance  with  Oriental  usage,  to  persuade  Ting 
to  abandon  a cause  which  he  knew  to  be  hopeless  ; 
but  all  his  overtures  were  courteously  declined.  With 
the  fall  of  Wei-hai-wei  and  the  death  of  Ting,  the 
war  was  virtually  ended,  for  Li’s  army  and  navy 
had  ceased  to  exist.  The  Throne  proceeded  to 
inflict  punishment  on  a number  of  Li’s  generals, 
who  had  proved  themselves  utterly  incompetent 
and  cowardly,  and  the  Court  prepared  to  flee  to 
Hsian-fu  in  case  the  victorious  Japanese  should  march 
on  Peking.  Li,  ever  cool  and  determined  in  the  hour 
of  misfortune,  made  arrangements  for  the  removal 
of  his  own  portable  property  from  Tientsin  to  his 
ancestral  home  in  Anhui  and  proceeded  to  take  up 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  235 


his  new  duties,  as  Envoy  Plenipotentiary  and 
negotiator  for  peace  in  Japan. 

Thus,  brought  to  nought  by  its  internal  disorders 
of  corruption,  came  to  its  inglorious  end  the  navy 
which  had  been  the  Viceroy’s  pride  and  the  chief 
source  of  his  fame.  At  the  first  shock  of  war,  all  his 
labour  of  years  had  collapsed,  being  as  a house  built 
upon  the  sands,  without  permanent  foundations  of 
honest  and  patriotic  purpose. 

The  collapse  of  the  Chinese  army  was  even  more 
rapid  and  complete,  but  its  prestige  had  never  been 
equal  to  that  of  the  navy  ; indeed,  its  futility  as  a 
fighting  force,  being  almost  a matter  of  accepted 
tradition,  could  not  have  caused  any  great  surprise 
either  to  Li  himself  or  to  the  Chinese  Government. 
Li’s  own  body  of  foreign  troops,  well  fed  and  well 
paid,  had  never  been  anything  more  than  an  Imperial 
bodyguard,  a parade  force,  useful  enough  for  the 
purposes  of  a Palace  coup  d’etat , or  for  stimulating 
the  imagination  of  journalists  and  diplomats  to  create 
the  impression  of  China  seriously  militant,  but  essen- 
tially an  exotic  growth — a purely  local  and  unrepre- 
sentative stage  effect.  All  the  spasmodic  attempts 
that  Li  and  other  viceroys  had  made  towards  army 
reorganisation  were  merely  as  the  patching  of  a worn- 
out  garment.  Mr.  Michie,  who  had  exceptional 
opportunities  of  watching  the  inner  workings  of  the 
Viceregal  administration,  has  accurately  described 
the  position  of  affairs  : 

“ The  immemorial  conditions  of  military  service 
were  unchanged.  No  army  was  formed,  but  a series 
of  local  levies  raised  without  cohesion  or  central 
control.  The  foreign  instructors  were  kept  strictly 
to  their  class-work,  were  subordinated  to  the  people 


236 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


whom  they  had  to  instruct,  and  possessed  no  kind 
of  authority.  They  were  allowed  to  drill  the  men, 
while  the  officers  for  the  most  part  held  themselves 
above  the  drudgery  of  the  parade-ground.  The  few 
who  had  acquired  a smattering  of  military  education 
in  Europe  were  as  helpless  as  the  foreign  drill-masters 
to  move  their  wholly  ignorant  superiors.  Hence 
abuses  of  the  most  grotesque  kind  did  not  creep  but 
rushed  into  every  camp  and  every  school,  reducing 
the  scientific  teaching  to  a hollow  farce.” 

As  regards  the  provision  of  arms  and  munitions 
for  the  army,  the  same  conditions  of  official  incom- 
petence and  dishonesty  existed  as  those  which  brought 
disaster  on  the  navy.  Every  provincial  authority 
played  for  its  own  hand — none  more  so  than  Chihli — 
and  with  an  eye  rather  to  the  perquisites  and  profits 
of  contracts  than  to  securing  a homogeneous  supply 
of  materiel  and  equipment.  There  was  neither  system 
nor  central  supervision,  with  the  result  that  local 
authorities  and  even  subordinate  officials  competed 
with  each  other  in  the  purchase  of  any  and  every 
sort  of  weapon  and  ammunition.  In  the  same  way, 
each  of  the  various  provincial  arsenals  purchased 
plant  and  materials  as  seemed  right  and  profitable 
to  the  officials  in  charge,  without  reference  to  each 
other  or  to  Peking  ; the  result  was  an  immense  quan- 
tity of  perfectly  useless  munitions,  served  out  hap- 
hazard to  men  who  had  never  been  trained — and 
indeed  were  not  seriously  expected — to  use  them. 
At  Tientsin,  as  in  the  chief  Treaty  Ports,  the  chief 
preoccupation  of  the  mandarins  in  charge  of  military 
supplies  was  to  secure  the  large  “ squeezes  ” of  arms 
contracts  ; there  was  never  any  lack  of  German, 
Austrian,  and  Japanese  agents,  ready  to  oblige  them 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  237 


with  obsolete  weapons  and  sand-loaded  shells,  at 
prices  which  left  both  parties  equally  well  satisfied. 
Nor  was  this  state  of  affairs  in  a way  altered  by  the 
exposure  of  its  rottenness  in  1894.  On  the  contrary, 
as  the  mandarins’  regular  sources  of  revenue  came 
to  be  curtailed  by  the  incidence  of  the  war  indemnity, 
their  proceedings  became  infected  with  an  apres  nous 
le  deluge  recklessness,  and  the  trade  in  arms  flourished 
in  proportion  to  their  increasing  necessities  and 
rapacity.  Chihli,  as  usual,  led  the  way,  by  mortgaging 
the  country’s  dwindling  credit  in  heavy  purchases 
of  miscellaneous  artillery  and  rifles  of  half  a dozen 
different  patterns.  Thus,  at  Hsiku  arsenal  alone, 
in  1900,  the  allies  found  and  seized  an  accumulation 
of  unused  war  material  valued  at  over  two  million 
sterling,  which  had  been  bought,  not  because  the  army 
needed  it,  but  because  the  officials  wanted  the  per- 
quisites and  pickings  of  these  transactions. 

At  the  time  of  the  war  with  France,  the  part  played 
by  Li  Hung-chang  was  less  military  than  political 
and  diplomatic.  In  discussing  its  events  and  results 
he  generally  allowed  it  to  be  understood  that  the 
successes  of  the  French  were  chiefly  due  to  ignorance 
of  the  art  of  war  on  the  part  of  the  Governor  of 
Kwangsi,  thereby  implying  that  a very  different  state 
of  affairs  existed  in  the  enlightened  district  under 
his  own  administration.  His  views  on  this  subject 
were  no  doubt  to  some  extent  sincere,  but  they  were 
also  partly  inspired  by  his  calculated  policy  of  creating 
an  impression  of  strength  as  the  next  best  thing  to 
possessing  an  effective  organisation  of  defence.  In 
discussing  the  situation  and  his  own  plans  with  The 
Times  correspondent  at  Tientsin  in  May,  1884,  he 
repeatedly  expressed  the  hope  that  Europe  would 


238 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


not  be  led  by  the  war  with  France  into  the  mistake 
of  believing  that  China  was  incapable  of  successful 
resistance  against  aggression.  He  professed  implicit 
belief  in  the  military  qualities  of  the  Chinese  soldier. 
“ All  that  is  wanted,”  he  declared,  “ is  organisation, 
with  drill  and  good  officers.  The  chief  cause  of  all 
Chinese  maladministration  is  the  provincial  autonomy 
system,  by  which  the  viceroys  and  even  governors 
are  semi-independent,  and  at  the  same  time,  as  regards 
military  matters,  profoundly  ignorant.” 

These  laudable  sentiments  were  natural  enough, 
coming  from  Li  at  a critical  moment  of  his  career 
when  the  maintenance  of  his  influence  with  the 
Empress  Dowager  depended  on  the  stultification 
of  the  ultra-conservative  party  at  Court  and  the  justi- 
fication of  his  own  programme  of  military  reforms 
on  Western  lines.  A month  later  the  same  corre- 
spondent (Mr.  Michie)  declared  that  the  result  of  the 
war  had  been  to  clear  the  ground  and  leave  Li  in 
more  sharply-defined  contrast  with  the  obstructives, 
“ recognised  by  his  countrymen  to  be  the  one  China- 
man possessed  of  the  art  of  reconciling  nationality 
with  the  assimilation  of  foreign  ideas.”  Politically 
speaking,  the  result  of  the  Tonquin  war  was  therefore 
not  unsatisfactory  from  Li’s  personal  point  of  view. 
At  the  same  time,  with  an  eye  to  the  future,  he  en- 
deavoured to  minimise  the  advantages  that  France 
had  gained  from  it.  He  assured  The  Times  corre- 
spondent that  “ the  ludicrous  feebleness  of  the  Chinese 
operations  seemed  to  him  no  reason  for  surrendering 
faith  in  the  capacity  of  the  Empire  to  create  an  army 
organised,  disciplined,  and  officered  well  enough  to 
defend  what  remains  from  European  ambitions,  if 
not  to  retrieve  the  old  losses.”  Therein  spoke  the 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  239 


diplomat,  intent  on  creating  abroad  the  impression 
of  latent  power  and  at  home  the  opinion  that  he 
himself  was  the  one  “ strong  man  ” to  make  it 
effective. 

But  in  China  the  chasm  that  lies  between  the  words 
and  works  of  public  men  is  wider  even  than  under 
the  European  imposture  of  party  politics.  Li  attri- 
buted the  blunders  of  the  Tonquin  war  to  the  stupidity 
and  ignorance  of  the  Governor  of  Kwangsi,  and  to 
the  Chinese  Government’s  fatal  habit  of  filling  round 
holes  with  square  pegs.  He  denounced  the  then 
existing  administrative  system  as  utterly  rotten, 
needing  a “ current  of  healthy  new  blood  to  be  set 
running  through  it  before  a cure  can  begin  to  be 
worked.”  Out  of  his  own  mouth,  therefore,  Li  stands 
condemned  ; for  the  generals  who  held  command 
by  his  appointment  in  1894  were  not  only  not  of  the 
new  blood,  but  they  were  notoriously  corrupt  and 
incompetent  mandarins  of  the  old  stamp,  while  the 
most  important  offices  in  his  civil  administration  were 
entrusted  to  men  like  Chang  P’ei-lun  and  Sheng 
Kung-pao. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  in  detail  the  lamentable 
phases  of  the  1894  campaign  on  land.  The  chief 
preoccupation  of  Li’s  generals  was  to  make  room  for 
the  advancing  Japanese,  while  preserving  the  appear- 
ance of  determined  resistance  ; the  Tientsin  troops 
(recruited  from  Li’s  province  of  Anhui)  were  more 
concerned  with  looting  from  the  Koreans  than  with 
engaging  the  enemy.  These  men  were  commanded 
by  General  Wei  Ju-kuei,  one  of  Li’s  favourite  hench- 
men, whose  utter  incompetence  and  cowardice  had 
frequently  been  denounced  by  the  Censors  ; he  was 
beheaded  in  November.  General  Yeh,  who  dis- 


240 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tinguished  himself  by  treachery  and  flight  at  Ping- 
yang,  was  another  of  Li’s  nominees  and  proteges.  The 
only  troops  that  displayed  any  stomach  for  fighting 
were  those  led  by  the  Shantung  Mahomedan  Tso 
Pao-kuei,  who,  contrary  to  all  his  colleagues’  ideas, 
fell  fighting  at  the  head  of  his  men.  At  Port  Arthur 
the  defence  had  been  entrusted  to  General  Wei 
Ju-ch’eng,  brother  of  Wei  Ju-kuei  and  his  equal  in 
cowardly  inefficiency.  Associated  with  him  was  the 
Taotai  Kung  Chao-yu,  civil  commandant,  who  fled 
to  Chefoo  when  the  Japanese  investment  of  the  for- 
tress began,  but  was  forced  by  the  Governor  of 
Shantung  to  return  to  his  post.  Under  such  leaders 
no  defence  by  Chinese  troops  was  to  be  expected. 
The  great  fortress,  on  which  such  vast  sums  had  been 
spent  and  which  German  experts  had  declared  to  be 
impregnable,  fell  almost  at  the  first  attack.  The 
garrison,  as  usual,  proceeded  to  loot  the  dockyard 
treasure  and  stores,  and  the  portable  property  of 
civilians,  preparatory  to  flight.  The  officer  in  com- 
mand of  the  harbour  defences  fled  after  disconnecting 
the  wires  of  the  mine-field.  Not  a single  torpedo  or 
mine  of  the  large  number  laid  was  ever  fired.  Prac- 
tically, no  opposition  was  offered  to  General  Oyama’s 
landing  at  Kinchou  on  October  24th,  or  to  his  capture 
of  Talien-wan  a fortnight  later.  When  the  Japanese 
army  entered  Port  Arthur  they  found  there  a large 
stock  of  coal  and  ammunition  ; the  fortifications  were 
undismantled,  the  dockyard  plant  undestroyed. 

Port  Arthur  was  Li  Hung-chang’s  most  imposing 
achievement,  his  constant  source  of  pride.  Its  brief 
career  and  inglorious  end  merely  served  to  emphasise 
a fact  which  Li  himself  had  had  occasion  to  proclaim 
thirty  years  before,  namely,  that  without  competent 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  241 


and  courageous  leaders,  Chinese  soldiers  will  not  fight, 
and  that  the  mandarin  caste  is  incapable  of  producing 
such  leaders.  He  had  learnt  this  lesson  during  active 
service  against  the  Taipings,  but  his  bias  of  class  had 
been  stronger  than  his  convictions,  and  he  had  failed 
to  apply  it. 

Nor  was  he  converted  to  sincere  purposes  of  military 
reform  by  the  humiliation  of  defeat  and  the  wrathful 
indignation  of  his  countrymen.  Early  in  December, 
when  the  disheartened  Chinese  Government  was 
sending  abortive  peace  missions  to  Japan  and  appeals 
to  the  European  Powers,  it  still  hoped  against  hope 
for  the  possibility  of  some  miraculous  stroke  of  strategy 
which  might  suddenly  save  the  situation.  Impelled 
by  this  hope,  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  summoned  Herr 
von  Hanneken  to  its  counsels.  He  came  to  Peking, 
conferred  with  Prince  Kung  and  Prince  Ch’ing,  and 
submitted  to  them  a cut-and-dried  scheme  for  the 
rapid  organisation  of  an  Imperial  (as  distinct  from 
provincial)  army  of  100,000  men,  with  2,000  foreign 
officers.  Herr  Detring,  just  then  returned  from  his 
futile  mission  to  Japan,  was  present  at  this  meeting 
and  tendered  to  the  reverend  greybeards  of  the  Yamen 
some  excellent  advice  on  the  financial  and  adminis- 
trative reforms  which  must  be  put  in  hand  as  pre- 
liminary and  essential  to  the  permanent  success  of 
any  sound  army  scheme.  The  Manchu  members  of 
the  Yamen  were  impressed  by  this  advice  and  inclined 
to  sanction  Herr  von  Hanneken’s  proposal,  but  the 
Chinese  with  one  voice  opposed  it.  And  Li  Hung- 
chang,  when  consulted,  sided  with  the  opposition. 
Under  his  direction,  his  faithful  servant  Sheng 
Kung-pao  submitted  an  alternative,  and  “ much 
more  economical,”  scheme.  For  reasons  that  were 


2\2 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


obvious  to  all  concerned,  he  recommended  a smaller 
army  (30,000  men)  and  more  guns,  and  his  proposals 
found  favour  with  the  Court  and  with  the  great 
majority  of  high  Chinese  officials.  There  was  no 
desire  on  their  part  to  embark  on  any  scheme  of 
army  reorganisation  which  would  involve  large  expen- 
diture, especially  if  that  expenditure  was  to  be  under 
the  strict  unproductive  supervision  of  foreigners. 
What  they  really  looked  for,  what  they  hoped  that 
von  Hanneken  would  evolve,  was  some  scheme,  of 
the  magical  kind  frequently  suggested  to  Li  by 
errant  chevaliers  d’’ Industrie , which  would  rout  the 
victorious  Japanese  by  unprecedented  stratagems, 
some  deep-laid  pitfall  of  the  sort  solemnly  advocated 
(without  details)  by  Chang  Chih-tung.  But  the  last 
thing  which  they  desired  was  to  see  2,000  foreign 
officers  invested  with  the  kind  of  authority  which 
would  limit  the  mandarin’s  time-honoured  right  to 
peculation,  patronage,  and  the  perquisites  of  office. 

Li  Hung-chang,  the  great  progressive,  became 
leader  of  the  reactionaries  in  this  matter.  Why  ? 
Partly,  no  doubt,  because  of  chagrin  at  his  own  dis- 
comfiture and  dislike  of  the  idea  that  a foreigner  1 
should  be  entrusted  with  a task  in  which  Li,  China’s 
great  man,  had  failed.  But  the  determinant  feature 
of  the  situation  and  the  root-cause  of  his  fierce  oppo- 
sition to  the  reasonable  proposals  of  one  who  had 
fully  proved  his  loyalty  to  China  and  to  himself,  lay 
in  the  fact  that  the  reorganisation  of  the  army  by 
foreigners  meant  foreign  control,  and  particularly 
control  of  arms  purchases.  In  other  words,  the  craft 

1 Von  Hanneken  entered  Li’s  service  as  aide-de-camp  in  1879,  engaged 
through  the  Chinese  Legation  in  Berlin.  He  had  served  in  the  artillery  and 
also  in  the  cavalry  of  the  German  Army.  His  loyal  and  eminent  services 
to  Li  and  to  China  were  never  adequately  recognised. 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  243 


of  Demetrius  was  in  danger,  and  greater  than  Diana 
of  the  Ephesians  is  the  mandarin’s  hereditary  right 
of  “ squeeze.”  Behind  Li,  as  one  man,  stood  the 
whole  Chinese  mandarinate,  far  more  deeply  con- 
cerned for  its  own  class  privileges  than  for  the  honour 
and  safety  of  the  Empire. 

When  Herr  von  Hanneken’s  proposals  were  even- 
tually shelved  by  the  Chinese  Government,  Li  had 
been  deprived  of  all  his  titles  and  honours,  retaining 
only  the  territorial  Governorship.  His  old  rival,  Liu 
K’un-yi,  head  of  the  Hunanese  clan,  had  been  ap- 
pointed to  supersede  him  as  Generalissimo  of  China’s 
naval  and  military  forces.  To  all  outward  appear- 
ances the  great  man  had  fallen  upon  evil  days  ; his 
enemies  mocked  him  openly  in  the  gates.  Arguing 
from  these  facts,  Mr.  Michie,  in  his  apologia,  asks 
how  could  Li  possibly  have  framed  and  carried  out 
an  independent  reactionary  military  policy  and  have 
succeeded,  through  Sheng  Kung-pao,  in  frustrating 
Herr  von  Hanneken’s  proposals.  The  answer  to 
this  apparently  reasonable  argument  is  that,  through- 
out the  period  of  his  apparent  disgrace,  Li  continued 
to  enjoy,  behind  the  scenes,  the  protection  of  Tzu 
Hsi  and  the  no  less  powerful  assistance  of  his  business 
associate,  the  Chief  Eunuch  Li  Lien-ying,  always  the 
power  behind  the  Throne. 

It  may  be  that  if  Russia  had  not  been  brought,  by 
Li’s  diplomacy  and  in  her  own  interest,  to  intervene, 
if  China  had  actually  been  stripped  of  her  fortresses  and 
territory  on  the  mainland  by  the  despised  “ Wojen,” 
and  if  Li  had  been  brought  to  account  for  these 
national  humiliations,  the  Manchus  might  at  least 
have  attempted  to  stay  the  process  of  disintegration 
by  adopting  some  such  serious  scheme  of  army  reform 


244 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


as  that  which  Herr  von  Hanneken  had  proposed. 
But  once  the  news  had  been  whispered  and  judiciously 
spread  abroad  that  Li  had  succeeded  in  his  congenial 
task  of  setting  one  barbarian  against  the  other,  and 
that  Japan  would  consequently  be  compelled  to 
restore  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-wei — in  other  words, 
that  the  penalties  of  defeat  were  indefinitely  remitted 
— even  the  Manchu  princes  took  heart  of  grace  and 
discarded  their  garments  of  repentance.  So  the  idea 
of  drastic  reforms,  of  honest  administration  and  con- 
scientious training  was  allowed  to  drop  by  general 
consent.  It  was  evident  that  China  was  to  be  per- 
mitted to  enjoy  at  least  one  more  congenial  breathing- 
space,  that  the  mandarin’s  sun  had  not  yet  set,  and  that 
he  might  still  make  hay  according  to  his  own  ideas. 

Therefore,  when  Li  departed  a few  months  later 
on  his  journey  to  Moscow  and  beyond,  he  went  in 
triumph  and  in  the  certain  knowledge  that  the  idea 
of  reorganising  the  army  under  the  direction  and 
control  of  foreigners  had  lapsed  with  China’s  imme- 
diate danger  of  dismemberment.  He  could  go  with 
a tranquil  mind,  assured  that,  on  his  return,  things 
would  be  just  as  they  had  always  been  at  Peking 
and  Tientsin.  There  would  then  be  new  schemes 
for  him  to  evolve,  contracts  to  be  placed,  new  lath 
and  plaster  to  repair  the  gaping  wounds  of  his  official 
whited  sepulchres  ; old  things  might  be  called  by 
new  names,  new  men  might  be  discovered  to  utter 
the  old  shibboleths  ; but  whatever  happened,  the 
sacred  rights  of  the  mandarin  in  general,  and  of 
Li  Hung-chang  in  particular,  would  remain  inviolate 
for  some  years  to  come.  So,  vogue  la  galere  ! Here 
we  have  Li  at  his  cynical  worst,  dominated  by  his 
passion  for  undisputed  authority.  Indifferent  to  the 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  245 


interests  of  his  country,  ready  to  abandon  all  the 
principles  which  he  had  advocated  for  years,  Li’s 
conduct  after  the  debacle  of  1894  proved  that  he  was 
prepared  to  barter  the  future  of  the  Empire  for  any 
scheme  that  promised  him  a new  lease  of  power.  In 
this,  as  indeed  in  many  other  matters,  he  was  a 
faithful  follower  and  imitator  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty 
Tzu  Hsi. 

It  is  impossible  for  the  foreigner,  looking  at  this 
aspect  of  Li’s  career  from  the  European  point  of 
view,  not  to  hold  Li  largely  responsible  for  China’s 
humiliating  defeat  and  for  many  of  the  subsequent 
misfortunes  of  the  Chinese  people,  even  unto  the 
present  day.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  he  was 
false  to  his  own  professed  convictions,  to  the  light 
of  his  own  superior  intelligence,  in  building  up  an 
imposing  and  costly  structure  of  naval  and  military 
equipment  on  foundations  which  he  knew  to  be 
utterly  unsound.  It  is  certain  that  in  pursuing  this 
course  he  was  actuated  as  much  by  personal  motives 
as  by  the  hope  of  creating  abroad  a fictitious 
impression  of  China’s  military  strength  ; also,  that 
he  followed  the  tradition  of  his  class  by  subordinating 
the  service  of  the  State  to  personal  ends.  But, 
looking  at  the  matter  from  the  Chinese  point  of  view, 
the  blame  that  he  incurred  is  not  ascribed  to  his 
methods,  but  only  to  their  lack  of  success  ; and  even 
this  measure  of  blame  has  already  been  condoned 
by  the  great  majority  of  his  countrymen  in  considera- 
tion of  his  meritorious  loyalty  and  achievements  in 
other  fields  of  the  public  service.  Posterity,  in  fact, 
is  doing  him  that  justice  which  his  contemporaries 
often  refused  him.  The  Chinese  people  are  generally 
unconcerned  with  politics,  leaving  the  business  of 


246 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


government,  of  war  and  peace,  to  the  official  hierarchy. 
Public  opinion  as  a rule  weighs  the  nation’s  great 
men  in  the  balance  of  Celestial  tradition,  counting 
it  to  them  for  righteousness,  even  in  the  day  of  failure, 
if  they  have  followed  closely  in  the  ancient  ways, 
sanctioned  by  immemorial  usage.  Venality  in  the 
mandarin  caste  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  accepted 
tradition  ; also  the  official  bedecking  of  whited 
sepulchres  and  the  solemn  pageantry  of  “ make- 
believe.”  For  these  things  Li  is  generally  exonerated, 
since  every  Chinese  subject  has  been  reared  in  tacit 
acceptance  of  the  fact  that  the  whole  art  of  govern- 
ment lies  in  skilfully  organised  deception,  the  creation 
of  a vast  framework  of  illusion,  and  division  of  the 
profits.  Europeans  saw,  or  thought  they  saw,  in 
Li  Hung-chang  a variant  from  the  normal  type  of 
Chinese  mandarin,  a new  Moses  who  should  lead  the 
people  into  the  promised  land.  The  Chinese  themselves 
saw  in  him  an  unusually  astute  exponent  of  the  art 
of  make-believe,  and  a pastmaster  in  the  science  of 
political  jiu-jitsu — above  all,  a Confucianist  scholar 
and  a true  believer  in  the  Canons  of  the  Sages. 
Wooden  guns,  tiger-head  shields,  armies  on  paper 
— all  these  for  centuries  have  played  their  part 
in  China’s  economical  militarism.  Li  Hung-chang 
merely  adapted  “ old  custom  ” to  the  requirements 
of  a new  dispensation  and  produced  some  new  and 
imposing  stage  effects.  If,  in  the  war  with  Japan, 
all  his  stratagems  and  devices  proved  useless,  if 
in  consequence  he  narrowly  escaped  the  extreme 
penalty  of  failure,  it  remains  to  his  credit  that  he 
was  able  by  sheer  force  of  character  (or  luck)  to 
regain  his  high  estate  and  to  pass  from  the  scene 
recognised  by  his  Imperial  mistress,  by  foreigners, 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  247 


aye,  even  by  his  enemies,  as  the  greatest  man  in  the 
Empire.  Thus  considered,  the  moral  aspect  of  his 
qualities  becomes  a matter  in  which  latitude  and 
longitude  are  dominant  factors. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  amongst  his  countrymen 
the  healing  hand  of  Time  has  effaced  the  memory 
of  Li’s  failures  and  that  contemporary  opinion  in 
China  (which,  be  it  remembered,  is  largely  an  official 
product)  now  pays  him  reverence.  As  the  bureau- 
cracy sees  it,  his  career  was  a model  of  almost  un- 
broken success,  achieved  on  strictly  classical  lines, 
with  interesting  diversions  into  exotic  byways  of 
modernism.  In  any  other  land  but  China,  Li’s 
handling  of  the  navy  would  have  been  a sore  subject, 
from  the  discussion  of  which  discreet  politicians 
would  abstain  ; not  so  with  Li’s  friends  and  followers 
in  Peking  to-day.  Only  a year  ago  a solemn  proposal 
was  made  to  the  late  President  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  in  a 
Memorial  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Navy,  asking  that  a 
special  temple  should  be  erected  in  Peking  to  the 
memory  of  Li  Hung-chang,  Tso  Tsung-tang,  and 
Shen  Pao-chen,  the  founders  of  the  Chinese  navy, 
“ so  that  naval  officers  and  men  might  pay  homage 
to  the  spirit  of  these  statesmen.”  The  Memorial, 
as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  gives  an  historical  account 
of  the  growth  of  the  Chinese  navy,  from  which  the 
uninitiated  might  conclude  that  its  career  has  been 
an  enduring  and  brilliant  success  even  unto  to-day. 

“ In  the  darkest  and  most  conservative  time  of 
the  late  Ching  dynasty  ” (it  says)  “ Tso  Tsung-tang 
foresaw  the  necessity  of  coast  defence  ; he  built  the 
Foochow  arsenal  and  recommended  Shen  Pao-chen 
to  be  the  Director-General  there.  Shen  organised 
an  arsenal  school  and  built  eight  gunboats,  which 


248 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


were  the  beginning  of  the  Chinese  navy.  Later  on, 
Li  Hung-chang  constructed  the  Pei-yang  and  Nanyang 
squadrons.  It  was  due  to  his  untiring  efforts  that 
the  navy  continued  to  grow,”  etc.,  etc. 

Closely  studied,  this  Memorial  is  not  so  much  a 
testimony  to  the  virtues  and  talents  of  Li  Hung-chang 
in  his  capacity  as  naval  organiser  as  a proof  of  the 
continuance  under  the  Republic  of  those  character- 
istics which  distinguished  mandarin  administration 
under  the  Empire,  of  its  infinite  capacity  for  solemn 
imposture,  of  “ the  unbroken  continuity  of  ancient 
traditions  ” upon  which  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  loved  to 
insist.  For  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  in  granting 
the  memorialists’  request,  wisely  observed  that  it 
would  not  be  right  “ to  check  the  enthusiasm  and 
patriotism  of  naval  officers,  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
in  view  of  the  critical  situation  of  the  country, 
everything  possible  should  be  done  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  encourage  the  martial  spirit  of  naval  men.” 
Thus  the  temple  to  the  memory  of  Li  becomes,  in 
fact  (or  would,  if  it  were  ever  built),  a monument  to 
the  splendid  persistence  of  mandarin  traditions. 
Surely  his  spirit,  “ wandering  by  the  Yellow  Springs,” 
must  rejoice  to  know  that  even  when  the  navy  has 
practically  ceased  to  exist,  its  classic  soul  goes 
marching  on,  steadily  following  the  ancient  way. 
Surely,  also,  he  must  chuckle  genially,  as  was  his 
wont,  at  the  characteristic  conclusion  of  this  matter, 
in  which  the  cloven  hoof  of  a material  purpose  peeps 
out  from  beneath  the  cloak  of  grateful  veneration. 

“ The  Ministry  therefore  proposes  that  a Club 
should  be  erected  for  the  officials  of  the  Ministry  of 
the  Navy,  and  a garden  should  be  laid  out  within  the 
enclosure  of  the  Club  premises,  with  flowers  and 


NAVAL  AND  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATOR  249 


shrubs  to  make  the  place  attractive.  After  office 
hours,  naval  officers  may  gather  together  at  this 
Club  for  recreation  and  mutual  fellowship.  In  the 
garden,  a temple  should  be  erected  to  the  memory 
of  Li  Hung-chang,  Tso  and  Shen,  and  dates  be 
selected  in  spring  and  autumn  upon  which  the 
Ministry  of  the  Navy  would  offer  sacrifices  to  the 
spirits  of  these  founders  of  the  Chinese  navy.” 

Not  Li  Hung-chang  himself  could  have  devised  a more 
suitable  spot  for  his  temple  ! 

It  may  be  suggested  that  this  Memorial  does  not 
necessarily  represent  any  general  opinion  of  con- 
temporary China  in  regard  to  Li’s  career,  for  the 
reason  that  President  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  being  Li’s 
protege , was  bound  to  show  due  reverence  to  his 
name,  and  to  arrange  the  mise-en-scene  for  such  acts 
of  homage.  But  this  is  not  so  : it  is  not  the  individual, 
but  the  mandarin  tradition,  which  here  pays  its 
respects  to  one  of  its  most  eminent  and  successful 
exponents.  If  we  are  unable  to  sympathise  with 
this  tradition,  if  we  fail  to  appreciate  the  Oriental 
system  of  “ culture,”  in  which  words  ceased  ages  ago 
to  have  any  direct  relation  to  facts,  if  we  condemn 
Li  Hung-chang  because,  in  spite  of  his  words,  his 
works  failed  to  infuse  into  the  military  administration 
of  China  a system  utterly  opposed  to  that  form  of 
culture,  let  us  remember  that  “ we  are  what  wind 
and  waters  make  us,”  and  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
modify  the  traditions  of  a race,  or  even  of  a caste, 
in  the  brief  space  of  a generation.  Finally,  in  con- 
doning Li’s  failures,  let  us  remember  that  the  Chinese 
system  of  government,  and  the  class  which  directs 
it,  derive  their  inspiration  from  the  Confucian 
philosophy  much  more  consistently  than  European 


250 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


countries  derive  theirs  from  Christianity.  The 
Chinese  system  is  founded  upon  a doctrine  of  moral 
force,  so  that,  as  Mr.  Michie  has  justly  observed, 
“ their  misconception  of  all  that  belongs  to  the  world 
of  physical  force  is  not  only  explicable  but  inevitable  ; 
for  between  the  two  is  no  common  ground  on  which 
even  a compromise  might  be  effected,  and  the  one 
must  eternally  misunderstand  the  other.” 


CHAPTER  VII 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN 

In  considering  the  career  of  Li  Hung-chang  as 
statesman  and  politician  it  is  evident  that  our  survey- 
must  overlap  at  certain  points  that  of  his  record 
as  an  official  and  of  his  achievements  as  diplomat. 
Li’s  policy  in  the  matter  of  the  Reform  movement  of 
1898,  for  example,  was  to  a great  extent  determined 
by  his  position  as  an  official.  Quite  obviously,  that 
position  was  at  variance  with  his  innermost  convic- 
tions in  the  region  of  domestic  politics,  and  the  results 
were  such  as  to  prejudice  his  reputation  for  broadly 
consistent  statesmanship.  Generally  speaking,  how- 
ever, there  is  to  be  observed  in  his  handling  of 
such  problems  as  were  involved  in  Young  China’s 
reform  programme — education,  social  emancipation 
from  ancient  tradition,  constitutional  government, 
and  religious  toleration — a very  remarkable  capacity 
for  philosophic  detachment  and  liberal  ideas,  un- 
biassed by  the  exigencies  of  his  position  as  official 
or  diplomat  ; a breadth  of  mind  and  perspicacity  of 
judgment  which  greatly  distinguished  him  from  his 
mandarin  colleagues. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  in  China  the  distinction 
between  an  official  and  a politician  cannot  be  drawn 
as  it  is  in  Europe,  for  the  reason  that,  until  quite 
recently,  politics,  as  understood  in  China,  were  a 
close  preserve  of  the  literati  and  gentry  classes,  from 
which  the  bulk  of  officialdom  was  drawn.  Even 


252 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


to-day,  despite  all  the  tumult  and  the  shouting  of 
so-called  Republicans  and  the  upheaval  which  drove 
the  Manchus  from  the  throne,  politics  make  little  or 
no  appeal  to  the  masses  of  the  people,  but  only  to 
the  “ intellectuals,”  chiefly  represented  by  the  Press, 
and  to  the  politicians  who  struggle  for  the  spoils 
of  office.  It  is  true  that  political  parties  of  a sort 
existed  in  the  State  before  Young  China’s  appear- 
ance on  the  scene,  but  the  objects  of  their  existence 
and  their  struggles  always  had  their  origin  in  pro- 
vincial clan  feuds  for  place  and  power,  and  not  in 
any  distinct  cleavage  of  public  opinion  on  questions 
of  national  policy.  Li  Hung-chang,  as  an  Anhui 
man,  belonged  as  a matter  of  birthright  to  the  power- 
ful party  which  disputed  the  field  with  the  Hunanese 
party  (led  by  the  Tso  and  Tseng  families)  from  i860 
to  1890.  The  struggle  perpetually  waged  between 
these  parties  was  economic  rather  than  political ; 
it  was  none  the  less  bitter  for  being  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  polite  rules  of  the  bureaucracy, 
by  secret  impeachments  and  Censors’  Memorials, 
by  Palace  intrigues  and  stratagems,  by  organised 
bribery  and  corruption.  Before  the  European  Powers 
and  their  trade  came  to  play  an  important  role  in 
the  affairs  of  the  Middle  Kingdom,  these  factions 
represented  men  rather  than  ideas  ; whichever  side 
produced  a great  scholar  or  a successful  suppressor 
of  rebellion  became,  ipso  facto,  stronger  in  proportion 
to  the  wealth  and  patronage  which  he  might  be  in 
a position  to  command  by  favour  of  the  Throne. 
But  as  the  Powers,  with  their  missionaries  and  multi- 
farious questions,  came  to  exercise  a more  and  more 
disturbing  influence  on  the  affairs  and  finances  of 
the  Government  at  Peking,  and  as  the  spread  of 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  253 


“ Western  learning  ” began  to  produce  its  harvest 
of  unrest  in  the  growth  of  Young  China,  as  a political 
party  founded  on  ideas,  it  came  to  pass  that  the  Anhui 
and  Hunanese  parties  respectively  became  identified 
with  certain  definite  lines  of  national  policy  in  regard 
to  the  ever-vexed  question  of  administrative  reform. 
Thus,  after  1870,  Anhui,  following  its  brilliant  leader 
Li  Hung-chang,  came  to  stand  for  moderate  pro- 
gressive ideas,  whilst  Hunan  represented  uncom- 
promising conservatism.  Later,  with  the  growth 
of  an  intelligent  vernacular  Press,  directed  by  men 
of  progressive  views,  not  only  these  provincial  factions 
but  the  whole  Mandarinate  came  to  be  roughly  divided 
into  Progressives  and  Conservatives,  and  the  struggle 
for  place  and  power  was  gradually  modified  accord- 
ingly. Finally,  a factor  arose,  disturbing  to  both  of 
these  parties,  in  the  wealth  and  disruptive  tendencies 
of  the  Cantonese  overseas,  and  of  their  followers  in 
Southern  and  Central  China  ; by  these  the  dynastic 
question  was  raised  in  a manner  which  gradually 
produced  a new  line  of  cleavage  in  the  bureaucracy, 
dividing  it  into  supporters  and  opponents  of  the 
Manchu  rulers.  After  the  Japanese  war  something 
approaching  to  an  expression  of  national  sentiment 
was  created,  and  the  revolutionary  conspiracies  led 
by  Sun  Yat-sen  and  other  Cantonese  were  secretly 
supported  by  a very  considerable  number  of  officials. 
If  Kang  Yu-wei  was  able  to  obtain  access  to  the 
Emperor  Kuang  Hsu  and  to  gain  his  support  for  the 
Reform  movement  of  1898,  it  was  because  Chinese 
officials  of  the  highest  rank  had  been  led,  by  the 
disastrous  results  of  the  war,  to  hold  opinions  which 
foreshadowed  the  end  of  the  autocratic  Manchu 
power.  Reform  thus  became  associated  with  revolu- 


254 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tion  in  the  minds  of  orthodox  supporters  of  the 
dynasty,  and  the  whole  course  of  domestic  politics 
was  complicated  by  the  fact  that  many  proved  Pro- 
gressives were  therefore  compelled,  as  a matter  of 
loyalty,  to  figure  as  reactionaries.  This  was  con- 
spicuously the  case  with  Li  Hung-chang. 

This  preliminary  explanation  of  the  comparatively 
recent  evolution  of  politics  in  China  is  requisite  to 
a proper  understanding  of  the  part  played  by  Li  Hung- 
chang  in  China’s  domestic  affairs,  and  more  especially 
of  his  apparently  inconsistent  conduct  in  supporting 
the  Empress  Dowager’s  coup  d’etat  and  her  ruthless 
**  suppression  of  the  Reform  movement  in  September? 
1898.  In  spite  of  superficial  appearances  to  the  con- 
trary, the  course  of  his  policy  was  generally  in  accord- 
ance with  all  his  professed  convictions,  and  these, 
in  their  turn,  were  the  natural  result  of  his  class  bias 
and  prejudices  as  a literary  aristocrat.  He  modified 
their  direction,  cela  va  sans  dire , to  meet  new  conditions 
in  matters  of  detail,  but  in  matters  of  fundamental 
principle  (such  as  his  Confucianist  loyalty  to  the 
Throne)  he  was  not  inconsistent — which  ds  more  than 
can  be  said  of  his  policy  in  the  matter  of  naval  and 
military  organisation. 

It  is  undeniable  that  Li  Hung-chang  held  certain 
fixed  principles,  which  guided  his  actions  throughout 
his  many-sided  career.  One  led  him  to  insist  on  the 
supreme  importance  of  maintaining  law  and  order 
at  all  costs  ; another,  arising  from  the  first,  was  to 
exact  observance  by  the  provincial  authorities  of 
all  treaties  with  foreign  Powers  ; a third,  which  he 
emphasised  by  force  of  example  all  his  days,  was 
that  to  deal  successfully  with  the  foreigner  it  was 
necessary  to  understand  him,  and  that  this  could 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  255 


only  be  done  by  means  of  direct  personal  intercourse. 
But  all  his  principles  were  bound  up  with,  and  limited 
by,  his  implicit  belief  in  the  moral  superiority  of  the 
Confucian  philosophy  over  the  material  civilisation 
of  the  West  and  his  unswerving  devotion  to  the 
Empress  Dowager,  as  the  de  facto  head  of  the  State. 

Admitting  the  existence  and  force  of  these  prin- 
ciples, admitting  also  that  his  record,  both  as  diplo- 
matist and  military  organiser,  gives  proof  of  concrete 
statesmanship  and  continuity,  we  are  compelled  at 
the  same  time  to  admit  that  his  life’s  work  as  states- 
man and  politician  contains  no  evidence  of  any 
clearly-defined  constructive  policy.  According  to 
Mr.  Michie’s  judgment,  his  claim  to  distinction  as 
a statesman  consists  in  his  having,  in  his  own  person 
and  without  a party,  stood  between  the  old  world 
and  the  new,  and  devoted  his  life  to  working  out  in 
practice  a modus  vivendi  between  them.  But  even 
Mr.  Michie  was  compelled  to  admit  that  his  methods 
were  generally  empirical  and  opportunist.  If  this 
were  the  case  in  his  direction  of  foreign  policy,  it 
was  infinitely  more  so  in  his  conduct  of  domestic 
affairs.  His  opportunism,  always  closely  modelled 
upon  that  of  the  Empress  Dowager,  indicated  a very 
shrewd  grasp  of  such  public  opinion  as  could  reach 
and  influence  Palace  politics,  and  he  possessed  her 
shrewd  faculty  of  securing  a profitable  equilibrium 
from  the  resultant  of  opposing  forces. 

Li  would  have  made  an  admirable  party  politician. 
Unfortunately  for  him,  there  was  never  in  his  day 
scope  for  eloquent  appeal  to  the  worldly  wisdom 
(or  from  the  political  ignorance)  of  the  masses. 
Despite  Young  China’s  vociferous  assertions  to  the 
contrary,  there  was  no  ground  in  the  Celestial  system 


256 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


for  the  construction  of  the  party  machine — no  possi- 
bility of  the  ballot-box,  or  even  of  that  kind  of  popular 
representation  which  consists  in  giving  to  a con- 
stituency the  choice  between  two  equally  undesirable 
candidates.  For  a practical-minded  man  like  Li 
the  dreams  of  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Kang  Yu-wei  were 
interesting  but  unprofitable  : nothing  but  the  sin 
of  rebellion  (which  was  not  for  him)  could  come  of 
all  their  loose  talk  of  voters  and  elections,  Houses 
of  Parliament,  and  democratic  government.  He 
foresaw  quite  clearly  that  a successful  attempt  to 
establish  the  letter  of  a non-existent  spirit  would  end 
(as  indeed  it  did  ten  years  after  his  death)  by  reducing 
Young  China’s  dreams  to  the  lamentable  spectacle 
of  paid  members  of  Parliament,  shamelessly  struggling 
for  the  spoils  of  public  administration.  But  had  the 
materials  for  party  government  existed  in  China — 
that  is  to  say,  a politically  semi-conscious  electorate, 
a stock  of  catch-words  for  its  mystification,  and  party 
funds  for  its  demoralisation — Li  would  have  made 
an  ideal  party  leader  and  Prime  Minister.  He  might 
have  had  no  constructive  policy  (except  for  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  loaves  and  fishes),  but  he  would 
assuredly  have  been  a pastmaster  in  the  game  of 
“ ins  and  outs.”  If,  instead  of  a horde  of  greedy 
relatives  and  hungry  fellow-provincials  battening 
crudely  on  the  public  purse,  he  could  have  led  into 
the  logomachy  of  party  politics  a well-trained  phalanx 
of  glib  lawyers  and  astute  financiers,  his  genius  would 
have  found  its  true  vocation.  For  Li  Hung-chang 
combined  the  wait-and-see  temperament  with  remark- 
able flair  as  to  the  direction  in  which  the  political 
cat  would  jump  at  any  critical  emergency  : his  infinite 
courage  and  resource  were  never  more  conspicuous 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  257 


than  in  the  hour  of  danger,  and  he  possessed  a certain 
bluff  geniality,  a tactful  capacity  for  saying  smooth 
things  to  rough  men,  which  would  have  made  him 
an  ideal  manipulator  of  the  party  machine  and  a 
graceful  exponent  of  public  opinion  after  the  event. 

As  things  were,  however,  his  role  in  domestic  politics 
was  closely  determined  by  the  limitations  of  his 
environment.  For  the  reasons  above  explained, 
it  resolved  itself,  first,  into  leadership  of  the  silent 
hole-and-corner  struggle  of  the  Anhui  against  the 
Hunan  faction  ; next,  into  lenient  antagonism  to 
the  unpractical  ideas  of  the  Cantonese  constitutional 
reformers,  and  support  of  the  dynastic  privileges  ; 
finally,  into  whole-hearted  opposition  to  the  schemes 
of  the  Boxer  leaders,  including  Her  Majesty  Tzu  Hsi 
and  the  Manchu  princes,  tempered  always  by  un- 
swerving loyalty  to  the  dynasty. 

His  attitude  towards  the  Boxer  rising  was  the 
logical  outcome  of  the  lifelong  opinion  which  in- 
fluenced all  his  political  activities,  domestic  and 
foreign — namely,  that  every  cause  of  collision  with 
the  European  Powers  must  be  avoided  at  all  costs 
until,  by  education  and  defensive  preparations,  China 
should  be  in  a position  successfully  to  resist  attack. , 
He  was  undoubtedly  just  as  anti-foreign  as  Chang 
Chih-tung  himself,  in  the  sense  that,  in  his  heart, 
he  despised  the  material  civilisation  of  the  West  ; 
but  in  the  crisis  of  Boxerdom  he  alone  of  China’s 
high  officials  had  the  courage  of  his  political  convic- 
tions and  dared  openly  to  rebuke  the  folly  of  the  Old 
Buddha.  Had  China  been  strong  enough  to  drive 
the  foreigner  into  the  sea,  as  Prince  Tuan  declared 
he  was  going  to  do,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that 
Li  Hung-chang  would  have  been  among  the  first  to 


258 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


bless  the  enterprise  ; but  he  knew  the  folly  of  that 
dream.  He  remained  firm,  therefore,  in  his  policy 
of  avoiding  conflict  with  the  European. 

His  attitude  towards  Young  China  was  more 
involved.  From  the  commencement  of  his  career 
as  Viceroy  of  Chihli,  a notable  feature  of  his  policy 
v,'had  been  his  encouragement  of  “ foreign  learning  ” 
lin  all  its  branches.  Educational  reform  played, 
indeed,  an  important  part  in  his  scheme  of  defensive 
preparations,  much  of  it  directed  towards  economic 
• and  industrial  warfare  ; he  advocated  the  employment 
in  the  public  service  of  men  trained  in  the  arts  and 
sciences  of  the  West  for  the  same  good  reasons 
that  he  supported  the  introduction  of  railways  and 
telegraphs.  He  encouraged  a radical  departure 
, from  all  mandarin  tradition  by  conferring  official 
posts  on  some  of  the  first  young  Cantonese  educated 
• in  America  (Yung  Wing’s  experiment) — men  who, 
in  certain  instances,  were  lacking  in  the  measure  of 
Chinese  scholarship  heretofore  regarded  as  indis- 
pensable for  a Chinese  official.1  In  addition  to  his 
military  and  naval  schools  under  foreign  instructors, 
he  instituted  a medical  school  at  Tientsin,  and  proved 
both  by  precept  and  example  his  confidence  in  the 
superiority  of  European  medical  science.  His  policy 
was,  in  fact,  a repudiation  of  the  time-honoured  belief 
that  the  scholar  who  could  quote  voluminously  from 
the  Classics  and  compose  a Hanlin  essay  was,  ipso 
facto , qualified  to  lead  an  army  in  the  field  or  to  direct 
the  finances  of  a province.  Coming  from  one  who, 
in  his  own  person,  had  brilliantly  vindicated  this 

1 Two  of  Li’s  later  English-speaking  proteges,  Tang  Shao-yi  and  Liang 
T’un-yen,  eventually  rose  to  hold  the  highest  offices  at  Peking  under  the 
Manchus.  Tang  Shao-yi  has  been  the  foremost  member  of  the  Kuo  Mintang, 
or  Popular  party,  under  the  reconstructed  Republican  regime. 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  259 


hoary  tradition,  his  broad-minded  initiative  in  this 
matter  must  assuredly  be  accounted  to  him  for 
statesmanship. 

Inasmuch  as  nine-tenths  of  the  Young  China  party 
were  the  product  of  “ Western  learning,”  it  was  only 
natural  that  the  reformers  should  look  to  Li  Hung- 
chang  for  sympathy  and  support.  Had  their  pro- 
gramme steered  clear  of  revolutionary  politics,  had 
Kang  Yu-wei’s  ambitious  schemes  not  aimed  at 
the  overthrow  of  the  dynasty,  their  expectations 
would  surely  have  been  realised.  So  long  as  the 
Reform  movement  worked  on  constitutional  and 
moderate  lines,  Li’s  attitude  was  always  sympathetic  ; 
if  he  repudiated  Kang  Yu-wei  and  his  associates  in 
the  end,  it  was  because,  in  his  judgment,  they  were 
' trying  to  run  before  they  had  learned  to  walk.  All 
his  principles  of  thought  and  action  were  based,  like 
those  of  Tzu  Hsi,  on  the  doctrine  of  the  “ happy 
mean  ” ; he  believed  in  reform,  for  definite  ends, 
but  not  in  revolution.  He  stood,  therefore,  at  the 
end  of  his  days,  half-way  between  the  red-hot  revolu- 
" tionaries  of  Canton  and  the  irreconcilable  Boxer 
Manchus,  and  was  feared  and  suspected  by  the 
majority  of  both  factions. 

According  to  the  Cantonese  writer  Lim  Boon-keng 
(“  Wen  Ching  ”),1  Li  was  not  unpopular  in  the  south. 
“ He  certainly  kept  the  difficult  province  of  Kuang- 
tung  in  good  order,  for  he  was  greatly  feared.  The 
old  ferocity  of  his  younger  days  lingers  in  the  village 
traditions,  and  he  may  boast  that  his  name  is  revered 
by  the  people.”  This  was  written  a few  months 
before  his  death,  when  the  bitterness  of  the  Reform 
debacle  of  1898  had  been  swallowed  up  in  the  Boxer 

1 “ The  Chinese  Crisis  from  Within.” 


i6o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tumult.  In  another  place  this  typical  Cantonese 
of  the  semi-Americanised  class,  writing  as  a follower 
of  Kang  Yu-wei  and  a bitter  foe  to  the  Manchus, 
declares  his  opinion  that  Li  Hung-chang,  “ in  spite 
of  his  political  idiosyncrasies,  was  the  great  pioneer 
of  true  reform  in  China.”  Lim,  like  many  others, 
mistook  a class  interest  for  a national  cause  ; the 
admiration  which  he  and  the  Cantonese  expressed 
for  the  Chihli  Viceroy  in  those  days  was  chiefly 
based  on  the  fact  that  it  was  he  who  had  thrown  open 
to  them  the  closely-guarded  preserves  of  the  literati 
and  invited  them  to  the  high  places  of  provincial 
Yamens.  When,  in  the  evil  days  of  September,  1898, 
Tzu  Hsi  sternly  forbade  the  Emperor’s  foolish  dreams 
and  cast  him  into  durance,  Li  Hung-chang’s  position 
became  very  uncomfortable  for  himself  and  dis- 
appointing to  the  reformers  ; but  those  who  knew 
him  best  never  had  any  doubt  as  to  the  course  he 
would  adopt.  Like  Chang  Chih-tung  and  Liu  K’un-yi 
(Viceroys  of  the  Yangstze  Provinces),  he  had  taken 
a keen  interest  in  the  political  and  economic  writings 
of  Kang  Yu-wei  and  Liang  Ch’i-ch’ao,  what  time 
they  were  editing  their  “ Shih  Wu  Pao  ” at  Shanghai ; 
like  Weng  Tung-ho  (the  highly  orthodox  Imperial 
Tutor),  he  had  admired  the  polished  style  in  which 
these  brilliant  scholars  expounded  their  new  doc- 
trines, and  he  had  assisted  in  the  introduction  of 
their  writings  at  Court.  This  attitude  was  thoroughly 
consistent  with  his  whole  policy  in  the  matter  of 
educational  reform.  He  supported  the  encyclopae- 
dists, as  they  called  themselves,  because,  and  so  long 
as,  they  fitted  in  with  his  ideas  of  assimilating  the 
arts  and  crafts  of  Europe  for  the  ultimate  strengthen- 
ing of  China  ; when  they  aspired  to  assume  the 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  261 


direction  of  an  unregenerate  State,  Li  Hung-chang 
looked  on,  more  in  sorrow  than  in  anger,  and  allowed 
events  to  follow  the  drastic  course  inspired  by  the 
“ divine  wrath  of  the  Old  Buddha.”  According  to 
“ Wen  Ching  ” : 

“ Towards  the  reformers  Li  secretly  showed  sym- 
pathy, but  openly  he  kept  aloof  from  them.  Of 
course,  Li  knew  that  reforms  would  save  China,  but 
his  own  reform  schemes  had  failed  so  miserably  that 
perhaps  he  felt  he  ought  not  to  raise  a hornets’  nest 
about  his  head  so  soon  after  the  troubles  he  had  gone 
through.  His  moderation  in  not  pushing  the  persecu- 
tion of  the  reformers  is  further  evidence  of  his  good 
sense.  When  the  order  came  to  him  to  destroy  the 
grave  of  Kang  Yu-wei’s  ancestors,  he  simply  ignored 
the  Edict,  and  when  relatives  of  reformers  came  into 
his  clutches,  he  merely  imprisoned  them.  But  he 
dared  not  show  any  open  recognition  or  mercy  to 
his  old  friends.” 

The  men  of  foreign  education  whom  Li  preferred 
"*  to  have  about  him  for  the  executive  work  of  his 
Viceroyalty — e.g.,  Tang  Shao-yi,  Wu  Ting-fang,  and 
Lo  Feng-loh — and  the  number  of  his  European  and 
American  advisers  and  employees,  afforded  proof 
sufficient  of  his  progressive  tendencies  ; but  Kang 
•*.  Yu-wei’s  movement  was  essentially  political  and 
anti-Manchu,  and  if  the  reformers  were  generally 
•►disappointed  at  Li’s  failure  to  support  it,  they  must 
have  been  singularly  indiscriminating  observers  of 
his  career  and  public  utterances.  Moreover,  as  “ Wen 
Ching  ” justly  observed,  Li’s  own  position  at  this 
time  was  a difficult  one,  and  it  behoved  him  to  walk 
warily.  As  a member  of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  after 
his  return  from  abroad,  subordinate  to  Prince  Kung 


262 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


and  Jung  Lu,  he  commanded  neither  the  prestige 
nor  the  power  which  he  had  wielded  as  Viceroy  at 
Tientsin.  His  enemies  were  many  and  crafty  ; in 
secret  Memorials  he  was  being  accused  of  having  sold 
the  Empire’s  northern  dependencies  to  Russia.  Kang 
Yu-wei  and  his  friends,  emboldened  by  their  rapid 
ascendancy  in  the  counsels  of  His  Majesty  Kuang 
Hsu,  were  at  no  time  inclined  to  be  conciliatory  ; 
those  who  declined  to  accept  unreservedly  their  red- 
hot  gospel  of  Reform  were  denounced  as  reactionaries 
to  His  Majesty  and  by  him  removed.  Thus  Weng 
Tung-ho,  K’ang’s  original  sponsor  at  Court,  was 
dismissed  on  June  15th.  Prince  Kung,  always  a 
restraining  force,  had  died  a fortnight  before,  and 
Jung  Lu  was  transferred  as  Viceroy  to  Tientsin, 
leaving  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  under  the  nerveless 
direction  of  Prince  Ch’ing.  Li’s  turn  came  on  Sep- 
tember 7th,  when  he  was  dismissed  from  office.  Of 
a truth,  the  proceedings  of  the  reformers  were  not 
calculated  to  enlist  the  sympathies  of  the  masterful 
old  Viceroy ; nevertheless,  as  “ Wen  Ching  ” and 
others  have  testified,  he  bore  them  no  malice  nor 
rejoiced  over  their  subsequent  downfall  and  that  of 
the  unfortunate  Emperor. 

On  the  contrary,  his  orthodox  Confucianism  and 
deep  respect  for  the  dignity  of  the  Throne  caused 
him  to  hold  aloof  from  the  reactionary  proceedings 
of  the  Old  Buddha,  and  eventually  to  oppose  them 
openly,  when  her  vindictive  wrath  against  the  insti- 
gators of  the  Reform  movement  led  her  to  plan  the 
dethronement,  disgrace,  and  death  of  the  Emperor 
and  to  impart  to  the  Manchu  reaction  a definite 
anti-Chinese  direction.  He  alone,  of  all  the  high 
officers  of  State,  took  no  part  (as  Grand  Secretary) 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  263 

in  the  great  audience  of  January  23rd,  1900,  at  which 
the  Emperor  was  compelled  to  sign  his  own  abdication 
and  the  selection  of  his  successor.  He  made  haste 
to  leave  the  capital  and  take  up  his  new  post  as 
Viceroy  of  Canton,  shrewdly  foreseeing  that  the 
Manchus’  valour  of  ignorance  would  speedily  impel 
them  blindly  to  attack  everything  and  everyone  that 
stood  in  the  path  of  violent  reaction,  including  Euro- 
peans. He  joined  with  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys  in 
denouncing  the  proposed  enthronement  of  a new 
Emperor,  so  that  Her  Majesty  was  led  to  reconsider 
the  matter  and  Kuang  Hsu’s  life  was  spared.  In  the 
higher  spheres  of  domestic  politics  Li  Hung-chang 
certainly  deserves  credit  for  courage,  consistency, 
and  intelligent  anticipation  of  events. 

After  the  Old  Buddha,  a fugitive  from  her  capital, 
had  seen  the  error  of  hei  ways,  it  was  undoubtedly 
' to  Li  Hung-chang  that  was  due  the  first  inspira- 
•v  tion  of  those  ideas  of  educational  reform  and  con- 
stitutional procedure  which  she  recorded  in  her 
penitential  Decrees  from  Hsian-fu.1  In  this  matter 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai  was  Li’s  faithful  follower  and  imitator, 
whilst  Chang  Chih-tung’s  conversion  coincided,  as 
usual,  with  the  dictates  of  personal  safety.  Li  had 
warned  her  of  the  folly  of  Boxerdom,  not  on  any 
puritanical  grounds  of  virtue,  but  simply  because 
the  venture  would  not  pay.  Now,  from  amidst  the 
abomination  of  Peking’s  desolation,  manfully  working 
to  save  something  from  the  wreck  of  Tzu  Hsi’s  for- 
^ tunes,  he  urged  her  to  don  such  garments  of  political 
repentance  as  would  restore  to  commercial  Europe 
and  sentimental  America  their  cherished  dream  of 
“ China  awakening.”  She  followed  his  advice,  and 

1 Vide  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,”  Chapter  XXII. 


264 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Li  had  at  least  the  satisfaction  before  he  died  of 
knowing  that  his  wisdom  was  likely  to  be  justified. 

It  is  not  possible  to  say  whether  Li  held,  in  the 
matter  of  constitutional  government,  any  very  definite 
ideas,  or  whether  he  had  even  seriously  studied  the 
subject,  but  it  is  certain  that  he  perceived  at  an  early 
stage  of  his  Viceregal  career  that  it  would  be  good 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  Manchus  to  temper  their 
autocratic  regime  with  concessions  to  the  opinions 
of  the  Cantonese  and  other  Progressives,  if  only 
because  that  autocracy  was  no  longer  in  a position 
to  maintain  its  authority  by  force.  Had  he  lived  to 
advise  the  Empress  Dowager  during  the  seven  years 
of  grace  that  were  left  to  her  after  her  return  to  Peking 
in  1901,  and  especially  after  the  Russo-Japanese  war, 
he  would  probably  have  devised  some  practical  modus 
vivendi  between  the  crude  theories  of  Young  China 
and  the  dogged  conservatism  of  the  Manchu  clans. 
As  a close  observer  of  the  evolution  of  constitutional 
government  in  Japan,  he  had  realised  the  possibility 
of  creating  the  appearance  of  representative  govern- 
ment while  retaining  the  essential  substance  of  auto- 
cracy and  the  privileges  of  the  ruling  class.  But  in 
1898  the  Court  had  not  been  educated  to  the  point 
of  perceiving  the  inevitable  necessity  of  change,  and 
Young  China  was  equally  incapable  of  perceiving 
that  the  process  of  change  must  be  a matter  of  slow 
and  patient  growth.  Li  was  as  far  in  advance  of  his 
generation  at  this  period  as  he  had  been  in  i860,  but 
after  1896  his  voice  was  as  one  preaching  in  the 
wilderness,  and  his  cautious  opinions  caused  him  to 
be  distrusted  on  both  sides. 

Li’s  attitude  towards  Christianity  deserves  notice, 
because  at  various  periods  of  his  career  it  affected 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  265 


his  conduct  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  As  usual, 

— where  his  private  human  relationships  were  concerned, 
it  was  a curious  mixture  of  heart  and  head.  His  own 

— opinions  on  the  subject  of  religion  in  general  were 
those  of  the  intellectual  aristocrat — sometimes  mildly 
interested,  sometimes  annoyed,  often  contemptuous, 

**  but  tolerant  withal,  as  becomes  the  classical  free- 
thinker. With  advancing  age  his  tolerance  became 
infected  with  cynicism,  not  unkindly,  and  certainly 
not  to  be  wondered  at,  when  we  remember  his  point 
of  view  and  his  experiences.  There  is  no  doubt 
whatsoever  that,  like  other  Chinese  officials,  he 

-•deplored  the  activity  of  the  conflicting  Christian 
missions  in  China,  and  rightly  regarded  them  as  a 
menace  to  the  peace  and  dignity  of  his  country  ; he 
- deplored  the  irrevocable  treaty  rights,  which  enabled 
all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  to  disseminate  all 
sorts  of  doctrines  to  the  grave  disturbance  of  the 
business  of  government,  they  themselves  being  by 
those  treaties  above  and  outside  Chinese  jurisdiction. 
He  deplored  the  political  character  of  much  of  the 
work  done  in  the  name  of  missions  (notably  in  the 
case  of  the  Russian  and  French  establishments)  and 
the  inculcation  (chiefly  by  American  teachers)  of 
political  ideas  dangerous  to  the  mind  of  Young  China 
and  to  constituted  authority.  But,  for  all  that,  he 
retained  to  the  end  of  his  days  a kindly  regard  for 

— certain  individual  missionaries  of  his  acquaintance 
and  sincere  respect  for  their  self-denying  labours  : 
it  was  in  his  practical  nature  to  put  works  before 
words,  to  prefer  the  example  of  beneficent  morality 
to  the  preaching  of  dogma.  He  was  therefore  a warm 
admirer  of  the  good  work  done  by  the  medical  mis- 
sions, and  testified  to  his  faith  by  establishing  a free 


266 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


hospital  at  Tientsin  under  a doctor  of  the  London 
mission. 

According  to  the  Preface  contributed  by  the  Hon. 
John  W.  Foster  1 to  the  “ Memoirs  ” published  in 
1913,  Li  Hung-chang,  “as  he  reached  manhood, 
possessed  the  same  ignorance  and  hatred  of  mission- 
aries and  their  work  as  prevailed  generally  throughout 
the  country,  referred  to  them  as  foreign  devils,  and 
treated  their  doctrines  with  scorn.  But  gradually, 
as  he  became  better  informed  as  to  their  work,  he 
revised  his  judgment.”  Nevertheless  Mr.  Foster  is 
constrained  to  confess  that  “ he  treats  their  doc- 
trines as  philosophic  or  moral  and  fails  to  comprehend 
the  spiritual  quality  of  the  teaching  and  mission  of 
Christ  ” ; also  that  “ the  inconsistencies  of  the 
Christian  nations  did  not  fail  to  attract  his  attention. 
He  notes  how  they  fight  among  themselves  and  cherish 
most  bitter  hatred  against  each  other.”  This,  to  say 
the  least  of  it,  is  putting  Li’s  views  very  mildly. 

There  occurs  a passage  in  these  “ Memoirs,”  under 
date  February,  1886,  which  fairly  represents  the  spirit 
(though  far  from  the  language)  in  which  Li  Hung- 
chang  usually  discussed  the  subject  of  comparative 
religion  and  the  ethical  foundations  of  Christianity  : 

“ During  several  years  I have  given  quite  careful 
study  and  thought  to  the  religion  of  the  West,  and 
I cannot  see  that  it  is  in  conflict  at  all  with  our  own 
philosophy.  On  the  contrary,  the  teachings  of  Con- 
fucius and  the  doctrines  of  Jesus  appear  to  be  on 
one  exalted  plane,  conceived  and  promulgated  for 
the  betterment  of  all  mankind,  ‘ heathen  ’ and  Chris- 
tian. I know  this,  that  if  my  lot  in  life  were  cast  in 

1 Mr.  Foster,  after  serving  as  Secretary  of  the  State  Department  in 
1892,  was  engaged  as  adviser  to  the  Chinese  Legation  at  Washington.  He 
accompanied  Li  in  that  capacity  to  Japan  in  1895. 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  267 


England,  France,  or  America  I would  want  to  call 
myself  a Christian,  for  that  is  the  religion  of  those 
countries  ; and  a man  who  would  order  his  life  by 
its  tenets  would  keep  out  of  trouble  and  be  respected. 
He  would  not  think  of  Confucius,  because  he  would 
have  no  need  for  him  or  his  teachings.  And  it  is 
the  same  way,  reversed,  in  China  : I have  no  need 
for  Christ  if  I will  but  follow  our  own  great  sage  and 
philosopher.  But  simply  because  I feel  no  personal 
call  for  the  Christian  religion  I will  not  therefore 
oppose  it,  since  I believe  that  there  are  thousands, 
perhaps  millions,  in  China  who  would  be  somewhat 
benefited  by  a knowledge  of  Jesus,  especially  as 
they  trouble  themselves  not  at  all  to  follow  in  the 
ways  directed  by  Confucius. 

“ Therefore  I would  sum  up  the  feelings  of  the  more 
intelligent  officials  and  literati  to-day — for  my  own 
sentiments  appear  to  be  largely  shared  by  this  class 
in  all  the  Eastern  Provinces  from  Canton  to  the 
_ Northern  Capital — it  is  the  foreigner  who  is  disliked, 
not  because  of  his  religion,  but  because  he  is  otherwise 
feared.  He  is  feared  not  at  all  in  this  year  because 
he  may  be  the  agent  of  Jesus  Christ  or  a follower  of 
that  great  man,  but  as  a possible  enemy  to  the  political 
and  industrial  independence  of  the  country.” 

Readers  familiar  with  the  lucid  diction  and  polished 
style  of  Li’s  ablest  Secretary,  Lo  Feng-loh  (for 
a period  Chinese  Minister  in  London),  will  probably 
find  in  this  passage  a curious  resemblance  to  the 
matter  and  manner  of  the  speeches  in  which  he  was 
wont  to  express  the  Viceroy’s  sentiments  during  his 
European  tour. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Li’s  original  estimate  of 
the  Christian  religion  and  its  exponents  was  con- 
siderably modified  during  the  period  of  his  relations 
with  General  Gordon,  to  which  I have  referred  in  an 


268 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


earlier  chapter,  and  that  by  association  with  that  preux 
chevalier  he  was  brought  to  recognition  of  the  universal 
quality  of  its  moral  appeal.  Regarded  either  from 
the  philosophical  or  the  ethical  point  of  view,  the 
doctrines  of  Christian  morality,  as  distinct  from 
dogma,  commended  themselves  to  his  intelligence 
chiefly,  as  he  was  wont  to  say,  because  their  spirit 
was  essentially  of  the  East — Eastern  ; a proof,  in 
fact,  of  the  superiority  of  the  foundations  of  China’s 
civilisation,  based  on  moral  force.  But  nothing 
could  close  his  eyes  to  the  political  difficulties  and 
dangers  created  by  Christian  missions  in  China.  The 
nature  of  those  dangers  was  temperately  set  forth 
in  his  famous  Memorial  of  1867,  from  which  I have 
already  quoted.  In  it  we  find  the  following  significant 
statement  of  his  policy  : — 

“ The  matter  of  missionary  extension  is  beset  with 
greater  difficulties  than  the  rest,  especially  as  it  is 
not  a State  question  with  foreign  Governments.  At 
the  present  moment  innumerable  churches  are  being 
erected  in  every  province,  district,  and  department 
for  the  explanation  of  their  canon  and  the  preaching 
of  their  faith  ; and  the  common  people  are  one-half 
of  them  deceived,  and  the  other  half  led  to  join  them 
for  evil  purposes.  Instructions  should  be  issued  to 
the  Superintendents  of  Northern  and  Southern  Trade, 
as  well  as  to  the  generals,  viceroys,  governors,  cus- 
toms superintendents,  and  taotais,  to  become  intimate 
with  the  foreign  officials  with  whom  they  are  in  com- 
munication. Then,  when  anything  is  to  be  arranged, 
there  would  be  no  harm  in  telling  them  distinctly 
that  when  the  common  people  misbehave  the  local 
functionaries  must  adjudicate  ; and  that  when  it 
happens  that  the  people  refuse  to  become  proselytes, 
the  officials  can  on  no  account  insist  upon  their  doing 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  269 

so  against  their  will — for  such  a course  would  but 
raise  riots  and  disturbances,  to  the  detriment  of 
international  amity.  At  the  approaching  revision 
of  the  Treaty  all  possible  arguments  must  be  used 
with  regard  to  this  point,  and  on  no  account  must 
any  further  clause  be  added.” 

It  was  not  long  before  he  had  occasion  to  correct 
his  opinion  that  the  missionary  question  was  one 
with  which  foreign  Governments  were  not  concerned. 
A year  after  his  appointment  to  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty 
we  find  him  associated  with  the  drafting  of  a Circular 
Note  addressed  by  the  Chinese  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment in  which  certain  reasonable  (but  to  France 
unacceptable)  proposals  were  made  for  preventing 
international  difficulties  by  the  regulation  of  mis- 
sionary work  in  the  provinces.  Of  these  proposals 
the  most  important  were  (1)  to  define  the  legal  status 
of  missionaries  in  the  interior  and  to  check  the  evil 
consequences  of  the  imperia  in  imperio,  which  had 
resulted  through  the  missionaries  separating  them- 
selves, and  even  their  native  converts,  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  local  authorities  ; and  (2)  to  recog- 
nise the  need  of  strict  examination  into  the  character 
and  antecedents  of  converts. 

In  spite  of  the  sympathetic  reception  given  to  these 
proposals  by  many  unbiassed  observers  on  the  spot, 
they  received  no  encouragement  from  the  Foreign 
Offices  and  Press  in  Europe.1  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock 
had  severely  criticised  the  “ toleration  clause  ” 
imposed  by  force  upon  China  in  the  Tientsin  Treaty 
of  1858,  denouncing  “ the  futility  of  grafting  on  to 
a Treaty  of  Commerce  a proselytising  agency  for 


1 Vide  Mr.  Michie’s  “ Missionaries  in  China,”  a dispassionate  study  of  the 
whole  history  of  the  question. 


270 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


r 


the  conversion  of  the  nation  to  Christianity.”  He 
foresaw  that  it  must  prove  “ a cause  of  distrust  and 
an  element  of  disturbance,”  and  the  subsequent 
history  of  China  has  lamentably  fulfilled  his  predic- 
tions. The  Christian  Church  militant  must  indeed 
bear  a great  burden  of  responsibility  for  the  troubles 
and  tribulations  that  have  afflicted  the  unfortunate 
Chinese  people.  As  Mr.  Michie  justly  observed,  in 
analysing  the  causes  of  the  Boxer  outbreak  in  1900, 
the  evils  of  which  the  Chinese  Government  com- 
plained in  1871  “ have  gone  on  increasing  year  by 
year,  outrages  and  massacres  following  each  other 
without  interruption,  and  the  exacerbation  of  feeling 
between  foreign  missionaries  and  the  Chinese  popula- 
tion going  on  with  accelerated  speed.  The  political 
results  to  China  have  assumed  in  these  later  years 
the  very  concrete  form  of  territorial  spoliation,1  and 
the  Chinese  have  had  abundant  experience  of  the 
religion  which  makes  nations  strong  and  the  people 
virtuous.” 

It  was  with  the  political  aspect  of  the  question  that 
Li  Hung-chang,  as  director  of  China’s  foreign  rela- 
tions, was  continually  concerned.  The  history  of 
the  claims  of  France  (disputed  by  Germany)  to  a 
protectorate  of  Christians  in  China  is  too  long  and 
too  intricate  to  be  told  in  the  present  work  ; sufficient 
to  say  that  it  introduced  a new  and  highly  dangerous 
element  into  the  administration  of  China’s  purely 
domestic  affairs.  No  stronger  instance  could  be 
adduced  of  the  political  purposes  for  which  mis- 
sionary activity  can  be  used  by  an  aggressive  Power 
than  the  spectacle  of  anti-Clerical  France  insisting, 


1 Germany’s  seizure  of  Kiaochao  (November,  1897)  was  justified  on  the 
ground  that  two  missionaries  had  been  killed  in  Shantung. 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  271 


against  China’s  will,  on  her  right  to  exercise  protection 
over  Christians  on  Chinese  territory. 

In  1885,  on  the  conclusion  of  the  Tonquin  war, 
Li  Hung-chang  conceived  the  idea  of  eliminating 
French  political  interference  from  the  affairs  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  in  China,  and  placing  its 
missions  on  a more  regular  and  reasonable  footing 
vis-a-vis  the  Chinese  authorities,  by  persuading  the 
Pope  to  accredit  a legate  to  Peking  and  to  allow 
the  appointment  of  a Chinese  Minister  to  the  Holy 
See.  For  this  purpose  he  sent  a confidential  agent 
on  a secret  mission  to  the  Vatican,  one  John  George 
Dunn,  an  English  Catholic,  agent  of  the  Eastern 
Extension  Telegraph  Company  at  Shanghai.  Mr. 
Dunn  was  also  authorised  to  submit  the  vexed  ques- 
tion of  the  Peitang  Cathedral,  a building  which, 
overlooking  the  Palace  grounds,  had  given  great 
offence  to  the  Empress  Dowager  and  Court.  Its 
removal  to  another  site  had  long  been  under  dis- 
cussion. This  question  was  eventually  arranged  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  Court  and  of  the  Lazarist 
mission,  though  at  considerable  expense  to  China. 
But  the  arbitrary  attitude  adopted  in  connection 
therewith  by  the  French  Government,  based  on  its 
assumed  protectorate  over  Roman  Catholic  missions, 
made  the  Chinese  all  the  more  anxious  to  arrange 
for  the  presence  of  a Papal  Nuncio  at  Peking.  For 
a time  it  seemed  as  if  Li  Hung-chang’s  negotiations 
to  this  end  (conducted  by  telegram  through  Mr. 
Dunn)  would  be  successful ; but  the  Pope  was  finally 
obliged  to  withdraw  his  assent.  The  French  Govern- 
ment presented  him  with  an  ultimatum  which 
threatened  severe  reprisals  against  the  Church  in 
France,  and  he  was  compelled  to  give  way.  It  would 


272 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


be  difficult  to  find  an  instance  of  more  flagrant  debase- 
ment of  religious  proselytism  for  political  purposes, 
or  one  more  calculated  to  intensify  the  suspicions 
with  which  the  Chinese  regarded  missionary  activities. 
If,  in  later  years,  Li  Hung-chang  was  disposed  to  be 
frankly  cynical  on  the  subject  of  the  European 
Powers’  concern  for  their  respective  religious  propa- 
ganda, who  shall  blame  him  ? 

The  German  Government,  for  reasons  manifestly 
political,  refused  in  1882  to  allow  the  French  religious 
protectorate  to  be  applied  any  longer  to  German 
missionaries  ; it  insisted  on  these  taking  out  their 
passports  through  the  German  Legation.  The  ques- 
tion became  acute  in  1886,  after  the  appointment 
of  Bishop  Anzer  to  Shantung.  The  Vatican  was 
persuaded  to  give  its  consent  in  1890  to  the  new 
procedure,  though  a similar  arrangement  proposed 
by  the  Italian  Government  was  vetoed.  The  position 
created  for  the  unfortunate  Chinese  authorities  by 
this  unseemly  strife  in  the  name  of  religion  was  one 
of  no  little  embarrassment.  Herr  von  Brandt,  German 
Minister  at  Peking,  was  perfectly  frank  in  dealing 
with  Bishop  Anzer  : the  “ protection  ” of  mission- 
aries was  a political  asset  which  Germany  had  no 
intention  of  surrendering  to  any  other  Power.  Bishop 
Anzer,  an  honest  man,  was  divided  between  his  duty 
as  a loyal  German  and  his  duty  as  a priest,  for  Pope 
Leo  XIII.  made  no  secret  of  his  preference  for  the 
French  protectorate.  Before  finally  deciding  on  his 
course  of  action  the  Bishop  went  to  consult  the  Pope, 
and  Li  Hung-chang  seized  the  occasion  to  write  to 
Cardinal  Rampolla  suggesting  the  possibility  of  some 
arrangement  to  regulate  the  status  of  Christians  in 
China.  He  still  clung  to  the  hope  of  seeing  a Papal 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  273 


Legate  at  Peking  who  would  settle  religious  questions 
without  recourse  to  horse,  foot,  and  artillery.  The 
attitude  of  the  Vatican  and  of  Bishop  Anzer,  on  his 
return  to  China,  was  of  a nature  to  encourage  this 
hope.  But  neither  Li  nor  his  Holiness  was  in  a position 
to  overcome  the  determined  objections  of  France  to 
any  such  arrangement.  In  October,  1891,  the  French 
Government  brought  pressure  to  persuade  the  Vatican 
to  abandon  the  project  of  sending  a Papal  Legate 
with  a letter  and  presents  to  the  Emperor  of  China. 
The  Roman  Church  militant  in  China  remained  there- 
fore auxiliary  to  the  secular  aims  of  diplomacy,  and 
Li  was  forced  to  realise  the  hopelessness  of  his  efforts. 
These  fruitless  negotiations  in  a cause  where,  for 
once,  all  the  right  was  on  China’s  side  and  all  the 
injustice  on  the  other,  undoubtedly  did  much  to 
embitter  his  subsequent  attitude  towards  mission 
work  ; but  to  his  credit  it  remains  that  his  bitterness 
never  descended  from  the  general  to  the  particular 
missionary.  Also,  although  he  had  failed  to  achieve 
abroad  that  which  would  have  greatly  simplified  the 
Chinese  Government’s  control  of  its  internal  affairs, 
he  remained  unshaken  and  successful  in  maintaining 
law  and  order  within  the  limits  of  his  Viceroyalty 
and  consistent  in  his  domestic  policy  of  eliminating 
every  possible  cause  of  friction  with  foreign  Powers. 

Later,  after  the  Japanese  war  and  his  removal  from 
the  Chihli  Viceroyalty,  when  the  turbulent  spirits 
of  Young  China,  full  of  the  pride  of  “ Western  learn- 
ing,” began  to  show  how  dangerous  a thing  is  a little 
knowledge,  when  Kang  Yu-wei’s  crude  theories 
threatened  to  involve  the  whole  fabric  of  government 
in  a chaos  of  iconoclasm,  the  great  majority  of  the 
conservative  literati  found  in  these  disruptive  influ- 


274 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


ences  fresh  proof  of  the  evils  of  missionary  teaching. 
For  Kang  Yu-wei’s  conception  of  a political  millennium 
was  unmistakably  inspired  by  his  enthusiastic  belief 
that  the  principles  of  government  laid  down  by 
Rousseau,  Mill,  and  other  European  writers  were 
directly  applicable  to  cure  the  rottenness  of  the  state 
of  China  ; also  it  was  no  secret  that  many  missionary 
schools  taught  the  Young  Chinese  idea  to  shoot,  by 
ways  and  means  of  secular  education  that  completely 
unfitted  the  student  to  play  the  part  of  a useful 
citizen  under  the  existing  social  system.  But  Li 
Hung-chang,  though  fully  alive  to  the  source  and 
nature  of  this  new  danger,  preserved  sufficient 
breadth  of  mind  not  to  condemn  the  Christian  reli- 
gion for  the  errors  in  secular  education  committed 
by  well-meaning  enthusiasts.  He  realised  that  the 
disruptive  elements  thus  created  in  missionary  schools 
were  not  so  undisciplined  and  revolutionary  as  those 
produced  in  the  purely  secular  colleges  in  Japan.  In 
the  one  case,  students  absorbed  crude  ideas  of  demo- 
cratic institutions  and  the  rights  of  man  ; in  the 
other,  a general  tendency  to  resist  constituted  autho- 
rity by  means  that  savoured  of  anarchism.  All  this 
his  acute  intelligence  had  long  foreseen  ; he  realised 
that  the  new  wine  could  not  be  contained  in  the  old 
vessels  of  China’s  political  economy,  also  that  its 
importation  could  not  be  prevented.  His  attitude 
towards  the  Reformers,  even  towards  those  of  frankly 
revolutionary  tendencies,  was  one  of  firmness  tem- 
pered by  sympathetic  regrets.  Had  his  advice  been 
followed  in  1871,  when  he  recommended  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  Institution  for  the  Study  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  special  examinations,  for  the  Civil  Service, 
of  men  educated  in  Western  learning,  Young  China 


AS  STATESMAN  AND  POLITICIAN  275 


would  have  been  much  easier  to  handle.  The  Empress 
Dowager  solved  the  problems  temporarily  by  drastic 
measures  in  1898  ; but  Li’s  political  judgment  was 
vindicated  again,  ten  years  after  his  death,  in  the 
revolution  of  1911 — an  upheaval  brought  about  by 
a body  of  malcontents  educated  for  the  public  service 
and  for  whom  no  prospect  of  employment  had  been 
provided. 

Viewed  as  a whole,  Li’s  record  as  a statesman  and 
domestic  politician  is  distinguished  from  that  of  his 
most  celebrated  colleagues  ( e.g .,  the  Viceroys  of 
Nanking  and  Wuchang)  by  his  steady  perception  of 
the  fact  that  change  was  inevitable  and  that  the  path 
of  wisdom  lay  in  making  timely  preparations  to  meet 
it ; also,  in  that  he  realised  that  the  materials  available 
for  making  such  preparations  were  few  and  inadequate. 
His  contemporaries,  as  a rule,  perceived  neither  the 
necessity  for  any  modification  of  the  Celestial  system 
of  government  nor  anything  in  their  own  mental 
equipment  to  prevent  them  from  dealing  with  any 
and  every  emergency.  A one-eyed  leader  of  the  blind, 
if  you  will ; but  that  one  eye  possessed  an  extra- 
ordinary range  of  vision. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 

Li  Hung-chang  was  undoubtedly  a maker  of  the 
nineteenth  century  in  China  to  a greater  degree  than 
any  of  his  contemporaries  ; more  so  even  than  the 
masterful  woman  who  controlled  the  destinies  of  the 
Empire.  For  Tzu  Hsi,  with  all  her  infinite  variety 
and  resource  in  the  arts  and  crafts  of  government, 
was  an  alien  ruler,  and,  as  far  as  the  masses  of  the 
Chinese  people  are  concerned,  her  influence  died  with 
her  and  with  the  passing  of  the  dynasty.  But  the 
power  for  good  and  evil  exercised  by  the  written  and 
spoken  words  of  Li  Hung-chang,  by  the  successes 
and  failures  of  his  multifarious  career,  is  felt  to-day 
in  many  undercurrents  of  the  great  sea  of  Chinese 
life.  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  late  unfortunate  ruler  of  the 
country,  whether  as  Resident  in  Korea,  Viceroy  of 
Chihli,  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  or  would-be 
Emperor,  was  always  a faithful  embodiment  and 
transmitter  of  the  Li  tradition  in  statecraft,  though 
lacking  in  Li’s  flair  and  born  under  a less  fortunate 
star.  Amongst  the  few  Chinese  officials  and  publicists 
whose  names  suggest  definite  ideas  to  the  intelligent 
European  there  is  probably  not  one  who  has  not  been 
made  or  marred,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  Li  Hung- 
chang.  The  men  who  figure  to-day  as  the  highest 
expression,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  of  the 
nation’s  intellectual  and  administrative  activities, 
whether  as  classical  conservatives  or  frock-coated 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


277 


progressives,  owe  much  of  their  material  and  moral 
equipment  to  the  mind  which  first  perceived,  and 
the  courage  which  proclaimed,  the  necessity  of  new 
measures  to  meet  the  impact  of  the  West.  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  the  suave  opportunist ; Tang  Shao-yi,  brilliant 
combination  of  East  and  West  ; Liang  T’un-yen, 
courtly  Minister  of  State  and  epicurean  ; Sun  Yat-sen, 
professional  agitator  and  dreamer  of  dreams  ; Liang 
Ch’i-ch’ao,  of  the  magic  pen,  patriot  and  thinker  ; 
aye,  even  the  swashbucklers  of  revolution  whose  lair 
is  in  Japan,  such  as  the  late  Huang  Hsing — all, 
in  greater  or  less  degree,  owe  some  of  their  ideals, 
and  not  a few  of  their  realities,  to  Li  Hung-chang. 
In  all  the  Yamens  of  the  northern  and  central  pro- 
vinces, the  mandarins  of  Young  China  and  Old  now 
feel  the  menace  of  a new  burden  of  alien  rule  impending 
from  the  East,  and  realise  that  there  is  neither  state- 
craft nor  wise  counsel  at  Peking.  Men  speak  of  Li 
as  of  one  who  was  a tower  of  strength.  Indeed,  the 
lucky  star  under  which  he  was  born  would  appear 
to  have  followed  his  course  to  the  Yellow  Springs  of 
Hades,  for  his  posthumous  reputation  amongst  the 
masses  of  the  Chinese  has  undoubtedly  been  enhanced 
by  reason  of  the  lack  of  any  strong  hand  or  command- 
ing intellect  amongst  his  successors  in  power  to-day. 

Li  himself  believed  implicitly  in  his  lucky  star. 
Like  many  other  men,  great  in  history,  who  have 
risen  to  unusual  heights  of  fame  and  power  by  sheer 
force  of  energy  and  brains,  he  preserved  to  the  end 
of  his  days  a naive  detachment  and  an  apparently 
inexhaustible  sense  of  satisfaction  concerning  his 
own  success  in  life,  not  unmixed  with  the  superstitious 
sort  of  wonder  which  one  observes  so  frequently  in 
supermen  of  his  type.  For  us  who  study  the  causes 


278 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


of  that  success  by  the  light  of  the  history  that  he 
made,  the  element  of  luck,  though  undoubtedly  a 
factor  at  the  outset  of  his  career,  appears  insignificant 
in  comparison  with  the  motive  force  of  his  extra- 
ordinary physical  and  mental  energy,  with  his  infinite 
capacity  for  taking  pains,  his  marvellous  memory, 
and  single-minded  attention  to  the  matter  in  hand. 
In  addition  to  these  things,  he  possessed  that  myste- 
rious quality  which  goes  by  the  name  of  personal 
magnetism — the  gift  of  enlisting  the  sympathy  of 
those  about  him,  of  commanding  the  loyalty  of  his 
followers  and  the  admiration  of  his  foes.  How  often 
(as  we  have  seen)  that  personal  regard  felt  for  him 
as  an  opponent  by  European  diplomats  was  worth 
more  to  him  and  to  China  in  grave  crises  than  any 
of  his  arguments  or  expedients.  His  splendid  physical 
appearance,  his  natural  bonhomie  and  accessibility, 
the  rough-and  ready  reasonableness  of  his  “ happy 
mean  ” philosophy,  all  combined  to  make  his  character, 
if  not  morally  convincing,  at  least  remarkably  inter- 
esting and  attractive.  In  a sense,  Li  Hung-chang 
was  born  great,  because,  at  a time  when  most  of  the 
exponents  of  the  Confucian  tradition  failed  to  hear 
the  still,  small  voice  of  Young  China  in  the  distance, 
his  mind  was  able,  not  only  to  memorise  the  “ Spring 
and  Autumn  Classic  ” backwards,  but  to  perceive 
the  necessity  for  acquiring  the  mechanical  and  mili- 
tary sciences  of  the  Western  world.  Never  for  an 
instant  was  his  faith  shaken  in  the  unassailable  wis- 
dom of  the  Confucian  system  ; but  he  combined  with 
the  arrogance  and  ignorance  of  the  typical  mandarin 
a shrewd  common-sense  and  breadth  of  vision  which 
enabled  him  to  estimate  forces  and  to  determine 
relative  values  as  none  of  his  countrymen  could  do. 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


279 


He  was  born  great  in  that  he  possessed  brain-power 
and  industry  far  above  the  average  ; he  achieved 
greatness  partly  by  his  own  hard  work  and  partly 
by  successfully  cultivating  the  favours  of  the  mighty. 
Finally,  with  the  first  serious  clashing  of  East  and 
West,  he  had  greatness  thrust  upon  him,  becoming 
in  truth  the  Indispensable  Man. 

The  Hon.  John  W.  Foster,  American  adviser  to 
Li  Hung-chang  in  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty  negotia- 
tions, has  recorded  the  following  opinion  of  the 
Viceroy  in  his  eulogistic  preface  to  the  “ Memoirs  ” 
published  “ with  the  consent  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment ” in  1913  : 

“ Li  Hung-chang  was  not  only  the  greatest  man  the 
Chinese  race  has  produced  in  modern  times,  but,  in 
combination  of  qualities,  the  most  unique  personality 
of  the  past  century  among  all  the  nations  of  the 
world.  He  was  distinguished  as  a man  of  letters  ; 
as  a soldier  in  important  campaigns  he  rendered 
valuable  services  to  his  country  ; as  a statesman  for 
thirty  years  he  maintained  a recognised  pre-eminence 
over  his  countrymen  in  the  oldest  and  most  populous 
nation  of  the  earth  ; and  as  a diplomat  his  achieve- 
ments entitle  him  to  a front  rank  in  the  international 
relations  of  all  history.” 

The  ingenious  Editor  of  these  same  “ Memoirs  ” 
sums  up  the  Viceroy’s  character  and  work  in  a very 
different  style  of  appreciation,  savouring  strongly  of 
“ Young  China,”  in  critical  vein  : 

“ Li  Hung-chang  was  powerful  because  of  his 
wealth,  his  army,  and  his  skill  in  diplomacy.  To 
increase  his  wealth  or  influence,  or  to  benefit  China, 
he  was  willing  to  be  double-faced  or  even  ten-faced. 
He  was  wanting  in  the  Christian  or  Confucian  standard 


28o 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


of  morality,  yet  he  preserved  a certain  rugged  inte- 
grity of  purpose,  that  makes  him  a great  man  and 
patriot.  He  served  his  country  and  his  ruler  faith- 
fully, and,  it  might  be  added,  himself ; for  during 
his  public  career  he  accumulated  great  wealth  and 
performed  great  public  industrial  service  by  means 
of  it.  . . . 

“ He  was  a conservative  and  adhered  to  the  customs 
and  superstitions  of  antiquity  ; yet  a progressive, 
introducing  enlightenment  and  reform.  While  he 
professed  to  see  the  danger  of  the  opium  curse,  he 
was  still  one  of  the  greatest  poppy-growers  in  the 
land.  He  united  the  traits  of  cordial  philanthropy 
and  heartless  cruelty,  of  truthfulness  and  men- 
dacity. By  his  own  people  he  was  loved  and  hated, 
despised  and  feared,  degraded  and  exalted  above 
any  other  Chinaman.  . . . He  knew  how  to  use  the 
foreigner  as  his  servant.” 

From  which  opinions  the  unbiassed  reader  may 
gather  that  Li  Hung-chang’s  was  a highly  complex 
character  ; also,  that  he  resembled  many  another 
statesman  in  that  his  conservatism  and  liberalism, 
veracity  and  falsehood,  were  frequently  a matter 
of  time  and  place.  In  him,  as  in  most  men,  there 
was  a Jekyll  and  a Hyde  ; his  human  equation  con- 
tained factors  of  insatiable  ambition  and  greed, 
balanced  by  the  other  factors  of  patriotism  and 
loyalty,  and  those  who  knew  him  and  understood 
him  best  could  usually  predict  whether  Jekyll  or 
Hyde  would  assume  control  in  any  given  emergency. 
In  judging  of  his  career  as  a whole,  however,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  factors  of  the  Li  equation 
varied  greatly  in  value  and  effect  at  different  periods 
of  his  life.  Herein  they  followed  the  common  law  ; 
but,  in  his  case,  the  differences  were  the  more  sharply 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


281 


marked  because,  as  his  self-appointed  Editor  has 
stated  with  such  brutal  frankness,  it  was  given  to 
him  to  be  “ loved  and  hated,  despised  and  feared, 
degraded  and  exalted  above  any  other  Chinaman.” 
The  events  which  brought  him  to  disgrace  and 
imminent  peril  of  death  in  1895  undoubtedly  served, 
for  example,  to  increase  his  love  of  money  and  the 
confidence  which  he  had  always  placed  in  the  com- 
forting virtue  of  wealth,  so  that  during  the  last 
few  years  of  his  life  avarice  became  his  ruling 
passion. 

Often,  amidst  the  bustle  and  racket  of  his  Tientsin 
Yamen,  surrounded  by  all  the  outward  and  visible 
signs  of  its  feverish  modernism,  men  forgot  in  him 
the  Hanlin  compiler,  the  Confucianist,  for  whom  the 
literary  tradition  and  the  Canons  of  the  Sages  were 
sacrosanct  ; but  with  the  Reform  crisis  of  1898  this 
side  of  his  character  asserted  itself  as  vigorously  as 
it  had  done  fifty  years  before.  And  when,  through 
her  own  blind  folly  in  1900,  the  Empress  stood  to 
lose  the  Dragon  throne,  that  unswerving  loyalty, 
which  some  had  doubted  when  he  went  to  Canton, 
dominated  every  other  consideration,  until  he  had 
succeeded  in  making  terms  which  saved  her  dignity 
and  a remnant  of  her  fortunes.  In  a word,  the  voices 
which  came  to  him  with  final  force  of  authority,  which 
determined  his  actions  in  sudden  crises,  were  the 
voices  of  his  tutelary  spirits  and  ancestral  gods, 
powerful  instincts  of  atavism,  bred  and  born  in  every 
son  of  Han  by  centuries  of  persistence  in  the  patri- 
archal social  system  and  the  fierce  struggle  for  life 
which  that  system  has  produced. 

Many  Europeans,  contemplating  the  philosophic 
pacifism  of  the  Chinese,  are  apt  to  forget  the  fierce- 


282 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


ness  of  that  struggle  ; nevertheless  1 it  constitutes 
the  chief  determinant  factor  in  the  history  of  the 
nation  and  in  the  soul  of  the  people.  Among  the 
literati  and  gentry  this  struggle  is  as  bitter  as  it  is 
with  the  toiling  millions  of  the  peasantry  ; its  grim 
shadow  lurks  close  beneath  the  polished  surface  of 
moral  maxims  and  benevolent  theories  of  govern- 
ment. Li  Hung-chang  was  always  well  aware  of 
the  pitfalls  and  perils  that  beset  the  path  of  a success- 
ful mandarin  ; he  fought  his  battles  with  the  sang- 
froid of  a gambler,  fully  alive  to  the  manifold  chances 
and  changes  of  Imperial  favour,  knowing  that  the 
best-laid  plans  of  his  patient  statecraft  might  at  any 
moment  be  overthrown  by  sudden  winds  of  jealousy 
or  greed  in  the  Forbidden  City.  Thrice  during  his 
official  career  he  was  deprived  of  all  his  honours  and 
dismissed  from  his  high  office  ; it  was  in  these  days 
of  adversity  that  he  displayed  at  its  best  the  imper- 
turbable fortitude  of  mind  which  constitutes  one  of 
his  chief  claims  to  admiration. 

In  many  aspects  of  his  character  Li  Hung-chang 
presents  a marked  resemblance  to  his  august  sove- 
reign, Her  Majesty  Tzu  Hsi,  a likeness  not  surprising 
when  we  consider  that  both  were  reared  in  the  same 
worship  of  words  and  ceremonial  shibboleths,  and 
both  endowed  by  nature  with  extraordinary  physical 
and  intellectual  energy.  Such  conditions  naturally 
produced  in  both  a similarity  of  conflict  between 
adventurous  impulses  and  deep-rooted  traditions ; 
moreover,  in  Li  Hung-chang’s  case  admiration  and 
loyalty  for  the  Old  Buddha  must  have  led  him  to 
model  his  actions  upon  hers  in  many  things.  Thus 

1 Vide  “ Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China  ” (Heinemann, 

i9I3)* 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


283 


we  find  in  both  these  masterful  natures  the  same 
patrician  pride  blended  with  a rough-and-ready  kind 
of  bourgeois  sans-genc  ; the  same  love  of  ceremonious 
ostentation  and  cheese-paring  thrift  ; the  same  cold- 
blooded cruelty  and  genial  kindliness ; the  same 
epicurean  joie  de  vivre  and  stoic  philosophy  ; the 
same  dignity  and  impudence  ; the  same  versatility 
of  ideas  combined  with  deep  reverence  for  antiquity 
and  gross  superstition.  Finally  both  had  a keen  sense 
of  humour,  a shrewd  mother-wit,  and  a happy  faculty 
of  avoiding  extremes  : both  were  firm  believers  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  middle  way. 

Li  was  often  called  the  Bismarck  of  the  East,  and 
relished  the  title  ; nevertheless,  its  appropriateness 
was  never  very  obvious,  except  in  so  far  as  both 
statesmen  held  the  power  behind  the  Throne  in  their 
respective  countries.  The  expression  “ Blood  and 
Iron  ” could  never  have  been  fittingly  applied  to 
Li : “ Blood  and  Silver,”  possibly.  At  the  height 
of  his  power  and  fame,  in  the  ’eighties,  men  gave 
him  this  name  who  believed  in  the  fighting  strength 
of  his  imposing  armaments,  and  who  saw  in  his 
brusque  manners,  his  jolly  laughter  and  slim  diplo- 
macy, points  of  resemblance  to  the  Iron  Chancellor. 
As  a matter  of  fact,  there  was  very  little  of  the  Bis- 
marck about  Li.  In  temperament  and  policy  he  was 
essentially  conciliatory  : his  diplomacy  was  a matter 
of  tact,  finesse  and  brains,  and  never  of  brutality. 
Sir  Robert  Hart  characteristically  described  him  in 
1900  as  a “ wily  old  gentleman,”  neatly  summing 
up  in  that  phrase  the  general  opinion  of  the  Viceroy’s 
own  countrymen  His  warlike  activities,  as  they 
had  reason  to  know,  were  essentially  part  of  his 
elaborate  statecraft  of  “ make-believe,”  and  very 


284 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


lucrative  withal  to  himself  and  his  corrupt  entourage. 
His  supple  fingers  could  by  no  stretch  of  imagination 
have  become  a mailed  fist. 

The  weakest  point  in  the  armour  of  Li’s  greatness 
was  undoubtedly  his  love  of  money.  Sir  Valentine 
Chirol,  who  had  excellent  opportunities  of  studying 
the  man  and  his  work  on  the  spot,  wrote  in  1896  : 

“ That  corruption  on  the  largest  and  most  unblushing 
scale  prevails  among  the  friends  and  relatives  who 
form  his  social  entourage  and  political  supporters, 
even  his  admirers  do  not  deny  ; and  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  that  his  own  hands  are  clean,  when  he  is  known 
to  have  amassed  a colossal  fortune,  reputed  by  many 
to  be  the  largest  possessed  by  any  single  individual 
in  the  world,  and  certainly  in  China.” 

We  have  seen  how  that  corruption  affected  his 
military  administration  and  how  his  nepotism  was 
a directly  contributory  cause  of  the  defeat  of  his  navy 
in  1894-95  : the  facts  are  beyond  dispute.  In  the 
opinion  of  the  two  comparatively  clean-handed  Vice- 
roys who  were  his  contemporaries  and  critics-in- 
ordinary  (Chang  Chih-tung  and  Liu  K’un-yi),  Li 
Hung-chang’s  pecuniary  relations  with  Tzu  Hsi’s 
notoriously  greedy  Chief  Eunuch  were  responsible 
for  a state  of  public  corruption  unequalled  since  the 
days  of  Ch’ien  Lung’s  multi-millionaire  Grand  Secre- 
tary,1 Ho  Shen.  The  Young  China  Press,  indeed, 
was  fond  of  comparing  Li  to  Ho  Shen  and  of  recalling 
the  fact  that  the  latter  owed  his  calamitous  end  to 
his  ill-gotten  wealth  and  the  cupidity  it  aroused  in 
others.  The  actual  amount  of  Li’s  wealth  was  most 
probably  much  exaggerated  ; it  certainly  never 

1 Vide  “ Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the  Court  of  Peking  ” (Heinemann,  1913). 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


285 


compared  with  that  of  our  Rockefellers  or  Roth- 
schilds, but  for  China  it  was  unusually  great.  There 
is  no  probate  in  the  Far  East,  nor  any  public  regis- 
tration of  wills  ; on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  such 
elusive  anonymity  of  wealth  as  exists  in  income-taxed 
Europe.  Your  rich  Chinese  invests  a large  part  of 
his  savings  in  retail  businesses  of  various  kinds  (such 
as  banking  and  pawnbroking,  opium,  salt,  and  grain), 
where  capital  commands  usurious  rates  of  interest  ; 
his  affairs  thus  become  common  property,  and  the 
fame  of  his  riches  increases  with  the  sphere  of  his 
operations  and  the  extent  of  his  rapacity.  Another 
portion  of  his  money  he  invests  in  portable  form  (gold 
bars  and  jewels  and  furs  and  jade),  because  visions 
of  sudden  tumults  and  swift  flights,  of  rebellion  and 
the  sacking  of  cities,  are  ever  present  in  the  people’s 
race  memory  and  an  abiding  cause  of  fear.  Thus, 
when  Li’s  star  appeared  to  have  set,  at  the  end 
of  1894,  it  was  common  gossip  that  his  portable 
wealth,  in  charge  of  one  of  his  sons,  was  secretly  sent 
south  to  the  ancestral  home  in  Anhui — a shipload  of 
trunks,  crates,  boxes,  and  bags  ; just  as  Tzu  Hsi 
brought  back  to  Peking  a whole  train-load  of  valuables 
after  her  sojourn  in  the  wilderness  in  1901. 

Li’s  avarice  certainly  grew  upon  him  with  the  in- 
crease of  his  riches.  In  the  Taiping  days  of  his 
association  with  the  “ Ever-victorious  Army  ” there 
were  already  many  indications  of  that  which  became 
his  ruling  passion  : the  most  conspicuous  feature 

of  his  relations  with  Gordon  and  the  other  leaders 
of  that  army  was  his  perpetual  unwillingness  to  part 
with  the  funds  required  for  the  payment  and  feeding 
of  the  troops.  He  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  he 
preferred  the  Imperial  army  to  live  by  plundering 


286 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


the  helpless  civil  population  rather  than  by  drawing 
regular  rations  from  his  own  exchequer.  Reference 
has  been  made  in  a former  chapter  to  the  pecuniary 
considerations  of  a private  nature  which  undoubtedly 
influenced  his  policy  and  weakened  his  determination 
at  the  outset  of  the  war  with  Japan,  to  his  vested 
interests  in  Korea,  and  his  fears  that  the  cost  of  the 
campaign  would  fall  heavily  upon  his  privy  purse. 
These  things  also  are  beyond  dispute.  But  before 
we  proceed  to  judge  and  condemn  him  for  them,  we 
should  remember  that  in  the  East  peculation  is  re- 
garded as  the  mandarin’s  right,  an  established  class 
tradition  of  privilege,  and  that  the  national  conscience 
in  China  looks  leniently  upon  the  amassing  of  wealth 
as  the  reward  of  a successful  career  in  the  public 
service.  It  is  not  that  the  people  fail  to  reverence 
integrity  in  their  officials,  but  that  they  regard  it  as 
something  abnormal ; their  very  respect  is  tempered 
by  good-natured  doubts  as  to  the  worldly  wisdom 
of  an  incorruptible  Viceroy  like  Chang  Chih-tung. 
Their  reverence  is  mixed  with  pity  for  the  poor 
scholar  whose  intelligence  has  failed  to  teach  him  the 
wisdom  which  was  Solomon’s,  that  “ the  rich  man’s 
wealth  is  his  strong  city,”  and  that  “ a man’s  gift 
maketh  room  for  him,  and  bringeth  him  before  great 
men.”  Li  Hung-chang  assimilated  with  the  Classics 
that  serpent  wisdom  of  the  East,  and  never  failed 
to  apply  it.  The  evils  of  the  social  and  political  system 
represented  by  wisdom  of  this  kind  were  emphasised 
in  his  case  because  of  the  heights  of  fame  to  which  he 
rose,  not  only  in  China  but  abroad,  and  by  his  appa- 
rent readiness  to  accept  other  ideals  and  methods 
as  the  result  of  his  contact  with  European  civilisation. 
Europeans,  who  witnessed  the  triumphs  of  his  intelli- 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


287 


gence  as  administrator  and  diplomat,  looked  to  him 
to  become  the  prophet  of  a new  dispensation  which 
should  lead  the  mandarin  out  of  the  wilderness  of 
corruption.  They  forgot  that  every  great  man,  how- 
ever remarkable,  is  au  fond  the  product  of  his  ancestry 
and  education,  and  that,  as  Herbert  Spencer  puts 
it,  he  cannot  remake  the  society  which  has  produced 
him ; that, 

“ along  with  the  whole  generation  of  which  he  forms 
a minute  part — along  with  its  institutions,  language, 
knowledge,  manners,  and  its  multitudinous  arts  and 
appliances,  he  is  a resultant  of  an  enormous  aggregate 
of  forces  that  have  been  co-operating  for  ages.  . . . 
All  those  changes  of  which  he  is  the  proximate  initi- 
ator have  their  chief  causes  in  the  generation  he 
descended  from.”  1 

No  virtue  of  honesty  is  to  be  hoped  for  in  the  man- 
darin’s caste,  because  the  ideals  and  conduct  of  that 
class  are  the  results  of  that  system  which  has  pro- 
duced them.  As  Sir  Valentine  Chirol  (writing  of  Li) 
justly  observes  : 

“ The  system  itself  is  a tissue  of  impostures.  As 
soon  as  a Chinaman  enters  official  life,  he  belongs  to 
an  oligarchy  which  stands  entirely  apart  from  the 
rest  of  the  nation,  wrapped  up  in  its  hereditary  pride 
and  bound  together  by  the  closest  ties  of  self-interest. 
He  may  try  to  keep  his  own  hands  clean,  but  woe 
betide  him  if  he  tries  to  impose  the  inconvenient 
practice  on  others.” 

Li  Hung-chang  never  attempted  that  forlorn  hope. 
Like  his  Imperial  mistress,  he  sedulously  observed 
the  convenances  of  mandarin  make-believe,  inditing 
soulful  memorials  on  the  pursuance  of  honest  adminis- 
1 Herbert  Spencer,  “ The  Study  of  Sociology.” 


288 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


tration,  on  the  evils  of  nepotism  and  the  beauty  of 
public  benevolence,  thickly  strewn  with  moral  plati- 
tudes in  the  best  classical  style.  But  the  men  who 
looked  after  the  financial,  as  distinct  from  the  adminis- 
trative, side  of  his  Viceregal  affairs  were  generally  of 
a type  which  ill  consorted  with  professions  of  solicitude 
for  the  public  purse.  Making  every  allowance  for  the 
immemorial  right  to  “ squeeze  ” and  public  accept- 
ance thereof,  the  reputation  of  Li’s  Yamen  at  certain 
periods  of  his  Viceroyalty  stank  even  in  the  nostrils 
of  his  fellow-countrymen.  II  y a des  convenances , and 
public  opinion  in  China  expects  officials  to  steer  a 
decent  midway  course  between  their  opportunities 
of  “ squeeze  ” and  their  sense  of  duty.  The  unblush- 
ing roguery  of  Chang  P’ei-lun,  Li’s  son-in-law,  and 
its  parlous  results  have  already  been  described  ; and 
his  case,  though  extreme,  was  typical  of  the  men  who 
held  the  purse  or  sat  at  the  receipt  of  custom  under 
Li’s  administration.  These  men  had  all  the  defects 
of  their  chief  without  his  redeeming  qualities. 

Li’s  greed  of  gain,  like  that  of  his  Palace  ally,  the 
Chief  Eunuch,  never  despised  the  day  of  small  things. 
His  was  a sordid  instinct  of  accumulation,  strangely 
incompatible  with  the  genial  breadth  of  his  mind  in 
other  directions.  For  example,  when  all  the  world, 
including  the  fugitive  Empress  Dowager,  was  anxiously 
expecting  him  to  go  north  from  Shanghai  in  Septem- 
ber, 1900,  to  undertake  that  which  was  probably  the 
most  important  service  that  he  ever  rendered  to  his 
country,  his  departure  was  mysteriously  postponed 
for  two  days.  Rumour  whispered  of  fresh  Russian 
overtures  to  convey  him  north  in  a Russian  steamer, 
as  being  safer  than  a British  ; of  objections  raised 
to  his  peace-making  by  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  and 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


289 


other  causes.  The  actual  reason  of  his  delay  was  that 
he  was  endeavouring  to  extract  from  the  Shanghai 
Taotai  the  money  which  he  had  expended  on  tele- 
grams to  St.  Petersburg — some  30,000  taels — and 
that  the  Taotai  refused  to  be  beguiled,  both  men 
knowing  that  there  was  little  chance,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, of  recovering  this  expenditure  from 
Peking.  In  his  own  house  his  thrifty  ways  were  well 
known  ; he  loved  good  cheer,  but  could  not  face  with 
a good  grace  the  mauvais  quart  (Theure  of  payment. 

At  more  than  one  period  of  his  Viceregal  career 
Li  was  induced,  by  the  accusations  of  Censors,  to 
make  public  profession  of  clean-handed  integrity, 
but  the  verdict  of  contemporary  opinion  remained 
unimpressed.  Indeed,  the  vast  fortune  which  he 
accumulated  and  the  character  of  the  men  whom 
he  employed  in  confidential  positions  left  no  room 
for  doubt  as  to  his  own  venality.  The  unblushing 
effrontery  displayed  in  wholesale  squeezing  by  certain 
of  his  proteges  frequently  led  to  serious  scandals,  for 
which  the  Court  was  compelled  to  rebuke  their 
patron.  The  cases  of  Cheng  Ki-tong,  cashiered  for 
unauthorised  borrowings  in  Paris,  and  of  Li  Feng-pao, 
diplomatic  agent  and  purchaser  of  cruisers  in  Berlin, 
were  severely  criticised  abroad  ; those  of  Sheng  Kung- 
pao  and  Chang  P’ei-lun  became  a byword  in  China. 
Their  methods  were  crude  and  inartistic  compared 
with  those  of  Li  himself ; but,  stoutly  supporting 
them  as  he  did  against  all  attacks,  he  was  identified 
with  their  proceedings  by  his  enemies,  who  naturally 
concluded  that  he  received  a considerable  share  of 
their  profits.  His  own  handling  of  such  matters  as 
the  reclamation  of  the  Yellow  River  and  the  transport 
of  grain  for  famine  relief  was  deeply  tainted  by  the 

L.H.  U 


290 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


same  greed  of  gain  as  he  had  displayed  in  military 
administration  while  Governor  of  Kiangsu. 

The  superstitious  side  of  Li’s  mind  frequently 
asserted  itself  in  strong  contrast  with  his  shrewdly 
practical  common  sense  ; like  Tzu  Hsi,  however, 
he  seldom  allowed  superstition  to  turn  him  from  any 
line  of  action  dictated  by  his  private  interests  or  public 
policy.  There  is  ample  evidence  throughout  his  career 
that  his  belief  in  ghostly  influences  and  the  unseen 
powers  in  heaven  and  earth  was  very  similar  to  that 
of  the  humblest  toiler  in  his  ancestral  fields,  a curious 
admixture  of  Confucian  agnosticism  with  an  atavistic 
tendency  to  belief  in  the  supernatural.  Where  tute- 
lary spirits  and  demons  were  concerned,  he  was  always 
prepared  to  give  them  the  benefit  of  reasonable  doubts, 
so  long  as  his  purse  was  not  immediately  affected. 
Foreign  observers,  chiefly  impressed  by  the  progres- 
sive activities  of  his  Tientsin  Yamen,  were  apt  to 
conclude  that  his  exhibitions  of  crude  superstition 
were  merely  part  of  his  tactful  conciliation  of  public 
snetiment,  and  insincere  ; but  in  this  they  were 
wrong.  As  an  orthodox  Confucianist,  Li  would  not 
discuss  the  immortal  gods  or  the  powers  of  darkness, 
but  his  attitude  towards  the  unseen  was  ever  one  of 
respectful  caution.  Thus,  in  1864,  we  find  him 
solemnly  memorialising  the  Throne  with  a request 
that  an  honorific  Imperial  tablet  should  be  bestowed 
on  the  tutelary  spirits  of  a shrine  at  Chang  Chow, 
by  whose  aid  the  rebels  had  been  defeated.  In  1877, 
the  year  of  the  great  drought  in  the  northern  pro- 
vinces, he  sent  for  the  sacred  rain-compelling  tablet 
of  Hantan  and  reported  thereafter  to  the  Emperor 
that  its  influence  with  the  Dragon  King  had  been 
most  satisfactory.  In  1894,  again,  we  find  the  great 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


291 


Viceroy  solemnly  informing  the  Throne  in  a long 
Memorial,  that  a devastating  breach  in  the  banks  of 
the  Grand  Canal  near  Tientsin  was  the  work  of  a 
malignant  river  god  ; this  kelpie  had  eventually  been 
conciliated  at  considerable  expense  in  sacrificial 
offerings  and  the  breach  repaired,  for  which  benefits 
the  Throne  was  requested  to  confer  honours  and  a 
shrine  (at  Government  expense)  upon  the  said  river 
god.  But  where  his  keen  practical  vision  perceived 
profitable  ventures,  this  reverence  for  antiquity  and 
the  ancestral  superstitions  was  relegated  to  a secon- 
dary part.  For  instance,  when,  under  his  adminis- 
tration, the  first  telegraph  line  was  erected  between 
Tientsin  and  Peking,  and  local  conservatism  expressed 
itself  by  destroying  the  poles  and  wires,  he  was  in- 
formed by  his  staff  that  the  damage  had  been  done 
by  the  outraged  spirits  of  Feng-shui.1  Li  bluntly 
refused  to  recognise  Feng-shui  as  properly  concerned 
in  the  matter  and  compelled  his  subordinates  to  pro- 
ceed vigorously  on  the  assumption  of  human  agency. 
Similarly,  when  Yu  Lu,  as  Tartar  General  of  Kirin, 
endeavoured  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  Kinchow- 
Kirin  railways  with  the  Newchwang  line  at  Moukden, 
on  the  ground  that  the  line  would  interfere  with  the 
repose  of  the  Dragon  guardian  of  that  holy  city,  Li 
wrote  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  Feng-shui  of  Moukden 
could  only  gain  by  the  building  of  so  necessary  a line. 
In  both  cases  he  carried  his  point.  Finally,  in  1900, 
when  the  allied  forces  were  proceeding  to  level  the 
old  walls  of  the  native  city  at  Tientsin,  the  gentry 
and  poor  people  petitioned  him  to  put  a stop  to  the 
work  on  the  ground  that  a city  without  a wall 
was  like  a woman  without  petticoats.  The  Viceroy 

1 Feng-shui , literally  “wind  and  water.” 


u 2 


2gz 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


refused  to  entertain  their  request,  observing  that  the 
wall  had  been  proved  useless  for  defensive  purposes  and 
that  its  removal  would  be  a public  improvement.  By 
the  appropriation  of  the  land  under  and  near  the  wall 
much  money  was  made  by  speculators,  amongst  whom 
were  a number  of  foreigners  and  several  officials  of 
Li’s  entourage,  whilst  thousands  of  wretched  squatters 
were  rendered  homeless.  There  was  generally  some 
good  financial  reason  for  Li’s  departures  from  “ Old 
Custom  ” and  disturbance  of  “ Feng-shui.” 

In  his  work  1 on  the  position  and  prospects  of  China 
after  the  Boxer  rising,  Sir  Robert  Hart  partly  attri- 
butes that  anti-European  movement  to  the  fact  that 
the  West  had  outraged  the  spirit  and  antagonised 
the  nature  of  the  Chinese  people.  He  refers  to  their 
“ inherited  pride,  in  its  massive  and  magnificent 
setting  of  blissful  ignorance  ” — pride  of  race,  pride 
of  intellect,  pride  of  civilisation,  pride  of  supremacy — 
which  “ had  been  so  hurt  by  the  manner  of  foreign 
impact  that  the  other  good  points  of  Chinese  character 
have,  as  it  were,  been  stunned  and  cannot  respond.” 
This  pride  of  race  Li  Hung-chang  certainly  possessed 
in  full  measure  ; by  virtue  of  his  faith  in  the  ineffable 
superiority  of  Chinese  over  Western  culture,  and  by 
his  quickness  of  perception,  he  was  usually  able  to 
invest  his  ignorance  of  practical  questions  with  an 
appearance  of  deep  sagacity.  But  his  ignorance 
was  none  the  less  as  “ massive  and  magnificent,” 
in  many  ways,  as  that  of  his  famous  colleague, 
the  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung  at  Wuchang.  Until 
his  mission  to  Japan  in  1895,  it  was  his  boast  that  he 
had  never  put  foot  on  foreign  soil,  and,  except  for 
a few  translations  of  English  text-books,  he  knew 

1 “ These  from  the  Land  of  Sinim  ” (1901). 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


293 


nothing  of  European  literature  or  science.  Even  in 
practical  matters  of  trade  and  finance,  he  was  fre- 
quently led  astray  by  his  complacent  belief  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  Classics  constituted  equipment 
sufficient  to  enable  him  to  meet  foreign  concession- 
aires and  financiers  on  equal  terms,  so  that  more  than 
one  adventurer  of  the  Polish  Count  variety  obtained 
an  embarrassing  hold  over  him.  But  his  mother-wit 
taught  him,  as  a rule,  to  conceal  his  lack  of  knowledge 
by  many  cunning  expedients  of  intellectual  jiu-jitsu, 
whereby  his  opponent  was  made  to  look  foolish.  In 
dealing  with  foreigners  it  was  his  invariable  custom 
to  lead  and  direct  the  conversation  to  his  own  liking 
and  to  carry  the  war  of  words  into  the  enemy’s  camp 
by  questions  of  apparently  artless,  but  usually  studied, 
impertinence.  By  this  simple  device  he  won  world- 
wide fame  as  a diplomatist  of  unrivalled  Oriental 
subtlety. 

But  his  association  with  Gordon  had  taught  him, 
before  he  became  ruler  of  Chihli,  that  ignorance, 
though  pardonable  in  a Viceroy,  was  China’s  weakness, 
and  that  the  foreigners’  command  of  mechanical  arts 
and  appliances  was  worth  acquiring.  Unfamiliar 
with  the  ethical  and  intellectual  aspects  of  European 
civilisation,  he  believed  that  China  had  only  to  master 
those  arts  and  appliances  from  the  text-books  in 
order  to  meet  the  West  on  equal  terms.  With  all 
his  acuteness,  he  never  appears  to  have  realised  that 
the  weakness  of  the  State  was  not  a matter  of 
mechanics,  but  of  morals  ; that  no  military  or  finan- 
cial reorganisation  could  ever  be  effectively  carried 
out  without  the  inculcation  of  a keen  sense  of  duty 
and  public  spirit  in  the  official  hierarchy.  He  be- 
lieved in  fortifying  the  wisdom  of  the  Oriental  serpent 


294 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


with  a smattering  of  Occidental  science,  and  nothing 
more.  While  he  encouraged  the  translation  into 
Chinese  of  numerous  scientific  and  historical  Euro- 
pean works,  it  remained  his  chief  pleasure  to  indite 
classical  essays  to  the  Divine  Husbandman  or  the 
goddess  Yuan-Fei  and  to  find  the  foundation  of  all 
wise  government  in  the  writings  of  Confucius  and 
Mencius.  The  superstructure  of  modernism  which, 
as  a matter  of  statecraft,  he  laboured  to  impose  upon 
the  Celestial  system  was  always  in  his  eyes  a necessary 
evil,  alien  and  exotic.  When,  in  1877,  he  advised  the 
Throne  to  establish  educational  institutions  for  the 
study  of  foreign  literature  and  science,  it  was  not  his 
object  to  interfere  with  the  then-existing  system  of 
classical  essay  education  for  the  public  service,  but 
merely  to  train,  outside  of  that  service,  a class  of  men 
qualified  to  fill  posts  in  which  familiarity  with  the 
works  of  Mencius  could  serve  no  useful  purpose.  In 
his  own  Viceregal  business  he  had  frequently  reason 
to  regret  his  ignorance  of  foreign  languages,  parti- 
cularly English,  which  compelled  him  to  share  the 
closest  official  secrets  with  interpreters  ; reason  also 
to  regret  many  an  expensive  blunder  due  to  the  hand- 
ling of  railway,  telegraph,  or  diplomatic  affairs  by 
men  trained  in  the  Four  Books  and  Five  Classics. 
Therefore,  as  means  to  a definite  end,  he  advocated 
“ Western  learning  ” and  thus,  until  1898,  came  to 
be  regarded  by  Young  China  as  leader  of  the  Pro- 
gressives. He  was  fond  of  composing  introductions 
for  the  series  of  science  primers  translated,  at  the 
initiative  of  Sir  Robert  Hart,  for  use  in  preparatory 
schools — laudatory  prefaces,  in  the  best  classical 
style,  for  works  on  subjects  of  which  he  himself  was 
completely  ignorant.  Tree-culture,  chemistry,  sur- 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


295 


gery,  or  the  higher  mathematics,  all  received  his 
Viceregal  benediction  ; but  in  almost  every  case 
he  found  opportunity,  while  advocating  the  benefits 
of  scientific  training,  tactfully  to  suggest  that  there 
is  no  new  thing  under  the  sun  and  that  such  wisdom 
as  the  West  has  perfected  was  China’s  birthright, 
under  other  names  and  forms,  in  the  golden  age  of 
the  Yellow  Emperor.  Thus,  in  the  preface  to  a medical 
work  written  by  a missionary  doctor  in  Chinese,  he 
praised  the  scientific  accuracy  of  foreign  methods 
in  the  compounding  and  prescription  of  drugs,  but 
improved  the  occasion  by  reminding  his  readers 
that  the  medical  theories  recorded  by  Pan-ku,  1800 
years  ago,  may  still  be  read  with  benefit  to  human 
knowledge.  He  advised  the  Chinese  students  not 
to  reject  new  ideas  because  they  were  strange,  but 
to  accept  this  book  as  a work  equal  in  value  to  a 
treatise  by  Ko-Hung  or  Sun  Tsz-miao,  and  to  en- 
deavour to  combine  Chinese  and  foreign  methods  in 
the  art  of  healing.  Coming  to  matters  of  detail,  he 
emphasised  China’s  claims  to  be  regarded  as  the 
fountain-head  of  all  knowledge,  by  finding  the  essence 
of  Eastern  anatomical  science  in  the  writings  of  a 
commentator  of  the  “ Chou-li  ” under  the  Han 
dynasty.  It  would  be  hard  to  find  anything  more 
fittingly  expressive  of  Li’s  habit  of  mind  than  these 
utterances.  And  it  was  a habit  which  he  was  at 
pains  to  inculcate  in  those  who  served  him  as  inter- 
preters and  spokesmen  ; the  after-dinner  eloquence 
of  his  ablest  lieutenants,  Lo  Feng-loh  and  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  was  always  gracefully  woven  about  the  text 
“ ex  oriente  lux.”  Indeed,  during  Li’s  tour  abroad, 
Lo  Feng-loh’s  fixed  habit  of  finding  a counterpart 
to  all  European  scientific  knowledge  in  the  writings 


296 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


of  China’s  sages  became  somewhat  monotonous  : 
Pan-ku’s  prophetic  soul  was  bound  to  figure  in  every 
speech  as  an  authority  on  everything,  from  political 
economy  to  aeronautics. 

In  order  to  acquire  for  China  the  mechanical  arts 
and  crafts  of  the  West,  Li  advocated  free  intercourse 
with  foreigners  and  set  an  example,  which  made  him 
many  enemies,  by  employing  the  services  of  numerous 
European  advisers  and  technical  experts.  In  so 
doing  he  committed  a bold  violation  of  the  national 
tradition  of  haughty  exclusiveness.  In  pursuing  this 
wise  policy  he  found  neither  sympathy  nor  support 
amongst  the  educated  classes  of  his  countrymen  ; 
nevertheless,  he  pursued  it  steadily  to  the  end.  He 
knew  what  Japan  had  done  and  was  doing  by  the 
judicious  enlistment  of  European  advisers  and  by 
sending  young  men  to  be  educated  in  the  best  schools 
abroad,  and,  recognising  the  fact  that  for  China 
the  need  of  foreign  experts  was  even  more  urgent, 
he  was  prepared  to  defy  the  forces  of  conservatism. 
The  eminent  services  rendered  to  China  by  such 
advisers  as  Sir  Robert  Hart  and  Sir  Halliday  Macartney 
were  not  lost  upon  him  ; he  frankly  recognised 
their  disinterested  loyalty  and  the  value  of  their 
probity  in  the  public  service.  Nevertheless,  the  man- 
darin in  Li  could  never  be  induced  to  invest  even 
those  whom  he  knew  and  trusted  most  with  that  full 
measure  of  executive  authority  which  might  have 
made  their  services  of  real  and  permanent  value  to 
his  country.  He  was  generally  broad-minded  and 
generous  in  dealing  with  his  rivals  and  critics,  and 
singularly  free  from  the  Oriental  weakness  of  in- 
triguing jealousy  where  his  own  countrymen  were 
concerned  ; but  towards  foreigners  holding  high  posi- 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION  297 

tions  under  the  Chinese  Government,  he  frequently 
displayed  petty  suspicions  and  jealousy  of  an  actively 
aggressive  kind.  In  the  case  of  Gordon,  his  uncon- 
cealed desire  to  minimise  the  achievements  of  that 
gallant  officer  was  natural  enough,  since  his  own 
advancement,  as  well  as  the  amour  propre  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  was  involved.  Also  his  unfor- 
tunate experiences  with  Burgevine  had  naturally 
made  him  fearful  of  placing  any  foreigner  in  a position 
to  exercise  independent  authority.  But  in  the  case 
of  Sir  Robert  Hart,  there  was  no  excuse  for  Li’s  atti- 
tude of  distrust,  and  occasionally  of  hostility,  towards 
one  who  had  rendered  so  many  and  great  services 
to  China.  A weak  point  in  the  armour  of  his  sturdy 
common  sense  was  this  refusal  to  give  full  confidence 
and  support  to  any  European,  even  after  a quarter 
of  a century’s  experience  of  his  trustworthiness.  It 
was  partly  due,  no  doubt,  to  his  persistent  dislike 
and  distrust  of  the  privileged  position  conferred  on 
foreigners  by  virtue  of  their  extra-territorial  rights  ; 
because  behind  the  individual  and  his  possible  griev- 
ances lay  the  shadow  of  the  Legation.  But  it  was 
also  due  to  amour  propre  ; he  resented  the  idea  that 
any  foreigner  should  be  entrusted  by  the  Government 
with  independent  authority  and  duties,  such  an  idea 
striking  at  the  very  foundations  of  the  mandarin’s 
pride  of  place.  Thus,  although  he  was  well  aware 
of  Hart’s  perfect  fitness  to  extend  the  efficient  organi- 
sation of  the  Customs  to  other  branches  of  the  public 
service,  with  great  benefit  and  no  danger  to  China, 
Li  always  opposed  such  expansion  of  the  Inspector- 
General’s  spheres  of  action.  In  time  of  trouble  it 
had  often  suited  him  to  put  Hart  in  the  forefront  of 
the  diplomatic  battle  (as  in  the  matter  of  the  Chefoo 


298 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Convention,  or  the  negotiations  with  France  in  1885), 
and  more  than  once  had  the  Viceroy  of  Chihli  had 
good  cause  to  be  grateful  for  the  aid  of  the  resourceful 
Irishman  who  worked  for  him  so  loyally  at  Peking. 
Yet  when,  in  1885,  Sir  Robert  Hart  was  offered  the 
post  of  British  Minister  in  China,  it  was  Li  Hung-chang 
who  stoutly  opposed  his  being  allowed  to  name  his 
successor  in  the  position  of  Inspector-General,  and 
who  proposed  to  appoint  in  his  place  a worthy  but 
futile  sinologue,  who  would  speedily  have  reduced 
the  Customs  service  to  its  native  chaos.  Again, 
when  the  reorganisation  of  Korea’s  finances  and  the 
definition  of  China’s  suzerain  rights  in  that  country 
had  become  matters  of  urgent  necessity,  it  was  Li 
who  opposed  the  extension  of  Hart’s  men  and  methods 
to  the  Korean  service.  He  preferred  to  let  the  policy 
of  the  Hermit  Kingdom  drift  aimlessly  under  the 
direction  of  his  haphazard  nominee,  the  scholarly 
but  unpractical  Baron  von  Mollendorff.  Finally, 
in  1891,  he  became  more  or  less  directly  identified 
with  an  intrigue  which  aimed  at  the  removal  of 
Sir  Robert  Hart  and  the  appointment  of  a high 
Chinese  official  as  Inspector-General.  This  intrigue 
was  inspired  by  his  foreign-educated  Cantonese  lieu- 
tenants, men  of  intelligence  and  education  like  Tang 
Shao-yi  and  Liang  Mao-ting,  who  resented  the 
foreigners’  assumption  of  superior  administrative 
ability  and  ignored  the  vital  fact  that  their  presence 
as  administrators  was  not  due  to  their  superior 
intelligence  but  to  their  honesty.  Li  Hung-chang 
must  have  been  well  aware  that  the  catchword  of 
“ China  for  the  Chinese,”  applied  to  the  Customs 
service,  would  speedily  have  destroyed  the  Empire’s 
only  reliable  source  of  revenue ; nevertheless,  his 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


299 

jealousy  of  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  position  and  power 
led  him  to  sanction,  if  he  did  not  encourage,  this 
dangerous  intrigue,  and  to  endeavour  to  undermine 
the  loyalty  of  more  than  one  of  the  Inspector-General’s 
subordinates.  But  the  effort  was  half-hearted  at 
best,  and  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  resourcefulness  was  more 
than  a match  for  the  conspirators,  whose  sordid 
interests  were  all  too  obvious.  Li  speedily  dissociated 
himself  from  a plot  foredoomed  to  failure,  and  his 
relations  with  the  Inspector-General  remained  out- 
wardly cordial  and  confidential.  But  the  ambitions 
which  inspired  it  were  scotched,  not  killed  ; they 
came  to  the  surface  again  in  May,  1906,  when  Tang 
Shao-yi,  from  the  height  of  his  position  as  Vice- 
President  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  returned 
to  the  attack,  endeavouring  to  subordinate  Sir  Robert 
Hart  and  the  Customs  service  to  his  own  authority, 
and  finally  bringing  about  the  departure  and  resigna- 
tion of  China’s  most  competent  and  loyal  adviser. 
Much  of  the  harvest  of  ingratitude  and  discourtesy 
which  Sir  Robert  Hart  reaped  at  the  hands  of  the 
Chinese  Government  from  1900  to  1908  was  sown 
in  the  Viceregal  Yamen  of  Li  Hung-chang  during 
the  years  preceding  the  Japanese  war,  when  his  power 
and  fame  were  at  their  highest. 

I have  said  that  his  jealousy  of  Gordon  was  to  some 
extent  natural,  and  explicable  by  the  facts  of  his 
own  position.  Nevertheless,  the  manner  in  which 
it  was  manifested  revealed  a streak  of  the  ungenerous 
distrust  which  characterised  nearly  all  his  relations 
with  Europeans  engaged  in  the  service  of  China.  So 
long  as  the  forces  of  the  Taipings  remained  undefeated, 
Li  relied  on  the  “ Ever-victorious  Army  ” as  the  back- 
bone of  the  Imperial  army,  but  once  the  end  of  the 


3 00 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


rebellion  was  assured,  his  chief  object  was  to  minimise 
the  foreigners’  claims  to  rewards  and  honour  and  to 
get  rid  of  them  on  the  cheapest  possible  terms,  re- 
taining only  a small  number  of  experts  to  work  under 
Dr.  (later  Sir  Halliday)  Macartney  in  his  arsenal  at 
Nanking.  Gordon  has  left  it  on  record  that  towards 
the  end  of  his  service  under  Li  the  latter’s  attitude 
was  deliberately  obstructive  and  unpleasant.  Sir 
Harry  Parkes  recorded  a similar  impression,  which 
was  not  lessened  by  his  shifty  and  discourteous  treat- 
ment of  Captain  Sherard-Osborn.  This  plain-spoken 
sailor,  indignant  at  Li’s  behaviour  to  Gordon,  bluntly 
refused  to  allow  his  flotilla  to  take  service  as  a pro- 
vincial force,  and  furthermore  declared  that  no  self- 
respecting  British  officer  could  ever  serve  under 
Li  Hung-chang  again.  Thirty  years  later  his  opinion 
came  to  be  endorsed,  after  bitter,  humiliating  experi- 
ences, by  Captain  Lang,  R.N.,  another  gallant  officer, 
whose  loyal  services  to  China  were  rewarded  with 
cavalier  rudeness  and  ingratitude.  On  more  than 
one  occasion  in  the  course  of  his  violent  differences 
with  Gordon,  and  notably  after  the  massacre  of  the 
Taiping  chiefs,  peace  was  patched  up  between  them 
by  the  tactful  skill  of  Mr.  (later  Sir  Robert)  Hart. 
Indirectly,  the  latter  owed  to  Li  his  subsequent  ap- 
pointment to  replace  Mr.  H.  N.  Lay  as  Inspector- 
General  of  Customs,  for  it  was  Li’s  categorical  refusal 
to  take  over  the  Lay-Osborn  flotilla  that  led  to  Mr. 
Lay’s  supersession. 

Where  foreigners  were  concerned  Li  was  apt  to 
forget  benefits  received,  but  never  benefits  conferred 
by  himself  ; therefore,  in  later  years,  when  Sir 
Robert  Hart’s  fame  abroad  had  reached  a point 
where  it  occasionally  eclipsed  his  own,  and  when  the 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


301 


Inspector-General  was  compelled  to  differ  from  him 
on  points  of  policy,  Li  was  disposed  to  emphasise 
this  matter  of  ancient  obligations  and  to  resent  the 
Irishman’s  autocratic  independence.  And,  to  do 
him  justice,  Sir  Robert  Hart,  always  a good  fighter 
until  shaken  by  the  crisis  of  1900,  gave  Li  as  good  as 
he  got  in  many  a shrewd  tussle,  and  the  steady  exten- 
sion of  his  semi-independent  authority  over  various 
branches  of  China’s  internal  and  foreign  affairs  was 
quite  sufficient  to  arouse  the  Viceroy’s  jealous  fears. 
Nevertheless,  whenever  serious  danger  threatened 
the  Empire  (as  in  the  wars  with  France  and  Japan 
or  the  Boxer  rising),  their  differences  were  not  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  them  from  working  together  in  close 
and  cordial  co-operation. 

Apart  from  this  weakness  of  jealous  distrust  of 
foreigners  in  high  positions,  Li’s  relations  with  those 
who  worked  with  and  under  him  in  the  service  of 
China  were  as  a rule  mutually  satisfactory.  He  pos- 
sessed indeed,  like  Tzu  Hsi,  an  indefinable  personal 
charm  and  geniality,  which  bound  men  to  his  service 
by  strong  ties  of  loyalty.  He  was  also  a shrewd  judge 
of  character  ; in  his  choice  of  men  he  was  guided 
more  by  personal  than  technical  qualifications.  He 
frequently  put  square  pegs  into  round  holes,  but  the 
results  usually  justified  his  mandarin  belief  in  the 
adaptability  of  the  human  equation,  and  in  certain 
cases  the  relations  between  the  Viceroy  and  his  foreign 
employees  approximated  to  intimate  friendship,  as 
closely  as  is  possible  for  minds  separated  by  the  un- 
fathomable gulf  that  divides  East  from  West.  Two 
Englishmen,  an  American,  and  a German  retained 
his  respect  and  confidence  through  good  and  evil 
report  and  in  return  did  him  yeoman  service — 


302 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


namely,  Dr.  Irwin,  Mr.  Alexander  Michie,  Mr.  Pethick 
(his  private  secretary),  and  Herr  Gustav  Detring, 
Commissioner  of  Customs  at  Tientsin.  To  the  latter 
Li  entrusted  many  delicate  negotiations,  besides 
relying  upon  him  to  obtain  accurate  information, 
through  Sir  Robert  Hart  and  the  Legations,  con- 
cerning men  and  affairs  at  Peking.  Dr.  Irwin 
(appointed,  despite  the  strong  opposition  of  Li’s 
family,  to  be  his  personal  physician)  and  Mr.  Pethick 
probably  saw  more  of  the  man  and  less  of  the  man- 
darin than  any  other  Europeans  ; and  by  their  testi- 
mony the  Viceroy  was  a very  lovable  character  in 
private  life — affectionate  to  his  family  after  the 
patriarchal  manner  of  the  East,  generous  and  genial. 
Dr.  Irwin  accompanied  Li  (and  his  gorgeous  coffin) 
on  the  grand  tour  to  Europe,  after  every  effort  had 
been  made  by  Russian  diplomacy  to  have  him  super- 
seded ; neither  the  exigencies  of  statecraft  nor  the 
remonstrances  of  his  womenfolk  could  persuade  the 
Viceroy  to  sever  his  relations  with  the  Irishman 
whom  he  trusted.  He  showed  a similar  love  of  fair 
play  on  many  other  occasions  where  Europeans  in 
the  Chinese  service  were  exposed  to  the  tender  mercies 
of  diplomacy  or  selected  as  scapegoats  for  the  further- 
ance of  high  policies  at  Peking.  It  was  chiefly  this 
quality  which  made  the  Viceroy  popular  and  respected 
amongst  the  foreigners  resident  at  Tientsin.  The  sport- 
loving  members  of  that  community  admired  him  for 
two  virtues  rarely  found  in  high  Chinese  officials, 
namely,  the  consistent  courage  of  his  opinions  and  his 
promptitude  in  action.  They  greatly  admired  the 
fortitude  which  he  displayed  at  Shimonoseki  in  the 
dark  days  of  national  defeat  and  personal  danger, 
and  their  sentiments  found  expression  in  a great 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


303 


banquet  given  to  him  by  the  Tientsin  Municipality 
on  the  eve  of  his  departure  for  Moscow.  On  this 
occasion  the  chairman  congratulated  the  aged  Viceroy 
on  having  “ successfully  weathered  the  storm  of  public 
opprobrium  which  is  sometimes  the  statesman’s 
greatest  honour.”  As  Tientsin  was  only  too  familiar 
with  the  real  causes  of  China’s  lamentable  debacle 
and  Li’s  personal  responsibility  for  the  rottenness 
of  the  military  and  naval  administration,  the  com- 
munity, in  expressing  these  sentiments,  was,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  recording  its  appreciation 
of  Li  as  a good  sportsman  according  to  his  lights. 
And  Li  was  greatly  pleased  by  this  spontaneous 
testimony  to  his  personal  qualities,  coming  at  a 
time  when  his  administrative  capacity  had  been 
weighed  in  the  balance  and  found  wanting. 

There  was  undoubtedly  something  very  impressive 
in  the  aged  Viceroy’s  fortitude  in  adversity,  in  the 
intelligent  and  deliberate  stoicism  that  he  wore  with 
such  easy  grace.  It  is  a virtue  which,  as  the  Boxer 
insurrection  proved,  often  springs  from  the  good  seed 
of  Confucian  philosophy  quite  independent  of  the 
quality  of  the  soil.  As  far  as  Palace  and  party  politics 
were  concerned,  Li  knew  that  without  the  protecting 
favour  of  the  Empress  Dowager  his  great  wealth 
would  be  a source  of  danger  to  him  rather  than  a 
defence.  He  knew  full  well  her  sudden  moods  of 
impulse  and  suspicion  ; and  knew  also  that  if  ever  she 
should  be  led  to  turn  against  him,  either  by  the  advice 
of  Prince  Tuan  or  other  enemies,  his  fortune  and  his 
life  would  be  in  jeopardy.  Yet,  knowing  these  things, 
he  kept  steadfastly  on  his  way,  sacrificing  nothing 
of  his  few  fixed  principles  to  popular  clamour  or 
private  intrigue. 


304 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


And  this  moral  quality  of  courage  is  the  more 
remarkable  because,  in  the  matter  of  physical  bravery, 
Li  Hung-chang  had  always  been  distinguished  for 
adopting  the  better  part  of  discretion.  In  his  cam- 
paigns against  the  Taipings,  and  later  against  the 
Nienfei,  he  was  not  wont  to  seek  a bubble  reputation 
at  the  cannon’s  mouth  or  to  lead  his  forces  in  the 
field.  He  professed  to  admire  the  courage  displayed 
by  Tseng  Kuo-fan  and  Tso  Tsung-tang  and  Gordon, 
but  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  his  heart  he  liked  the 
pen  far  better  than  the  sword  and  regarded  ordeal 
by  battle  as  unworthy  of  the  Superior  Man.  He 
realised  that  someone  must  be  found  to  face  it  ; also, 
that  the  path  of  military  glory  might  prove  the 
shortest  road  to  power  : but  throughout  his  military 
career  his  first  care  was  to  preserve  for  his  country  and 
himself  a life  which  he  always  regarded  as  very  valu- 
able. Yet  in  the  field  of  politics  and  public  life,  where 
elements  of  personal  danger  were  ever  present,  he 
showed  no  disposition  to  conciliate  or  avert  them. 
He  played  his  game  of  statecraft  with  cool  courage 
and  took  his  risks  like  a man,  even  when  they  in- 
cluded the  tremendous  possibility  of  evoking  the 
divine  wrath  of  the  Old  Buddha. 

A striking  example  of  his  moral  courage,  displayed 
at  the  very  outset  of  his  career,  in  opposition  to  all 
the  vested  interests  and  traditions  of  the  literati , 
was  his  famous  Memorial  (above  quoted)  on  China’s 
foreign  relations  submitted  to  the  Throne  in  1867.1 
Another  equally  remarkable  example  was  given  in 
the  last  year  of  his  life,  in  a Memorial  which  publicly 
rebuked  and  admonished  Her  Majesty  for  her  share 
in  the  Boxer  madness.  A translation  of  this  State 


1 Vide  supra , p.  84. 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


305 


paper  has  already  been  given  in  “ China  under  the 
Empress  Dowager,”  but  it  is  worthy  of  reproduction 
because  of  the  light  which  it  throws  on  the  character 
of  Li  Hung-chang  and  his  high-minded  courage  in 
moments  of  national  danger. 

“ It  is  to  be  remembered  that  between  this,  our 
Empire  of  China,  and  the  outer  barbarians,  hostilities 
have  frequently  occurred  since  the  remotest  antiquity, 
and  our  national  history  teaches  that  the  best  way 
to  meet  them  is  to  determine  upon  our  policy  only 
after  carefully  ascertaining  their  strength  as  com- 
pared with  our  own.  Since  the  middle  of  the  reign 
of  Tao-Kuang  the  pressure  of  the  barbarians  on  our 
borders  has  steadily  increased,  and  to-day  we  are 
brought  to  desperate  straits  indeed.  In  i860  they 
invaded  the  capital  and  burnt  the  Summer  Palace  ; 
His  Majesty  Hsien-Feng  was  forced  to  flee,  and  thus 
came  to  his  death.  It  is  only  natural  that  His  Majesty’s 
posterity  should  long  to  avenge  him  to  the  end  of 
time,  and  that  your  subjects  should  continue  to 
cherish  undying  hopes  of  revenge.  But  since  that 
time,  France  has  taken  from  us  Annam,  the  whole 
of  that  dependency  being  irretrievably  lost  : Japan 
has  fought  us,  and  ousted  us  from  Korea.  Even 
worse  disasters  and  loss  of  territory  were,  how- 
ever, to  follow  : Germany  seized  Kiaochao  ; Russia 
followed  by  annexing  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  ; 
England  demanded  Wei-hai-wei  and  Kowloon,  to- 
gether with  the  extension  of  the  Shanghai  Settlements, 
and  the  opening  of  new  treaty  ports  inland  ; and 
France  made  further  demands  for  Kuang-Chou-wan. 
How  could  we  possibly  maintain  silence  under  such 
grievous  and  repeated  acts  of  aggression  ? Craven 
would  be  the  man  who  would  not  seek  to  improve 
our  defences,  and  shameless  would  be  he  who  did  not 
long  for  the  day  of  reckoning.  I myself  have  enjoyed 
no  small  favours  from  the  Throne,  and  much  is  ex- 


3°6 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


pected  of  me  by  the  nation.  Needless  for  me  to  say 
how  greatly  I would  rejoice  were  it  possible  for  China 
to  enter  upon  a glorious  and  triumphant  war  ; it 
would  be  the  joy  of  my  closing  days  to  see  the 
barbarian  nations  subjugated  at  last  in  submissive 
allegiance,  respectfully  making  obeisance  to  the 
Dragon  Throne.  Unfortunately,  however,  I cannot 
but  recognise  the  melancholy  fact  that  China  is 
unequal  to  any  such  enterprise,  and  that  our  forces 
are  in  no  way  competent  to  undertake  it.  Looking 
at  the  question  as  one  affecting  chiefly  the  integrity 
of  our  Empire,  who  would  be  so  foolish  as  to  cast 
missiles  at  a rat  in  the  vicinity  of  a priceless  piece 
of  porcelain  ? It  requires  no  augur’s  skill  in  divina- 
tion to  foresee  that  eggs  are  more  easily  to  be  cracked 
than  stones.  Let  us  consider  one  recent  incident 
in  proof  of  this  conclusion.  Recently,  in  the  attack 
by  some  tens  of  thousands  of  Boxers  and  Imperial 
troops  upon  the  Foreign  Settlements  of  Tientsin, 
there  were  some  two  or  three  thousand  foreign 
soldiers  to  defend  them  ; yet,  after  ten  days  of  des- 
perate fighting,  only  a few  hundred  foreigners  had 
been  slain,  while  no  less  than  twenty  thousand  Chinese 
were  killed  and  as  many  more  wounded.  Again, 
there  are  no  real  defences  or  fortified  positions  in  the 
Legations  at  Peking,  nor  are  the  foreign  Ministers 
and  their  Legation  staffs  trained  in  the  use  of  arms  ; 
nevertheless,  Tung  Fu-hsiang’s  hordes  have  been 
bombarding  them  for  more  than  a month,  and  have 
lost  many  thousands  of  men  in  the  vain  attempt  to 
capture  the  position. 

“ The  fleets  of  the  allied  Powers  are  now  hurrying 
forward  vast  bodies  of  their  troops  ; the  heaviest 
artillery  is  now  being  brought  swiftly  to  our  shores. 
Has  China  the  forces  to  meet  them  ? Does  she  possess 
a single  leader  capable  of  resisting  this  invasion  ? 
If  the  foreign  Powers  send  100,000  men,  they  will 
easily  capture  Peking,  and  your  Majesties  will  then 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


307 


find  escape  impossible.  You  will  no  doubt  endeavour 
once  more  to  flee  to  Jehol,  but  on  this  occasion  you 
have  no  commander  like  Sheng-pao  to  hold  back 
the  enemies’  forces  from  pursuit  ; or,  perhaps,  you 
may  decide  to  hold  another  Peace  Conference,  like 
that  at  Shimonoseki,  in  1895  ? But  the  conditions 
to-day  existing  are  in  no  way  similar  to  those  of  that 
time,  when  Marquis  Ito  was  willing  to  meet  me  as 
your  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  When  betrayed  by 
the  Boxers  and  abandoned  by  all,  where  will  your 
Majesties  find  a single  prince,  councillor,  or  statesman 
able  to  assist  you  effectively  ? The  fortunes  of  your 
house  are  being  staked  upon  a single  throw ; my 
blood  runs  cold  at  the  thought  of  events  to  come. 
Under  any  enlightened  sovereign  these  Boxers,  with 
their  ridiculous  claims  of  supernatural  powers,  would 
most  assuredly  have  been  condemned  to  death  long 
since.  Is  it  not  on  record  that  the  Han  dynasty  met 
its  end  because  of  its  belief  in  magicians  and  in  their 
power  to  confer  invisibility  ? Was  not  the  Sung 
dynasty  destroyed  because  the  Emperor  believed 
ridiculous  stories  about  supernatural  warriors  clad  in 
miraculous  coats  of  mail  ? 

“ I myself  am  nearly  eighty  years  of  age,  and  my 
death  cannot  be  far  distant  ; I have  received  favours 
at  the  hands  of  four  Emperors.  If  now  I hesitate  to 
say  the  things  that  are  in  my  mind,  how  shall  I face 
the  spirits  of  the  sacred  ancestors  of  this  dynasty 
when  we  meet  in  the  halls  of  Hades  ? I am  compelled, 
therefore,  to  give  utterance  to  this  my  solemn  prayer, 
and  to  beseech  your  Majesties  to  put  away  from  you 
at  once  these  vile  magic  workers,  and  to  have  them 
summarily  executed. 

“ You  should  take  steps  immediately  to  appoint 
a high  official  who  shall  purge  the  land  of  this  vil- 
lainous rabble,  and  who  shall  see  to  it  that  the  foreign 
Ministers  are  safely  escorted  to  the  headquarters  of 
the  allied  armies.  In  spite  of  the  great  heat,  I have 


3°8 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


hurried  northwards  from  Canton  to  Shanghai,  where 
your  Majesties’  Decrees  urging  me  to  come  to  Peking 
have  duly  reached  me.  Any  physical  weakness,  how- 
ever serious,  would  not  have  deterred  me  from  obey- 
ing this  summons,  but  perusal  of  your  Decrees  has 
led  me  to  the  conclusion  that  your  Majesties  have 
not  yet  adopted  a policy  of  reason,  but  are  still  in 
the  hands  of  traitors,  regarding  these  Boxers  as  your 
dutiful  subjects,  with  the  result  that  unrest  is  spread- 
ing and  alarm  universal.  Moreover,  I am  here  in 
Shanghai  without  a single  soldier  under  my  command, 
and  even  should  I proceed  with  all  haste  in  the  en- 
deavour to  present  myself  at  your  Palace  gates,  I 
should  meet  with  innumerable  dangers  by  the  way, 
and  the  end  of  my  journey  would  most  probably 
be  that  I should  provide  your  rebellious  and  turbulent 
subjects  with  one  more  carcass  to  hack  into  mince- 
meat. I shall  therefore  continue  in  residence  here 
for  the  present,  considering  ways  and  means  for 
raising  a military  force  and  for  furnishing  supplies, 
as  well  as  availing  myself  of  the  opportunity  of  ascer- 
taining the  enemies’  plans,  and  making  such  diplo- 
matic suggestions  as  occur  to  me  to  be  useful.  As 
soon  as  my  plans  are  complete,  I shall  proceed  north- 
wards with  all  possible  speed.” 

The  secret  of  Li’s  triumphantly  successful  career 
is  enshrined  in  these  two  Memorials,  the  one  instinct 
with  creative  intelligence,  the  other  with  high  moral 
courage.  For  the  rest,  Sir  Robert  Hart  has  recorded 
his  opinion  that  luck  and  circumstance  were  as  impor- 
tant factors  in  that  career  as  brains,  which  is  probably 
as  true  and  as  false  as  such  generalisations  are  bound 
to  be.  The  determinant  circumstance  of  Li’s  success 
lay  in  that  he  perceived  (dimly  enough,  it  is  true) 
hard  facts  which  his  countrymen  could  not  see  at  all. 
The  blindness  of  others  may  be  regarded  as  his  luck, 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


309 


but  his  own  power  of  exceptional  vision  constitutes 
a fair  claim  to  greatness.  With  all  his  faults,  he  was 
for  thirty  years  the  one  man  whose  influence  was 
generally  admitted  to  be  the  most  hopeful  sign  of 
China’s  long-expected  and  still-deferred  awakening. 

At  Sikawei,  on  the  outskirts  of  the  Foreign  Settle- 
ments at  Shanghai,  there  stands  a bronze  statue  of 
Li  Hung-chang,  erected  in  his  honour  by  the  firm  of 
Krupp,  grateful  for  past  favours  and  hopeful  of  bene- 
fits to  come.  This  exotic  product  of  Teutonic  culture 
fittingly  commemorates  the  venal,  ineffectual,  and 
insincere  side  of  Li’s  complex  personality,  the  avari- 
cious Li  who  lived  and  moved  in  a sordid  atmo- 
sphere of  concessions,  contracts,  and  “ squeezes.” 
But  the  severely  dignified  shrines  erected  in  memory 
of  his  greatness  in  Peking  and  at  his  ancestral  home 
in  Anhui  commemorate  with  equal  fitness  the  nobler 
side  of  his  character — his  sturdy  patriotism,  his 
courage,  and  his  far-seeing  wisdom.  At  these  shrines, 
on  the  appointed  days,  his  descendants  make  obei- 
sance, and  dignified  officials  perform  the  accustomed 
rites  of  homage  ; for,  even  in  these  days  of  chaos  and 
mushroom  republicanism,  Confucianism  retains  its 
strong  hold  on  the  soul  of  the  people,  and  the  scholar 
statesman  who  has  achieved  the  posthumous  title 
of  “ Learned  and  Loyal  ” commands  the  veneration 
of  the  mandarin,  top  hats  and  frock  coats  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding.  Hyde  has  his  monument, 
Jekyll  his  shrines  ; and  at  both  there  are  those  who 
do  him  reverence,  according  to  their  lights.  These 
divided  honours,  these  monuments  of  Old  China  and 
New,  one  pointing  eastwards  and  the  other  west,  have 
been  regarded  by  certain  hasty  observers  as  recording 
between  them  the  triumph  of  a cynical  opportunism  ; 


310 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


but,  as  a matter  of  fact,  they  constitute  a fitting  tribute 
to  Li  Hung-chang’s  faithful  adherence  to  the  Con- 
fucian  doctrine  of  the  happy  mean.  Were  it  not  that 
the  Krupp  statue  is  inevitably  associated  in  the  minds 
of  Europeans  with  the  worst  abuses  of  the  mandarin 
system,  with  itching  palms  and  backdoor  bribes,  and 
all  their  lamentable  consequences  of  defeat  and  dis- 
integration, it  might  have  gone  down  to  posterity 
as  an  appropriate  monument  to  the  man  who  first 
proclaimed  belief  in  the  ultimate  possibility  of  bridg- 
ing the  gulf  between  East  and  West.  At  the  native 
memorial  shrines  all  his  greed  of  gain  is  condoned, 
his  failures  forgiven,  and  only  his  virtues  remem- 
bered ; but  the  Krupp  statue  cannot  fail  to  remind 
even  the  most  sympathetic  and  tolerant  of  the  fatal 
defect  which  stultified  all  Li  Hung-chang’s  pro- 
gressive schemes  and  brought  him  in  old  age  to 
humiliation. 

On  November  7th,  1901,  at  the  age  of  seventy- 
eight,  Li  died,  as  he  had  lived,  bearing  the  brunt  of 
his  country’s  affliction  and  mistakes — a pathetic  but 
very  dignified  figure,  manfully  striving  to  save  some- 
thing from  the  wreck  of  Tzu  Hsi’s  fortunes,  to  abate 
something  of  the  vengeful  demands  of  the  Powers. 
He  died  as  he  had  lived,  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle, 
wearing  his  heavy  harness  with  indomitable  courage. 
Pierre  Loti,  who  saw  him  in  his  squalid  quarters  in 
Gold  Fish  Lane  shortly  before  his  death,  draws  a 
striking  picture  of  Li  amidst  the  abomination  of 
desolation  left  by  the  Boxers  in  Peking.  It  is  a picture 
in  which  the  heroic  quality  of  the  man  stands  out  in 
clear  relief.  For  the  Empress  who  had  failed  to  listen 
to  his  advice,  he  fought  with  grim  tenacity,  against 
heavy  odds,  using  every  art  and  craft  of  his  diplo- 


THE  HUMAN  EQUATION 


3ii 

macy  to  create  dissensions  amongst  the  Plenipoten- 
tiaries, and  all  with  the  knowledge  of  a mortal  illness 
upon  him.  Even  on  his  deathbed  he  fought  on, 
resisting  Russia’s  claims  that  he  should  pay  her  price 
of  “ friendship  ” by  signing  away  the  Manchurian 
provinces.  Finally,  having  made  an  honourable 
peace  for  her  Majesty  and  prepared  the  way  for  her 
return  to  Peking  and  power,  he  died,  regretting  only 
that  he  could  not  live  to  see  the  Old  Buddha  once 
again.  Rightly  might  that  Imperial  lady  mourn  his 
decease  and  order  the  Princes  her  kinsmen  to  pour 
valedictory  libations  to  his  spirit  on  behalf  of  the 
Throne  ; for,  whatever  his  faults,  Li  was  ever  the 
embodiment  of  active  and  unswerving  loyalty. 

The  ship  of  China’s  State  had  become  water-logged, 
her  compasses  unstable  and  her  crew  unnerved,  long 
before  Li  was  called  upon  to  take  the  helm.  More 
than  once,  by  sheer  skill  of  pilotage,  he  brought  her 
into  safe  anchorage,  through  reefs  and  shoals  of 
strange  waters  ; more  than  once  he  found  the  men 
and  means  to  caulk  her  leaking  timbers  and  mend  her 
battered  sails.  But  the  fierce  winds  that  burst  upon 
her  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  had  left 
her  hopelessly  unseaworthy,  unfit  to  navigate  the 
perilous  seas  of  change.  The  best  of  pilots  with  the 
best  of  luck  might  defer,  but  could  never  finally  avert, 
the  day  of  dissolution  : what  China  needed  was  a 
master-builder,  and  the  task  was  beyond  the  power 
of  man  or  super-man.  Li  left  the  ship  of  State  in 
many  respects  better  than  he  found  her  ; for  years, 
by  lavish  use  of  paint  and  bunting,  he  gave  her  a 
brave  outward  show  of  seaworthiness  ; nearly  all 
that  her  officers  learned  of  navigation  in  uncharted 
seas  they  learned  from  him.  More  than  once  he  was 


312 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


compelled  by  stress  of  weather  to  jettison  some  of 
her  cargo,  both  territory  and  sovereign  rights,  and 
on  such  occasions,  no  doubt,  he  was  unduly  mindful 
of  his  private  goods  and  ventures.  But,  when  all 
is  said  and  done,  he  was  the  best  and  bravest  steers- 
man in  the  Empire,  and  for  thirty  years  kept  the  ship 
in  commission  under  the  Dragon  flag.  With  his 
passing  from  the  scene,  there  was  no  strong  hand  to 
take  the  helm.  To-day,  the  ancient  craft  lies  water- 
logged and  helpless,  encompassed  by  new  perils  of 
internal  strife  and  foreign  aggression  ; and  many  of 
her  crew,  remembering  Li  Hung-chang’s  Ulysses 
voice  of  wise  counsel,  do  reverence  to  his  wisdom. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 


Readers  who  may  desire  more  detailed  informa- 
tion than  can  be  given  in  the  present  work  concerning 
particular  features  or  phases  of  China’s  history  during 
the  period  under  review  will  find  it  by  reference  to 
the  works  named  in  the  following  brief  list  : — 

The  condition  of  affairs  in  China  at  the  time  of  the  first 
wars  with  England  is  described  in  Sir  George  Staunton’s 
“The  British  Embassy  to  Peking,”  2 vols.  (1797);  Henry 
Ellis’s  “ Journal  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Embassy  to 
China  ” (1817)  ; the  Rev.  Charles  Gutzlaff’s  “ China  Opened,” 
2 vols.  (Smith,  Elder  & Co.,  1838)  ; Commander  Hall’s 
“ Voyages  of  the  Nemesis ,”  1840-43  (London,  1845). 

The  results  of  these  wars  and  the  beginning  of  China’s 
diplomatic  and  commercial  relations  with  foreign  Powers  are 
recorded  in  Laurence  Oliphant’s  “ The  Earl  of  Elgin’s  Mission 
to  China  and  Japan,  1857-59,”  2 vols.  (Blackwood,  1859), 
and  in  Wingrove  Cooke’s  “ China  and  Lower  Bengal  ” (1861). 
Boulger’s  “History  of  China,”  3 vols.  (1881),  gives  a useful 
summary  of  the  Empire’s  history,  as  recorded  by  Chinese 
writers. 

T.  T.  Meadows  in  “ The  Chinese  and  their  Rebellions  ” 
(Smith,  Elder  & Co.,  1856)  analyses  the  permanent  causes 
of  Chinese  unrest.  The  same  problem  is  examined  in  the 
present  writer’s  “ Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in 
China”  (Heinemann,  1912).  Mr.  Meadows’s  work  deals  with 
the  origin  and  early  years  of  the  Taiping  rebellion.  The 
principal  events  of  that  long-drawn  civil  strife  will  be  found 
recorded  in  Wilson’s  “ Gordon’s  Campaigns  and  the  Taiping 
Rebellion”  (1868)  and  in  Hake’s  “The  Story  of  Chinese 
Gordon,”  2 vols.  (Remington  & Co.,  1884-85). 

For  the  constitution  of  the  Chinese  Government,  its  methods 
of  administration,  and  the  organisation  of  its  bureaucracy, 
the  reader  should  consult  W.  F.  Mayers’s  “ The  Chinese 


3H 


LI  HUNG-CHANG 


Government,”  3rd  edition  (Kelly  & Walsh,  Ltd.,  Shanghai, 
1897);  also  H.  B.  Morse’s  “The  Trade  and  Administration 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  ” (Kelly  & Walsh,  Ltd.,  Shanghai, 
1908).  A very  complete  account  of  the  Empire’s  foreign 
relations,  covering  practically  the  whole  period  of  Li  Hung- 
chang’s  public  activities,  is  given  in  Cordier’s  “ Histoire  des 
Relations  de  la  Chine,”  3 vols.  (Felix  Alcan,  Paris,  1902). 
Another  most  important  work,  dealing  with  the  same  subject 
from  the  point  of  view  of  British  diplomacy  and  commerce, 
is  Alex.  Michie’s  “ The  Englishman  in  China,”  2 vols.  (Black- 
wood, 1900).  A curious  book,  of  considerable  historical 
interest,  is  Johannes  von  Gumpach’s  “Treaty  Rights  of  the 
Foreign  Merchant  in  China  ” (Shanghai,  1875).  The  best 
collection  of  the  Treaties  and  Conventions  made  with  or 
concerning  China  and  Korea  is  that  compiled  by  W.  W.  Rock- 
hill  and  published  by  the  Government  Printing  Office  at 
Washington,  2 vols.  (1904  and  1908). 

Information  concerning  the  Reform  movement  of  1898 
and  the  events  leading  directly  to  the  Boxer  rising  of  1900 
will  be  found  in  “ China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,”  by 
Backhouse  and  Bland  (Heinemann,  1910).  “ The  Chinese 

Crisis  from  Within,”  by  “ Wen  Ching  ” (Grant  Richards, 
1901),  gives  an  interesting  account  of  Young  China’s  aims 
and  methods  as  understood  by  a Europeanised  Cantonese.  See 
also  the  Rev.  Arthur  Smith’s  “ China  in  Convulsion  ” (New 
York,  1901).  Sir  Robert  Hart’s  “ These  from  the  Land  of 
Sinim  ” is  valuable  chiefly  because  of  the  light  which  it  throws 
on  the  personality  of  its  distinguished  author  in  his  plea  for 
leniency  towards  China  in  the  hour  of  her  humiliation. 

Professor  R.  K.  Douglas’s  “Li  Hung-chang  ” (1895)  gives 
a broad  outline  of  the  Viceroy’s  career  up  to  the  time  of  the 
Japanese  war.  Mrs.  Archibald  Little’s  work  under  the  same 
title  will  be  found  to  contain  much  interesting  detail,  gathered 
on  the  spot  by  a fair-minded  and  sympathetic  observer. 

Finally,  as  works  of  permanent  interest  and  value,  the 
following  should  be  consulted  : — Sir  Valentine  Chirol’s  “ The 
Far  Eastern  Question”  (Macmillan,  1896);  Professor  H.  A. 
Giles’s  “ Chinese  Biographical  Dictionary  ” (1897)  and  “ China 
and  the  Chinese  ” (1902)  ; Professor  Douglas’s  “ China  ” 
(1899) ; and  Pere  Richard’s  “ Comprehensive  Geography  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  ” (Shanghai,  1908). 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE 


1 793.  Lord  Macartney’s  embassy  to  the  Court  of  Ch’ien 
Lung  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of  British 
trade  in  China. 

1795.  Emperor  Ch’ien  Lung  succeeded  by  his  son  Chia 
Ch’ing. 

1799.  Increasing  signs  of  unrest  and  rebellion  in  Southern 
China. 

1816.  Lord  Amherst’s  embassy  to  the  Court  of  Chia  Ch’ing. 
1821.  Emperor  Chia  Ch’ing  succeeded  by  Tao  Kuang. 
1821-30.  Anti-dynastic  risings  spread  in  Southern  and 
Western  China. 

1823.  Li  Hung-chang  born. 

1830.  First  railway  in  England. 

1834.  East  India  Company’s  monopoly  in  China  trade 

abolished. 

1835.  Lord  Napier  sent  to  Canton  as  Superintendent  of 

Trade. 

,,  Yehonala  (subsequently  Empress  Dowager  Tzu  Hsi) 
born. 

1837.  Accession  of  Queen  Victoria. 

1838.  First  English  telegraph  line  completed. 

1839.  British  merchants’  opium  at  Canton  handed  over  to 

Chinese  authorities  and  destroyed. 

1840-2.  First  war  between  Great  Britain  and  China. 

1841.  Canton  taken.  Cession  of  Hongkong  to  Great  Britain. 

1842.  Treaty  of  Nanking.  Shanghai  and  four  other  ports 

opened  to  foreign  trade. 

1847.  Li  Hung-chang  passes  Metropolitan  Graduate  Exami- 

nation. 

1848.  Revolutions  in  Europe. 

1850.  Emperor  Tao  Kuang  succeeded  by  Hsien  Feng. 

1851.  Taiping  rebellion  assumes  definite  aims  and  force. 

1852.  Tzu  Hsi  becomes  Imperial  concubine  to  Hsien  Feng. 

1853.  Taiping  leader  assumes  title  of  Heavenly  King  at 

Nanking. 


3 1 6 LI  HUNG-CHANG 

1854.  First  Treaty  with  Japan  signed  by  Commodore  Perry , 
U.S.N. 

1854-5.  Crimean  War. 

1856.  Tzu  Hsi  gives  birth  to  son  (later,  Emperor  T’ung 

Chih). 

1857.  Second  war  between  Great  Britain  and  China. 

1858.  Lord  Elgin  concludes  Treaty  of  Tientsin. 

1857-8.  Indian  Mutiny. 

1859.  Chinese  Government  repudiates  Treaty  and  renews 

hostilities. 

1860.  Capture  of  Peking  by  Anglo-French  forces.  Flight 

of  Court  to  Jehol.  Treaty  of  Tientsin  ratified. 
Opium  trade  legalised.  Mr.  (later  Sir)  Frederick 
Bruce  first  British  Minister  at  Peking. 

,,  Russia  acquires  from  China  cession  of  territory  north 
of  the  Amur  and  between  Ussuri  and  the  Pacific. 

1861.  Death  of  Emperor  Hsien  Feng.  Tzu  Hsi  becomes 

Empress  Dowager  and  Joint  Regent. 

„ Emancipation  of  Russian  serfs. 

1861-5.  American  Civil  War. 

1862.  Li  Hung-chang,  engaged  in  operations  against  Taiping 

rebels,  becomes  Governor  of  Kiangsu. 

1863  (March).  “Chinese”  Gordon  succeeds  Burgevine  in 

command  of  “ Ever-victorious  Army.” 

,,  (Dec.).  Gordon  quarrels  with  Li  Hung-chang  on 

account  of  latter’s  treacherous  killing  of  rebel 
chiefs. 

1864  (May).  Rebellion  waning;  “Ever-victorious  Army” 

disbanded. 

„ (June).  Capture  of  Nanking  by  Imperialists.  End  of 
the  rebellion. 

1865.  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  succeeds  Sir  Frederick  Bruce 
as  British  Minister  at  Peking. 

,,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  appointed  British  Minister  to 
Japan. 

1870.  Tientsin  massacre.  Li  Hung-chang  becomes  Viceroy 

of  Chihli. 

,,  Mr.  Thomas  Wade  succeeds  Sir  R.  Alcock  as  British 
Minister. 

1870-1.  Franco-German  War. 

1871.  Occupation  of  Kuldja  (Ili)  by  Russia. 

1 872.  End  of  regency.  Emperor  T’ung  Chih  attains  majority. 
,,  Mahomedan  rebellion  in  Yunnan.  Revolt  of  Yakub 

Beg  in  Kashgaria. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE 


3i7 


1875.  Death  of  T’ung  Chih.  Tzu  Hsi,  aided  by  Li  Hung- 

chang,  contrives  illegal  succession  of  infant  Kuang 
Hsu. 

,,  Murder  of  Mr.  Margary  (H.M.  Consular  Service)  in 
Yunnan. 

1876.  Chefoo  Convention  negotiated  between  Li  Hung-chang 

and  Sir  Thomas  Wade. 

,,  Independence  of  Korea  recognised  by  China’s  Treaty 
with  Japan. 

1876- 7.  First  Chinese  railway  (Shanghai-Woosung)  laid; 

subsequently  pulled  up  by  Chinese  authorities. 

1877.  Mahomedan  rebellion  suppressed  by  Tso  Tsung-tang. 

Kashgaria  reconquered. 

1877- 8.  Great  famine  in  Shantung  and  Shansi. 

1879.  Treaty  of  Livadia  (concerning  Kuldja)  signed  by 

Ch’ung  Hou. 

1880.  Difficulties  with  Russia.  Gordon  revisits  North 

China. 

1881.  Treaty  of  Livadia  amended  and  ratified. 

„ Tientsin-Shanhaikwan  railway  line  begun  (finished 

,i894)-  . 

„ First  Chinese  telegraph  line  laid,  between  Peking  and 
Tientsin. 

1882.  Difficulties  with  Japan  concerning  Korea. 

,,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  appointed  British  Minister  at  Peking. 

1883.  Difficulties  with  France  concerning  Tonquin. 

1884.  War  with  France.  Li  Hung-chang  negotiates  Four- 

nier Convention. 

1885.  Li  Hung-chang  and  Count  Ito  negotiate  convention 

providing  modus  vivendi  in  Korea. 

,,  Admiralty  Board  established  at  Peking. 

1886.  China  recognises  British  sovereignty  in  Burmah. 

1889.  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu  attains  majority  and  assumes 

government. 

1890.  Constitution  promulgated  by  Mikado. 

1892.  Death  of  Li  Hung-chang’s  wife. 

1894.  War  with  Japan.  China  defeated.  Li  Hung-chang 
removed  from  Viceroyalty  of  Chihli. 

„ Revision  0/  Treaties  in  Japan  restores  judicial  autonomy. 

1895  (April).  Li  Hung-chang  negotiates  Treaty  of  Shimo- 
noseki. 

1896.  Russia  obtains  rights  of  railway  construction  through 
Chinese  (Siberian)  territory. 


3i8  LI  HUNG-CHANG 

1896.  Li  Hung-chang,  Envoy  to  Coronation  of  Tzar,  visits 
European  capitals  and  the  United  States. 

1897  (Nov.).  Germany  seizes  Kiaochao  Bay  in  Shantung. 

1898  (March).  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  with  rights  of 

railway  construction  in  Manchuria,  “ leased  ” to 
Russia  by  China. 

,,  Wei-hai-wei  “ leased  ” to  Great  Britain. 

,,  “ Battle  of  Concessions  ” and  spheres  of  influence. 

,,  (Sept.).  Coup  d’etat  at  Peking.  Tzu  Hsi  suppresses 
Reform  movement  and  resumes  regency. 

1899.  United  States  Government  proposes  adherence  of 

Powers  to  policy  of  the  “ open  door.” 

,,  Reactionary  movement  in  China  assumes  form  of 
anti-foreign  agitation. 

,,  Li  Hung-chang  appointed  Viceroy  at  Canton. 
1899-1902.  South  African  War. 

1900.  Boxer  rising.  Peking  Legations  besieged  and  relieved. 

Flight  of  Court  to  Hsian-fu. 

,,  Li  Hung-chang  appointed  peace  negotiator. 

1901.  Death  of  Queen  Victoria. 

„ (Sept.).  Peace  Protocol  signed  at  Peking. 

„ (Oct.).  Court  commences  return  journey  to  Peking. 

,,  (Nov.).  Death  of  Li  Hung-chang. 


INDEX 


Admiralty  affairs  : 77,  101,  164,  230,  247. 

Advisers,  Li’s  foreign  : 229,  296. 

Alcock,  Sir  Rutherford  : 269. 

Amherst,  Lord  : 17. 

Ancestor  worship  : 7,  100. 

Ancestral  home  of  Li  family  : 38,  40,  61,  124,  234,  285,  309. 

Anglo- Japanese  alliance  : 198. 

Anhui  clan  : 252,  257. 

Annals  and  edicts  : 29,  34,  45. 

Annam  : Vide  Tongking  question  ; King  of,  145-7. 

Anti-Manchu  movement : 23,  69,  100,  125,  185,  257,  261. 

An  Wei-chiin,  Censor  : 103,  108,  174. 

Anzer,  Bishop  : 272-3. 

Arms,  trade  in  : 236. 

Army,  Chinese  : 226,  235  et  seq. 

Arsenal,  Hsiku  : 237  ; Nanking,  226,  300  ; Tientsin,  230-1. 

“ Awakening  of  China  ” : 235,  263,  309. 

Bacninh,  Capture  of  by  French  : 144,  149. 

“ Battle  of  Concessions  ” (1898)  : 171,  198. 

Biographers  of  Li  : 30. 

“ Bismarck  of  the  East  ” : 283. 

“ Black  flags  ” in  Tongking  : 145,  151. 

Board  of  Admiralty  : 77,  101  ; revenue,  102,  223. 

Bourse,  M.  : 146. 

Boxer  rising  : 13,  26,  89,  93,  96-7,  185,  198,  201-2,  257,  270. 

Brandt,  Herr  von  : 175-6,  178,  272. 

Bright,  Mr.  John  : 215. 

British  Consular  Service  : 215. 

British  policy  and  diplomacy  in  China  : 95,  137,  172,  189,  198,  214-6. 
Brown,  General : 53,  130. 

Brown,  Sir  J.  McLeavy  : 165. 

Bruce,  Sir  Frederick  : 45. 

Bureaucracy,  the  Chinese  : 8,  35,  252. 

Burgevine,  soldier  of  fortune  : 46-7,  50,  52,  82,  224-5,  297. 

Burmah  trade  routes  : 1 36. 


320 


INDEX 


Campbell,  Mr.  J.  D.  : 154. 

Canton,  early  trade  at : 16. 

Cantonese  revolutionaries  : 26,  99,  107,  253,  257-8,  264,  274. 

Cassini,  Count : 181-3,  187,  1 99>  212. 

Censorate,  the  Chinese  : 6,  1 1 , 13,  88,  92,  104,  114,  148,  230. 

Centralisation  policy,  Li’s,  25-7,  101,  222. 

Chang  Chih-tung,  Viceroy:  19,  81,  88,  92-3,  110-13,  1 91 , 196,  225,  242) 
263,  286  ; rivalry  of  with  Li,  192,  208. 

Chang  P’ei-lun  : 102,  162,  221,  231,  234,  239,  288. 

Chang  Yin-huan  : 105,  178. 

Chefoo  Convention  : 139-40,  215. 

Chen  Hsiao-chi,  General : 43-7,  52-6. 

Cheng  Ki-tong  : 289. 

Chia  Ch’ing,  Emperor  : 17. 

Chief  Eunuch.  Vide  Li  Lien-ying. 

Ch’ien  Lung,  Emperor  : 7,  10,  17,  189. 

“ China  for  the  Chinese  ” : 1 17,  298. 

“ China  Merchants  ” S.  N.  Co.  : 117,  120,  152. 

Chinese  Civilisation  : 14-15,  24,  29,  281  ; Court,  condition  of,  6,  10,  185  ; 
government,  7,  18,  35. 

Ch’ing,  Prince  : 101,  206-7,  209,  221,  241,  262. 

Chirol,  Sir  Valentine,  quoted  : 171,  284,  287. 

Christianity  in  China  : 265  el  seq. 

Ch’un,  Prince  : 60,  78,  101,  149,  156,  191. 

Ch’ung  Hou,  Envoy  to  Russia  : 60,  112,  132,  190-1. 

Clan  system  : 223,  243,  252,  257. 

Confucianist,  Li  an  orthodox  : 39,  61,  246,  281,  290,  303,  310. 

Cordier,  M.  Henri,  quoted  : 145,  213. 

Coronation  of  Tzar  Nicholas  II.  : 182,  212. 

Coup  d'etat  (1898)  : 185,  254. 

Customs  Service,  Imperial  : 297-9. 

Denby,  Colonel  : 178. 

Detring,  Herr  Gustav  : 31,149,170,227,241,302;  mission  to  Japan,  175, 
J77- 8- 

Douglas,  Professor  : 40,  45. 

Dunn,  Mr.  J.  G.’s  mission  to  Vatican  : 271-2. 

Dynastic  annals  : 29,  30,  34. 


East  India  Company  : 16. 

Eastern  Siberian  Railway  : 183,  198. 

Elgin,  Lord  : 188. 

Emperor  Kuang  Hsu.  Vide  Kuang  Hsu. 

Hmpress  Dowager  (Tzu  Hsi)  : 13,  23,  30,  60,  72,  87,  173,  195,  230  ; protects 
Li,  91-2.  « 80,  207,  243  ; and  Russia,  184,  201;  the  Boxers,  21 1. 


INDEX 


321 


Eunuchs  of  the  Palace  : 12,  77,  94,  99  (also  vide  Li  Lien-ying). 
“ Ever-victorious  ” Army  : 42,  46-55,  86,  187. 

Famine  relief  : 289. 

Feng-sbui  superstition  : 291-2. 

Ferry,  M.  Jules  : 147,153-5. 

Formosa  expedition  by  Japan  : 143. 

Foster,  Hon.  John  W.  : 31,  40,  266,  279. 

Fournier,  Captain  : 146,  150-1. 

Franco-Russian  entente  : 171,198. 

French  policy  in  China  : 144-56,  179,  269-72. 

Freycinet,  M.  de  : 155-6. 

Fukhien  clique  in  Navy  : 223,  229. 


Garnier  expedition  (Annam)  : 144. 

German  Emperor  : 90. 

German  policy  in  China  : 175-6,  179,  270,  272. 

Germany,  Li’s  visit  to  : 65. 

Giers,  M.  de  : 205. 

Gordon,  General,  and  Li  : 5,  37,  44-7,  48-59,  82,  86,  99,  224,  226,  267,  285, 
293,  299  ; advice  to  Chinese  Government,  60,  194. 

Grand  Council : 9,  1 1,  106,  18 1. 

Great  Britain,  first  war  with  China  : 16. 

Gros,  Baron  : 188. 

Gutzlaff,  Rev.  Charles,  quoted  : 17. 


Hanlin  academy  : 39. 

Hanneken,  Herr  von  : 227,  231,  241-4. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert : 13,  31,  55,  59,  70,  90,  100,  132,  138,  151-3,  170,  283,  292 
294,  297,  308;  Inspector-Genera)  of  Customs,  165,  296,  298,  300 
and  Gordon,  194. 

Hay,  Mr.  Secretary  : 205. 

Hayashi,  Baron  : 181. 

Hofei  treasury,  Li  employed  at : 41. 

Hongkong  opium  traffic  : 125,  141. 

Ho  Shen,  Grand  Secretary  : 77,  284. 

Hsien  Feng,  Emperor  : 12,  77. 

Hsu  Tung  : 96. 

Hunanese  clan  : 243,  252,  257. 


Ignatieff,  General : 188. 

Ili.  Vide  Kuldia. 

Impact  of  the  West  on  China  : 27,  74,  128,  252. 
Indian  opium  trade  : 123,  140. 


L.H. 


3 22 


INDEX 


Inouye,  Count : 1 66. 

Inspector-General  of  Customs.  Vide  Hart. 

Irwin,  Dr.  : 67,  302. 

Ito,  Admiral  : 234. 

Ito,  Count  (later  Prince),  82,  155,  162,  166,  177,  187. 

Japan,  Li  envoy  to  : 179. 

Japanese  policy  in  China:  64,  157-186,  197;  Korea,  168-9;  Legation  at 
Seoul  burned,  159,  165. 

Jung  Lu  : 206,  262. 

Kaiping  coal  mines  : 12 1. 

Kang  Yi  : 96. 

K’ang  Yu-wei : 230,  253,  256-9,  262. 

Kashgaria  : 143,  189-90. 

Kiaochao,  seizure  of  : 270. 

Korea  : 64,  78,  131,  158,  161-9,  23°>  29$- 
Kovalesky,  Colonel  : 189. 

Kowsbing , S.S.,  sinking  of  : 230. 

Krupp’s  firm  and  Li  : 176,  178,  231,  309-10. 

Kuang  Hsii,  Emperor:  13,  24,  98,  170,  173,  253;  and  Li  Hung-chang, 
182;  and  reformers,  185,  262. 

Kublai  Khan,  Court  of  : 16. 

Kuldja  question  : 60,  112,  167,  189,  195. 

Kung,  Prince:  101,  145-6,  149,  175,  194,  241,  262;  supports  Li,  1 8 1 . 
Kuo  Min-tang  party  : 24,  71,  258  n. 

Lang,  Captain,  R.N.  : 221,  223,  227,  300. 

Langson,  defeat  of  French  at  : 1 51,  154. 

Lay,  Mr.  H.  N.  : 300. 

Lay-Osborn  flotilla.  Vide  Sherard-Osborn. 

Legations,  siege  of  (1900) : 205. 

Lessar,  M.,  Russian  Minister  : 209. 

Liang  Ch’i-ch’ao  : 100,  260,  277. 

Liang  Mao-t’ing  : 298. 

Liang  Shih-yi  : 122. 

Liang  T’un-yen  : 258,  277. 

Liaotung  Peninsula  : 114,  180-1,  198. 

Li  Chao-ching  : 67. 

Li  Ching-ch’u  : 70. 

Li  Ching-fang  (Lord  Li) : 63,  67,  70,  105,  119,  124,  174. 

Li  Ching-hsi  : 68-70. 

Li  Ching-mai : 68. 

Li  Ching-shu  : 70. 

Li  Han-chang,  Viceroy  : 62,  65,  72,  138,  221. 


INDEX 


323 


Li  Hung-chang  : alleged  ambitions  to  throne,  99  ; anti-foreign  at  heart, 
257 ; antiquity,  reverence  for,  290,  295  ; appointed  to  Tsung-li 
Yamen,  95  ; avarice  of,  46,  51,  172,  281,  285  ; belief  in  superiority 
of  Chinese  civilisation,  27,  29,  21 1,  255,  268,  278;  bon-vivant, 
73  ; Boxers,  attitude  towards  the,  202  ; character  of,  59,  71-74, 
80,  91,  155,  203,  278,  283  ; Christianity,  attitude  towards,  264-5 
el  seq  ; commercial  enterprises  of,  116-7,  120-2  ; common  sense  of, 
278,  291  ; compared  with  colleagues,  19,  111  ; Confucianist,  ortho- 
dox, 39,  136,  255,  262,  281  ; courage  of,  moral,  263,  304;  death 
of,  310;  denounced  by  censors,  103,  174,  192;  diary,  none  kept 
by,  33)  diplomacy  of,  25,  42,  50,  69,  74,  77,  84,  126,  134,  138, 
160,  170,  177,  184,  187,  293  5 educational  policy,  263  ; Empress 
Dowager  (Tzu  Hsi),  relations  with,  60,  79,  87,  91-2,  98,  100,  102, 
109,  1 1 5,  1 1 8,  127,  156,  243,  257,  263,  310;  points  of  resemblance 
t0,  25>  51;  73)  245>  255)  276>  282,  287,  301  ; envoy  to  Japan,  179, 
235  ; facial  paralysis,  smitten  with,  73  ; family  life,  66,  71,  73, 
302  ; filial  piety,  of,  38,  64,  66,  71  ; fiscal  policy,  25-6  ; foreigners, 
attitude  towards,  203,  212,  296-7;  appreciation  of,  37,  85,  136, 
254,  258  ; distrust  of,  19,  46,  127,  257,  296-7,  301  ; foreign-drilled 
troops  of,  235;  fortitude  in  adversity,  1 1 6,  173,  179,  234,  282, 
302-3;  France,  relations  with,  64,  no,  1 3 1 , 144-156;  Gordon, 
General,  relations  with,  5,  37,  45-60,  226,  285,  293,  297,  299 ; 
Governor  of  Kiangsu,  42,  61,  83,  222  ; his  father,  38  ; brothers, 
38,  65  ; first  wife,  38  ; second,  61,  73  ; mother,  62-5  ; sons,  68  ; 
honours  conferred  on,  78,  175,  182  ; in  disgrace,  95,  181,  243, 
282;  Grand  Councillor,  181  ; “Indispensable  Man,”  the,  126-49, 
192  ; industry  and  energy  of,  279  ; influence  on  contemporaries, 
22,  24,  247,  276-7;  Japan,  relations  with,  64,  no,  131-2,  143,  157 
et  seq.,  183;  jealousy  of  Hart  and  Gordon,  297-301;  journalists, 
relations  with,  89,  214,  228,  238  ; journey  abroad  (1896),  28,  67, 
182,  21 1,  244  ; Krupp’s,  relations  with,  176,  231,  309  ; law  and  order, 
respect  for,  1 1 1,  135,  202,  254  ; Li  Lien-ying  (Chief  Eunuch),  relations 
with,  12,  77,  243,  288;  literary  achievements  of,  31,  34,  39,  159, 
294  ; loyalty  to  the  throne,  22,  97,  100,  245,  254,  281,  311  ; memorials 
to  the  throne,  6,  20,  29,  47,  56,  62,  78,  81,  83,  135,  142,  156,  202, 
206-7,  23°)  268,  304  ; memory,  retentive,  of,  39,  81,  278  ; military 
and  naval  career,  39-41,  43,  51  -77,  82,  225,  241,  245  ; reorganisation 
and  reforms,  77,  89,  115,  173,  194,  217-50,  254,  284;  missionaries, 
relations  with,  136,  265  et  seq.;  Navy,  vide  Admiralty;  official 
career  of,  76,  79,  82,  94,  216  ; opium-growing  by,  123  ; oppor- 
tunism of,  255,  309;  pacific  and  conciliatory  policy  of,  88,  in, 
113,  119,  126,  145,  169,  195,  283;  palace  examination,  passes,  3, 
39  ; peace  plenipotentiary  (1900),  205  ; physical  strength  and 
vitality,  37,  73,  116,  128  ; political  reformer,  as,  20,  25,  101,  253,  263  ; 
racial  pride  of,  292,  297  ; railways,  policy  re,  122,  291  ; reformers, 
and,  274;  Russia,  relations  with,  22,  46,  59,  109,  112,  174,  183, 
1 92-2  n ; seventieth  birthday  of,  79,  113;  Shanghai,  at,  202-3; 
shot  by  Japanese  fanatic,  73,  179;  statecraft  of,  25,  51,  167,202, 
210,217,251,255,304;  superstitions,  277,290-1;  Taiping  rebellion, 
suppression  of,  19,  39,  43-5,  86  ; tolerant  philosophy  of,  37,  62, 
72,  258  ; tour  round  the  world,  182,  211,  214,  244;  venality  and 
nepotism  of,  21,  23-4,  44,  91,  119,  219-21,  224,  236,  243,  246,  284, 
288,  309  ; Viceroy  of  Canton,  95,  263  ; Chihli,  61-3,  72,  77,  87, 


324 


INDEX 


134,  178,  213,  222,  288  ; Hukuang,  6r,  83  ; wealth  of,  64,  74,  77, 
120,  174,  199,  284;  Young  China,  relations  with,  258;  Yuan 
Shih-h’ai,  relations  with,  24. 

Li  Kuo-chieh  : 70. 

Li  Kuo-yun  : 70. 

Li  Lien-ying  (Chief  Eunuch)  : 12,  33,  77,  94,  joo,  106,  109,  118,  181,  199, 
221,  288  ; and  Russia,  207. 

Lim  Boon-Keng  (“  Wen  Ching  ”)  : 229,  259-62. 

Literati:  3,  6,  16,  21,  81,  114;  class  pride  of,  1 8,  20,  34.  Also  wide 
“ Mandarins.” 

Liu  Hsiieh-hsun  : 204. 

Liu  K’un-yi,  Viceroy  : 19,  22,  93,  196,  260,  284. 

Lobanow,  Prince  : 183,  200. 

Lo  Feng-loh  : 213,  261,  267,  295. 

Loti,  Pierre  : 310. 

Lung  Chi-kuang,  Governor  of  Canton  : 70. 

Macao,  opium  smuggling  at  : 125. 

Macartney,  Earl,  mission  of  : 17. 

Macartney,  Sir  Halliday  : 296,  300. 

McClure,  Captain  : 231,  233. 

MacDonald,  Sir  Claude  : 129,  1 7 1 , 205,  288. 

Ma  Chien-chung  : 159. 

McGiffen,  Captain  : 231. 

Mackenzie,  Dr.  : 66. 

Mahomedan  rebellions  : 61,  190. 

“ Make-believe  ” in  Chinese  politics  : 35,  49,  1 14,  173,  218,  229,  246,  283. 
Manchu  dynasty,  house  laws  of : 12. 

Manchuria,  Russians  in  : 198,  200,  205-6,  208  ; South,  18 1. 

Manchurian  Convention  (Russia)  : 208-9. 

Manchus  and  Chinese  : 10,  24,  36,  94,  96,  100,  125,  181,  185,  241,  243,  253, 
259,  262,  264  ; and  Taiping  rebellion,  9,  19. 

Mandarin  class  and  traditions  : 9,  13-15,  19,  24,  35,  42,  57,  79,  81,  108-9, 
117,  «25,  1 33»  '38,  196,  224>  238,  24',  244,  249,  284,  297>  3‘°- 
Mannix,  Mr.  : 33. 

Marco  Polo  : 16. 

Margary,  murder  of  Mr.  : 136-7,  215. 

Matsushima  flagship  : 232. 

Mayers,  Mr.  W.  F.,  quoted  : 8. 

“ Memoirs,  The,”  of  Li  Hung-chang  : 31,  34,  38,  49,  65,  80,  117,  199,  266, 
279. 

Metropolitan  Boards  : 10,  13. 

Michie,  Alexander,  Mr.,  quoted  : 28,  128,  130,  143,  172,  235,  238,  250,  270 
writings  of,  31,  43,  131,  1 51,  213,  219,  255. 

Middle  Ages,  China  in  the  : 15. 

Missions.  Vide  Christianity. 


INDEX 


325 


Mollendorff,  Baron  von  : 165,  298. 

Mongolia  : 197. 

Morphia  trade  : 123. 

Morrison,  Dr.  E.  G.,  quoted  : 124. 

Moukden  railway  : 291. 

Mouravieff,  Count  : 186,  206. 

Muzart  Pass  : 191,  195. 

Napier,  Lord,  at  Canton  : 16. 

Navy,  Chinese  : 219  et  seq.,  247. 

Nicholas  II.,  Tzar  : 182,  187,  201,  212. 

Nienfei  rebels  : 61-2,  225,  304. 

Official  class.  Vide  Mandarin  class. 

“ Old  Buddha.”  Vide  Empress  Dowager. 

Opium  trade  : 123-5,141. 

Oyama,  General  : 240. 

Parses,  Sir  Harry  : 129,  134,  300. 

Parliament,  Chinese  : 71. 

Patenotre,  M.  : 152. 

Patriarchal  system,  Chinese  : 15,  20,  28,  72,  302. 

Pavlow  (Russian  Minister)  : 205. 

Peace  Protocol  (1901)  : 109,  198,  208-9. 

Peacock’s  feather  decoration  : 77-8,  182,  228. 

Peitang  Cathedral  question  : 271. 

Pei-yang  naval  and  military  administration  : 77,  88,  218,  223,  227. 
Peking,  capture  of  (i860)  : 18,  42. 

Pethick,  Mr.  : 31,  170,  214,  302. 

Pien-ma  frontier  question  : 71, 

Ping-yang,  battle  of  : 240. 

Port  Arthur  : 177,  184-5,  223,  22li  24°- 
Portuguese  navigators  in  China  : 16. 

Press,  the  Chinese  : 253,  284. 

Primorski  province  ceded  to  Russia  : 188. 

Progressive  party,  the  : 253,  264,  294. 

Protet,  Admiral : 46. 

Provincial  autonomy  : 25-7,  218,  222,  236. 

Quinsan,  General  Gordon  captures  : 51. 

Railway  construction  and  concessions  : 122,  291. 

Rampolla,  Cardinal : 272. 

Rebel  chiefs,  massacre  of  : 45,  51-7. 

Reform  movement  (1898)  : 93,  99,  185,  253-4,  259-61,  274. 

Republic  and  Parliament : 24,  252,  256. 


326 


INDEX 


Revolution  of  1911  : 10,  67,  275. 

Riviere,  Captain  : 144. 

Rochechouart,  M.  de  : 133. 

Roman  Catholic  missions,  French  protectorate  of  : 270,  273. 

Russia  occupies  Port  Arthur  : 184-5. 

Russian  policy  in  China  : 46,  60,  no,  131,  171,  179-183,  192-21 1 ; inter- 
vention against  Japan,  179-80. 

Russo-Chinese  bank  : 183,  200. 

Russo-Japanese  entente  : 184,  201  ; war,  264. 

Salt  Gabelle  : 1 24. 

Seoul.  Vide  Korea. 

Siberian  railway  : 196,  200. 

Shanghai,  Li  at  : 202-3. 

Shan-hai-kuan  railway  : 209. 

Shao  Yu-lien  : 105. 

Shen  Pao-chen  : 247. 

Sheng  Hsiian-huai  (Sheng  Kung-pao)  : 34,  121-2,  171,  204,  239,  241,  243, 
289. 

Sherard-Osborn  flotilla  : 25,  101,  129,  222,  300. 

Shimonoseki,  Li  at  : 73,  155  ; Treaty  of,  103,  no. 

Siccawei,  statue  to  Li  at  : 309. 

Social  conditions  in  China  : 3,  37,  281. 

Soochow,  capture  of  : 43,  45,  51-7  ; massacre  of  Wangs,  45,  51-7. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  quoted  : 1,  287. 

“ Squeeze  ” system  : 91,  236,  243,  289,  310. 

Staveley,  General : 45-6. 

Struggle  for  life  in  China  : 281. 

Sun  Yat-sen  : 23,  67,  253,  256,  277. 

Suzerainty,  Chinese,  over  Korea  : 168,  298. 

Taiping  rebellion  : 3-5,  18,  35,  40-1,  43-58,  61,  187. 

Tang  Shao-yi  : 258,  261,  277,  298-9. 

Tientsin,  Li’s  medical  school  at:  258;  massacre,  132,  137  municipality 
banquet  to  Li  : 182. 

Tientsin-Shanhaikuan  railway  : 122. 

Times,  The,  quoted  : 171,  237. 

Ting,  Admiral  : 227,  229-34. 

Ting  Ju-chang  : 104. 

Tongking  question  (and  Annam)  : 64,  92,  131,  144,  146-7,  150-6. 

Treaty,  Li-Ito  (1885)  : 166;  of  Livadia,  112,  167,  192-3,  195  ; Nanking, 

18  ; secret,  with  Russia  (1896),  183,  200,  205  ; of  Shimonoseki,  26, 
93,  103,  no,  179-81  ; of  Tientsin,  83,  85,  135,  139,  269. 

Tricou  : 17,  147-9. 

Tsen  Yu-ying,  Viceroy  : 137. 

Tseng  Chi-tse,  Marquis  : 144-9,  I93< 


INDEX 


327 


Tseng,  Kuo-fan,  Viceroy  : 5,  41,  44,  81,  109,  132,  225,  304. 

Tso  Pao-kuei,  General  : 240. 

Tsingtao  : 70. 

Tso  Tsung-tang,  Viceroy:  22,  60,  92,  no,  152,  195,  304;  in  Kashgaria, 
190. 

Tsung-li  Yamen  : 9,  83,  95,  133,  142,  144-6,  153. 

Tuan,  Prince  : 96,  202,  206,  257. 

T’ung  Chih,  Emperor  : 98. 

Turkestan,  Russian  : 190. 

Tyler,  Captain  : 231,  233. 

Tsarevitch  in  China  : 197. 

Tzu  Hsi.  Vide  Empress  Dowager. 

United  States  policy  in  China  : 204,  206. 

Vatican,  the,  and  Li : 271-3. 

Vlangaly,  Russian  Minister  : 190. 

Wade,  Sir  Thomas  : 137,  19 1. 

Wai-wu-pu,  established  : 9. 

Wang  Chih-ch’un  : 182. 

Wang  Wen-shao  : 178,  210. 

War  with  France  : 92,  no,  237  ; Japan,  92,  169,  286. 

Ward,  commander  of  “ Ever-Victorious  ” Army  : 42,  82. 

Wei  Ju-kuei,  General : 104,  239. 

Wei-hai-wei,  naval  harbour  : 223,  227,  232  ; surrender  of,  233-4. 

“ Wen  Ching.”  Vide  Lim  Boon-Keng. 

Weng  Tung-ho  : 115,  182,  260,  262. 

“ Western  Learning  ” : 253,  259,  273,  294. 

Witte,  Count  de  : 187,  199. 

Wu  Ting-fang  : 23,  206,  261,  277,  295.  # 

Yakub  Bey’s  rebellion  : 189. 

Yalu,  Battle  of  the  : 176,  230,  232. 

Yangtsze,  Viceroy  : 103,  181,  206-8,  260,  263,  275,  284. 

Yeh,  General  : 104. 

Yellow  Jacket,  the  : 175. 

Yellow  Peril,  the  : 90. 

Yellow  River  reclamation  : 289. 

Young  China  ; and  the  Manchus,  23,  93,  95,  181,  201,  253,  262  ; and  the 
Reform  movement,  185,  252,  258-9,264,  274,  294;  revolutionary 
and  republican,  25,  33,  68,  99,  256,  277. 

Yuan  Shih-k’ai  : 24,  26,  69-71,  89,  109,  122,  164,  263,  276;  Resident  in 
Korea,  167-8,  171  ; President  of  the  Republic,  247. 

Yu  Lu,  Tartar  General : 291. 


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